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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 408 Records
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1996 (8) TMI 568 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion in Section 26(1) and (2) of the Act I that the transfer is not rendered void and that it is only a voidable transaction. In the present case also, the transfer effected by the 4th defendant in favour of the plaintiff under Ex.A-11 deed of transfer is not a void transaction, but only a voidable transaction. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot be barred from filing the suit on the basis of Ex. A-11 deed of assignment to recover the amour is due from the defendants 1 to 3. The lower Court has clearly erred in dismissing the suit mainly on the ground that the suit itself is not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 26 of the A.P. Chit Funds Act, 1971. The suit is clearly maintainable and the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount from the defendants 1 to 3. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the decree and judgment of the Lower Court are set aside and the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff is decreed with costs as prayed for.
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1996 (8) TMI 567 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ed in the light of the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 2858 of 1977, dated 2nd May, 1989.
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1996 (8) TMI 566 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vehemently stated that this Court should call upon the Registrar of the Patna High Court to explain and it is no part of his duty to explain as to how he obtained a copy of the document. To say the least, we are surprised at the attitude of the appellant's counsel in totally refusing to disclose the source from which the appellant obtained a copy of the document. In our opinion, the appellant and his counsel owe a duty to this Court to disclose the source or circumstances under which the said document dated 4.4.1996 was obtained. We express our strong displeasure at the attitude of the appellant and his counsel in totally refusing to disclose to the Court the manner in which a document filed in Court was obtained. For the present, we do not want to say anything further in this matter, but we want to make it clear that the attitude adopted is totally reprehensible and cannot be countenanced by a Court of law. 12. We dismiss the appeal. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 565 - CEGAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... ce. We have here two extremes of approach by the AC and the Ld. Collector (Appeals). What was required to be done was to conduct an enquiry in terms of Collector (Appeals) order dated 24.12.1993 which had legally acquired finality. Since this has not been done we hold that the Ld. lower authority's order is not proper and we therefore, set aside the same and remand the matter to the original authority for de novo decision in the light of our observations above. 18. The appeal of the Revenue is therefore allowed by remand in the above terms. Before parting with the case we would like to observe that the methodology for the purpose of effectuating the purposes of the notification is in line with the practice of the department in the matter of assessment of boilers cleared by M/s. BHEL which are cleared piecemeal and also the instruction of the Board issued under Rules (sic) 37B for the purpose of classification of ESP which are reproduced at page Nos. 5 and 6 of this order.
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1996 (8) TMI 564 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Consequently, the award is modified arid is made a rule of the Court as per the above terms. Suit and is are disposed of. 21.There shall be a decree 1. directing the objector, M/s. Bry Air (India) Pvt. Ltd. to pay the claimant, M/s. Ram Bahadur Thakur (P) Ltd. the sum of ₹ 3,30,00-; 2. directing the seller to pay interest @ 10% per annum on Rs l,32,000.00 from 1.1.85 up to the date of payment; 3. directing the objector to pay interest @ 10% per annum on Rs. l,98,000.00 from 1.11.85 up to the date of payment; 4. directing the objector to pay the claimant the sum of ₹ 91,000 / -with interest(c) 10%perannumfrom the date of award (6.11995) till the date of payment; 5. directing the setting aside of imposition of penalty of ₹ 50,000.00 ; 6. directing the objector to pay the claimant the costs of ₹ 10,000.00 imposed in the award; 7. directing the parties to bear their own costs in the suit and the application. Award made Rule of the Court with modifications.
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1996 (8) TMI 563 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... right to claim compensation in respect of the acquired land claiming interest in the land which his predecessor-in-title had. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and Ors. 1986 3 SCR 743; Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors. 1995 1 SCR 412; Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati and Anr., (1995) 5 SCC 335 and Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S. G. Industrial Institute 1995 3 SCR 174. We need not deal at length with this issue as is the settled legal position. But since other appellants are owners of the lands who are challenging the validity of the notification and since we have upheld the validity of the notification though others have challenged its validity, it is not necessary to dismiss the appeal of Bahadur Singh on this ground alone as we are upholding the notification under Section 4(1) in the appeals of other appellants. 14. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 562 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... evenue approached the Tribunal and the Tribunal following the decision in Appeal No. 392 (Gau.) of 1987, without discussing independently about the present case allowed the appeal preferred by the revenue. Thereafter, the assessee requested the Tribunal to refer the above question which was refused. Situated thus, the assessee filed application before this Court which was numbered as Civil Rule No. 1(M) of 1994. By order dated 21-3-1994, this Court directed the Tribunal to refer the above question for opinion. Hence, the present reference. 2. In Raichand Kothari v. CIT IT Reference No. 8 of 1995 , this Court held that the Tribunal is not competent to reverse a finding without discussing the facts available and without giving reasons as to why the Tribunal came to a finding contrary to the finding arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals). Following the decision in IT Reference 8 of 1995, we answer the question in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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1996 (8) TMI 561 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t in favour of plaintiff and said Roori. The said succession certificate and rights flowing therefrom cannot be ignored. Admittedly no attempt has been made by defendant Nos. 1 to 4 to annul the succession certificate on the grounds available under the Succession Act. The Additional District Judge committed serious error of law in not considering the said Will and the succession certificate in question which unequivocally clinches the matter and thereby the ultimate judgment of the Additional District Judge is vitiated. The High Court also was in error in not examining these questions and dismissing the Second Appeal in limine. 8. In the aforesaid premises, we set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court in Second Appeal as well as that of the Additional District Judge in Case No. 66 of 1986/1993 and confirm the judgment and decree of the Senior Sub Judge, Tran Taran in Suit No. 218 of 1982. This appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 560 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... atter for the bank to decide. This order does not preclude the petitioner Corporation from adopting such remedies as are open to it under law, including civil suits, for establishing its claims and contentions. Similarly, this order does not preclude the Government, Collector or any other authority from recovering the amounts which they claim are due to them either from respondents 3 and 4 or from any other person liable in that behalf in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. If any proceedings are already initiated in that behalf they can also be continued according to law. We are informed that both the appellant as well as respondent have filed civil suits which are pending disposal. Under these circumstances, we think that it is not necessary for us to go into the question. It would be open to the parties to agitate their rights in the suits and decrees will be passed by the Civil Court in accordance with law. 12. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 559 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... order dated 21st March 1996 the interim stay of the impugned demands was continued subject to the condition that the appellants shall pay 50% of the arrears of the demand within eight weeks and will continue to pay 50% of the future demand. ..... ...... ...... Even if the appellants succeeded they will be entitled to refund of the amount paid by them with interest at the rate of 12%. In view of this interim order, as the appellants have succeeded in these appeals as aforesaid in getting the impugned demands quashed the respondents are directed to refund the amounts collected by them from the appellants pursuant to the impugned demands pending these appeals with 12% interest from the date of receipt of such amounts till repayment. The amounts shall be refunded within eight weeks from the receipt of the copy of this order by the respondents. The appeals accordingly are partly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the cases there will be no order as to costs all throughout.
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1996 (8) TMI 558 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... on video films etc. as mandated under Section 52A do not find place, it would be infringement of copyright. 12. In our view, on the facts in this case, the offence would fall under Section 68A of the Act. Accordingly, the conviction of the respondent is altered to one under Section 68A. There would be no prejudice to the respondent. In view of the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that instead of imposing a sentence of imprisonment, sentence of fine of a sum of ₹ 10,000 would meet the ends of justice. Therefore, the conviction and sentence ordered by the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court are modified to one of conviction under Section 68A. The respondent is sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 10,000. In default, he should undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. Even if he does not pay the fine and undergoes the sentence, the State is at liberty to recover the fine from the respondent 13. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
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1996 (8) TMI 557 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... of the decree for execution on the ground of delay in payment or for unreasonable stand taken in execution ? In our view, the executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction and the order is one without jurisdiction and is thereby a void order. It true that the High Court normally exercises its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, CPC but once it is held that the executing Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, it is but the duty of the High Court to correct the same. Therefore, we do not find any illegally in the order passed by the High Court in interfering with and setting aside the order directing payment of interest. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. Whatever be the difference of amount due and payable to the petitioner, it is but the duty of the respondents to pay the same as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of the receipt of this order. The petitioner is directed to communicate this order to the respondents.
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1996 (8) TMI 556 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... uld appear that in the course of his argument learned Counsel was somewhat more emphatic than the High Court would have wished, but the observations were not called for. 2. Needless to say, the appeal is not contested. 3. The appeal is allowed. The observations against the appellant personally in the paragraphs of the judgment aforementioned are set aside and shall be deemed to stand deleted. 4. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 555 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er 3/5, 1990, were only to give preference to a few creditors, respondents Nos. 4 to 76 who have paid not a single pie. The procedure for selling the property of the company, namely passing of the resolution and authorising the directors, has not been followed in this case. An agreement dated December 11, 1990, has also been entered into nullifying the sale that if the dues are paid then they will again execute the sale deed in favour of the company. This shows that preference was given to these creditors excluding other creditors similarly situated. 14. In these circumstances, the application is allowed and the sale of movable/immovable property to respondents Nos. 4 to 76 on December 3, 1990, and December 5, 1990, is annulled. The official liquidator is directed to take possession of the movable/immovable property and deal with the same in accordance with law. The superintendent of police is directed to provide sufficient force for taking possession of the said properties.
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1996 (8) TMI 554 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t document Exhibit B-42 was not a valid document but the High Court, for justifiable reasons did not go into the merits of the question. The High Court has left the point open to be agitated by the parties concerned before the proper forum at the appropriate stage. We see no ground to interfere with the conclusions reached by the High Court. 8. Mr. D.D. Thakur also raised an additional point. According to him the Act was amended after December 21, 1970 when the lease was granted to the appellant. The precise contention is that on the date of the contract the provisions of the Act, as existed, gave the appellant lull protection and the appellant could not be ejected from the suit premises except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This point was neither pleaded nor raised before any of the courts below. We are not inclined to permit the learned Counsel to raise the point at this stage. 9. The appeal is dismissed with costs. We quantify the costs as ₹ 20,000/-.
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1996 (8) TMI 553 - CESTAT DELHI
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... ... ..... the crown corks there is another Tribunal's decision in the case of present respondents themselves reported in 1992 (59) E.L.T. 327 (Tribunal) wherein the Tribunal had held that the provisions of Rule 57D have to be applied with reference to the nature and description of the inputs and the Tribunal held that on these consideration inputs which are in the nature of discrete articles like crown corks when damaged or rendered unfit for use during the manufacture of the final product will constitute waste which no doubt, may comprise of a part of the total quantity of the particular duty paid input received by the manufacturer. Following this decision, which is applicable to the facts of these cases, the demand on this quantity of crown corks is also not sustainable. Therefore even on merits there is no need to interfere with the order of the lower authority. In this view of the matter, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and appeals are therefore rejected.
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1996 (8) TMI 552 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oor No.1/53. In the deposition he had stated that he had mentioned the same, in his plaint, but it is not SO. It is also a false plea as found correctly by the teamed Judge. The above three circumstances are sufficient to uphold the refusal of specific performance, It has been held by this Court repeatedly that a person who has come to Court with a false plea is not entitled to the equitable relief of specific performance," In addition, the Division Bench also agreed with the Learned single Judge and held that the third respondent had no knowledge whatever of the plaintiff s agreement and, therefore, he was a bond fide purchaser for value without notice. This is a concurrent finding of fact after appreciation of evidence. It would thus be seen that on both the grounds, the courts below rightly refused to exercise the discretion on legal principles to grant specific performance. It does not, therefore, warrant interference. The special leave petition is dismissed, T.N.A.
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1996 (8) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t should be mandatory for the requisitioning authority/establishment to intimate the employment exchange, and employment exchange should sponsor the names of the candidates to the requisitioning departments for selection strictly according to seniority and reservation, as per requisition. In addition, the appropriate department or undertaking or establishment should call for the names by publication in the newspapers having wider circulation and also display on their office notice boards or announce on radio, television and employment news bulletins; and then consider the cases of all the candidates who have applied. If this procedure is adopted, fair play would be subserved. The equality of opportunity in the matter of employment would be available to all eligible candidates. 7. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No case is made out to disturb the directions issued by the Tribunal for appointment of the selected candidates. Therefore, the directions survive. No costs.
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1996 (8) TMI 550 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r the said newly added wall. 18. Furthermore, OS. No. 195/74 is decreed to the effect declaring that the wall HJV belongs to the plaintiff. It is made clear that such a right of the plaintiff is subject to the rights of the defendants by prescriptive easement which are elaborately dealt with in the Judgment and without detrimental to such rights and interests of the defendants. It is also made clear that the plaintiff shall not do anything in dealing with his wall as above so as to cause obstruction or damage or affecting the rights of the defendants in any manner to such an extent. It is also made clear that the defendants shall not interfere with the plaintiff's enjoyment of the suit wall as above, however, subject to their rights in the wall stated above. The defendants' rights of easement and prescription, as stated above, extends to the entire suit wall (EFGHJV). In the peculiar circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs throughout.
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1996 (8) TMI 549 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on (ii) of Section 3, such narrow reading would lead to the provision being rendered otiose. It has to be borne in mind that the primary purpose of the Act is to build a Labour Welfare Fund, a measure well deserved for the Labour, and the excise duty imposed is in the nature of a cess to achieve that purpose. So the provision by its own compulsion requires to be construed widely as otherwise the purpose of legislation would be frustrated. Therefore limestone used by an owner extracted from his mine, for any purpose relatable to and in connection with the manufacture of commodities, including iron and steel, would attract payment of excise duty at the rates specified therein. Such interpretation would only be the purposive one and commended by the language employed. We therefore hold accordingly. 4. For the foregoing reasons, agreeing with the views expressed by the High Court as to the interpretation of the provision, we dismiss this appeal but without any order as to costs.
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