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1999 (7) TMI 715
... ... ... ... ..... of the Act instead of holding that one of them is repealed by the other.......... 21. The result of above discussion is that the election of respondent No. 6 Jagdish Sankhyan to the post of President and further nominations by him to the posts of Vice-president, Cashier, other Office-Bearers and Members of the Managing Committee are illegal, non est and do not confer any right on respondents Nos. 6 to 8, other Office-Bearers and Members of the Managing Committee. In this view of the matter, we have no option but to accept these writ petitions set aside the election to the post of President and nominations to the posts of Vice-President, Cashier and other Office- Bearers as well as Members of the Managing Committee of the respondent- Society held on 25-5-1998. Order accordingly. The impugned order dated 27- 12-1998 (Annexure P-15) is set aside and the Registrar is directed to hold election of the respondent-Society at the earliest in accordance with law. No order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 714
... ... ... ... ..... the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation. (Union of India Vs. Devki Nandan Aggarwal AIR 1991 SCW 2754; State of Kerala Vs. Mathai Verghese 1987 CriLJ 308 . Consequently, it would be impermissible to hold that second proviso to Section 81 is broader in itself as would also govern a case where an accused has not been arrested in execution of warrant under Section 78 of the Code. I am, Therefore, of the opinion that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad had no jurisdiction to admit the petitioner/accused on bail under Section 81 of the Code. If the Courts are allowed to exercise powers of grant of bail beyond the scope of Section 81 of the Code, it would result in a judicial chaos and inherent conflict betwixt the comity of Courts. This would inevitably lead to contradictory orders and overlapping jurisdiction. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner is dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 713
... ... ... ... ..... cause of concern which had drawn attention of the kings and his subject since ancient time, the Government and the Courts of various countries Including ours." From the above observations and the other discussion made by the learned Judges in the Supreme Court case of M/s. B.R. Enterprises (supra), it is clear that the nature of the agreement for payment of a prize won on a lottery ticket continues to be in the nature of a wager to which the provisions of Section 30 of the Contract Act would be applicable irrespective of the fact that in order to check, reduce or control the evil of such gambling both Centre and the State have been permitted legislative powers in the Constitution. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the learned trial Judge was fully justified in refusing to grant any relief to the plaintiff on the basis of his claim for recovery of prize money on the lottery ticket sold to him. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed, but without any order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 712
... ... ... ... ..... the agreement. The contention of the applicant that since the agreement specifically provided that the arbitration should be in accordance with the Indian Arbitration and Reconciliation Act, 1996, they are entitled to enforce the arbitration clause without resorting to the earlier steps, is absolutely untenable. 12. Therefore, in view of the fact that the applicant has filed this arbitration request to appoint an arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration clause provided in Ext. P4 agreement without resorting to or complying with or exhausting the prerequisites for the enforcement of the arbitration clause provided in the agreement, the same is not maintainable as premature. Therefore, this Arbitration Request is dismissed. However, this order will not preclude the applicant from enforcing the arbitration clause in the agreement after due compliance of the prerequisites for enforcing the arbitration clause provided in the agreement. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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1999 (7) TMI 711
... ... ... ... ..... ector of Enforcement to conduct investigation and inquiry and to complete the same by filing a report before the concerned Court. The consequential prayers asked for by the Appellant will depend upon the investigation to be conducted by Respondents 1 to 3. The decisions cited Supra categorically held that under section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Kerala Police can conduct investigation into offences committed abroad add no sanction therefore of the Central Government is necessary. In view of the above decisions, we hold that the judgment under appeal rendered by Jagannadha Raju, in O.P. No. 15432 of 1994 dated 9th February 1995, reported in 1995 (1) K.L.T. 468 does not stand and is set aside The writ appeal is allowed. The reference answered accordingly. We make it clear that Respondents 1 to 3 shall conduct and complete the investigation within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and proceed further in accordance with law. No costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 710
... ... ... ... ..... tial portion of the loan amount, the guarantor need pay only the balance. In other words, all that a guarantor is liable for is, the reminder left after adjusting the payment made by the principal debtor. The decision cited by the Appellant as indicated above, are not sufficient, to drive this Court to a different conclusion in this case. Therefore, there arise no situation for answering the substantial question of law involved in the case in favour of the Appellant. Moreover, Section 145 makes it clear that in every contract, there is an implied promise by the principal debtor to indemnify the surety and on its basis, the latter is entitled to recover from the former, whatever sum, the latter had rightfully paid under the contract of guarantee. There is no contention that the guarantor has made any payment wrongfully . So, Section 145 also enable the Plaintiff to get a decree in the same terms as was granted by the Courts below. The S.A. therefore fails. Dismissed. No costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 709
... ... ... ... ..... raud. There is no necessity for a document writer to write a promissory note, especially when Ex.A.1 is in a printed form, and, except the amount and signature, all other details are printed. The lower Court has found fault with the evidence of P.W.1 on the ground that some portions of Ex.A.1 seem to have been obliterated. It assumed that the plaintiff wanted to give a colour of genuineness for the same. I do not find any justification in coming to that conclusion when the defendant himself has no such case. 15. I find that the judgment of the Court below is illegal, and that the lower Court has not considered relevant materials, but at the same time, it has considered irrelevant materials and has based its conclusion on the same. 16. In the result, the judgment of the Court below is set aside, and the Revision is allowed. S.C.No.9 of 1997, on the file of District Munsif's Court, Polur, is decreed with costs. Revision petitioner is entitled to costs in this Revision also.
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1999 (7) TMI 708
... ... ... ... ..... in which the common component is criminal breach of trust. When the offender in the offence under Section 406 is a public servant (or holding any one of the positions listed in the section) the offence would escalate to Section 409 of the Penal Code. When this Court held that in regard to the offence under Section 409 of the IPC read with Section 120B it is no part of the duty of the public servant to enter into a criminal conspiracy for committing breach of trust, we find no sense in stating that if the offence is under Section 406 read with Section 120B IPC it would make all the difference vis-a-vis Section 197 of the Code. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we have no doubt that the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the prosecution proceedings. The case against the respondent has to go to trial in accordance with law. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court and direct the Special Judge concerned to proceed with the trial.
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1999 (7) TMI 707
... ... ... ... ..... d part, the inquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether the court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case. 12. Chinnappa Reddy, J. has also observed in the same tone in Ram Chander v. State of Haryana 1981CriLJ609. 13. We cannot therefore accept the contention of the appellant as a legal proposition that the Court cannot exercise power of re-summoning any witness if once that power was exercised, nor can the power be whittled down merely on the ground that prosecution discovered latches only when the defence highlighted them during final arguments. The power of the court is plenary to summon or even recall any witness at any stage of the case if the court considers it necessary for a just decision. The steps which the trial court permitted in this case for re-summoning certain witnesses cannot therefore be spurned down nor frowned at. 14. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 706
... ... ... ... ..... ances the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the accused made certain allegations against the trial judge the substantive law cannot be bypassed. 10. In this view of the matter, this appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition under Section 482 and the other interim orders passed thereunder are quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to hear the accused on the question of sentence and pass appropriate orders according to law. Till then the accused shall remain in jail. This appeal stands disposed of accordingly. 11. We make it clear that it is open to the High Court to consider all the contentions which the accused may raise against the said conviction either in the appeal which they may file, or administratively, untrammeled by any of the observations made by us in the judgment.
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1999 (7) TMI 705
... ... ... ... ..... ot; 8. Accordingly, suit is dismissed against defendants No. 3 and Office is directed to make an endorsement to that effect in red ink in the title of the plaint against the name of 3rd defendants. 9. By the order dated 28-6-99 the suit has also been dismissed for want of jurisdiction against 1st defendant. Office is directed to make necessary endorsement by red ink in this title of the suit against the name of the 1st defendant as well. 10. Notice of motion stands disposed of as aforesaid. 11. The written statement filed by 2nd defendant, copy whereof has already been given to the learned Advocate for the plaintiffs, is taken on record. 12. The parties are directed to file their affidavits of documents within four weeks time from today and they are further directed to take inspection of the documents within four weeks thereafter. In the meanwhile the parties are directed to exchange draft issues. 13. S. O. after 8 weeks for settlement of issues. 14. Notice of motion allowed.
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1999 (7) TMI 704
... ... ... ... ..... msp;We have gone through the facts on record. We find that both the Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, who had adjudicated the matter and the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), Bombay, had held that the goods in dispute were not the carpets and floor mattings but were accessories of motor vehicles. The goods in dispute are canvas canopy, floor matting and seat covers for motor vehicles. Floor matting was made from jute coated with PVC. Other items also were not used as floor coverings. The Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) has also referred to the HSN Explanatory Notes and the relevant Chapter Notes to arrive at his conclusion that the type of the goods involved in these proceedings were not to be classifiable as floor coverings. 4. Keeping in view the nature of the products, we do not find any infirmity in the view taken by the lower authorities. We do not find any merit in this appeal filed by the Revenue and the same is rejected. Ordered accordingly.
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1999 (7) TMI 703
... ... ... ... ..... s, the appeals stand partly allowed and it is directed that the Civil Writ Petition No. 17490/90 filed in the High Court by the respondent seeking a writ of mandamus giving effect to the promotion of the appellant with effect from 1.1.1986 shall stand allowed and the orders made by the learned Single Judge as also by the Division Bench in that regard are maintained. The Civil Writ Petition No. 12577/92 seeking quashing of the charge-sheet dated 3.12.1991, subsequently amended to seek the relief of setting aside the punishment of reduction of pay by one stage by the order dated 4.3.1995 of the Disciplinary Authority, is directed to be dismissed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge and of the Division Bench, to the extent to which order of the Disciplinary Authority and the punishment imposed by him have been interfered with by the High Court are set aside. The appeals be treated as disposed of accordingly. In view of the partial success there will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 702
... ... ... ... ..... 34. Under these circumstances, the impugned Government Orders down-grading the posts of Secondary Grade Teacher and Specialist Teacher drawing Secondary Grade scale of pay as Secondary Grade (Junior) Teacher and Specialist Teacher (Junior) respectively on consolidated emoluments of ₹ 800 per month in Government, Local Body (Municipal/Corporation/Township/Panchayat Union) and Aided Schools in the year 1990-91 on account of retirement, resignation, death etc., are void. All appointments made in pursuance of the impugned Government Orders shall be treated as regular appointments and the petitioners are entitled to regular time-scale of pay with effect from the date of their respective initial appointments and not from the date as indicated in the Government Orders. The impugned Government Orders and other Orders/proceedings issued thereto are quashed. Consequently all the writ petitions are allowed. No costs in all the writ petitions. All the interim petitions are closed.
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1999 (7) TMI 701
... ... ... ... ..... exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Rather in a case under Section 125 of the Code trial court is to take a prima facie view of the matter and it is not necessary for the court to go into the matrimonial disputes between the parties in detail. Section provides maintenance at the rate of ₹ 500 per month. There is outcry that this amount is too small. In the present case, however, we are quite surprised that the court granted paltry amount of ₹ 200 per month as maintenance which was confirmed in the revision by the Sessions Court and the High Court thought it fit to interfere under Section 482 of the Code in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. 13. Whatever may be the merit of the case, High Court wrongly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code in passing the impugned order. The appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated December 4, 1997 of the High Court is set aside. 14. We will award ₹ 1,000 as cost to the appellant.
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1999 (7) TMI 700
... ... ... ... ..... e facts and circumstances of each case. The steps taken in the suits are proper in law and on facts of the case, they call for no need to retrace the order passed by the learned trial Court. 24. I am unable to agree with the contention that the learned trial Court has fallen in error of jurisdiction in dismissing the application at this stage and hold that there are triable issues which cannot be rejected at the threshold and the parties must be permitted to conclude their evidence. Being unable to see any error of jurisdiction or otherwise in the impugned order dated 4-3-1997, I have no hesitation in dismissing this revision. However, without any order as to costs. 25. As the present suit was instituted in the year 1996 and keeping in view the peculiar facts of this case, T would prefer to request the learned trial Court to decide the suit as expeditiously as possible. In any case within one year from the date a copy of this order is placed ,on the record of the trial Court.
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1999 (7) TMI 699
... ... ... ... ..... 8377; 25,000/- under Ex.A26 admittedly received by the defendants. On the basis of these two entries he had granted a decree for ₹ 2,15,000/-. It is pointed out that ₹ 1,83,000/- plus ₹ 25,000/- comes to ₹ 2,08,000/- and not ₹ 2,15,000/-. Further the plaintiff has not filed the suit on the basis of the accounts and there is no counter claim by the defendants. Therefore the learned trial Judge committed an error in decreeing the suit on the basis of alleged admission made by the defendant in Ex.B12 and Ex.A26. As pointed out in the earlier paragraphs the suit is based on a pronote supported by oral and documentary evidence Exs.A4 and A5 and the decree ought to have been passed on the basis of Ex.A20 supported by Exs.A4 and A5. 15. For the reasons mentioned above, we dismiss the appeal and confirm the judgment and decree on grounds other than the grounds mentioned by the trial Court. Appeal thus dismissed however there will be no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 698
... ... ... ... ..... py land is granted by the State Government and he was not entitled to hold the land as a Bhumiswami was to be called a Government lessee in respect of such a land subject to the rights and liabilities as stipulated under section 182 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code. The Revenue Officer contemplated under section 182 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code acts on behalf of the State. The State itself had chosen to get its grievance, if any, redressed before the forum stipulated in the deed of lease. It could not by its unilateral action by-pass the same as appears to have been done in the present case. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances as brought on record, we are satisfied that the ultimate order passed by the learned Single Judge disposing of the writ petitions does not require any interference. In view of the aforesaid conclusions, these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed, subject to the observations made hereinabove. There shall however be no order as to costs.
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1999 (7) TMI 697
... ... ... ... ..... iff to value his claim for the purposes of the court fee. In exercising the aforesaid liberty, the plaintiffs have valued the suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at ₹ 200/- and accordingly affixed court fee of ₹ 25/- on the plaint. 8. The aforesaid plea of the learned counsel is wholly unacceptable in law keeping in view the fact that primary relief claimed by the petitioners-plaintiffs is for cancellation of the registered sale-deed dated 24th July, 1997 by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1. This claim of the petitioners-plaintiffs cannot be considered to be governed by section 7(iv)(b) and (c) of the Court Fee Act, 1870. Therefore, ad-valorem court fee is liable to be paid on the sale consideration of ₹ 1,62,000/-. 9. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I find no infirmity in the impugned order of the trial Court. This revision petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.
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1999 (7) TMI 696
... ... ... ... ..... pur Sahkari Katai Mills filed declaration under KVS Scheme and their declaration was accepted and on deposit of requisite amount their appeal filed in the Tribunal was dismissed as withdrawn vide Final Order No. A/23/99 NB (DB) dated 7.4.99. The Tribunal in the case of Quality Fabricators & Erectors Vs. CCE, Baroda reported in 1999 (33) RLT 122 in the similar situation where the dispute of the main party was settled under KVS Scheme in favour of the assessees on which only was imposed held that "in view of appeal of the main manufacturer having been settled, it would not be desirable holding the appellant herein, as guilty of contravening the provisions of Central Excise law." 8. In the present case, the adjudicating authority imposed the penalty on the appellant under Rule 209A without giving any finding in the adjudication order and in view of the above decision of the Tribunal the penalties imposed on the appellants are set aside and the appeals are allowed.
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