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Showing 1 to 20 of 214 Records
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1991 (6) TMI 257 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ted only on or after the date of the cheque. 13. The question as to when a post-dated cheque can be considered to have been drawn for the purpose of Section 138 of the Act cannot be dealt with independently of the right to present the same. In relation to the drawer and drawee, a post-dated cheque becomes operative only from the date of the cheque when alone the same is intended to be honoured. A post dated cheque for the purpose of Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act has to be considered to have been drawn on the date it bears and, in this case, since the cheque was presented within six months of the date of the cheque, it cannot be said that the condition in the said proviso is not satisfied. 14. In view of the above, with respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken in Babu Xavier's case 19901 TLNJ (Crl) 121 referred to earlier. 15. The Criminal M. C. is without merit and the same is liable to be dismissed which, accordingly, is hereby dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 256 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
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... ... ..... is an order of the court in every sense of the term and it is not possible to countenance the view that framing of charge is not an order at all. 34. To sum up, we find that an order framing charge is an order of moment; it deprives the liberty of a citizen and puts him to jeopardy of a trial. Such an order finally rejects the plea of the accused that he is entitled to a discharge or that he is not liable to be tried. Such an order concludes the enquiry and the pre-trial proceedings against the accused. The order framing charge takes away a very valuable right of the accused. Hence, in our considered opinion, an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2), Cr.P.C. and such an order is amenable to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court of Session and the High Court under Section 397(1), Cr. P.C. We answer the reference accordingly. 35. Now, let the revision petition be listed before the learned single Judge for decision on merits.
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1991 (6) TMI 255 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed one and the respondent is liable to pay interest on the said amount to the petitioner. Therefore, I am inclined to hold that this is a fit case where the respondent should be directed to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the sum of ₹ 39,176/- ordered to be refunded to the petitioner by the judgment in C.M.A. No. 409 of 1980 for a period of three years from 21-12-1984, the date of judgment in C.M.A. 409 of 1980, up to 21-12-1987, when the amount was actually refunded to the petitioner. 8. In view of the above discussion, the respondent is directed to pay to the petitioner the interest at 12% per annum on ₹ 39,176/- for a period of three years from 21-12-1984 to 21-12-1987, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order in this writ petition and the writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. In other respects, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 9. Petition partly allowed.
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1991 (6) TMI 254 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... n after granting time to the assessee to file the return by 22nd November, 1985, the IAC should initiate steps for penalising the assessee to the extent of ₹ 1,00,000 for what can only be considered as a technical lapse, if at all it can be so called. We are fully satisfied that the levy of penalty was wholly misconceived and that the CIT(A) was, therefore, justified in deleting the same. There is absolutely no substance in the department’s appeal which deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 13. Coming to the cross objection of the assessee, the only ground taken is that the CIT(A) has not dealt with one ground which should be dealt with, in the event of the Tribunal reversing the order of the CIT(A). 14. Since we have confirmed the order of the CIT(A), we do not find it necessary to deal with the cross objection which is also hereby dismissed. 15. In the result - (a) The appeal by the department is dismissed. (b) The cross objection by the assessee is dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 253 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e available for public library, is it not open to the Government to withdraw? That means Section 48 itself is rendered otiose. It is exactly this which the appellant wants us to accept. We find neither reason nor Justice to hold that promissory estoppel would apply. This is the answer for point No. 1. 13. As regards acquisition being tainted with malafides to favour one or more individuals, we have the Decision in Chandra Bansi Singh v. State of Bihar. That was a case in which withdrawal of a portion of land in question was held to favour a few. The said Decision does not help the appellant in any manner. 14. For these reasons, after having given our careful consideration, we find absolutely impossible to apply the Doctrine of promissory estoppel to the cases arising under the Land Acquisition Act which if accepted, would militate against the power of the Government under Section 48 of the Act. Accordingly we concur with the learned single Judge and dismiss this Writ Appeal.
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1991 (6) TMI 252 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... file a petition for enhancement. Since, it ignores the provisions of the statute as noticed above, as also the Division Bench judgments of this Court (supra), the judgment of the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 243 of 1984 (Gulab Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu) cannot be said to lay down the correct law. 4. Thus, for what we have stated above, we find that the application for enhancement filed by the Revenue by its authorised representative before the Tribunal during the pendency of the appeal filed by the assessee is competent and the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to pass orders on that application after putting the assessee no notice. After the introduction of section 36(3-A) in the statute book, such an application has to conform to the period of limitation prescribed thereunder. In view of the above discussion, the revision fails and is dismissed, as the only question raised has been answered against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. 5. Petition dismissed
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1991 (6) TMI 251 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... efore, once again request you to kindly consider and waive the above stated penalties and interest as the levy thereof would create tremendous hardships to us". The word "hardship" was used but, no case whatever on the ground of hardship was made out. The making out of such a case is imperative for the CIT has to record reasons for waiving or reducing the interest and penalty. The CIT cannot be faulted for not noting the plea. 14. Lastly, we must note that Dr. Balasubramanian, learned counsel for the Revenue, submitted that the discretion under Art. 226 could, in any event, not be allowed to be invoked here, having regard to all the facts and circumstances. We agree. 15. The appeal is dismissed. The appellant shall pay to the respondents the costs of the appeal. 16. Counsel for the assessee requests continuation of the interim relief that was granted pending the disposal of the appeal. Having regard to what we have said, we are unable to accede to the request.
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1991 (6) TMI 250 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... time of building of the bodies but it would only pass when the complete bus with fitted body to the chassis was delivered to the customer. In view of this position the Supreme Court has reached the conclusion that the supply of bodies constitute a sale and the assessees were liable to sales tax. It is true that Mysore High Court in the decision of Shankar Vittal Motor Co. Ltd. 1964 15 STC 771 has taken a different view but the law seems to be settled by the Supreme Court decision. In view of this position it becomes clear that the sales tax authorities, including the Tribunal were perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the transaction was liable to tax under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969. In view of this position the question referred to this Court requires to be decided in affirmative and against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. We accordingly reply and answer the abovesaid question with no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (6) TMI 249 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y has been levied, mechanically without disclosing the grounds to support the levy of the maximum penalty, the order is not sustainable. In the impugned order, exhibit P8, the second respondent has not applied his mind to the reasons for imposing the maximum penalty. On that ground exhibit P8 order has to be interfered with by this Court. In the result, I dispose of the original petition by quashing exhibit P8 to the limited extent indicated hereinbelow. The second respondent is directed to examine the issue afresh to decide the quantum of penalty that is to be imposed on the petitioner. He is not to mechanically levy the maximum penalty without disclosing the grounds warranting the same. Final order under section 45A of the Act should be passed against the petitioner as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Issue photo copy of the judgment to the parties on usual terms. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (6) TMI 248 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ny textiles. In the other decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Vaithilingam 1980 46 STC 297, this Court held that having regard to the entry which uses the expression cotton yarn , the product sold by the assessee in that case known as cotton thread would continue to be cotton yarn. Thus having regard to the ratio of the decisions referred to above of our High Court, which are very much binding on us, we have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that sewing thread does not lose its character as cotton yarn and continues to retain its identity and character as cotton yarn notwithstanding the fact that they are sold for being used as sewing thread. In our view, sewing thread is no different from cotton yarn and they are one and the same commodity and consequently we agree with the conclusions of the Tribunal, reject the contention of the State and order that the tax revision case be dismissed. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 247 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 7 the Legislature would have done so, especially since similar entries in sales tax enactments of other States contain glass bottles also. In the Karnataka enactment the relevant entry reads Glassware and glass bottles . In the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act it reads Glassware, bottles . In the Rajasthan Act sales tax is exigible on other glass or glassware . It would thus appear that glass bottles had been specifically mentioned when tax was intended to be levied under the Sales Tax Act. The mention of the words glass bottles in the Karnataka enactment and the word bottles in the Andhra Pradesh Act is suggestive of the non-inclusion of glass bottles within the expression glassware . What is exigible to tax under entry 111 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act is only glassware. Glass bottles and phials do not come within that entry nor were they intended to be included. These tax revision cases are therefore devoid of merit and are hereby dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 246 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere was reduction in the assessment of tax in terms of appellate order, no notice as required by explanation to sub-rule (2) of rule 32 was issued and therefore, the action under sub-section (1) of section 13-A is untenable. Since there is no clear material in this regard, I have not delved into the factual controversy. Be that as it may, in view of the order passed above, there is no need for resolution of controversy as raised presently. Explanation to sub-rule (2) of rule 32 posits issue of a revised notice of demand in form X when there is variation of quantum of assessment. As a corollary it follows that until such a revised notice of demand is issued, the question of any default in payment would not arise. 9.. The notice of attachment issued which is annexed as annexure 2 to the writ application is, therefore, vacated being not sustainable in law. The writ application and Misc. case No. 3221 of 1991 are accordingly disposed of. Writ application disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (6) TMI 245 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nspection is regarded as illegal. But the question here is can the materials collected without due compliance with the provisions contained in clause (12) of rule 34 be relied upon by the assessing authority to make an assessment. It should in this connection be remembered that this sub-clause in fact is introduced with the intention of safeguarding the interest of the assessee which otherwise will get prejudiced on the authority concerned exercising its power to conduct the inspection arbitrarily. 4.. As already noted the materials relied upon by the assessing authority to make the assessment are materials collected without complying with the procedure prescribed under clause (12) of rule 34. If that be the position, the assessment in dispute has rightly been found by the Appellate Tribunal as an assessment not made in accordance with law. 5.. There is therefore little scope to interfere with the same. The T.R.C. fails. Accordingly the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 244 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e costs of paper separately. It appears that the assessee has treated the supply of paper separately. The Supreme Court observed that except the materials supplied on the basis of such contract the contract will continue to be a contract for work and labour and no liability to sales tax would arise in respect thereof. Attention is drawn to the statement containing the details of printing materials purchased by vouchers in the year 1979-80 attached to the trading, profit and loss account as on March 31, 1980. There is no material on record to show that paper was supplied on the basis of the agreement between the parties. In order to exclude the cost of paper the paper should have been supplied on the basis of the contract as per the decision of the Supreme Court. The passage relied on by the learned Government Pleader is therefore of no assistance to the revision petitioner. In the result the revision is found to be devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 243 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ayment of tax was not stated, there might not be filing of complete returns and, therefore, subsection (2) of the relevant sections of the respective Acts may apply. Assuming that in spite of non-mention of the reason for non-payment of tax, the returns can be said to be complete, those returns should be, in the alternative, governed by sub-section (1). In the class of returns where the reason for non-payment was stated, sub-section (1) of the relevant sections of the respective Acts should apply. If there is any case of a return, where otherwise a complete return of turnover tax was not furnished, there was no return in respect of turnover tax and, therefore, such a case should be governed by sub-section (2) of the relevant sections of the respective Acts. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. Any interim order, if still in force, is vacated. No order is made for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 242 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oking section 5 of the Limitation Act. In other words, the learned Additional Government Pleader contended that any review will have to be filed within a year and beyond that the Tribunal has no power to entertain the review application. We are unable to agree with the learned Additional Government Pleader. The fact that a limitation is prescribed does not mean that application of section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded from the purview of the section disabling the Presiding Officer from applying the same when invoked. It is well-settled that unless a specific prohibition is there in the section itself section 5 of the new Limitation Act will apply (vide Arrya Vysia Samajam v. Murugesa Mudaliar 1990 TLNJ 82). The ratio laid down in the above case squarely applies to the facts of this case. Accordingly we find there is no substance in the argument of the learned Additional Government Pleader. Consequently, the revision fails and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (6) TMI 241 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oking to the abovesaid decision of this High Court also it becomes clear that if any particular order is germane to the provisions under which the authority is acting it cannot be said that the order would be bad in law. The abovesaid decision of this High Court also goes to support us in our view that the Commissioner while exercising the powers contained under section 67 of the Act of 1969 was entitled and authorised to pass any order which he thinks just and proper and which is germane with the purpose and instant object of the Act. Looking to the present question from this angle also, it becomes clear that the Tribunal was justified in taking the view as stated above. In view of this position we are inclined to answer the question referred to the High Court in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We do hereby accordingly answer and reply the question referred to this Court with no order as to costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1991 (6) TMI 240 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... out the result of the investigation undertaken by the assessing officer, no effort was made to rebut the same by way of praying for examining anybody attached to those firms. As it was the case of the petitioner-assessee that it had made the purchases from the aforesaid firms, and as it was found on investigation that it was not so, it was the burden of the assessee to dislodge the finding arrived at by the investigating officer. Nothing having been done in this regard, it cannot be held that any illegality was committed in relying on the result of the investigation undertaken by the assessing authorities. Kalra Glue Factory s case 1987 66 STC 292 (SC) was one where the assessee had absolutely no knowledge about the statement made by a person on whom reliance was placed. The present is not a case of that nature. 11.. In view of the above, we would answer the second question in the affirmative and against the assessee. D.M. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1991 (6) TMI 239 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... plicant will be entitled to the issuance of declaration forms on this basis on fulfilment of the necessary conditions. 26.. On the strength of this decision, the applicant is entitled to get eligibility certificate under rule 3(66a) for manufacture of emergency mobile power pack unit (which is covered by item 10 of Tenth Schedule to the said Rule) up to September 30, 1983 on fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the said rule. He may, however, be eligible to obtain tax-holiday in respect of trolley only with effect from October 1, 1983. Consequently, the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated February 24, 1988 is also set aside. 27.. Interim orders in RN-602 of 1989 are vacated. Assessments for the period covered by the eligibility certificate may be revised accordingly. 28.. In the result, the applications succeed and are allowed on contest. There will be no order for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1991 (6) TMI 238 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e has not established that the assessee who has entered the sale proceeds of these discarded goods in his books of account has had the intention to carry on business in these articles. For that matter there is nothing on record to show that the assessee has had such intention. If that be the position the findings of the Tribunal that the assessing authority has gone wrong in including the sales turnover of empty gunnies, cashew shells, etc., in the taxable turnover of the appellants, is unassailable. 6.. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 accordingly are answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The third question, in our view, does not arise for consideration. It is all the more so in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in 1967 19 STC 1 (State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd.) and the Division Bench ruling of this Court in 1981 47 STC 73 (Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Carborundum Universal Ltd.). The T.R.Cs therefore are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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