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Showing 1 to 20 of 300 Records
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1989 (9) TMI 408 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tations in Section 37(2) of the Ndps Act in the above provision. That is not permissible in view of the clear intention of the legislature. The limitations placed on the Special Court cannot be read as fetters in exercise of powers under Section 439 of the Code. We reject Mr. Aurora's contention. (34) The upshot of the above discussion is that the petitions stand dismissed. The petitioner, Kishan Lal in Cr. Writ Petition No. 622 of 1988 is on interim bail, which is expiring on 22nd September, 1989. In the interests of justice, we extend his interim bail by another two weeks to enable him to make an appropriate application before the learned Single Judge. (35) As the only question raised before us on behalf of the petitioner Gurdev Singh in Cr. M(M) No. 1132 of 1988 was that cognizance by the Magistrate had not been taken validly and other arguments on merits could not be urged before us, that petitioner is also at liberty to move an appropriate application, if so advised.
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1989 (9) TMI 407 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... business when the predecessor cannot be found. In the instant case, the Tribunal's finding of fact is that the predecessor was found and in fact a provisional assessment was made on the non-resident company. 7. Moreover, the non-resident company had filed its return and no further action for assessment was taken. The only point that has been taken on behalf of the department is that the Indian company had filed a return. But that does not alter the legal position in any way. The income accrued or arose to the non-resident company. If an assessment was to be made on the successor-company, it must be done in accordance with the provisions of law. If the predecessor-company could be assessed and was available for assessment, no proceeding could be taken against the successor under section 170(2). 8. In that view of the matter, the question referred to is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. B.P. Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 406 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion of recalling the said order and so-called application for recalling the order was thoroughly misconceived. The learned Judge, therefore, could not have entertained the application as such and determined the subject matter in controversy between the parties and passed any judicial order granting relief in any form in the said proceeding. 28. For the foregoing reasons, the order under appeal being without jurisdiction is and declared to be void and as having no effect in the eye of law. 29. It is clarified that we have not gone into the merits of the dispute and that this order will not prevent the eighth respondent or any of the other respondents from seeking appropriate relief from the appropriate Bench in accordance with law. 30. The appeal succeeds and is allowed accordingly. 31. No separate order is required to be passed on the application which too stands disposed of in light of the foregoing order. Interim relief, if any, is vacated. 32. I agree. 33. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (9) TMI 405 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e view that there is no explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the appeal. There is no explanation for not preferring the appeal during one of the periods in which he was not ill. When there is " no cause" for the delay it cannot be treated as " sufficient cause." 26. Learned counsel for the second respondent vehemently contended that the second respondent is a poor dismissed employee and his case should he viewed with compassion. In our opinion, rules of limitation are not different for poor man and rich man. The law has to be applied equally whether the concerned litigant is rich or poor. Hence, this contention cannot be accepted. 27. In these circumstances, the writ petition has to be allowed. We allow the writ petition and quash the order of the first respondent dated 31 August 1982, made in Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Case No. 22 of 1981. Having regard to the fact that the second respondent is an employee, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 404 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the jurisdictional Magistrate. 4). The petitioner is at liberty to make an application either under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code before the competent court for grant of bail, within two weeks from the date of his arrest and release on bail pursuant to this order. If the petitioner fails to make application within the aforesaid time, the order for anticipatory bail shall cease to be effective on the expiry of the two weeks. (iii) If the petitioner makes an application either under section 437 or Section 439 of the Code within the period to two weeks from the date of his arrest, the anticipatory bail granted pursuant to this order shall remain in force till the date on which such an application is disposed of. (iv) The court, before whom such an application, either under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, is made, shall dispose of the application on its merits most expeditiously uninfluenced by the grant of anticipatory bail by this order. 25. Order accordingly.
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1989 (9) TMI 403 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e to dispose of the subsequent application with despatch. It will also result in consistency. In this view that we take we are fortified by the observations of this Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment in Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan 1987CriLJ1872 . For the above reasons we are of the view that there was no justification for passing the impugned order in the absence of a substantial change in the fact-situation. That is what prompted Shetty, J. to describe the impugned order as a bit out of the ordinary'. Judicial restraint demands that we say no more. 8. It is true that ordinarily this Court does not interfere with an order granting bail but in the facts of this case, we feel judicial discipline will be sacrificed at the altar of judicial discretion if we refuse to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. 9. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 8th June, 1989 granting bail to the respondent accused.
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1989 (9) TMI 402 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lation of the constitutional right of the party concerned. They are not without remedy when especially the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is wide open to time, both under the Constitution and also by virtue of Section 16 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985. 32. For all these reasons, we do not find any merits in this Special Criminal Application and as such, the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. 33. At this stage Mr. Bhargav Bhatt makes a request for grant of leave for appeal to the Supreme Court. We have elaborately considered the impact of Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis Section 344 of the old Code. We have considered Article 21 of the Constitution in relation to the present case in which the petitioner has been an under-trial under the T.A.D. Act. We do not find any question of law which is of general importance to be decided by the Supreme Court arises in this case. Accordingly the request for leave is rejected.
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1989 (9) TMI 401 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... amed an issue as to whether the tenant's denial of the landlord's title to the schedule property including the said premises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appel- lant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground. Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. No other argument have been advanced before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissal with costs. S. K. A. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (9) TMI 400 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r only when it is referred to him by either party for decision. The reference is also implied. As the Superintending Engineer will decide the matter on reference he has to act judicially and decide the dispute after hearing both the parties and permitting them to substantiate their claim by adducing materials in support. In deciding the dispute he must act judicially. In the said clause it is also provided that his decision shall be final and as the agreement is binding between the parties the decision shall also bind both of them. The result would be the decision would be finally binding on the parties. Though the expression 'award or arbitration' is not appearing in the aforesaid clause, even then the expression as it stands embodies an arbitration clause which can be enforced. In this view of the matter, we are unable to find merit in this application and the same stands dismissed without any order as to costs. Haridas Das, J. 7. I agree. 8. Application dismissed.
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1989 (9) TMI 399 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... spension allowance, if any) for a period of 6 months immediately preceding this order. So far as Driver Raju is concerned he will be absorbed in regular service as per the offer made in the letter of July 4, 1987 disregarding the subsequent communication of July 25, 1987. The security guard Vipti Singh will also be reinstated in service but without back wages. In the case of the 12 dismissed workers we are, on the facts placed before us, of the view the circumstances did not exist for the exercise of extraordinary powers under Rule 32 of the Rules. The orders terminating the services of the 12 union representatives are therefore set aside and they are ordered to be reinstated in service forthwith with back wages coveting a period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of this order. They should be reinstated forthwith. In view of the above directions no further order is required on the C.M.PTFAI will pay ₹ 5,000 in all by way of costs to the Union. Petition Allowed.
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1989 (9) TMI 398 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... on, which resulted in passing of the award. It is by virtue of the award the liability ultimately crystallised. In the case of CIT vs . Shewbux Jahurilal 1962 46ITR688(Cal) , it was held by a Division of this Court that even though the assessee maintained accounts on the mercantile system, he was not bound to show all anticipated losses as and when the claims were made and pay tax on that basis and had the matter readjusted later when the anticipated loss was quantified. It was further held that the loss could be claimed only when it was ascertained and the assessee was, therefore, entitled to have the loss allowed in the asst. yr. 1950-51 when the matter was finally settled. Similar view has been taken by this court in the case of CIT vs . Roberts McLean & Co. Ltd. 1978 111ITR489(Cal) on identical facts. 7. In view of the above, both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. B.P. Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 397 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... e to tax. It rejected the Department';s argument based on the application of sec. 86(v) on the ground that that section dealt with the inclusion of the income in the hands of a member of AOP for rate purposes. The Tribunal pointed out that apart from the amount received on the dissolution of the AOPs the income of the assessee was a loss of ₹ 3524 and that therefore, even if the income of the year under consideration, was includible u/s. 86(v) there, was no tax effect so far as the assessee was concerned, Thus the entire decision turns on the fact that the dissolution of the AOPs took place because of the restrictive provisions introduced in the Finance Act, 1980 and also the fact that there was no tax effect. In the present case there are no such facts, There are no accidental or fortuitous circumstances and the tax effect to the advantage of the assessee is considerable. 16. For the above reasons, we uphold the order of the Commissioner. The appeals are dismissed.
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1989 (9) TMI 396 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d. He has also adverted to the appointment order Ex.P.3 as well as to the allotment order Ex.P.4 issued to the petitioner. The petitioner in fact, had been duly questioned during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C and he had categorically admitted all those facts. Top of all, he did not opt to put any question to P.W.1 whilst he was in box on this aspect of the matter. He did not also adduce any evidence in proof of the same. It is for the first time he would put forth such a contention obviously to escape from the penel consequences to be flown by the operation of the provisions of section 630 of the Act. As such the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner on this aspect of the matter cannot at all be expected to commend acceptance at the hands of the court. 20. In view of my discussion on all the contentions raised by learned counsel for the petitioner it goes without saying that the petition deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the petition is dismissed.
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1989 (9) TMI 395 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... has sold the property to the respondents in total disregard of his right to purchase the same. This is not a case of a tenant who has failed to pay the rent without any rhyme or reason. He was not averse to paying the rent but he genuinely believed that he was under no obligation to do so as he had a prior right to purchase the property. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this is a case in which the Controller should have invoked the proviso and called upon the appellant to pay the arrears from December 1977 to May 1978 within a certain time. Failure to do so has resulted in miscarriage of justice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the ejectment decree cannot be allowed to stand. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the eviction decree. The matter will go back to the Controller with a direction that he will give the benefit of the provi- so extracted above to the appellant in accordance with law. Parties will bear their own costs. N.V.K. Appeal Allowed.
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1989 (9) TMI 394 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ine authority which had no link whatsoever with the activity of the detenu. The Court observed that if the detaining authority has really applied his mind and if the subjective satisfaction were really based on proper application of mind, the detaining authority would not have said that it has also relied on this set of documents. The order of detention was quashed on the ground that there has been non-application of mind by the detaining authority. (8) Following the aforesaid judgments I hold that in the present case also the order of detention is vitiated on account of irrelevant material being relied upon by the detaining authority for reaching the subjective satisfaction for passing the detention order which shows in fact non-application of mind. (9) Hence, I allow the writ petition, make the rule absolute, quash the detention order and direct that the petitioner be set at liberty if not required to be detained in any other case. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1989 (9) TMI 393 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... d by the notification under the Ordinance and the Act shall be restored back and they shall take over the management of the Samiti from the Board immediately but it is made clear that the Karyapalika and Byabasthapika Sabha which were functioning in 1984 and which we are restoring will within six months from the date of this order hold proper elections in accordance with the constitution to elect a Byabasthapika and Karyapalika. This is necessary because the period of the Karyapalika and Byabasthapika Sabha which was functioning in 1984 has come to an end although from 1984 till today they were not allowed to function. It is further directed that the authorities, officers, the Board or appointed by the Board or the State Government shall restore back all assets and properties of the Samiti to the Karyapalika which will be restored immediately after the passing of this order. The petitioners shall also be entitled to costs of this petition. Costs quantified at ₹ 10,000.
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1989 (9) TMI 392 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd April 1967 which was the date on which the appellant was appointed as a ranger. The dates of appointment and confirmation of respondent No. 13 who is a direct recruit, have been noted earlier. In this view of the matter the claim of seniority as made by the appellant has no substance. It is settled law that the provisions of statutory rules cannot be modified or altered by executive instructions and it is only in the absence of statutory rules that executive instructions have relevance. As such even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted that on account of the memorandum to the Cabinet or any other executive instruction the appellant was to be given seniority as claimed by him, it could not be done as in case of a conflict the statutory provisions contained in this behalf in proviso (iii) of Rule 35 of the Rules shah prevail. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (9) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t should be agreed between the parties and in case there was no agreement, cost should be taxed. The award is clear and unambiguous and does not leave this question undecided. In the circumstances, there is no scope of remission of this award or not enforcing what the arbitrator has awarded. Under the Act, if an application is filed for decree in terms of the award, the court in upholding the award ought to grant a decree in terms of the award and not substract any portion thereof. Since the award directed costs of appellant’s reference to be paid as is mutually agreed upon or as taxed, the Division Bench ought to have passed an order for costs as taxed. We, therefore, direct that the award to be enforced and the costs as mentioned hereinbefore should also be payable by the respondent. The judgment and order of the High Court are modified to that extent. In the facts and the circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (9) TMI 390 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in excess of the limit fixed, he can issue only one draft order of the assessment. He has no power under that section to issue more than one draft order. 17. We respectfully differ with the view expressed in the case of Sudhir Sareen (supra). We are of the view that the power that has been conferred under section 144B is to be exercised in course of assessment proceeding. Till such time as the assessment order is passed, the ITO has all the powers under section 143, which include making further enquiry and making further discovery and also to receive new information relevant for assessment. Under section 144B, the ITO does not become functus officio by merely passing or forwarding the draft order. It is only after the final assessment order is made that the ITO loses jurisdiction over the assessment proceeding. 18. In that view of the matter, the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the revenue. 19. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
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1989 (9) TMI 389 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... deposits after 20th Nov., 1968 and 21st Feb., 1969. It was only when the assessee had entered into an agreement with the bank to renew the fixed deposits with the bank, the bank agreed to pay the interest on the fixed deposits during the intervening period when the fixed deposits were not renewed. The right of getting the interest arose to the assessee as a result of the agreement between the assessee and the bank in 1972. Even though the bank agreed to pay interest w.e.f. 20th Nov., 1968 and 21st Feb., 1969 on the two fixed deposits, it cannot be said that the assessee had any right to get any interest during that period, when there was no agreement between the bank and the assessee for renewal of the fixed deposits. 8. Under the circumstances we are of the view that the Tribunal has taken a correct view of the law. The question, is therefore, answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee, J. I agree.
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