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Showing 1 to 20 of 276 Records
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1989 (3) TMI 404 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... es lead to an inference that someone else might have committed this foul play taking advantage of the failing health of Bhargava and Bhargava himself might have voluntarily agreed to meet good the loss of money fearing for any criminal prosecution. 38. Mr. A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of R-1 has alleged that there is no evidence to prove the conspiracy and the absence of identification parade is detrimental to the prosecution. We have already dealt with the similar argument in the earlier part of this judgment, and so it is unnecessary for us to reiterate the same. 39. For the reasons hereinbefore mentioned, we hold that the impugned order of acquittal passed by the High Court is neither erroneous nor perverse nor improper and unreasonable resulting in miscarriage of justice and this is not a fit case for interference in exercise of the powers of this Court vested under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 40. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 403 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f persons falling into this category are not more than live. In the rejoinder filed on behalf of the Government, it is staled that the Government made some orders extending the period for individuals to pass the examination on administrative grounds or on some genuine hardships. It is also stated that such orders were made upon recommendations by the respective departments and those persons passed the examination within the period extended. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of these statements made in the rejoinder. The power to relax the conditions of the rules to avoid undue hardship in any case or class of cases cannot now be gainsaid. It would be, therefore, futile for the respondents to make any grievance. 14. In the result and for the reasons stated, we allow these appeals and in reversal of the judgment of the High Court, we dismiss the writ petitions filed by the contesting respondents. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (3) TMI 402 - KERELA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the solemnization of marriage had voluntary sexual intercourse with the second respondent. The only evidence in support of the plea is that of P.W. 1 the power of attorney holder of the petitioner examined on 4-2-1984. The records do not show that the respondents had notice of the posting of the case on that date. The case was actually posted for trial on 22-7-1984. The trial had been advanced to 4-2-1984 and an ex parte decree is passed against the respondents on 8-2-1984. The respondents had thus no opportunity to cross-examine P.W. 1 and to adduce evidence on their behalf. The decree appealed against cannot, therefore, be sustained. It is accordingly set aside and the case is remanded to the lower Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the directions and observations contained in this judgment The parties will appear before the Court below on 3-4-1989. The appeal is allowed as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs in this appeal.
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1989 (3) TMI 401 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s position is also apparent. It is not necessary in the facts of this case to go into the question whether these documents were relevant or material. 4. In view of the fact that the copies of the documents were, in fact, supplied at the request of the appellant, but the copies supplied were illegible, we are of the opinion, that the safeguards provided by the Constitution have not been followed. In that view of the matter the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained and, therefore, is set aside. The order of detention dated June 9, 1988 is quashed and the appellant be set at liberty unless he is required in respect of any other proceedings. 5. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1989 (3) TMI 400 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s above. There will be no order as to costs. 39. We kept it on record that, we have not separately dealt with the facts in the case of Bepin yora v. West Bengal Housing Board & Ors., FMA No. 851 of 1987, since the facts and point of law involved there are the same as in this appeal of Kanchan Vora. Thus, the order which we have proposed. that will also given the case of Bepin Vora. Consequent to the order which we propose, we then dispose of the cross-objections as filed. On the prayers of Mr. Das, we decide that the order which we propose to day, shall be kept in abeyance for eight weeks. He has agreed that his client will duly comply with the terms and conditions as indicated earlier, within four weeks. We further decide that if such compliance is made, by two weeks of the said compliance, the authorities should decide the matter in terms of the directions and then till eight weeks form today, status quo as on today, be maintained. Sudhanshu Shekhar Ganguly, J. I agree.
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1989 (3) TMI 399 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the petitioner furnished untrue facts with regard to the material particulars within the meaning of Section 18. As I have already stated, in my opinion, the scope of jurisdiction of a writ Court does not go to the extent of examining materials independently in coming to an independent conclusion on a question of fact. 12. So far as the question of bona fide is concerned, in my opinion that is not material in the present case. If there is an under-invoicing, that is, if the petitioner has not shown the correct export value, then the declaration is not correct and there is a violation of Section 18. Whether they have acted bona fide or not is immaterial. In any event whether the person has acted bona fide or not is not a pure question of law and at this stage this Court cannot hold that the petitioners have acted bona fide. 13. For the aforesaid reasons I dismiss this application and discharge the Rule. There will be no order as to costs. Interim orders if any are vacated.
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1989 (3) TMI 398 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... claim this deduction following the mercantile system of accounting for this particular year. 4. The finding of the Tribunal is that the final settlement was communicated to the assessee immediately after the close of this accounting period and as the accounts for this year were still open, a provision was made for this liability. The Tribunal held that such a provision had rightly been made and should be allowed as a deduction 5. In view of this finding of the Tribunal, the question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. -I agree.
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1989 (3) TMI 397 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d. The judgment passed by the High Court as well as by the by the first appellate court is set aside We remand the matter back to the first appellate court as that court had disposed of the appeal treating it to have been rendered infructuous We therefore direct that the learned IInd Additional District Judge, Nagpur before whom the appeal was filed will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law. 14. A suggestion was made by the counsel for the appellant about some tests and willingness of the appellant for getting those test performed which could be used as additional evidence in respect of the paternity of the child born to the appellant which has been made a ground for declaration of marriage as nullity. Without expressing any opinion, it would be appropriate for the lower appellate court to consider the matter if parties approach about additional evidence. The appellant shall be entitled to costs of this appeal. Costs quantified at ₹ 2500/-.
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1989 (3) TMI 396 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nding to the effect that the books; of account were not produced with ulterior motives in order to evade the payment of tax and in fact in my opinion the Tribunal has not dealt with this aspect of the matter but has only referred to certain decisions without mentioning the facts of those cases and also the principles laid down therein. Learned counsel for the revenue has not been successful in repelling the submissions made on behalf of the assessee. After hearing the counsel for the parties and carefully perusing the order of the Tribunal I am of opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 4. In the result the revision succeeds in part and is allowed to that extent. The order of the Tribunal to that extent is set aside and it is, directed to decide the appeal afresh accepting the books of account as correct. Parties shall bear their own costs. 5. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under Section 11 (8) of the Act.
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1989 (3) TMI 395 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... such a view could be advocated in a film. To say that one should not be permitted to advocate that view goes against the first principle of our democracy. 50. We end here as we began on this topic. Freedom of expression which is legitimate and constitutionally protected, cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people. The fundamental freedom under Article 19(1)(a) can be reasonably restricted for the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) and the restriction must be justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicksand of convenience of expediency. Open criticism of Government policies and operations is not a ground for restricting expression. We must practice tolerance to the views of others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democracy as to the person himself. 51. In the result, we allow these appeals, reverse the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions of the respondents. In the circumstances of case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (3) TMI 394 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ts and the circumstances as enumerated in the judgment of the Tribunal in paragraph 4 onwards, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Tribunal is correct. In the premises there is no merit in these appeals. The appeals must fail and are, therefore, dismissed accordingly.
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1989 (3) TMI 393 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he J. & K. Bank Ltd., Calcutta and the petitioners because if what transpired at Calcutta is excluded and has to be excluded in this case for what has been said above the facts are covered by the following observations made in AIR 1938 Mad 129 1938 Cri LJ 261 In the world of business things are often done which are betrayals of confidence and deceptions which arouse moral indignation but are nevertheless civil wrongs which can be righted by Civil Courts and are not crimes which can be punished by a Criminal Court. Not every immoral act is criminal and it is an abuse of the process of a Court to attempt to create new crimes in order to compel men to conform to a high standard of probity in business dealings or to force them to execute their promises. 8. For the foregoing reasons the petition is allowed and the proceedings pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathuna, in which process under Section 420, R.P.C. has been issued, against the accused are quashed.
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1989 (3) TMI 392 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t to make such an award for the extended period of contract. 33. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding the amount of ₹ 2,81,800/- under claim No. 1. The award of the said amount is liable to be deleted from the award. 34. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and the Civil Revision Petition are allowed in part. The amount awarded by the arbitrator under claim No. 1 shall be deleted. It is also held that the arbitrator had no power in law to award interest for the period commencing from the date of award till the date of decree of the Civil Court. However, the respondent-contractor shall be entitled to interest from the date of the decree (i.e., from 19-2-1985) at the rate of 15 per annum, till realisation. We are awarding interest at the rate of 15 per annum since that happens to be the rate which was adopted by the arbitrator in the award. There shall be no order as to costs. 35. Order accordingly.
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1989 (3) TMI 391 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appeal before the appellate Court will hot bar the Court to issue Rule for non-compliance of Court order which is not stayed by the appellate Court or modified by the same Court. 12. In the circumstance, reliance placed by Mr. Khan, CGA, in support of his argument on AIR1960Cal454 will not hold good for the reason time limit having been prescribed under Section 82, CPC for execution of a decree which aspect of the matter had come under discussion in reference to contempt proceedings within the execution period. 13. For the reasons given and observations made, the question framed gets settled and we hold that there is no bar to entertain contempt proceedings or issue Rule during limitation period provided for appeal or even if the appeal against the order is filed and stay is not obtained. 14. We answer the reference, formulated in the form of question, accordingly. 15. The contempt petitions will come up for further orders before the Court early. S.M. Razvi, J. 16. I agree.
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1989 (3) TMI 390 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ions of Section 13(2)." It is highlighted in this connection that in the affidavit- in-reply filed by the respondent No. 1, the detaining authority, he merely denied the specific averments made in para 3(III) that no act prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order on the part of the detenu is alleged to have been committed by the detenu between 14th March to 13th April, 1988 etc. without specifically denying those statements. In this background, a mere bald statement that the detenu who is in jail custody is likely to be released on bail and there are full possibilities that he may continue the above offensive activities without reference to any particular case or acts does not show on the face of the order of detention that there has been subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in making the order of detention in question. We, therefore, quash the order of detention and direct the respondents to set the detenu at liberty forthwith. Y.L. Petition allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 389 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... copy of the earlier grounds of detention was also one of the documents furnished to the detenu in the present case which confirms the fact that the detaining authority has considered the earlier grounds of detention along with other documents for drawing his requisite subjective satisfaction for passing this impugned order. In other words, the earlier grounds of detention dated 2.1. 1987, quashed by the High Court was one of the material documents considered by the detaining authority in drawing his subjective satisfaction. Therefore, we hold that this order of detention is vitiated on the ground that the detaining authority has taken into consideration the grounds of earlier detention order along with other materials f or passing this impugned order. Hence, the order is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we quash the detention order on this ground and direct that the detenu be set at liberty forthwith if his detention is not required for any other case. Petition allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 388 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . 33B of the Act, directing the ITO to revise the order of assessment. The question before the Tribunal was whether the CIT was competent to direct the ITO to modify the order of assessment under s. 18A (8) of the Indian IT Act, 1922. 3. The order of the ITO originally passed stood rectified by the rectification order in appeal, passed by the AAC. That part of the order for charging interest has merged with the order of the AAC. Only operative order on the point of charge of interest was the order of the AAC. At that, stage, the CIT could not intervene and modify the assessment order. CIT cannot pass an order under s. 35B, revising the order passed by the ITO when the order of the ITO about the point in dispute had completely merged in the appellate order and was not in existence in the eye of law. 4. Under these circumstances, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1989 (3) TMI 387 - JAMMU AND KASHMIR HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gs are independent of each other and cannot successfully be argued to point out that they overlap. There is no substance either in the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Board mechanically approved the reasonings given by the ITO as it is simply an argument in futility to say that since the communication is issued through the media of the secretary it cannot be said that the Board has not applied its mind while holding the belief for the approval granted. 8. On totality of the circumstances, we do not find that the notice issued, impugned in the writ petition, calls for any interference at this stage or that the same is either illegal or unconstitutional so as to entertain the writ petition. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed summarily. The interim order passed in CMP/439/86 on 19-3-1986, stands vacated. However, the dismissal of the writ petition will not be as bar to the petitioner to pursue the remedies open to him under law.
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1989 (3) TMI 386 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... st. yrs. 1971-72 and 1972-73 respectively being the estimated amount of interest as income from undisclosed sources on accrual basis ? Reframed question No. 3 Whether the Tribunal has acted perversely by not taking into consideration that relevant facts and materials and/or by failing to take into consideration the relevant materials and evidence ?" 11. The reframed question No. 1 is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The question No. 2 is answered in the following manner Whether the amount of loan has become irrecoverable or not depends on facts and circumstances of the case. It is not necessary for a moneylender to wait till the company actually goes into liquidation before writing off the loan amount or to consider the loan amount and the interest payable on that loan amount as irrecoverable. 12. The question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE, J. I agree.
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1989 (3) TMI 385 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eld that the word "specified" used in Heading No. 84.66 is merely a surplusage. If that expression conveys any meaning, then not every industrial plant would come within the purview of the concessional rate of Duty under Heading 84.66 but only those industrial plants which have been so specified by the Central Government to come under Heading 84.66. 52. In the result, I am of the view that the Respondent No. 2 did not commit any illegality in refusing to register the contract of the importation of this machinery or this petitioner per expansion of its laboratory and such refusal being in accordance with law, cannot be interfered with by the Writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. All interim Orders are vacated and the Respondents No. 1 and 2 are entitled to recover the duties chargeable for the imported machinery under the relevant Heading of the Customs Tariff Act and to take proper steps for recovery there of.
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