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Showing 1 to 20 of 285 Records
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1992 (3) TMI 368 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Government of 25th January, 1990/8th February, 1990 had submitted National Saving Certificates by way of security and in case the Government had changed its policy, it was bound to return the National Saving Certificates to the respective licensees. We consider this submission to be just and proper. learned Counsel for the State appearing before us also conceded that such National Saving Certificates would be returned to the licensees. We accordingly direct the State Government to return all the National Saving Certificates taken by way of security to all the licensees who had entered in agreements under the old policy of five years license, within two months from the date of the communication of this order. This direction will not apply in case of such licensees who have filed civil suits for the recovery of such amounts and their cases would be governed by the ultimate decision in those civil proceedings. 9. In the results, we dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 367 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ned by the age of superannuation of 60 years in the Lakshmi Commercial Bank. When his services were continued on amalgamation of the Lakshmi Commercial Bank with the Canara Bank he became an employee of the Canara Bank and was, therefore, entitled only to the right given by proviso (ii) to Clause (i) of Sub-section (5) of Section 45 which entitled him to the same terms and conditions of service as employees of the corresponding rank or status of the Canara Bank. Age of superannuation of the employees in Canara Bank being 58 years only, respondent No. 1 could not claim to retire at 60 years. The High Court misconstrued Clause (i) and proviso (ii) thereunder of Sub-section (5) of Section 45 of the Act and Clauses 10 and 12 of the amalgamation scheme to take the contrary view. The impugned Judgment of the High Court has, therefore to be set aside resulting in dismissal of the Writ Petition of respondent No. 1 filed in the High Court. Consequently the Appeal is allowed. No costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 366 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... necessary to decide the question in these proceedings since there is no finding by the Special Judge as to whether the petitioner can inspect the application moved by the Investigating Officer on the basis of which non-bailable warrants were issued by the Special Judge. This point is left open to be decided by the Special Judge as and when agitated before him. 31. In view of my aforesaid discussions the petition is accepted in part. The issuance of the non-bailable warrants against the petitioner by the Special Judge on 14-3-90 and 25-4-90 for being produced before the Special Judge so that the investigating officer may join him in investigation is held to be without jurisdiction and thus could not be issued. Investigating officer is, however, free to take any steps permissible under law to proceed further with the investigation of the case. The prayer with regard to the setting aside of the orders dated 5-6-1990 and 7-6-1990 is however, declined. 32. Petition partly allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 365 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... period, it is not open to this Court to read into the Section, by adding anything to it. 9. The rest of the contentions of the petitioner involve questions of fact relating to the alleged offence. The question whether the accused had to pay money to the complainant and whether he had issued the cheque, as well as other questions of fact have to be established on evidence. It is a matter of evidence whether the complainant is able to establish the various allegations, as held in P.T.V. Ramanuj Achari v. Giridharlal Agrawal 1991 (II) ALT 10. There are no grounds to quash the proceedings under S. 482, Cr.P.C. The Crl. Petition No. 1687/91 is dismissed. 10. Though the dates of cheques, dates of return by the bank and the dates of notices are different the questions to be considered in Crl. Petition No. 190/92 are the same as in Crl. Petition No. 1687/91. For the reasons mentioned in Crl. Petition No. 1687/91, the Crl. Petition No. 190/92 also is dismissed. 11. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (3) TMI 364 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d to this court. It is neither convenient nor proper that the official liquidator appointed liquidator of respondent No. 1 should be asked to defend the said suits in that court since wasteful expenditure is to be avoided. 6. I pass the following order Applicants are granted leave under section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, to continue to prosecute Original Suit No. 7 of 1986 as also Original Suit No. 507 of 1989 filed against respondent No. 1 and others. However, these suits are ordered to be transferred from the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Ranga Reddy District at Saroor Nagar, Andhra Pradesh, to this court for being tried by this court. 7. Mr. Sanghavi applies that the operation of order transferring the said suits for trial to this court be stayed for a period of four weeks. Since the order passed is a composite one, on the application of Mr. Sanghavi, the operation of the entire above order is stayed for a period of four weeks. 8. Issuance of copy expedited.
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1992 (3) TMI 363 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d Drugs and Cosmetics Act. A 1940 on the one hand and the 1989 Rules on the other. We however, find that the attention of the Rajasthan High Court was not drawn to the decision of the Supreme Court in Southern Pharmaceuticals' case. In Southern Pharmaceuticals' case (supra) it was categorically held that Entry 8 of the List Ii enabled the State Legislature to enact law with respect to intoxicating liquors and that "the enumeration of 'intoxicating liquor' in Entry 8, List Ii, confers exclusive- power to the State Government to legislate in respect of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol." In our opinion "there is no conflict between the impugned Rules and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and in any case even if there be any overlapping, the two sets of provisions continue to subsist." (55) For the aforesaid reasons we find no merit in these writ petitions and the same are dismissed, with costs. Interim orders stand vacated.
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1992 (3) TMI 362 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w to the merits of the case, we find that the petitioner has averred in his writ petition that before the licence was cancelled he was not given any opportunity of being heard. No counter-affidavit has, however, been filed on behalf of the State to controvert the above contention of the petitioner in spite of opportunity having been given to file the same. 4. Para 11 of the U. P. Kerosene Control Order, 1962, under which licence was granted to petitioner, expressly provides that before a licence is cancelled, the licensee shall be given a reasonable opportunity of submitting his explanation. As uncontroverted materials unmistakably show that no such opportunity was given, we find no hesitation in allowing this writ petition and setting aside the impugned order of cancellation. 5. Before we part with this judgment, we place on record that this order will not stand in the way of the licensing authority to proceed in the matter afresh in accordance with law. 6. Petition allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 361 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ,197 1.69 1,04,621 1984-85 3,40,87,358 12,30,812 5,20,055 1.53 5,20,055 12. Looking to the figures of profits, we are of the opinion that the CIT(Appeals) has rightly observed that the quantum of secret commission has become quite excessive. We have also noticed that for assessment year 1983-84 the CIT has set aside the assessment order under section 263 on the ground that the Assessing Officer wrongly allowed payment of secret commission without proper verification. The assessee is in appeal before us against the order under section 263. However, the fact remains that the extent of secret commission allowed by the Assessing Officer is not acceptable to the CIT. Looking to the past history and the above data we are of the opinion that the secret commission should be disallowed to the extent of 50 per cent of the claim and we direct accordingly. In the result this ground of appeal is allowed in part. 13. to 24. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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1992 (3) TMI 360 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... remanded to the learned trial magistrate with a direction to inquire into the question whether the nomination forms nominating H. Dayani and Dr. Nirmal Sen were received and acknowledged by the Local (Health) Authority competent to receive and acknowledge the same. This question will be considered as a preliminary question and the learned magistrate will record a finding thereon . If he comes to the conclusion that the nomination forms had been acknowledged by the competent Local (Health) Authority he shall drop the proceedings against the Directors of the company, other than the company and the nominated persons. If on the other hand he comes to the conclusion that the prescribed forms had been acknowledged by a person other than the competent Local (Health) Authority he will proceed against all the persons who are shown as the accused in the complaint i.e. all the Directors including the nominated person and the company. The appeals are allowed accordingly. Appeals allowed.
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1992 (3) TMI 359 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... shall approve the draft scheme of 1986 within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the judgment; and publish the approved scheme in the gazette. The permits granted to the 50 operators or any other shall stand cancelled from that date, if not having expired in the meanwhile. No permits shall be renewed. Appropriate action should be taken by respondents 3 to 4 in CA No. 1198/92 (S.L.P. No. 9701/90) to see that all the permits, granted to the 50 operators including the appellants are seized and cancelled. The U.P. State Transport Corporation shall obtain required additional permits, if need be, and put the stage carriages on the routes to provide transport service to the travelling public immediately on publication of the approved draft scheme in the State Gazette. The Appeal arising out of S.L.P. No. 2083/91 is allowed with costs throughout against respondents Nos. 4 to 13. The appeals arising out S.L.P. Nos. 6300/91, 9701/90 and 9702/90 are allowed without costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 358 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng feature is what occurs at page 180 of the Report which is as under The deed purports to be a sale and has the outward form of one but at the same time it alls itself a "conditional sale". It has, however, no clause for retransfer and instead says (Clause 6) that if the executants pay the money within two years, the property "shall come in exclusive possession and occupation of us, the executants". That is clear about the possession but is silent about the title. In the context we can only take these words to mean that if there is payment within the specified time, then the title will continue to reside in the executants; for what else can a right of exclusive possession import in these circumstances? 23. The position here, as explained above, is entirely different. For these reasons, we hold that no exception could be taken to the judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 357 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... des for the determination of the lease; in such a situation, even after the determination of the lease in the manner stated in the term lease, the recovery of possession will have to be made only by recourse to Section 21(1). 22. We are clearly of the opinion that the view expressed in Bharath Petroleum Corporation's case is not correct and, therefore, the same is overruled. 23. The entire writ petition is before us and, therefore, the question is whether we should proceed to quash the proceedings pending before the Court of Munsiff, Udupi. A formal quashing of the proceedings may not be necessary in the instant case as we have already declared the law and the same is bound to be applied by the Court of Munsiff, Udupi. We direct, therefore, the Court of Munsiff, Udupi, to take up the proceedings before it in H.R.C. No. 19 of 1989 and decide the same in the light of this judgment. 24. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. Rule made absolute. 25. Order accordingly.
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1992 (3) TMI 356 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ice is not a matter which affects the legal rights of the respondent. The courts below, therefore, failed to note that the second respondent has no direct interest in the subject-matter of the litigation and the addition of the respondent would result in causing serious prejudice to the appellant and the substitution or the addition of a new cause of action would only widen the issue which is required to be adjudicated and settled. By the joining of the party would embarrass the plaintiff and issues not germane to the suit would be required to be raised. The mere fact that a fresh litigation can be avoided is no ground to invoke the power under the Rule in such cases. 19. We are, therefore, of the view that the courts below were wrong in concluding that the second respondent is a necessary or a proper party to be added as a defendant in the present suit instituted by the appellant. 20. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. No order as to costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the Judgment-debtor in this case and only such amount, if any, can be attached in discharge of a decree. It is also submitted that the liability of the Judgment-debtor to the appellant Bank was far in excess of the amounts covered by the two FDRs and therefore nothing is due from the Bank to the Judgment-debtor. This is a matter for verification. However, in the view taken by us above namely that the Bank has a general lien over the two FDRs we set aside the order of the High Court directing the appellant Bank to deposit an amount of ₹ 35,000/-. The High Court shall, however, consider the objections raised by the Bank, namely that no amounts are due to the Judgment-debtor, in the light of the above principles laid down by us and then decide whether there is any amount left for being attached by the Decree-holder in execution of his decree. With the above directions the appeal is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 354 - HOUSE OF LORDS
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... ... ..... ude the achievement of a legitimate commercial (i.e., business) end. The composite transaction does, in the instant case ; it achieved a sale of the shares in the operating companies by the Dawsons to Wood Bastow. It did not in Ramsay. Secondly, there must be steps inserted which have no commercial (business) purpose apart from the avoidance of a liability to tax not 'no business effect'. If those two ingredients exist, the inserted steps are to be disregarded for fiscal purposes. The court must then look at the end result. Precisely how the end result will be taxed will depend on the terms of the taxing statute sought to be applied." My Lords, in all the circumstances I entirely agree with the reasoning of my noble and learned friend, Lord Templeman in his speech and with the course which he therein proposes. Appeal allowed. Taxpayer to pay costs here and below. Solicitors Belmont and Lowe for Hugh James Jones and Jenkins, Cardiff ; Solicitor of Inland Revenue.
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1992 (3) TMI 353 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Government or the Central Government. It is not disputed that the detenu gave nine copies of the representation to the Superintendent Jail for onward submission to the authorities. We are of the view that the Superintendent Jail, in the circumstances of this case, was under an obligation to send one coy of the representation to the Central Government. The Superintendent Jail sent the representation only to the State Government and not to the Central Government. When the detenu gave sufficient number of copies of his representation and left it to the Jail authorities to forward the same to the authorities as specified in the grounds of detention, the Superintendent Jail was legally bound to send one copy to the Central Government. We are, therefore, of the view that the detenu was denied his right to make an effective representation and on that short ground his detention is liable to be quashed. 6. We allow the writ petition and quash the detention order dated July 23, 1991.
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1992 (3) TMI 352 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... k the adjudicating Authority has applied its mind before ordering imposing of personal penalty once again even after remand of the very same earlier order by this Court. If the Adjudicating Authority thought fit to collect information, it is but proper that the Adjudicating Authority ought to have given the particulars to the petitioner to rebut the information by evidence collected by the Department with regard to the market value. It has not been done. Only in the counter-affidavit the fact how the market value was arrived at has been set out. In view of that, the impugned order has got to be set aside and it is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Adjudicating Authority to consider the question of redemption fine and personal penalty afresh, after giving opportunity to the petitioner, within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 14. In the result, the writ petition will stand allowed to the limited extent as stated above. No costs.
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1992 (3) TMI 351 - CEGAT, CHENNAI
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... ... ..... ntioned in my order above, the question is whether this statement and the statements of others who have implicated him can be considered as inadmissible in evidence will have to be gone into after detailed arguments are heard and which cannot be done at this interlocutory stage. I agree with my learned brother that prima facie there is no infirmity in the lower authority's order so far as this applicant is concerned. Taking into consideration therefore, the nature of the offence, the circumstances of the case, the value of the contraband gold involved, I order that on the applicants making pre-deposit of ₹ 2.00 lakhs (Rupees Two lakhs) each on or before 29th May 1992, the pre-deposit of the balance of penalties would stand dispensed with pending appeal. Slay of the recovery of the balance amount is also granted subject to the applicants complying with this order. In case of failure to comply with the terms of this order, appropriate orders under law will be passed.
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1992 (3) TMI 350 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as is evident from the circumstances, the Tribunal should not have rejected the application on the ground of alleged unsatisfactory nature of the explanation of the delay. That is why I think the delay should have been condoned and the appeal heard on merits. 4. There was a direction from this Court previously that the gold seized from the petitioner shall not be minted unless it had already been melted. In the circumstances of the case I think that this interim order should continue pending the appeal as well. 5. The order Ext.P15 is quashed. The first respondent Tribunal is directed to take the Appeal No. G/578/89/MAS on its file for hearing on merits. The Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Pending disposal of the appeal the gold seized from the petitioner shall not be minted unless it has already been dealt with otherwise. 6. The original petition is disposed of as above.
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1992 (3) TMI 349 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng given by the litigants and on the basis of which the Court did not pass interim orders in favour of the petitioners. The entire administration of justice would crumble in case the litigants are permitted to ignore solemn undertaking on spacious ground that undertaking was given without properly appreciating the legal consequences thereof. If our judgment, the Corporation is bound to refund the excess duty recovered during the pendency of the petition within one month to the petitioners. 10. Accordingly, petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The respondents are directed to refund the excess duly recovered under item 53(c) of schedule 'I' of Octroi Rules from the date of lodgment of the petition till the date of the judgment within a period of four weeks from today in accordance with the undertaking furnished. The respondents shall pay costs to the petitioners. Mrs. Singhvi applies for stay of the operation of order. Prayer refused.
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