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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 311 Records
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1996 (5) TMI 427 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... High Courts are requested to issue necessary directions in this behalf to all the criminal courts under their control and supervision. 6. The criminal courts and all courts trying criminal cases shall take appropriate action in accordance with the above directions. These directions are applicable not only to the cases pending on this day but also to cases which may be instituted hereafter. As and when, a particular case gets covered by one or the other direction mentioned in Directions (1) and (2) read with Direction (4) above, appropriate orders shall be passed by the concerned court without any delay. The writ petition is disposed of with the above directions No costs. Note The Registrars of the High Courts are requested to communicate copies of this Order to all the criminal courts under the control and superintendence of the respective High Courts with a direction to send compliance reports to the High Court within three months from the date of receipt of communication.
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1996 (5) TMI 426 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (for short the ’Act’) the State Government declared the notified market area with annexures thereto. Under annexure ’A’ to the notification it was stated that the area falling within a radius of 8 kms. from the plots specified in Schedule B are within the notified area. In schedule B it was mentioned that the area comprising in Attabira and Bheden Police Station in the District of Sambalpur are within the notified area. It is now seen that the villages Saharatikira and Bheden are situated within the 8 kms. radius from the aforesaid police stations. Under these circumstances, the villages do fall within the notified area. The respondent admittedly are doing purchase of paddy from the notified area. Consequently, they shall be required to pay market fee under the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court dated March 21, 1991 in OJC no. 2337/85 stands set aside. no costs. The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawan.
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1996 (5) TMI 425 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the High Court and the said view of this Court is binding under Articles 141 of the constitution. For the reasons aforementioned the judgments of The High Court under challenge in both the appeals whereby it has been held that the respondents are entitled to be considered for appointment on the basis of the Scheme cannot be sustained and have to be set aside. The appeals are, there-fore, allowed, the impugned judgments of the High Court dated June 29 1995 in Civil Rule No. 171 of 1993 and Civil Rule No. 936 of 1993 are set aside and the said writ petition filed by the respondents are dismissed. No costs. By order dated September 22, 1995, this Court, while directing that notice be issued to the respondent Special Leave petition (Civil) No. 20376 of 1995, also directed the petitioners to deposit for contesting this petition. The said amount had been deposited and has been permitted to be withdrawn by the respondent in the said matter. The said amount shall be retained by him.
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1996 (5) TMI 424 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner has in fact filed a complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C. for taking ognizance against the officer concerned for using a forged document in charging the petitioner. This complaint of the petitioner is pending before the Special Judge (CBI) Patna. It is perhaps on account of the fear of being found guilty on forgery document that the Regional C.B.I. Officers are reluctant to withdraw the charge against the petitioner. That is why after having a short adjournment on 6 occasions from this Court to enable them to withdraw the proceedings against the petitioner, the C.B.I. has changed its stand and even their Senior Counsel in his place." We cannot simply ignore the above extracts from the rejoinder affidavit in the facts and the circumstances of the case. To put it mildly we observe that we are not at all happy about the way in which the C.B.I. has conducted itself in this case. We are sure that the department will not give room for such observations in the future.
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1996 (5) TMI 423 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ew taken is affirmed. We also set aside the judgment of the Ernakulam Bench which declared the memorandum as invalid; so too of the Patna Bench in appeal SLP(C) No.15438 of 1994 qua respondent No.1. We also state that cases of respondents 2 to 4 in appeals SLP(C) Nos.2533-34 of 1994 do not stand on different footing. 18. Despite the aforesaid conclusion of ours, we are of the view that the recovery of the amount already paid because of the aforesaid judgments of the Tribunals would cause hardship to the concerned respondents/appellants and, therefore, direct the Union of India and its officers not to recover the amount already paid. This part of our order shall apply (1) to the respondents/appellants who are before this Court and (2) to that pre-1987 Apprentice in whose favour judgment had been delivered by any CAT and which had become final either because no appeal was carried to this Court or, if carried, the same was dismissed. This benefit would be available to no other.
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1996 (5) TMI 422 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... atent Appeal stands attracted In consequence, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stands attracted to Letters Patent Appeal insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded either by special or local law Since the rules made on the appellate side, either for entertaining the appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent or appeals arising under the contempt of courts, had not expressly excluded, Section 4 of the Limitation Act becomes applicable we hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does apply to appeals filed against the order to the learned single Judge for the enforcement by way of a contempt. The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. The delay stands condoned. Since the High Court had not dealt with the matter on merits, we decline to express any opinion on merits. The case stands remitted to the division bench for decision on merits. The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1996 (5) TMI 421 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to prove the legal necessity and substantial portion of the sale consideration went into the discharge of the antecedent debts. The First Appellate Court has given a clear finding on this. Having regard to the long lapse of time when the suit was instituted, challenging the alienation, nothing more could be expected from the purchasers to prove the legal necessity and the application of sale consideration. o p /o p In the view we have taken on the facts of this case, it is not necessary in this case for us to consider the correctness of the view expressed by the High Court that the amount reserved for the discharge/payment of future instalments of ’kuri’ subscription would not amount to antecedent debt to bind the minor. o p /o p In the circumstances, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgement and decree of the High Court and restore the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, dismissing the suit. However, there will be no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1996 (5) TMI 420 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... an, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 419 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd Badi", i.e. Mangori have been used while in entry No.3 of the notification after the words "letter head pads" the words "other stationery articles made of handmade paper" have been used meaning thereby that entry No.3 is not restricted to only invitation cards, envelopes, file covers, letter heads pads but also includes other stationery articles made of handmade paper. The question is whether the ingredients of papad are exclusively composed of the pulses or maida or rice, etc? When the notification mentions papad and Badi, i.e. Mangori it would appear that they did not intend to differentiate between gole or flat papad made of any ingredient. Under those circumstances it appears that the interpretation given by the High Court is not correct and that of Tribunal is correct. The appeal is allowed and if there is any difficulty it would be open to the Govt. to make necessary declaration in exemption notification itself by way of amendment. No costs.
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1996 (5) TMI 418 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Firm v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1991 U. P. T. C. 918. That was a case in which the Income Tax Officer initiated action for reassessment under Section 147 (b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on coming to know of a recent judicial decision of which he was not aware at the time of the original assessment. It was held that the judicial decision constituted information on the basis of which reassessment proceedings could be initiated. In the case before us the Audit Party provided the information which was already on record but to which the sales tax officer did not advert his attention while framing the original assessment. Thus he had a reason to believe that by virtue of the said omission the turnover of peas had escaped assessment and, therefore, he had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings. In our view, therefore, there is no illegality in the notices issued by the respondent and the writ petition has to be dismissed with costs. 10. The writ petition fails and is dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 417 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... claim beyond time which has been rejected by the Tribunal or the High Court, the claimant does not challenge the same and allows the said judicial order to become final. The aforesaid Amending Act shall be of no help to such claimant. The reason being that a judicial order saying that such petition of claim was barred by limitation has attained finality. But that principle will not govern cases where the dispute as to whether petition for claim having been filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident is pending consideration either before the Tribunal, High Court or this Court. In such cases, the benefit of amendment of subsection (3) of Section 166 should be extended. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court. We direct the Tribunal to entertain the petition for claim filed on behalf of the appellant and to dispose of the same as early as possible in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (5) TMI 416 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... rnan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 415 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e insurance cover to ensure that their interests are fully protected in all events." In view of the above consideration and findings we are of the opinion that the national Commission was right in limiting the liability undertaken in the contract entered into by the. parties and in awarding the amount for deficiency service to the extent of the liability undertaken by the respondent. Therefore, we do not think that there is any illegality in the order passed by the Commission. Shri Krishnamani has brought to our notice that there are number of judgments covering divergent views. In view of the view we have expressed above, it is now settled law and the Tribunals would follow the same. Lastly, it is Contended that besides the amounts awarded by the State Commission, liberty may be given to the. appellant to pursue the remedy available in law. It is needless to mention that the remedy available at law would be pursued accordingly to law. The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (5) TMI 414 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed at all times. The enlistment of the direct recruits, allocated to Customs Houses on the basis of their selection, would obviously present no difficulty. Equally enlistment of promottee Appraisers, since coming from feeder sources of Customs Houses, from the date of their promotion, would present no difficulty. Both would be entitled to placement in the joint seniority list on the basis of their continuous officiation. We thus go to uphold the orders of the Tribunal to this extent that a fresh All India Combined List of Appraisers be prepared by the respondents on the basis of continuous officiation of the incumbent in the post of Appraiser appointed on and from the date of the Customs Appraisers Service, Class II Recruitment Rules 1961, But for Appraisers appointed prior to that date the rule of Mervyn Continho would be the basis to work Out the inter seniority of the incumbents to operate the quota and rotational rule. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly, No costs.
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1996 (5) TMI 413 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Government is bound by the previous policy or whether it can revise its policy in view of the changed potential foreign markets and the need for earning foreign exchange?
Held that:- Grant of licence depends upon the policy prevailing as on the date of the grant of the licence. The Court, therefore, would not bind the Government with a policy which was existing on the date of application as per previous policy. A prior decision would not bind the Government for all times to come. When the Government are satisfied that change in the policy was necessary in the public interest, it would be entitled to revise the policy and lay down new policy. The Court, therefore, would prefer to allow free play to the Government to evolve fiscal policy in the public interest and to act upon the same. Equally, the Government is left free to determine priorities in the matters of allocations or allotments or utilisation of its finances in the public interest. It is equally entitled, therefore, to issue or withdraw or modify the export or import policy in accordance with the scheme evolved. We, therefore, hold that the petitioners have no vested or accrued right for the issuance of permits on the MEE or NQE, nor the Government is bound by its previous policy. It would be open to the Government to evolve the new schemes and the petitioners would get their legitimate expectations accomplished in accordance with either of the two schemes subject to their satisfying the conditions required in the scheme. The High Court, therefore, was right in its conclusion that the Government are not barred by the promises or legitimate expectations from evolving new policy in the impugned notification. SLP dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 412 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oresaid decisions of the Supreme Court the finding of the Tribunal that the transactions were in the nature of intra-State sale appears to me to be quite unsustainable in law and I have no doubt in my mind that the sales in question were made in course of inter-State trade and commerce within the meaning of section 3(i)(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act and Central sales tax were rightly collected and deposited by the assessee in the State from where the movement of the goods had commenced. 20.. I would, therefore, answer the second question in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. 21.. The main question relating to the merits of the case having been answered in favour of the assessee we do not see any need or occasion to answer the first question dealing with the procedural aspect of the matter. 22.. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Commercial Taxes Tribunal. S.N. JHA, J.-I agree. Reference answered in favour of petitioner.
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1996 (5) TMI 411 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , the entry 39 would then read Raw wool including wool waste but excluding knitting wool . The assessee has, therefore, to be taxed within the letter of the law. 7.. The word raw as per Oxford English Reference Dictionary means In the natural state not processed or manufactured not analysed or processed new to an activity. Wool waste is obviously not something wholly new or which has not undergone any process. As per assessee s own showing it is an admixture of the bye-products of the raw wool after the latter has undergone some kind of process be it a refinement or something else. It cannot be, therefore, termed as raw wool. 8.. From the foregoing discussion it, therefore, inevitably follows that our answer to the question has to be in negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the department. We answer the reference accordingly but without any order as to costs. 9.. A copy of this order be transmitted to the Board of Revenue. Reference answered in the negative.
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1996 (5) TMI 410 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... suppression of sale. As already pointed out, there was no witness in this case where a seizure was made merely on the basis of an alleged confession. Another point which appears to be significant though not argued, is that according to the recorded reasons Shri Khaled Anwar, Commercial Tax Officer, was present in the seizing party, but he chose to leave the seizure to be done by an inspector. This by itself may not be illegal, but the circumstance together with the other circumstances mentioned already, does not support the validity of the seizure. 10.. Accordingly, both the seizures made on November 2, 1995 purportedly under section 66 of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994 in respect of the applicants in RN-232 of 1995 and RN-233 of 1995 are invalid. Both the applications are allowed. 11.. The respondents are directed to return the seized books of accounts and documents to the representatives of the applicants by May 13, 1996. 12.. No order for costs. Applications allowed.
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1996 (5) TMI 409 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the High Court was right in refusing to rectify and strike off the trade marks of the respondents from the register of trade marks?
Held that:- It is true that while exercising discretion, the Court under Section 46 of the Act should take into consideration not only commercial interest of the parties but also public interest The High Court refused to exercise the discretion to strike off the trade mark from the register. It is seen that the appellant had not abandoned, at any point of time, the use of the trade mark of the respondent-registered proprietor till filing of the application. Though the appellant has not used the trade mark by itself since 1954 and after the expiry of the permitted use by Sen Raleigh until the notice was issued by the respondent directing the appellant not to use the trade mark, the appellant came to use the same in passing off bicycles manufactured by it under trade mark of the respondent. It is not relevant for the purpose of Section 46(1)(b) whether the bicycles were manufactured with the assistance of technical know-how passed on by Sen Raleigh or the permitted user. Suffice it to state that the appellant, as a fact, had used the trade mark of the respondent in passing off the bicycles manufactured by it. The High Court, in our view, declined, for good reasons, to rectify the trade mark under Section Act b) of the Act. We are also not persuaded to take a different view from that of the High Court. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court has properly exercised its discretion and refused to rectify and strike off the trade mark, from the register of trade marks of the Registrar. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 408 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es 1983 52 STC 124 (Mad.), similar view was taken by their Lordships and it was observed If a sale effected by an assessee is not a first sale, which is only taxable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, then under the provisions of the Act that sale cannot be brought within the net of taxation and it is for the revenue to search out the first seller and levy tax on the first sale. It is not for the assessee, who is the subsequent seller, to show that the first sale has been taxed. The onus on the subsequent seller is only to point out that there has been a first sale and the onus is not on him to show that the first sale has, in fact, suffered tax. In Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kantilal Suresh Chand 1999 112 STC 603 (1996) 16 Tax Law Decisions 85, a Division Bench of this Court has taken a similar view. Hence, for the reasons mentioned above, we answer the aforesaid question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference answered in the negative.
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