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Showing 1 to 20 of 220 Records
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1991 (5) TMI 265 - CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND GOLD TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... regulations has been given to FFS machine with either vacuumising system or gas flushing system or both. 11. It is, therefore, apparent that the intention of Notification No. 125/86 could not be to deny the benefit of concessional rate of duty to FFS machine when it is imported either with vacuumising accessory or with inert gas flushing accessory or with both. The word 'and', therefore, in the context of the above discussion would be required to be read as 'or'. Such a reading is permissible in view of the intention of the legal provisions enacted or in view of the irrationalities and anomalies arising out of the reading of 'and' as a conjunctive word. Good number of authorities have already been referred to in learned Vice President's judgment which support the above. Accordingly, the benefit of Notification No. 125/86 should be extended to the appellants who have imported the FFS machine with inert gas flushing system only. I order accordingly.
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1991 (5) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n of the offence as pointed out supra either on 8/07/1986 or on 29/07/1986. Two complaints were filed on 10/08/1988 and one complaint was filed on 10/09/1988, i.e. clearly after a period of one year. Admittedly the appellant had not approached the court under S. 473 of the Code for extension of the period of limitation. (10) “Secondly Mr. TuIsi relying on a decision of this court reported in P.D. Jambekar vs. State of Gujarat 19730 2 S.C.R. 714 submitted that the date of the knowledge should be taken from the date of the receipt of the report. After going through that decision we are of the firm view that the said decision will hardly be of any assistance to this case and as such it cannot be availed of by the appellant. (11) “For all the reasons stated above we find no reason to dislodge the concurrent finding of the courts below holding that the prosecution is clearly barred by limitation. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed as devoid of merits.
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1991 (5) TMI 263 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e satisfaction of the Collector of Customs, Bombay for the difference of duty between 10% and 92%. 4. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and having regard to the special facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to relief as nothing has been placed before us to justify the discrimination. However, without going further in the merit we are of the opinion that since the appellant has already imported the goods at the concessional rate of the duty and has also sold the goods at a fixed price under the orders of this Court, it would not be just or fair to direct the appellant to pay the difference of the duty at this stage. 5. We think that the ends of justice would be met if the appeal is disposed of in terms of the interim order except that the appellants are discharged from the security furnished to the Collector of Customs, Bombay under the orders of this Court. We order accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (5) TMI 262 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... M.M. Punchhi, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed
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1991 (5) TMI 261 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... jha, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (5) TMI 260 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... a copy of the Supreme Court’s judgment. Accordingly, after due notice, the matter was taken up again today (27-5-1991) when Shri Sunder Rajan stated that he was mistaken in his understanding when he stated that the Supreme Court had set aside the Tribunal’s decision. The Court had only admitted an appeal against the said decision. He produced for our perusal a report appearing on page A96 Volume 43 of E.L.T. 1989, from which it is clear that the Supreme Court had admitted an appeal filed by Aerolex Hose Private Ltd. against the Tribunal’s order. The report does not state that the Supreme Court had stayed the Tribunal’s order. Shri Sunder Rajan was also not able to state whether the Supreme Court had since disposed of the matter. In these circumstances, we do not see any reason to take a different view in the present case. 15. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the appeals have no merit and, accordingly, we dismiss the same.
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1991 (5) TMI 259 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
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... ... ..... days of the receipt of this order, cancelling the share certificates wrongly sent to the transferors and for issuing duplicate share certificates to the extent necessary ; (d) the interim order passed on November 23, 1990, in the application under Section 247/250 of the Companies Act, 1956 (in Case No. 24 of 1990-CLB) that any transfer by any of the transferors in respect of the impugned shares lodged by Jagatjit Industries Ltd. shall be void till the hearing of the main application will stand vacated, after the impugned shares are registered by Mohan Meakin Ltd. The said application under Section 247/250 of the Act is disposed of accordingly ; and (e) in the facts and circumstances of this case, Mohan Meakin Ltd. shall pay costs of these proceeding assessed at ₹ 10,000, ₹ 500 and ₹ 1,000 payable to Jagatjit Industries Ltd., Galaxy Pet Packaging P. Ltd. and Quick Return Investment Co. Ltd. respectively within 10 days from the date of receipt of this order.
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1991 (5) TMI 258 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was raised. Agreeing with the High Court this Court rejected the defence argument based on Article 14 on the ground that in the facts of the case it was not necessary to set aside the order of the Assistant collector before granting a redemption decree. The other decision in Mohd. Murtiza Khan v. state of M.P. and Others, 1966 M.P.L.J. 933 arose out of a suit in which the interpretation of the provisions of the Bhopal Land Revenue Act was involved. In similar situation as in the present appeal before us, this Court held that Article 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, had no application to the suit as the order under the Bhopal Land Revenue Act had been passed without jurisdiction and could be ignored without getting it set aside. Article 142 of the Limitation Act was applied. 9. For the reasons mentioned above we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the decree passed by the first appellate court. the appeal is accordingly allowed with costs through out.
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1991 (5) TMI 257 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be confiscated and when the valuation has also been finally determined by the Collector, i.e. the declared value as accepted by the Collector, then there .was no occasion for not releasing the goods and the petitioner cannot even be held liable for demurrage in these facts and circumstances. In our opinion, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to a direction for the release of the goods without payment of any demurrage/ground rent charges/container charges in respect of the period from the date of filing of the bill of entry. (4) Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are directed to clear the goods of the petitioner forthwith without payment of any demurrage/ground rent charges/container charges with effect from filing of the bill of entry. In case respondent no. 3 has any claim in respect of any charges, it may resort to appropriate remedy against respondent no. 1. (5) Respondent no. 1 shall pay costs of the petition which we fix at ₹ 1,000.00 .
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1991 (5) TMI 256 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ends of justice will sufficiently be met if a lesser punishment as provided under Section 71(f) is awarded to the appellant. Accordingly, we set aside the punishments of three months' R.I. and dismissal from service and remand the matter to the court martial which shall award any of the lesser punishments having due regard to the nature and circumstances of the case and in the light of the above observations made by us. Since we are setting aside the sentence of three months' R.I. any detention suffered by the appellant after the orders of the court-martial shall not be treated as a disqualification for being reinstated into service which shall, however, be subject to any of the minor punishments to be awarded by the court-martial. Already much time has lapsed, therefore, we hope the court-martial would dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible preferably within three months. The appeal is thus disposed of subject to the above directions. Appeal disposed of.
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1991 (5) TMI 255 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... proper to set aside the selections already made. In these circumstances even if we were inclined to give direction to the Board to create three more posts and give chance to all the candidates securing equal or higher marks in the written examination than the writ petitioners, there was a remote chance of the writ petitioners being selected..In our view such exercise would be in futility, taking in view the chance of success of the writ petitioners. In the result, we allow these appeals in part and quash the rule made by U.P. State Electricity Board keeping 40 marks for interview and 40 marks for group discussion being arbitrary. We direct that in future the marks for interview and group discussion shall not be kept exceeding 10 and 5 of the total marks, respectively. The selection already made by the Board for the post of Assistant Engineers (civil) shall not be disturbed. In the facts and circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs. Appeals partly allowed.
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1991 (5) TMI 254 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rment is missing right from the date the said cheque was tendered till the assessment order was passed and in view of this fact we find the charging of interest in the recovery certificate is not correct. Similar position is also for the assessment year 1984-85 when the petitioner deposited ₹ 11,746.21 paise through a cheque dated 30-4-1984 and finally a demand was made in consequence of the assessment order for that year in question on 29-1-1988 for ₹ 11,745/-. The case of the petitioner and the defence of the Department is identical even for this relevant year in question and, therefore, the consequence is the same as per decision in respect of the earlier year. 3. In view of the aforesaid observations we direct respondent Nos. 3 and 4 not to recover interest from the petitioner which has been included in the recovery certificate dated 19-11-88 for the assessment year 1981-82. 4. With the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition is allowed, with costs.
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1991 (5) TMI 253 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e adjourned to a next date but once the court after giving opportunity propose to impose appropriate sentence again there is no need to adjourn the case any further thereon. No doubt the Sessions Judge needed to adjourn the case under s. 235(2) to next date but in the High Court the counsel was directed to show any additional grounds on the question of sentence . The High Court observed that the counsel was unable to give any additional ground. It is Further contended that the appellants are young men. They are the bread winners of their family each consisting of a young wife. minor child and aged parents and that, therefore, the death sentence may be converted into life. We find no force. These compassionate grounds would always be present in most cases and are not relevant for interference. Thus we find no infirmity in the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court warranting interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (5) TMI 252 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ble to manage the property, the application for appointment of a son as manager of the joint family property was not be ordered. Since Vasantrao did not obtain any order from the competent court under the Lunacy Act to have him appointed as Manager of the joint family to alienate the property, the sale is per se illegal. The sale, therefore, appears to be to defeat the statutory right of the appellant. The rigour of the second proviso to s. 88(1)(b) is thus inapplicable. Thereby the right and interest as a deemed purchaser acquired by the appellant has not been effected by a subsequent notification issued under s. 88(1)(b). The High Court, therefore, committed manifest error in holding that the appellant is not entitled to the relief. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the orders of the High court, The Tribunal and District Collector are set aside and that of the Mamlatdar is confirmed, but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal Allowed.
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1991 (5) TMI 251 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted to them that a Single Member could hear cases laid before the Tribunal led to the conclusion that the judicial business of the Administrative Tribunal was intended to be carried by a bench of two Members. The vires of sub-section (6) has not been under challenge and, therefore, both the provisions in Section 5 have to be construed keeping the legislative intention in view. We are of the view that what we have indicated above brings out the true legislative intention and the prescription in subsection (2) and the exemption in sub-section (6) are rationalised. 7. Now in the instant case we have been told that subsequent to the decision of the Tribunal, there has been a letter from the Director of the Central Soil Salinity Research Institute, Karnal, that there is no scope for the appellant to be fitted into that Institute to which the appellant has been Advocates who appeared in this case Ms Shyamla Pappu, Senior Advocate (J.D. Jain, Advocate, with her) for the Petitioner;
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1991 (5) TMI 250 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o as to deprive the reversioners of their right to claim the property after the death of the widow? In Radha Rani’s case (supra) this Court held. ‘‘In the case of an alienation by Hindu widow without legal necessity, the reversioners were not bound to institute a declaratory suit during the lifetime of the widow. They could wait till her death and then sue the alienee for possession of the alienated property trating the alienation as a nullity.’’ Therefore, it is obvious that the appellant could not acquire any right by adverse possession against reversioner during lifetime of her mother. Her claim was rightly negatived. Before parting with this case, we express our thanks to Sri Padmanabhan, Senior Advoacate who, on our request rendered valuable assistance. We are thankful to Sri Parekh and Sri Narasimhulu also for their assistance. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (5) TMI 249 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... x Act was made in March, 1991. This confusion undoubtedly was partly the cause of the non-deposit of the tax. Vide orders, annexures P3 and P4, the authorities have imposed penalty on the petitioner with regard to the original capacity as well as the increased capacity after modernisation. The said annexures are consolidated and do not give a break-up of the penalty that is to be imposed for the period prior to March 22, 1991 and subsequent thereto. This petition is allowed and the aforesaid orders being unsustainable are hereby quashed with no order as to costs, and the matter is remanded to the Assessing Authority for fresh decision. No observation made herein will stand in the way of the Assessing Authority in arriving at his independent conclusions. The petitioner will be entitled to urge all legal and factual matters before the Assessing Authority. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Assessing Authority on 1st July, 1991. Petition allowed.
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1991 (5) TMI 248 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and came to the conclusion that the view which commanded itself to the court was not an unreasonable view. Having regard to the enunciation, the Supreme Court made in the two cases referred to above, and the principle of beneficent construction , approved by this Court in Sri Virupaksha Enterprises case 1990 77 STC 28 (Kar), the petitioner must succeed. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the endorsement of the Commercial Tax Officer, II Circle, Udupi, dated January 22, 1988 (annexure A), is quashed. As a result, the petitioner shall be entitled to exemption from payment of purchase tax under section 6 of the Act. It is made clear that this ruling shall be made applicable to all similar manufacturing units to which the notification in question is applicable. I, therefore, issue a mandamus to the second respondent-State to exempt the petitioner from payment of purchase tax on its purchase turnover of raw cashew, and grant refund of tax paid. Writ petition allowed.
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1991 (5) TMI 247 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... roviso to subrule (7). It is on these facts, we have held that the rejection of the petitioner s application by the respondent-sales tax authority was not justified since on that date after giving opportunity the petitioner complied with the requirement of deposit of fees by requesting for adjustment of the amount lying with the department which was refundable to him. In view of the aforesaid position, we are satisfied that the impugned order dated 7th October, 1985 (annexure 15 to the petition) is liable to be quashed. In the result, we allow this petition, quash the order dated 7th October, 1985 (annexure 15 to the petition) and direct the respondent No. 2 to pass orders for grant of recognition certificate to the petitioner for the years 1981-82, 1982-83 and 1983-84 in terms of the directions given by us as aforesaid within a period of three weeks from the date the certified copy of this order is produced before the said authority. Costs on parties. Writ petition allowed.
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1991 (5) TMI 246 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s for purchase and sale in the conduct of business. The presumption raised under the circumstances, is rebuttable presumption but it is not expected that the opposite party will furnish proof of the negative fact that he is not a dealer and explain these entries in that context. Under the facts and circumstances of the case in my opinion the opposite party has discharged his initial burden by bringing on record such material that he has not conducted any business and the names of the dealers were in connection with transportation of goods business. Moreover, in this case the adverse material does not contain any such particulars which may lead to any adverse inference and thus the Tribunal has not committed any error of law in not treating the opposite party as a dealer. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. The revision is accordingly dismissed. The opposite party shall be entitled to costs which are assessed to at Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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