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Showing 1 to 20 of 276 Records
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1992 (7) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 5's promotion would have to be invalidated. In the result we allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. We direct the University to fix the Appellant's seniority between the actual date of appointment of Dr. Bhatia and the regularisation of the ad hoc promotions of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. The University will determine the point of time when the Appellant could have been appointed on the substantive post of Professor of Medicine had there been no prohibition against the implementation of the select list. The University will decide on the premise that had there been no intervening stay against the implementation of the select list prepared pursuant to the advertisement of December, 1984 what would have been the date of appointment of the Appellant. Needless to clarify that the date so fixed will be between the date of appointment of Dr. Bhatia and the date of regularisation of services of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 354 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tated and the question referred to us at the instance of the assessees. The fact that the applicant-assessees have not appeared before us and have not submitted any arguments on why this question of law was wrongly deckled by the Tribunal clearly shows that the applicant-assessees are not more interested in the proceedings and do not desire any answer by the Court on the question referred to it. In these circumstances, we fail to see why we should take up public time in deckling a question in which the party desiring it to be answered by the Court is not interested." For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that if the party at whose instance the reference is made, fails to appear at the hearing, or fails in taking steps for preparation of the paper-books so as to enable hearing of the reference, this Court is not bound to answer the reference. We refuse to answer the reference and also saddle the assessee with the costs of the department quantified at Rs. 150/-.
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1992 (7) TMI 353 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l by evidence is indeed entirely a different matter. Since there is no positive finding either of the adjudicating officer or of the Appellate Board that Section 68 has not been factually established in this case or that the said section cannot be attracted and rather the departmental proceeding and the order passed therein could not be sustained because of absence of a finding on the matter or better I should say because of non-consideration of the said provision of Section 68 by the adjudicating officer, that question which arises for consideration in the criminal proceeding in view of the specific averment made in the complaint remains open to be decided at the trial of the case. Therefore, I find that this is not a fit case where the criminal proceeding is liable to be quashed simply because the petitioner has been found not guilty by the Appellate Board on the ground of absence of a finding by the adjudicating officer. 4. The present application is, therefore, dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 352 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rant selection scale of ₹ 5900-200-6700 to RHJS Officers with effect from 1.9.1988 under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Revised Pay Scales) Rules, 1989. However, the third direction given by the learned single Judge to grant supertime scale of ₹ 7300-7600 to seven Officers of the RHJS from amongst those who are already in selection scale w.e.f 1.1.1992 and post them as District Judges at five Divisional Headquarters other than Jaipur and two at Jaipur; one for Jaipur City and another for Jaipur District is set aside. It is for the High Court to recommend for grant of such a supertime scale to the RHJS Officers to the State Govt. and it is for the State Govt. to consider and decide such a request, if made by Hon'ble the Chief Justice on behalf of the Full Court within a reasonable time so that no heart-burning may persist in this wing of administration of justice. 41. In the circumstances of this case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of this appeal.
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1992 (7) TMI 351 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shown to be the Joint Hindu Family property. Prima facie the defendants have been able to establish that they constituted a Joint Hindu Family under the name and style of Dev Raj Bajaj and Sons and property bearing No. A-167, Defence Colony, New Delhi was a Joint Hindu Family property. One of the sons has filed a suit for partition of the property Nothing has been brought on record that prima facie the partition decree obtained from this court was a result of a fraud or collusion. A member of a Joint Hindu Family can claim partition if he does not want to remain joint with other members. I do not find any prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. Balance of convenience also is not in favour of the plaintiff as the defendant No. 3 is enforcing his legal rights against the plaintiff. In the result, I find no merit in this application and the same is dismissed. Any expression/opinion given in this order is tentative and will not prejudice the rights of the parties on merits.
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1992 (7) TMI 350 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a person or documents and that is possible, and at least more effective, when the person being interrogated is in custody. Liberty of the citizen is desirable but also desirable is the need to detect, investigate and prosecute those guilty of any offence, not excluding economic offences. 7. To sum up, the fact that petitioner has been in custody since 4-6-1992 at the behest of the CBI, that some information in relation to the FERA violations has come to light as a result of the CBI interrogation and that he is ready to subject himself to a custody less interrogation by the Enforcement Directorate Officers, has to be weighed against the requirements of the FERA authorities to interrogate and effectively do so a complicated and complex web of offences falling under the FERA. As always, it is the public interest which shall prevail and the request for anticipatory bail by the petitioner has to be turned down. The application fails and is hereby rejected. 8. Application rejected.
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1992 (7) TMI 349 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... anubhai P. Patel, an individual. In fact, the order passed by the Commission shows that it decided to throw the baby out with the bath water without pausing to consider how, due to any contamination in the bath water, the baby also could be thrown out. Consequently, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the controversy between the parties, these petitions are allowed. The orders of the Commission at annexure C so far as the seven petitioners are concerned are quashed and set aside. The seven applications moved by the concerned petitioners are restored to the file of the Commission with the direction to proceed further beyond the stage of section 245D(1) and to treat them as having been admitted for settlement and to deal with them in accordance with law and also to pass appropriate orders on the merits in these applications as per section 245D(4). Rules issued in these petitions are made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs in each one of them.
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1992 (7) TMI 348 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ended that it is not in all the cases that the link is snapped because of delay and for this purpose he has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of TA. Abul Rahman V. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in Judgments Today 1989 (3) S.C.444. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by Supreme Court, that the live link does not snap automatically because of the delay. But the circumstances of each case has to be viewed and weighed in each case. As pointed out above the facts of this case clearly shows that the live link between the ground of detention and the passing of order of detention stood snapped. There was nothing afresh before the detaining authority for passing the detention order even after the petitioner was released on bail on 29th November, 1990. (16) For the above reasons, I accept this petition, set aside the order of detention and the Rule issued is made absolute. The detenu be released if not required in any other case.
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1992 (7) TMI 347 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... (1)(c) as the Tribunal has not taken into consideration the advertisement published by the CBDT. Thus when the circulars of the Board clearly barred the investigation of roving nature, the CIT could not pass orders under s. 263 of the IT Act and under s. 25(2) of the WT Act, directing the Assessing Officer to find out the year of acquisition of gold ornaments and also to find out whether the ornaments in fact were purchased by somebody else than the assessee. If such directions are not of roving nature then we do not know as to what directions can be treated to be of roving nature. The assessee has followed the directives contained in answers to question Nos. 17, 23 and 24 of the Circular No. 451 issued by the Board in 1986. 8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the CIT under s. 263 of the IT Act, 1961 is not based on any materials on record and as such requires cancellation. 9. In the result all the appeals are allowed.
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1992 (7) TMI 346 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... head to another major head not in other circumstances. The purpose of the enactment is only the orderly growth of a city and it regulates each area of the city with regard to the nature of buildings that could be put up, namely, commercial, industrial or residential. When that aspect is taken care of, rest of the matters should be left to the municipal authorities and other licensing authorities who regulate the trade or other activities. Consequently, I do not think the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner will have any bearing on the interpretation of the provisions of the Act. 10. The upshot of this discussion is that when once a building is permitted to be constructed either in the category of residential, commercial or industrial, that purpose cannot be altered whatever may be the other purposes for which it is utilised in any of the groups brought under the major heads referred to by me. 11. Consequently, this petition fails and is dismissed. Rule discharged.
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1992 (7) TMI 345 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 3. We may also point out in this connection the submission made by learned counsel for the respondents that the Special Court is required to follow the procedure prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of trial offence. But while dealing with other questions which may arise before the Special Court, the court is entitled to proceed in accordance with all relevant procedural or substantive laws which may be applicable. 14. Undoubtedly, it would have been better had these powers of the Special Court been spelt out more clearly and explicitly in the Ordinance itself, or in the rules which have been framed under the Ordinance. Nevertheless the provisions of Section 3 sub-section (4) are wide enough to provide an aggrieved person with the right to a hearing and a right to have his grievance redressed before the Special Court. In the premises we do not see any reason to exercise our powers under Art. 226. The petition is therefore dismissed. 15. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to his antecedents which were not disclosed by him at the time of his appointment as Vice-Chancellor. Similarly the judgment in Dr. D.C. Saxena v. State of Haryana (1987)IILLJ360SC has no relevance to the facts of this case. 17. We, therefore, allow the appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the High Court, allow the writ petition of the appellant and quash the resolution of the Institute-Body dated November 24, 1980 and the consequent order retiring the appellant. Since the appellant has already attained the age of 62 years, there is no question of reinstating him in the office of the Director of the AIIMS. He shall, however, be entitled to his salary less the non-practising allowance, for the period from December 1, 1981 to January 21, 1984 Respondents 1 and 2 are directed to pay the arrears of the salary to the appellant within three months from today. The appellant shall also be entitled to 12 interest on the said arrears. We quantify the costs as ₹ 10,000/-.
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1992 (7) TMI 343 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... usiness as and for the business of the plaintiffs by the use of the word "Bedrock" as part of the first defendants' corporate name; and (ii) from infringing the plaintiffs' registered trade marks and/or passing off goods manufactured by anyone other than the plaintiffs, or their permitted users, by use of the word "Bedrock" in connection with such goods, (b) The above injunction in terms of prayer (a) (i) is suspended for a period of 8 weeks from today, to enable the first defendants to take steps to have their corporate name changed by adopting appropriate legal proceedings. 49. Ms. Wandrewala, learned counsel for the first defendants, orally applies for stay of the other injunction for the purpose of going in appeal. I see no reason to do so, in view of the undertaking given by Santosh Kumar Poddar dated 20th July, 1992. Application rejected. 50. Costs shall be the costs in the cause. Certified copy expedited. 51. Notice of motion made absolute.
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1992 (7) TMI 342 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... irregularity in the filing of the affidavit, the appellant should have been given an opportunity to rectify the same. 4. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Division Bench was in error in dismissing the appeal on the short ground that the affidavit filed in support of the petition was not in proper form and that the petition could not be entertained. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Division Bench dated 21 -8-1991. In the result, the Company Appeal will stated revived before the Division Bench for disposed on merits. 5. The appeal is allowed accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (7) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... aking twenty trips to Delhi they spent a seizable amount of ₹ 29,000 from their own pockets as against which they have received a sum of ₹ 5,000 only on 29th October, 1991. At one point of time they had also difficulty in procuring accommodation in Maharashtra Sadan till we passed orders in that behalf. such devotion and dedication enhances the image and prestige of the legal profession. Apart from the time actually spent on the aforesaid twenty occasions in this Court one has to merely imagine the number of hours they must have devoted for preparing the defence. We direct the State of Maharashtra to pay the outstanding amount of ₹ 24,000 which they have spent for travel and lodging and boarding expenses and we also direct that they together be paid a further sum of ₹ 25,000 by way of professional fees for rendering service as amicus curiae. The said amount will be paid to them within one month from today. Death Reference disposed of/Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 340 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the procedure provided by Note 2 and that consequently the relinguishment letters even if executed voluntarily by the teacher relinquishing his or her right tinder Rule 51A cannot result in the forfeiture or the preferential right to appointment. Rule 51A and Note 2 thereunder are based upon public policy and they are intended to prevent malpractices. Therefore the judgment of the learned. Single Judge is correct and is liable to be confirmed. In this context we may state that a learned Single Judge of this Court in Pathuma's case has taken the same view as the one we have taken in this case. We may al1986 K.L.T. 166 so add that in the decisions in Punnen v. Vasudeva Kurup 195 K.L.T. 924 and Muralidar v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1924 it has been held that a tenant cannot relinquish his rights under the Tenancy Act. The said principle is based upon public policy and the same will appf to the cases on hand. For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Appeals are dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Court decides to follow the second course, it must bear the parties fully with reference to the entire evidence on the records relevant to the issue in question and this is possible if only a proper paper book is prepared for hearing of facts and notice is given to the parties. The grounds which may be available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by the court below is vitiated in law, does not by itself lead to the further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be finally arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal of the entire evidence the ultimate conclusion may go in favour of either party and it cannot be prejudged, as has been done in the impugned judgment. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment as also the judgment of the first appellate court and remit the entire matter to the first appellate court for fresh decision of the appeal filed before it, in accordance with law. The cost will abide the final result in the case.
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1992 (7) TMI 338 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... inistrative Tribunal or Adjudicating Authority has exonerated the petitioner, then on the same facts and material criminal proceedings cannot continue and have to be ordered to be dropped. Therefore, there is no question of his seeking discharge. He is asking for quashing of those proceedings which in the eye of law are not maintainable. This to my mind, the High Court is the appropriate forum to do. The same facts and circumstances which have been gone into by the adjudicating authority and pursuance to which petitioner is exonerated I see no reason why criminal proceedings instituted against him and pending before the learned A.C.M.M. be not quashed. For quashing such proceedings, to my mind, this Court alone can do it by exercising its inherent power and therefore, I find no merit in the objection of Mr. Dass. With these observations, the petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of A.C.M.M., New Delhi are hereby quashed.
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1992 (7) TMI 337 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ers, etc., cannot amount to an attack on any political party if the criticism is genuine and objective and made in good faith. If the norms for appraisal was the same as applied by the censors while granting the U' certificate, it is difficult to understand how Doordarshan could refuse to exhibit it. It is not that it was not sent for being telecast soon after the disaster that one could say that it is outdated or has lost relevance. It is even today of relevance and the press has been writing about it periodically. The learned Additional Solicitor General was not able to point out how it could be said that the film was not consistent with accepted norms setout earlier. Doordarshan being a State controlled agency funded by public funds could not have denied access to the screen to the respondent except on valid grounds. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the High Court order. In the result both the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1992 (7) TMI 336 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t be laid at the doors of the University, directing action be taken against its officials. Though the observation of the learned Single Judge was diluted by the Division Bench, we consider such observations are not warranted in the circumstances of this case. 13. In view of the offer made by the learned Counsel for the first respondent which has come to be accepted by the learned Attorney General we uphold the impugned memorandum dated 4.4.91, subject to the following modifications 1. The period of debarment is reduced and the first respondent will be permitted to appear in the ensuing semester to be held in April 1993. 2. He shall appear and pass in all the subjects pertaining to Semesters III to VIII following the prevailing University regulations. 3. He should pass all examinations to receive the Degree on or before April, 1997. 4. The Degree certificate shall not contain any endorsement as to debarment. 14. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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