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Showing 1 to 20 of 228 Records
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1994 (8) TMI 321 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e appellant at the initial stages of the Enquiry. On the other hand, as noted earlier he allowed the Enquiry to merrily proceed to its logical end took a chance of a favourable verdict and ultimately having found that the Report had gone against him, he turned-round and sought to challenge the Report on such a technical plea. This conduct on the part of the appellant has resulted in the respondent irritrievably changing their position to their detriment and consequently even on the ground of estoppel the appellant cannot raise such a contention after the gamut of the entire enquiry is order and the Report has gone against him. 34. In that view of the matter, we find no reason to interfere with the Judgment impugned nor do we consider it necessary to pronounce upon the question as to the true scope and ambit of Statute 13. We leave that question open. 35. In the result this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 320 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... arge of the debts at any time. I do not think that would have been the intention of the Legislature while incorporating section 138 in the Negotiation Instruments Act. Though, the appellant did not state the circumstances under which he obtained the Pronote and the cheque in his complaint yet it is clear from the evidence the circumstances under which the complainant obtained a signed blank cheque from the respondent. So, the appellant has obtained this blank signed cheque with a view to make use of it, as a threat to the respondents for realisation of the amount. So, it cannot be construed that the respondent had issued the cheque voluntarily for discharge of any debt or legal liability as envisaged under section 138. I, therefore, find that the facts and circumstances of the case are not attracted by the provisions of section 138 of the Act and that the learned Magistrate was justified in acquitting the accused. Hence, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. 11. Appeal dismissed.
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1994 (8) TMI 319 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ubstance of the matter and not act on mere technicality". As was also observed in a much earlier five-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Pratap Singh 1955 2 SCR 1029 , the tendency of the Courts towards technicality is to be deprecated for "it is the substance that counts" and must take precedence over mere form or technicality. We are satisfied that in this case the representation made by the detenu was in fact, in effect and in substance considered by the appropriate authority. As already indicated, we answer Question No. 3 in the negative. 19. Having thus answered the questions referred to us for our consideration, we would now direct that the writ petition filed by the detenu shall be placed before the appropriate Bench forthwith for final disposal on the other questions involved. The office is directed to take immediate steps so that the matter may be placed before the appropriate Bench during the course of the next week. 20. Ordered accordingly.
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1994 (8) TMI 318 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te gives the drawer time of 15 days for making payment and if he pays that amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, the offence would not be committed. For the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to consider the question as to what would be the consequence if the payee voluntarily gives more than 15 days for payment while issuing the notice. In the case referred to above, the notice had given 30 days time for payment and possibly that may be the reason why that notice was held invalid. But in the present case, the fact that the notice gives 7 days time for payment does not render it invalid. After considering all questions raised in this petition, I do not find any good ground to quash the proceeding. This petition is rejected. 15. However, it is made clear that any observations made by this court on the factual aspects of the case may not be taken into consideration at the time of appreciation of the evidence by the trial court after conclusion of the trial.
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1994 (8) TMI 317 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... display callousness and disregard of the discharge of their duties and make it impossible to the superior or controlling officers to extract legitimate work from them. The writing of the confidentials is contributing to make the subordinates work at least to some extent. Therefore, writing the confidential reports objectively and constructively and communication thereof at the earliest would pave way for amends by erring subordinate officer or to improve the efficiency in service. At the same time, the subordinate-employee/officer should dedicate to do hard work and duty; assiduity in the discharge of the duty, honesty with integrity in performance thereof which alone would earn his usefulness in retention of his service. Both would contribute to improve excellence in service. 12. Accordingly the appeal is allowed. The order of the compulsory retirement is set aside and the O.A. is accordingly allowed with all consequential benefits and with costs quantified as ₹ 5,000.
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1994 (8) TMI 316 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... . Sen, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1994 (8) TMI 315 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... by their transfers. If even a few of them follow his example and challenge the transfer in courts, the appellant would be spending his time defending his actions instead of doing the work for which he holds the office. Challenge in courts of a transfer when the career prospects remain unaffected and there is no detriment to the government servant must be eschewed and interference by courts should be rare, only when a judicially manageable and permissible ground is made out. This litigation was ill-advised. 25. We do hope that this would be a passing phase in the service career of the appellant and his crusader's zeal would be confined to the sphere of his official activity for improving the image and quality of public service of the police force, in which he holds a high office. By achieving that purpose, he would render much greater public service. These observations are apposite in the present context. 26. The appeal is dismissed for the reasons given by us. No costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 314 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r-of-Attorney. He held the property in cestui que trust for and on behalf of the respondent though he fraudulently got inserted his name in the sale-certificate issued by the court without the respondent's knowledge and consent. Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act does not stand in the way for the declaration of title and possession of the plaint schedule property. The courts below were, therefore, wrong in dismissing the suit relying on Section 66(1) of C.P.C. The High Court was perfectly right in reversing the decree of the appellant court and that of the trial court and decreeing the suit as prayed for. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Since the petitioner has fraudulently acted and abused judicial process, the special leave petition is dismissed with exemplary costs of ₹ 10,000. The costs would go to the Supreme Court legal Aid Committee. (The order be communicated to the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee for the recovery of the amount).
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1994 (8) TMI 313 - THE COMPANY LAW BOARD, NORTHERN REGION BENCH, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... the petitioner-bank disowns the second contract and has gone on a theory of implied bailment/pledge or alternate security for the first contract. In the circumstances, the only transaction that subsists regarding IRFC bonds is the one between KVB and SCB. Though the petitioner-bank has attempted to challenge the transaction by pointing out certain discrepancies in figures, the overwhelming evidence submitted by all the other parties shows the genuineness of the transaction. 56. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the true owner of these IRFC bonds should be SCB. Accordingly, we direct IRFC to register SCB as the holder of the 9 per cent IRFC bonds covered in the petition and deliver the securities in its possession to SCB after due registration. IRFC shall also pay all arrears of interest due on these bonds. Consequently, the interim order with regard to the deposit of interest stands vacated and the FD along with interest shall also be paid to SCB. No order as to costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 312 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... etitioner-Society will be paid 50% of the premium and, therefore, the impugned orders are not vulnerable or assailable. We have gone through the impugned orders passed by the District Registrar and the Joint Registrar and we find that they do not suffer from any legal error, which may warrant any interference by this Court. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in contentions Nos. 6 and 7 and the same are rejected. 16. All the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners by Mr. Zaveri, therefore fail. We do not find any merit in this Special Civil Application so as to warrant any interference under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India and accordingly this Special Civil Application is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim order dated 19-11-1981, which was continued thereafter by further orders, shall continue further for a period of eight weeks only as prayed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 311 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the power may be used after the summons are issued and no question regarding the maintainability of an application by the defendants bringing to the notice of the trial Court any ground on which the plaint is liable to be rejected can arise. If the Court can reject a plaint suo motu and that too before admitting the plaint it certainly can do it at a later stage before the defendants have filed their written statement. 18. In the result the petition is bound to succeed and thus the Order dated 10-4-1990 of the trial Court is hereby quashed and set aside. The learned Civil Judge is directed to entertain the petitioners' application under Order 7, Rule 11 on its merits and dispose it of as per the law, at the earliest, preferably within 8 weeks from the date of the receipt of this judgment since already a long period of time has elapsed after the filing of the suit. Rule accordingly made absolute, in the above terms with however no order as to costs. 19. Order accordingly.
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1994 (8) TMI 310 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... nruffled and calm in the midst of contending forces. To recall the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Franklin S. Pollak 343 US 451096 Law. Ed. 1068 The Judicial process demands that a judge move within the framework of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted. 34. With this we leave. 35. Civil appeal No. 5525/94 arising out S.L.P. (C) No. 16577 of 1993 and Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 880 of 1993 are dismissed. No costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 309 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... om the Divisional Officer to the effect that the proposal was required to be accepted by the Central Office in order to complete the contract. But, that by itself cannot be a ground to hold that the contract was concluded on mere submission of the proposal. In view of what has been said by the Supreme Court, non-communication by the Divisional Office or by the Central Office to the effect that the insurance contract will be complete only after the acceptance of the proposal cannot be construed as acceptance of the same. 15. For the reasons stated above, we hold that there was no concluded contract of insurance between the defendant-Corporation and the deceased before his death. In the absence of such a contract, the Corporation is not liable to pay the amount to the plaintiff as claimed by her. 16. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Sub Judge and dismissed the suit. The parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.
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1994 (8) TMI 308 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... out following any procedure known to law. There, has, thus, been a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and the appellant has been made to suffer huge financial loss without being heard. Fair play in action warrants that no such order which has the effect of an employee suffering civil consequences should be passed without putting the concerned to notice and giving him a hearing in the matter. Since, that was not done, the order (memorandum) dated 25.7.1991. which was impugned before the Tribunal could not certainly be sustained and the Central Administrative Tribunal fell in error in dismissing the petition of the appellant. The order of the Tribunal deserves to be set aside. We, accordingly, accept this appeal and set aside the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 17.9,1993 as well as the order (memorandum) impugned before the Tribunal dated 25.7.1991 reducing the basic pay of the appellant From ₹ 190 to ₹ 181 w.e.f. 18.12,1970.
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1994 (8) TMI 307 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oners an endorsement was made by their learned Advocates that it is not possible to produce them and by filing Purshis he has closed the evidence. Not only that even after the arguments were heard an application Exh. 125 was given by the petitioners for permitting them to appear for cross-examination. The said application was also granted by the tribunal by fixing a date for the petitioners to remain present, however, for the reasons best known, the petitioners did not remain present. Under the circumstances, the tribunal dismissed the application and, in my view, rightly so. Since the petitioners have failed to prove their case about the injury sustained by them, about the treatment they have taken and the expenses incurred by them for the treatment, the tribunal rightly dismissed the claim of the petitioners. In this view of the matter, the ld. Advocate for the petitioners has failed to make out any case for my interference in these applications. Hence, rejected in limine.
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1994 (8) TMI 306 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to have allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Case law discussed. AIR 1968 SC 247-Distinguished." 8. I, therefore, deem it proper to quash order Ann. B as being violative of principles of natural justice with liberty to respondent No. 1 to issue show-cause notice to the petitioner, if felt necessary, and hear it before passing any order. On such opportunity being given, the petitioner shall have right to contest the competence also and respondent No. 1 shall, after hearing the petitioner, pass a reasoned order. 9. In case respondent No. 1 concluded against the petitioner and passed an adverse order, the petitioner shall have freedom to impugne the same before an appropriate authority in conformity with law. Points agitated in this petition shall thus be treated open and litigable. 10. This petition thus stands allowed in terms indicated above but without any order as to costs. Security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner, after due verification.
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1994 (8) TMI 305 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... dated January 5, 1972, party No. 2 had specifically admitted that right of worship is available to all the parties. 49. Before we conclude we may mention that the award has been acted upon by the parties to a considerable extent in the sense that during the pendency of the proceedings in court the objectors (parties Nos. 3 and 6) as well as other parties - have alienated a number of properties which have been allotted to their share under the award. Some of the sale deeds or agreements for sell were executed by respondent No. 14 claiming full ownership on the basis of the impugned award. This is an additional circumstance which persuades us to hold that the award made by the arbitrator should be maintained and should not be upset. 50. The appeal is therefore, allowed. The Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the Additional District & Sessions Judge for making the award the rule of the court is restored. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1994 (8) TMI 304 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
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... ... ..... nt is a technician. The facts stated in the petition show that he has not been a resident in India in any of the four financial years preceding the financial year 1993-94. He has arrived in India after April 1, 1993, as required by the section. The applicant is, therefore, entitled to the exemption granted under section 10(5B), viz., that if any tax has been paid by his employer (W. I. P. L.) on the salaries paid to him for the services rendered by him as a foreign technician such tax would not be included in his total income for a period of forty-eight months from the date of his arrival in India. Ruling. The Ruling of the Authority on the two questions set out in the application is (1) On the stated facts of the case, the exemption under section 10(5B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is available to the applicant. (2) On the stated facts of the case, the applicant is a "technician" within the meaning of the Explanation to section 10(5B) of the Income- tax Act, 1961.
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1994 (8) TMI 303 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ot; with a black rectangular background of the word 'White' before the words "TVs and FM Radios", the appellant has also mentioned words "For Colour/Black & White TVs. and FM Radios". Again, we do not find that the manner in which the said words are written by both the parties on their respective Cartons are likely to misguide or confuse the buyers. This is apart from the fact that whereas the respondent-plaintiff's carton is in black and white the appellant's carton is fully in colour. 6. Hence we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court. It is made clear that the observations made above are only for deciding whether the appellant should be restrained from using the trade mark, the logo and the carton, at this interim stage." The High Court will not be precluded from coming to a different conclusion at the final hearing on perusing the entire evidence before it. The costs will be the costs in the cause.
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1994 (8) TMI 302 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o application to the facts in this case. In that case, for the posts of Motor Vehicles Inspector, apart from the qualifications prescribed, they issued additional qualifications and selection was sought to be made on the basis of additional qualifications. It was held that since recruitment was sought to be made on the basis of the qualifications prescribed, the additional qualifications prescribed thereafter have no retrospective effect to the recruitment already set in motion. Under those circumstances, additional qualifications were directed not to be taken into account for considering the claims of the candidates on the basis of the original advertisement. The ratio therein is clearly inapplicable to the facts in this case. 7.The appeal is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances without costs. The State is directed to issue fresh notification within a period of six weeks from the date of the receipt of this order for recruitment in accordance with the amended Rules.
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