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Showing 21 to 40 of 375 Records
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1995 (3) TMI 483 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... alifications laid down by the Central law, they act unconstitutionally. So also when the State authorities derecognise or disaffiliate an institution for not satisfying the standards or requirement laid down by them, although it satisfied the norms and requirements laid down by the central authority, the State authorities act illegally. 45. We find nothing in the impugned judgment of the High Court which is contrary to or inconsistent with the propositions of law laid down above. Hence we dismiss the appeals and the special leave petitions with costs. 46. As a result, as has been pointed out earlier, the provisions of the Central statute on the one hand and of the State statutes on the other, being inconsistent and, therefore, repugnant with each other, the Central statute will prevail and the derecognition by the State Government of the, disaffiliation by the, State University on grounds which are inconsistent wit those enumerated in the Central statute will be inoperative.
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1995 (3) TMI 482 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ose a tax" ; and so, the imposition of which section 60 speaks of, is of a tax proposed to be imposed by the Board, and not a tax which had already been imposed by the time the Act came to be enforced. 61. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the collection of octroi by the appellant at the enhanced rates, mentioned in the schedule of 1963 Rules, without there having been compliance of what was required by section 62 of the aforesaid Act. Conclusion 62. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the 1881 Notification did in fact permit the appellant to collect octroi duties at the rates specified in 1963 Octroi Rules framed by the appellant; and there was no obstacle in law in allowing the appellant to do so. 63. The appeals are allowed accordingly by setting aside the impugned judgment, with the result that the writ petitions filed in the High Court by the respondents stand dismissed. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 481 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fter all this was over, the respondent approached the High Court by way of a writ petition questioning the order of his dismissal which was transferred to the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal has set aside the said dismissal order on the ground that no ample opportunity was given to the respondent to show cause against the action proposed. The Tribunal holds that though the respondent did not show cause pursuant to the show-cause notice, yet it was obligatory upon the authority to consider the appropriate punishment called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. In our opinion, the said principle can make no difference in the facts of this case. Here, the respondent has been convicted for corruption and there can be nothing short of dismissal in such cases. No other lesser punishment can be contemplated in such cases. 3. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the Tribunal is set aside and the order of dismissal is restored. No costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 480 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ataswami, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 479 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... declared that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and defendant Nos. 1 to 2B are restrained by an order of permanent injunction from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the suit property in any manner. 2. It is hereby declared that the two notifications, one published by the first defendant in No. KTW 531, ASR/74/7490 dated 21-4-1976 and the Gazette Notification at page N. 608/Part VI dated 8-7-1976 relating to the suit property are illegal and void. 3. The order passed by the first defendant in No.WKF.SR.6(v) dated 10-1-1980 directing the plaintiff to hand over possession of the suit property to the managing Mutawalli is illegal and not binding on the plaintiff. 4. The concerned Revenue Authorities are directed to delete the entries in the revenue records which stand in the name of the second defendant in respect of the suit property. 28. The appeal is dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in this appeal. 29. Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 478 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... akhs and balance amount was assured to be deposited only after delivery of possession. That also would be illegal. 5.Accordingly, the sale and confirmation thereof on 29.8.90 are set aside. The appeal is remanded to the High Court and the appropriate single Judge would proceed to conduct the sale in accordance with law by open auction after due publi- cation of the sale so that all the intending bidders would have opportunity to participate in the sale. Thereafter, it would take action according to law. Since it is a suit for foreclosure and the preliminary decree has become final, it is not open to any party to widen the scope of the suit or sale made pursuant to the preliminary decree. If any party has got any other right or remedy, the same has to be worked out elsewhere, according to law and not in this suit. We are not expressing any opinion with regard to the rights, if any, of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the property. 6.The appeal is allowed with no orders as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 477 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e withdrawn and some additional facts are sought to he introduced, it would be inconsistent and the High Court was not justified in permitting such an amendment. We find no force in the contention. It is settled law that even the admission can be explained and even inconsistent pleas could be taken in the pleadings. It is seen that in paragraph 6 ot the written statement definite stand was taken hut subsequently in the application for amendment, it was sought to be modified as indicated in the petition. In that view of the matter, we find that there is no material irregularity committed by the High Court in exercising its power under Section 115 C.P.C. in permit-ting amendment of the written statement. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs, Since the terms of the agreement are subject matter in the suit, it would be open to the parties while adducing evidence to explain the terms and conditions of the convenant and the circumstances in which they came to be executed.
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1995 (3) TMI 476 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... an be condoned by the appellate Court on showing sufficient cause. The Court passing the judgment or order has no jurisdiction to grant time for filing an appeal. Admittedly the appeal is to be decided by a Division Bench of this Court and if delay is required to be condoned, it can be condoned by a Division Bench of this Court and the learned single Judge who passed the impugned judgment had no jurisdiction to decide any point which is the subject-matter of the appeal. Even if the decision is right on merit, it is by a forum which is lacking in competence in regard to the subject-matter. Even a right decision by a wrong forum is no decision. It is non-existent in the eye of law and hence a nullity (See AIR 1987 SC 533). 18. In view of the above, this ground of Mr. Potsangbam also fails. There is no merit in the condonation applications and, accordingly, all the misc. cases are dismissed. 19. However, in the facts and circumstances of the cases, we make no order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 475 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on taken by the Intelligence Officers under S. 45a of me Act. The conclusion arrived at by us is that an officer of the department who is conferred state-wide jurisdiction by the Government by notification can initiate action under S. 45a of the Act as against dealers having business anywhere in the State and that action can never be held to be without jurisdiction on the ground that such officer is not having jurisdiction over any local limits. The contrary view taken by the learned Single Judge in Sivaramakrishnan's case ,1994 KLJ (Tax cases) 369, is not correct and we overrule the same. In these proceedings we are not to examine the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the officers under S. 45a of the Act. Petitioner are having effective alternate remedy by way of revision against those orders. Without prejudice to their rights to challenge the impugned orders as per the provisions of the Act, Original Petitions are dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 474 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t from the fact that they tried to establish their case de novo by leading fresh evidence. Though this is so, we are of the view that the defendents were wrongly advised and we have to set right the dent caused to the decision of the Privy Council. The only way available to is in this proceeding to do so is to restore the view that taken by that high powered Committee. 12. We hold that plaintiff could not have taken stand in the present proceeding that Shivalingayya's nomination and installation as Padadayya was invalid, which would render his entire exercise futile and one akin to shadow boxing. It may also be stated that his suit was either barred by limitation or was hit by the provisions contained in Section 50 read with 51 of the Act. 13. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, with the result that the suit filed by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 473 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y the, State Government in its direction exceeds the area of policy, the Board may not be bound by it unless it takes the same view on merits itself 9.In the present case, the flat rate per H.P. for the agricultural pump sets indicated by the State Government, appears to have been found acceptable by the Board as appropriate particularly because it is related to the policy of concessional tariff for the agriculturists as a part of the economic programme. At any rate, there is no material in the present case to indicate that the flat rate indicated by the State Government for the agricultural pump sets was so unreasonable that it could not have been considered appropriate by the Board. We do not consider it necessary to go into the larger question of the exact area of policy in the context of Section 78A except to indicate broadly as we have already done. We do not find any merit even in this point urged on behalf of the appellants. 10.Consequently, the appeals are dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 472 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... Justice S.C. Sen Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 471 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decision in The Manager, Government Branch Press and Anr. v. D.B. Belliappa in support of his submission that administrative orders affecting the rights . of citizens should contain reasons therefore. We are afraid, the said principle cannot be extended to matters of selection. Unless the rules so require, the Selection Committee/Selection Board is not obliged to record reasons why they are not selecting a particular person and/or why they are selecting a particular person, as the case may be. If the said decision is sought to be relied upon with respect to the adverse remarks made against the appellant, the attack should fail for the reason that the memo containing adverse remarks in this case does set out the particulars in support of the same. It is equally relevant to note that no allegation of mala fides or arbitrariness has been leveled against the Chief of the Army Staff who made the said remarks. 19. For all the above reasons, we dismiss the appeal but without costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 470 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... en, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 469 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rvice in terms of Rule 3(2) read with appendix A' and allot the posts ineach year of allotment as contemplated under rule 12 read with Rule 5(2)(a) and issue orders appointing substantively to the respective posts within the quota and determine the inter se seniority between the appellants promotees and R.R. Sheoran, direct recruits in the respective quota cadre posts of Executive Engineers etc. within four months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The inter se seniority of promotees and direct recruits shall be determined accordingly. All the inpugned promotions or those pending proceedings in the High Court or in this Court shall be subject to the above determination and the status quo would continue till the appointments according to the rules are made and seniority is determined in the light of the law declared in this judgment. The appeals is disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Appeal disposed of
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1995 (3) TMI 468 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... affects the creditworthiness of the prosecution case to a great extent. 22.From a critical analysis of the material on the record, we find that it would not be safe to rely upon the sole testimony of PW3 Gurmej Singh, the brother of the deceased, without independent corroboration in view of the infirmities pointed out by us above which render his testimony as not wholly reliable and since in the present case no such independent corroboration is available on the record, it would be unsafe to rely upon the testimony of PW3 only to uphold the conviction of the appellant. The prosecution has not been able to establish the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court, therefore, fell in error in convicting and sentencing the appellant. His conviction and sentence cannot be sustained. This appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged.
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1995 (3) TMI 467 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fy our invoking the power under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution to award to the contemner a suspended sentence of imprisonment together with suspension of his practice as an advocate in the manner directed herein. We accordingly sentence the contemner for his conviction for the offence of criminal contempt as under (11.1) The contemner is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks. However, in the circumstances of the case, the sentence will remain suspended for a period of four years and may be activated in case the contemner is convicted for any other offence of contempt of court within the said period, (11.2) The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an advocate for a period of three years from today with the consequence that all elective and nominated offices/posts at presents held by him in his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him forthwith. The contempt petition is disposed of in the above terms.
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1995 (3) TMI 466 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tions of service, etc., of teachers and other persons in college is referable to Section 17 of the Act and there is nothing in Section 17 and Rule 11 to indicate that they are confined in their application to colleges other than technical educational institutions and that there is no reason why the conditions of service of teachers in technical education institutions should not be governed by Rule 11. We find no substance in this contention. Once it is found that on a proper construction the Act and the Rules do no apply to professional and technical educational institutions then none of the provisions of the Rules, including Rule 11, can be said to apply to professional and technical educational institutions and it is not Possible to say that some of the provisions of the Rules we applicable while others do not apply to such institutions. 22.For the reasons aforementioned we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1995 (3) TMI 465 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es not owe any further amount to the petitioner-company. Under these circumstances, we find that there was no justification by the department to issue fresh garnishee order against the bankers of the petitioner-company and to ask it to pay the amount demanded. For these reasons, we are of the view that this petition deserves to be allowed by quashing the impugned garnishee order dated February 28, 1995. 5.. In the result, this petition succeeds and it is hereby allowed. The impugned notice/order under section 17 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, issued on February 28, 1995 against the second respondent is hereby quashed. It is needless to say that in the light of the ultimate order that we have passed in this petition, the second respondent is bound to honour cheques issued by the petitioner-company without taking into account the garnishee order issued against it by the department and quashed by us by this order. No order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 464 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t suffer from any legal infirmity or constitutional infirmity or legislative incompetence warranting any interference by this Court under article 226 of the Constitution and no question of vires is involved in the context in which learned counsel has raised the question of vires in view of the clarification made above that under sub-section (3) of section 4-A, Commissioner of Sales Tax can cancel or modify or amend the eligibility certificate if he finds that the facility of exemption has been misused in any manner whatsoever or any of the conditions on which facility was granted has been violated. 14.. In the instant case, since the revision of petitioners is pending before this Court, we have refrained ourselves from making any discussion about the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner except the discussions which were necessary to clarify the legal position. With the above observations, this writ petition is disposed of finally. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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