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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 492 Records
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1998 (2) TMI 619 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n ingredient of subletting, had not been present to hold that there was subletting. In the background of the facts of the case, this observation does not purport to lay down that in every case payment of consideration must be established by the landlord to prove subletting by the tenant. 10. The Rent Controller as also the Rent Control Appellate Tribunal have found it as a fact that the petitioner had sublet the premises. This finding was accepted by the High Court and was not interfered with on the ground that was no infirmity of illegality in the judgment. 11. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit in this Special Leave petition which is dismissed. However, having regard to the facts of the case, we allow the petitioner, on its request, time till 31st July, 1998 to vacate the premises on furnishing usual undertaking in this Court within two weeks from today so that fresh legal battle for execution may not start as the blood seems to be still hot and stamina endless.
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1998 (2) TMI 618 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... utary and serves the interests of justice. The procedural rigour cannot be allowed to come in the way of substantive justice. Filing of the second suit without actually obtaining permission to withdraw the first suit should only be treated as a procedural irregularity, which is curable. The permission to withdraw the first suit is only to file a fresh suit and when such permission is granted, the suit already instituted should not fail. The permission takes away the bar of res judicata. Hence the second suit should be held as maintainable. 6. In the above circumstances, I am of the view that the petitioner is entitled to withdraw the first suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action and that the suit already filed for the same cause of action is not an obstruction for invoking Order 23 Rule 1(3) C.P.C. 7. The C.R.P. is accordingly allowed and the order of the Court below is set aside. I.A.N0. 1962/97 is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 617 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erent power Under Section 482 of the Code. Accordingly both the criminal misc. cases are dismissed at admission stage. It is seen from the certified copy of the orders passed in the complaint case that learned S.D.J.M. has issued non-bailable warrant of arrests for default in appearance of the petitioners. It need not be construed as wilful default inasmuch as both of them approached this Court to get the relief of exemption from personal appearance. Hence, keeping in view submission of the petitioners, it is observed that in the event the petitioners will surrender in the Court of S.D.J.M. within a period of six weeks from today and apply for bail, that shall be disposed of on merit and in accordance with law during the course of the day and without taking note of the abovesaid conduct of default in appearance. Till expiry of the period of above six weeks the N.B.W.A. shall remain stayed. 12. Hence, both the criminal misc. cases are dismissed with the aforesaid observations.
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1998 (2) TMI 616 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rd the assessee. Seen also I.B. After hearing both the parties and considering the matter the reasonable rent is fixed at Rs. 1,000/- and municipal annual value therefore come to Rs. 10,800/- after allowing statutory deduction as admissible. 3. The learned Trial Judge, in our opinion, has rightly held that the said order is not a reasoned order. The Hearing Officer while disposing of the objection filed by an assessee is statutorily obliged to pass a reasoned order. It is now well settled principles of law that assignment of reason is also one of the limbs of principles of natural Justice and an unreasoned order is a nullity particularly when an appeal lies therefrom. When an unreasoned order is passed, even the Appeal Court would feel great difficulty in considering the same in its proper perspective. For the aforementioned reasons both the appeal and the application are dismissed. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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1998 (2) TMI 615 - COMPANY LAW BOARD, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... t No. 2 addressed certain communications to the chairman of the Company Law Board indicating therein that the former was still prepared for an amicable solution to the dispute on reasonable terms, and as such sought for one more personal meeting in the presence of the Bench, between respondent No. 2 and the petitioner. He made the same submission when he met the chairman and vice-chairman in their chamber later. However, when counsel for the petitioners, Shri U. P. Mathur, was informed of the request by respondent No. 2, he submitted that his client was not willing for any further discussion on the matter of compromise. Accordingly, this order is being issued. 17. All the applications are dismissed and the parties be bound by the consent terms as recorded in our order dated August 14, 1997, subject to whatever order may be passed by the Bombay High Court. A copy of the memo signed by all the parties on July 8, 1997, will also form the part of this order. No order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 614 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nt of this Court in V. Appayamma v. L. Sahu AIR1973AP168 the same principle was laid down and it was said by the Court that, ".....but if the Commissioner is not examined, the report submitted by him does not cease to form part of the record." 4. Therefore, I am of the view that if an application is made for examination of Commissioner, the Court has no other option but to examine the Commissioner and in case such a request is not made by any of the parties then only the report of the Commissioner can be part of the record and be piece of evidence. However, if a request is made for the examination of the Commissioner, the report can become part of evidence only after the Commissioner is examined. 5. With these observations, the order passed by the Trial Court is set aside and the revision petition is allowed. The Trial Court is directed to summon the Commissioner for a date to be fixed by it so that he is examined in the light of his report by the concerned parties.
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1998 (2) TMI 613 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd that he has played fraud upon the Court. In my opinion, technically, there is nothing to disagree with the submissions of the defendants' Advocates Mr. Parikh and Mr. Merchant. It has to be concluded that the conduct of the plaintiff was certainly improper in not coming out clean as far as assets were concerned. He should have come clean about his means and should have paid the required Court Fees. Hence, the following order ORDER 27. Notice of Motion is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a), which reads as follows "(a) That the plaintiff is disappeared under the provisions of Order XXXIII, Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908." 28. The plaintiff is directed to pay the Court Fees which he was required to pay at the time of filing the suit as per the provisions of the Court Fees Act, within two weeks from today. 29. Notice of Motion disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. 30. Matter stands adjourned to 19th March, 1998. 31. Motion allowed.
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1998 (2) TMI 612 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... 77; 17 lakhs as his unaccounted income. Thus, it is clear that the assets found at the time of search were the application of the unaccounted income of ₹ 17 lakhs which was offered to tax by the assessee in his return filed in response to notice under s. 158BC. Thus, keeping in view the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the opinion that the assessing officer was not justified in making the addition of ₹ 1,47,91,840 as the concealed income of the assessee because the profit earned on the unaccounted receipts on the basis of the special provisions at 8 per cent as per s. 44AD of the Act will be less than the amount of ₹ 17 lakhs disclosed by the assessee as undisclosed income in the return filed in response to notice under s. 158BC. Accordingly we do not find any justification in the action of the assessing officer in making the addition of ₹ 1,47,91,840 which is directed to be deleted. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1998 (2) TMI 611 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... al High Court in the case of Shivanand Electronics (supra), holds that the report in Form No. 10CCAC could be filed only before the assessment under section 143(3) is made, we are of the view that this decision does not assist the revenue in a situation where the income as per the computation of the assessee is nil and so, furnishing of the report in Form No. 10CCAC is not possible. It is an axiomatic that the law does not expect the impossible to be complied with. In this view of the matter and in the light of the binding nature of the circulars of the Board on the Assessing Officer, we are of the opinion that there was a mistake apparent from record in the assessment under section 143(3) made and accordingly, the Assessing Officer should have taken into consideration, the Form No. 10CCAC. Accordingly, we uphold the order of the CIT(Appeals). The Assessing Officer may consider the claim for deduction under section 80HHC as per law. 12. The appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
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1998 (2) TMI 610 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ;an order" occurring in Section 20(1) of the Act includes every order passed by the Tribunal under the Act which affects the rights or liabilities of the parties, or these relate to only final order passed by the Tribunal. In the context of Sections 17(2) and 20(1) of the Act, I am of the opinion that the words "any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act" occurring in Section 17(2) of the Act and the words "an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act" occurring in Section 20(i) relate to every order of the Tribunal made under the Act which affects the rights or liabilities of the parties. Obviously, any interim order passed under Section 19(6) of the Act by the Tribunal, if it affects the rights or liabilities of any party, will be subject to appeal under Section 20(1) of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in this revision and the same is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1998 (2) TMI 609 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... beginning with January 4, 1997, the answer is that the Central Agency furnished the address which was given by the respondents themselves in the High Court. This is not an answer to the question as to why no action was taken by the Central Agency on or after January, 1997. The Counsel now says that the Central Agency addressed letters to the concerned Department but got the response that the address is the same. It is quite obvious, therefore, that the respondents cannot be served. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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1998 (2) TMI 608 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... permission to produce secondary evidence, the Court is required to satisfy itself whether the document sought to be produced falls within the definition of secondary evidence as defined in Section 63 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case, the document in question appears to be a photostat copy of its original assessment order but there should be some evidence that this copy was made from its original by the photostat machine. However, no such material is available on the file of the case. o p /o p 6. For the above reasons, I hold that the learned lower Court has committed illegality or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in according permission to the plaintiff to produce photostat copy of the assessment order of the year 1980-81. o p /o p 7. In the result, I allow this revision petition and set aside the order dated 1-12-1997 passed by the learned Addl. Civil Judge (Senior Division ) No. 2, Udaipur. The parties are left to bear their own costs. o p /o p
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1998 (2) TMI 607 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... fact and circumstances of the case in the light of the correspondence and the assessees’ seeking clarification from the Board, it cannot be said that there had been a deliberate attempt to suppress facts with an intent to evade duty. The same goods had been cleared prior to introduction of the new Tariff and the design charge had effected prior to the introduction of new Tariff, which laid new criteria. However, these criteria has also not been met as held by us in our findings on merits. Hence, the ground made out on admissions by some witnesses is not germane to the main issue of classification, on which the Collector in Revenue’s appeal has rightly held the issues in favour of the assessee. We have examined the ratio of the citations reported and noted the same, while arriving at the conclusion. 29. In the result, there is no merit in the appeal of Revenue in E/998/95-B and the same is rejected and the assessee’s appeal in E/2738/89-B1 is accepted.
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1998 (2) TMI 606 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in rejecting the application for setting aside ex parte decree. The appeal deserves to and is accordingly allowed. The trial Court is directed to restore the suit to its original number. As both the parties are present before this Court they are directed to appear before the trial Court on 16-3-1998. No further notice to the defendant would be necessary. Within three weeks from the date of appearance, the defendant shall file his written-state-ment. If he fails to file the written-statement, the trial Court shall be free to close his rights and deliver a judgment under Rule 10 of Order 8, C.P.C. As the suit was instituted in the year 1987, it is directed that from the date of appearance of the parties, the trial Court shall dispose of the suit within a period of six months. The Registry is directed to remit the records back to the trial Court so as to reach the said Court on or before the date of hearing. C.C. to both parties within seven days, if applied on urgent charges.
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1998 (2) TMI 605 - COMPANY LAW BOARD DELHI
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... ... ..... here are no other complaints against the company. 64. As regards the appointment of the petitioner as a permanent director we have already dealt with the lukewarm interest shown by the petitioners in the affairs of the company. Further, the petitioners appear to be only espousing the cause of respondent No. 3. Hence, by inducting the petitioner we may be perhaps escalating the disputes further between respondents Nos. 2 and 3 which could be only detrimental to the interest of the company. In the end, we dispose of the petition without granting any of the prayers of the petitioners. All interim orders stand vacated. However, since the petitioners, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have already deposited the cost of the shares with the RSMDC, on unloading of the shares as per decision of the civil court the party/parties who get the shares shall reimburse forthwith the money deposited to the parties who do not get shares along with simple interest at the rate of 14 per cent, per annum.
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1998 (2) TMI 604 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ntencing'. has suggested that the maximum sentence should be reserved for the gravest instances of offence likely to occur as a principle of commonsense (vide p. 110). We do not think that the maximum sentence prescribed in the Section need be awarded in this case since on a consideration of all aspects of the case we feel that the said upper limit is on the higher side. Nevertheless, after bestowing our serious consideration in the matter we are of the definite opinion that imprisonment for period of at least 10 years would be necessary to meet the ends of justice looking at the manner in which the offence was perpetrated by the four accused persons. 16. In the result, we enhance the sentence of imprisonment from 5 years as awarded by the Designated Court, to 10 years for all the for accused A-1 Subhash Singh Thakur, A-2 Jayendra Thakur Bhai Thakur, A-3 Shyam Kishore Garikapati and A-4 Chandrakant Patil. Ordered accordingly. All the appeals would stand thus disposed of.
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1998 (2) TMI 603 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ltimate sufferor on account of dismissal of appeal being public, there may be difference of degree of proof required by the Govt. and the private party to establish sufficient cause but that would not or cannot relieve the Govt. from alleging and proving sufficient cause for delay. The Govt. is not required to give reasons for each day's delay but has to allege and prove overall cause for the entire period. The Govt. cannot get over the delay simply because it is Govt." 5. The observations made in State of Rajasthan v. Sukhdeo (1996 (2) Raj LW 598) (supra) aptly covers the field and no case is made out for condonation of delay. The appellant is guilty of not furnishing material particulars as to why the delay has been caused. Making sweeping averments as above would not suffice. 6. I, therefore, dismiss the application filed by the appellant and hold that the appeal filed by the appellant is hopelessly barred by time and the same is dismissed. Application dismissed.
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1998 (2) TMI 602 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or before 15 April, 1998. Thereafter, it shall deposit a sum of ₹ 15 lakhs on or before the 7 July, 1998, by means of a bank draft and another amount of ₹ 15 lakhs by 7 September, 1998. It is noteworthy that as per the scheduled instalments agreed to be paid by the respondent-company till 5.2.1998 a sum of ₹ 35 lakhs was payable; hence, the court has fixed the instalments accordingly. It is made clear that in case the respondent-company defaults in making payment of any one of the instalments, it shall be open to the court to pass an order for publication of the notice under rule 24 of the Companies (Court) Rules. However, till such time as the respondent-company pays the instalment as ordered by this court, the publication of the notice under rule 24 shall remain in abeyance. 10. List this case for further orders on 24 April, 1998, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the first instalment has been paid by the respondent-company. 11. I order accordingly.
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1998 (2) TMI 601 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy b y efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner' According to the learned counsel bar against the institution of a suit would stand on a different footing from bar against eviction as such which is contained in Section 13 of the Act. In our opinion the difference in language does not help t he appellants ion any manner. We have already pointed out that Section 13 of the Act does not make any reference to a decree passed in a civil suit. When a suit is validly instituted and the rights of parties which had crystallised ont eh date of the suit are determined by a decree in that suit the execution thereof cannot be stopped by the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. Hence, we are unable to accept any of the contentions of the appellants. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (2) TMI 600 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... question was never raised by the appellant either in the writ petition before the High Court or in the Special leave petition, we find that respondent No.1 has interest, as he was officiating Principal appointed under statute 13.20 of the Meerut University. it was argued by learned counsel for the appellant that the statute contemplates the appointment of a Principal should be of a senior most teacher which respondent No.1 is not. Repelling this argument, respondent No. 1 has pointed out through an affidavit before this Court that since the senior most teacher declined this after, the next senior most, i.e. respondent No.1, was appointed to which there was no denial. For all these reasons, we do not find any substance in the objection of the appellant regarding locos standi of respondent No.1. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. Hence, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Costs on the parties.
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