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1993 (6) TMI 251
... ... ... ... ..... ot a continuing offence and I have held this independently even without taking any support from the Supreme Court decision in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh (1981 Cri LJ 722) (supra). In spite of the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Balram Singh (supra) I am inclined to hold for reasons discussed earlier that the offence of dishonest misappropriation or criminal breach of trust is not a continuing offence and in this regard I receive support from another single Bench decision of this Court in Mohipal v. State 1986 Cal Cri LR 1. I therefore find that the prosecution in this case is barred by limitation and for this reason the proceeding in the Court below must be quashed. The other questions raised in this revisional application are however not considered or decided by me as I find that on ground of limitation the proceeding in the Court below must be quashed. The revisional application is accordingly allowed and the proceeding in the Court below is quashed.
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1993 (6) TMI 250
... ... ... ... ..... rks out to Rs. 67,000/- which shall carry interest of 11% for three years prior to the institution of the suit and 6% interest from the date of suit till realization. 51. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The respondent/plaintiff is entitled to recover Rs. 67,000/- with 11% interest thereon for the period of 3 years prior to the institution of the suit and 6% interest thereon from the date of suit till realization. It is stated at the Bar that the appellant has deposited Rs. 1,00,000/- which have been withdrawn by the respondent/contractor, by the end of August, 1985. Accordingly, the interest shall be calculated till that period. The appellant shall pay the balance of amount due within next eight weeks and respondent shall be at liberty to withdraw that amount. The amount be deposited in the trial Court. The cross-objections filed by the respondent/ contractor are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 52. Appeal partly allowed.
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1993 (6) TMI 249
... ... ... ... ..... No. 2 is also to be answered in the negative and against the assessee holding that the addition of ₹ 77,439 was correct. 11. The assessee, however, contended that the collection made during the year was ₹ 16,44,077 and the payment ₹ 17,60,781, thus, there was an excess payment of ₹ 1,23,704 but this excess payment is in the context of the current collection and current payment without taking into account the opening unpaid collection. This contention is also accepted by the Tribunal irrespective of whether the figures are correct or not, insofar as it is based upon the same premise that section 43B is not applicable and there was no case for any addition whatsoever out of the sales-tax payments. The Tribunal is directed to sort out the figures of collection payment and the disallowable amounts on the basis of the principle we have laid down. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal in this respect. There will be no order as to costs. Sen, J. - I agree.
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1993 (6) TMI 248
... ... ... ... ..... duction of that amount and the assessee's tax liability would have remained the same. Therefore, even if the sister concern now gets a deduction of the said sum of ₹ 4,02,418, it would not be better off regarding its tax liability than if the interest had been actually charged because they would have got a deduction of ₹ 6,41,618 and that too much earlier, i.e., in the assessment year 1976-77. 4. Section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act') has no application to the facts of the present case because in the case of the assessee no allowance or deduction has been made in the assessment year 1976-77. The receipt of the said amount by way of reimbursement of tax liability also does not fall within the ambit of section 28(iv) because the receipt of the said amount is not a benefit arising from the business of the assessee. In our view, the Tribunal had rightly declined to frame the question as referred to us. Rule discharged. No order as to costs.
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1993 (6) TMI 247
... ... ... ... ..... two applicants similarly situated apply on the same day but application of one is processed fast and receives sanction before the expiry of the Scheme but the other application is not processed as fast and before it is sanctioned the Scheme expires, the latter applicant shall suffer for no fault on his part. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to follow the decision of the Madras High Court. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this petition and direct the respondents to decide the application for grant of subsidy filed by the petitioner on merits on the basis of acquisition of eligibility qualifications before the expiry of the Scheme i.e. 30-9-1988. The applications before the expiry of the Scheme i.e. 30-9-1988. The application shall be decided within two months from today and if the applicant is found eligible, subsidy shall be paid within two months of the decision by the State Level Committee. There shall be no orders to costs of the petition. Security be fefunded.
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1993 (6) TMI 246
... ... ... ... ..... unting in the previous year relevant to the asst. yr. 1972-73 was not bona fide. Besides, it was not shown by the Revenue that this change lacked durability or regularity and was merely a stop gap arrangement to avoid payment of tax. The assessee trust was entitled to switch over to the cash method of accounting in view of the peculiar circumstances in which the trust was placed. This Court has also held that the income derived from trust property must be determined on commercial principles and, in doing so, all outgoings, including outgoings by way of income-tax paid by the assessee trust, must be deducted and it is only from the surplus income in the hands of the trustees that the question of application or setting apart of income can arise. 3. Following the said judgment, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1993 (6) TMI 245
... ... ... ... ..... ght. His conclusion, therefore, that the unit is not economically viable is no more than an averment unsubstantiated and unrelated to the facts and circumstances. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the second ground taken by the Additional Commissioner should also be rejected. 10.. In the light of the above, we are of the view that the application should be allowed and that the orders of the respondents rejecting the prayer of the applicant for grant of eligibility certificate should be set aside. The impugned order dated July 31, 1990, passed by the respondent No. 2 as well as the impugned order dated November 7, 1991, passed by the respondent No. 3 are accordingly set aside. The respondents are directed to grant the eligibility certificate to the applicant for the period in question as prayed for within three months from date. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. S.N. MUKHERJEE (Judicial Member).I agree. Application allowed.
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1993 (6) TMI 244
... ... ... ... ..... to be obtained from the dealer on the results of such investigation, some delay was inevitable. This could not be considered as inordinate in the facts and circumstances of the case. Non-collection of tax is an essential pre-requisite of the claim of tax exemption. As a vital requirement of eligibility has not been fulfilled, the applicant cannot legitimately urge the plea of prejudice on account of delay in the rejection of his application, when such delay was not found to be unusual regard being had to the circumstances of the case. 33.. In view of the reasons discussed above, the applicants are not entitled to get eligibility certificate for the relevant period. There is no case for interference with the order of the Additional Commissioner dated April 7, 1992. Interim order passed on July 6, 1992 by the Tribunal is vacated. 34.. In the premises, the application is dismissed on contest without any order for costs. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).I agree. Application dismissed.
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1993 (6) TMI 243
... ... ... ... ..... of Sales Tax v. T.P. Elias 1993 90 STC 25 1991 KLJ 113 . In coming to the said decision, this Bench followed the earlier Bench decisions of this Court in R.S. Narayana Shenoi v. State of Kerala 1961 12 STC 665, George v. Sales Tax Officer 1963 KLJ 769 and K.K. Ismail v. State of Kerala 1979 43 STC 123. It is unfortunate that the attention of the Appellate Tribunal was not invited to any one of these decisions when it disposed of the appeal. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal is patently against the aforesaid Bench decisions of this Court. The decision of the Appellate Tribunal is erroneous in law. 5.. On this short ground, the order of the Appellate Tribunal is set aside. This revision is allowed. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Appellate Tribunal enable it to restore the appeal to file and pass fresh orders within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The T.R.C. is allowed. Petition allowed.
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1993 (6) TMI 242
... ... ... ... ..... nd appeal, the Appellate Tribunal confirmed the assessment except in the matter of additional sales tax. The Appellate Tribunal held that levy of additional sales tax is illegal. It is thereafter, the Revenue has filed the above revision from the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated June 4, 1990 for the year 1980-81. 2.. We heard counsel for the Revenue, Senior Government Pleader Mr. V.C. James. The respondent was not represented before us. 3.. In view of the recent Supreme Court decision in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Aysha Hosiery Factory (P.) Ltd. 1992 85 STC 106, additional sales tax under the Kerala Additional Sales Tax Act can be levied on inter-State sales or purchases. The decision to the contrary by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is erroneous in law. We set aside the said decision, in so far as the Appellate Tribunal has held that the additional sales tax cannot be levied on interState sales. The revision is allowed, to the above extent. Petition allowed.
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1993 (6) TMI 241
... ... ... ... ..... ion. The order of the Appellate Tribunal impugned in the tax revision case in so far as it relates to the closing stock of goods of the nature mentioned above has also got to be set aside. 21.. We therefore dispose of the cases before us as follows W.A. Nos. 696, 697, 698, 699, 700 and 709 of 1990, and 10 of 1991 and T.R.C. No. 151 of 1991 are allowed in part. There will be a direction to the assessing authority in these cases to modify the orders of assessment marked exhibit P1 in W.A. Nos. 696, 697, 698 and 699 of 1990, exhibit P4 in W.A. No. 700 of 1990 and exhibit P9 in W.A. No. 709 of 1990, annexure II in W.A. No. 10 of 1991 and that impugned in T.R.C. No. 151 of 1991 by deleting the amounts for which the closing stock of goods kept with the assessees agents outside the State as on March 31, of the relevant assessment years were purchased, from the assessment. W.A. No. 701 of 1990 and O.P. No. 668 of 1991 are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in these cases.
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1993 (6) TMI 240
... ... ... ... ..... bserved that the Tribunal had not enquired into the nature and character of the commodities made and sold by the respondents and merely proceeded on the basis that they were all cast iron castings. In the circumstances and for the reasons stated above, we are inclined to set aside the orders of the Tribunal and remit the matters back to the Tribunal. Accordingly the tax revision cases are allowed, the orders of the Tribunal are set aside and the matters are remitted back to the Tribunal for deciding in the light of our judgment and in accordance with law after hearing both sides. The respondents before us who are the appellants before the Tribunal shall be at liberty to file additional material before the Tribunal for substantiating their cases as regards the nature and character of the goods which form the subject-matter of the disputed turnovers and the Tribunal shall give reasonable time to the respondents, if they so desire, for that purpose. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1993 (6) TMI 239
... ... ... ... ..... er of the dealer for levy of tax. This, therefore, does not suffer from the defect found by the Supreme Court in the Rajasthan Act. The case decided by the Supreme Court is thus distinguishable inasmuch as the legal provisions in that case are different. The challenge on the ground of invalidity, therefore, fails. 32.. In view of the reasons given above, the Commercial Tax Officer was within his jurisdiction to issue notice under section 14(1) on the applicant for the purpose of levy of tax under section 6D. While levying such tax, the Commercial Tax Officer will take into consideration the decision taken in this judgment. 33.. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed on contest. Interim order is vacated. There will be no order for costs. On the verbal prayer of the learned advocate for the applicant, the operation of this judgment is stayed for a period of six weeks. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1993 (6) TMI 238
... ... ... ... ..... ees are burdened with the higher rate of tax because subsequently the State Government had issued a notification on July 14, 1981, reducing the rate of tax to 5 per cent. If this notification had only been issued a little earlier the appellant would have got the benefit of the same. It is for the State Government or the Commissioner to consider whether in the particular situation the assessee before us has actually suffered any hardship. If only a few dealers, by virtue of the peculiar circumstances, are made to bear a higher tax which was really not the intention of the Revenue, we hope the State Government or the Commissioner would grant the necessary relief to the assessee. But it is not possible for us to grant the relief having regard to the law as we understand the same. Appropriate representation may be made by the assessee in this regard to the State Government or to the Commissioner or to both. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (6) TMI 237
... ... ... ... ..... se items should or should not be included in plant and machinery. The way he treated the issue does not appear to be happy, but we do not send back the case on remand, because the ultimate dispute before us was confined to only two items. Accordingly the application is dismissed without any order for costs. A copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal, so that our observation regarding writing of the order may be communicated to the appropriate officers for their guidance. The interim orders passed in this case stand vacated. Mr. S.K. Mehata, learned advocate for the applicant, makes an oral prayer for stay of operation of the judgment for ten days. The learned State Representative opposes the prayer for stay on the ground that the decision is based on mainly a finding of fact by the authorities below. After hearing both sides the prayer for stay is rejected. P.R. BALASUBRAMANIAN (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1993 (6) TMI 236
... ... ... ... ..... tax has directly impeded the free-flow of his trade, the applicant has not made out any case as to how such free movement of his trade or goods has been directly hit. Unless it is shown specifically that a particular levy directly and materially restricts free-flow of trade, it cannot be held that article 301 has been contravened. The question of resort to the proviso to article 304(b), therefore, does not arise at all. The contention of Mr. Bose in this regard thus fails. 23.. In the premises, there is no case for interference with the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner dated June 4, 1991. Interim order passed by this Tribunal on August 28, 1991, is vacated. The security deposit of Rs. 60,000 may be adjusted by the sales tax authorities against turnover tax payable by the applicant. 24.. In the result, the application is dismissed on contest without any order for cost. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1993 (6) TMI 235
... ... ... ... ..... various payments and to show how the total amount of tax paid by the assessee, especially in a case where the payments were made by cheques, is less than the admitted tax due. This has not been done. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is vague and of a sweeping nature. It discloses an error of law. We are of the view that the Appellate Tribunal should be directed to look into the matter over again in the light of the annexures appended to the tax revision cases. 4.. We, therefore, set aside the common order passed by the Appellate Tribunal dated June 8, 1990, for the years 1978-79 and 1979-80, and direct the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Additional Bench, Ernakulam to restore the appeals to file and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. The details of the annexures, appended to the tax revision cases, shall be forwarded by the Government Pleader to the Appellate Tribunal for its perusal and adjudication. 5.. The tax revision cases are allowed. Petitions allowed.
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1993 (6) TMI 234
... ... ... ... ..... lower authorities and in sustaining the addition to 50 per cent of the unsupported purchases as per accounts to cover up the omissions estimated. This is for the year 1986-87. No modification was made for the year 1987-88. Having found that the returns and accounts are not acceptable for both the years, the Appellate Tribunal gave quantum relief, for the year 1986-87, but declined to do so for the year 198788. In a case where the accounts are rejected and best judgment assessment is warranted, the quantum of estimate to be made is largely a question of fact. As the final fact-finding authority, the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has given detailed reasons in the common order dated December 2, 1991 for sustaining the estimates made. The order of the Appellate Tribunal does not suffer from any error of law. 7.. Even on the merits, T.R.C. Nos. 124 and 125 of 1992 should fail. All the three tax revision cases are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1993 (6) TMI 233
... ... ... ... ..... e observations contained in the judgment dated July 3, 1987. 5.. Incidentally we should clear any lurking doubt with regard to the communication of the Board of Revenue and the Government order referred to in the Bench decision in Antony s case 1992 86 STC 196 (Ker) 1991 1 KLT 358. Exhibits P1 and P2 communications of the Board of Revenue and the Government respectively referred to in paragraph 7 of the judgment or their legal effect were not considered in the said judgment. We should also add that exhibit P1 communication of the Board of Revenue referred to therein is one dated December 30, 1967 and exhibit P2 order of Government referred to in the said judgment is one dated January 30, 1968. The order of the Board of Revenue, which is relevant in the instant case, is one dated April 28, 1970 and the order of the Government which is relevant is one dated August 21, 1984. This aspect shall be borne in mind in considering the appeals afresh by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal.
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1993 (6) TMI 232
... ... ... ... ..... my. While revising or revoking such schemes it has, of course, to be ensured that there is no violation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. But a promise cannot be kept open-ended for an indefinite period by the Government, in case of a promisee, who just takes a few preliminary steps with regard to the project and does not pursue its implementation with due diligence and vigour but lies dormant for quite some time without any reasonable cause and then resumes work and completes it long after he had due notice of the termination of the scheme in question. In such circumstances, can he be allowed to take the plea of promissory estoppel and resort to the principle of equity? The answer is obviously no. 46.. It will be evident from the foregoing discussion that the facts of the cases do not have the essential ingredients of the rule of promissory estoppel. 47.. In the result, the applications fail and are dismissed on contest with no order for costs. Applications dismissed.
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