|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 537 Records
-
2004 (11) TMI 625 - COMPANY LAW BOARD PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... upreme Court in the case of L.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Anr quoted above, and keeping in view of the circumstances of the case, I am of the view that it is a continuous cause from 1988 onward till the petitioner filed earlier petition in May 2002 after having exhausted all channels, which was subsequently withdrawn and the present petition was filed. Accordingly, I am inclined to accept the version of the petitioners that this being a partnership company, is having continuous cause since 1988, the three years period of Limitation under the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will not apply in this case. In view of Supreme Court judgement, the Limitation Act is not applicable to the proceedings before quasi-judicial tribunals. As such, the provisions of Limitation Act are inapplicable in the present case before this Board. Accordingly, the issue of limitation is decided with the observations that CP N. 24/03 is maintainable.
-
2004 (11) TMI 624 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... view of the Tribunal that the remand of the case to provide a fresh inning to the assessing authority is not justified. Penalty under Section 10A of the Act was levied by the Assessing Authority for the alleged violation of clause (d) of Section 10 of the Act. Once first appellate authority arrived at a conclusion on the fact of the case that there was no violation of Section 10(d) of the Act penalty ought to have been quashed. The case could not be remanded back to the assessing officer with the direction to issue a fresh notice specifying the clause under which the default was committed. It is always open to the assessing officer to initiate penalty proceedings for the default under any other clause of Section 10 of the Act separately. There was no need to remand back the matter after coming to the conclusion that the penalty levied for the default of Section 10(d) of the Act was not justified. 10. In the result, all the three revisions fail and are accordingly, dismissed.
-
2004 (11) TMI 623 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cision in W.A. No. 149 of 1990 are contrary to the various authoritative decisions of the Apex Court. Therefore, we overrule the same. The decision reported in 1992 (1) KLT 524 is affirmed. We hold that the impugned amendment made in the Special Rules for the Government Presses Subordinate Service providing ratio of 1 1 for promotion to higher posts between diploma holders and certificate holders is not discriminatory and it is not violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Government is bound to effect promotions on the basis of the amended Special Rules. In the result, O.P. Nos. 17419 of 1995 and 12952 of 1995 are dismissed and O.P. No. 16867 of 1995 is allowed and we direct the second respondent to dispose of Ext. P3 representation and grant promotion, if he is otherwise entitled, in accordance with the amended Special Rules from the respective dates. The Judgment should be implemented within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.
-
2004 (11) TMI 622 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e the matter in Ghaziabad or U.P. Courts. It cannot be held that the registration of FIR at Shahdara, Delhi, was without jurisdiction, illegal, abuse of process of law or actuated with any malafides. The judgments of the Apex Court in State of Haryana Ors. V. Bhajan Lal Ors. and T.T.Antony V. State of Kerala (supra) are of no help to petitioners as it is not a case of second FIR but merely a case of transfer of the FIR from one Police Station to another Police Station. 11. In the result, this Court is of the considered view that the prayer for quashing the FIR No. 375/2003 registered at PS Shahdara and for prohibiting the Police from carrying out further investigations is without any merit. 12. The petition, Therefore, stands dismissed. 13. However, it is clarified that the benefit of bail that has been granted to two of the petitioners by the Courts at Ghaziabad shall continue and shall not be re-agitated merely on the ground that the case has been forwarded to Delhi Police.
-
2004 (11) TMI 621 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... t and/or other bidders. If ultimately no other bidder appears, as in the past, it may happen that the applicant may claim that the property be sold to the applicant for the price offered; and even otherwise if some other bidder appears it is not sure as to whether the bid would go higher. For that matter even the applicant may bid or may not bid. Therefore, the application cannot be granted because the entire exercise would be in the realm of guesswork and as already stated hereinbefore, the secured creditors and the workmen would have to wait for realization of a reasonable price, and for how long one would not know. The assets which are already disposed of, being of a depreciable nature, it is not possible to accept the contentions raised on behalf of the applicant. 21. In the circumstances, the application stands rejected for the aforesaid reasons. The applicant shall pay costs to respondent Nos.1 and 2 quantified at Rs.2,500/- (Rupees Two thousand Five hundred only) each.
-
2004 (11) TMI 620 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ase, if any. 6. On appreciation of evidence of PW.1 and Exs. P-1 to P-8 and also Exs. D-1 to D-8, the learned Magistrate recorded a finding that the ingredients of legally enforceable debt or liability had not been established by the prosecution and hence, acquittal had been recorded. The findings recorded by the learned Magistrate definitely cannot be said to be based on improper appreciation of evidence. Further explanation to Section 138 of the Act clearly specifies that for the purpose of this section debt or other liability means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. 7. In the light of the above discussion, the findings recorded by the learned Magistrate cannot be doubted and they are based on appreciation of evidence. Hence, the said findings are hereby confirmed. The acquittal recorded by the learned Magistrate is well justified in the facts and circumstances referred to supra. No merits in the appeal and accordingly, the criminal appeal shall stand dismissed.
-
2004 (11) TMI 619 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... oods have been received in the factory. I also observe that it has not been disputed by the Revenue that the inputs were duty-paid and the same were received in the factory for being used in the manufacture of the final products. Thus, in view of the subsequent amendment made in Rule 57G of the Rules by Notification No. 7/1999-CE (NT) dated 9-2-1999, the MODVAT Credit cannot be denied on account of some minor procedural lapses in the duty-paying documents. The Board has also clarified, vide Circular No. 441/7/1999-CX, dated 23-2-1999, that Notification No. 7/1999-CE(NT), has been issued so as to empower the Assistant Commissioner, having jurisdiction over the factory of the manufacturer, to allow the credit ignoring minor procedural lapses provided the inputs have suffered duty and are being used in the process of manufacture. Thus, I do not find any merit in the appeal, filed by the Revenue, which is rejected. (Operative part of order pronounced in open Court on 30-11-2004).
-
2004 (11) TMI 618 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... al, if Modvatted, is not to be included in determining the cost of production of excisable products. The other issue raised is the question as to whether profit earned by the job worker is to be included and to what extent. In the clarificatory order passed by this Court in Ujagar Prints v. Union of India 1989 3 SCC 531 it was explained by way of an illustration that the value of the raw material, the value of the job work done and the manufacturing profit and the expenses for the processing have to be taken into consideration. The determination of the excisable value shall be done on that basis. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.
-
2004 (11) TMI 617 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y plead under Rule 13 that he be declared as elected and prove that he received majority of the valid votes. In an election petition after declaration of the elected candidate as invalid, in every case, as an incidental relief Election Tribunal cannot grant further declaration in favour of election petitioner that he/she got elected. A copy of the E.O.P. No. 22 of 2001 filed by first respondent before the Election Tribunal, Anakapalli, is placed before this Court. First respondent sought for declaration that the election of the petitioner herein as Sarpanch of Lemarthi Agraharam Village is null and void and no specific relief is prayed under Rule 13 of the Rules. Therefore, it was not proper for the Election Tribunal to grant such declaration and on this ground also the impugned order is liable to be quashed. 12. In the result for the above reasons, the writ petition succeeds and it is accordingly allowed with costs. A writ in the nature of certiorari shall issue accordingly.
-
2004 (11) TMI 616 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hese were surmises and conjectures in the formation of opinion by the assessing officer. Thus, the plea of collusion remains merely an allegation and has not been proved by the revenue. The onus that lay upon the revenue in this respect has also not been discharged. The Apex Court in Uma Charan Shaw v. CIT 1959 37 ITR 271 (SC) has held that the conclusion which is the result of suspicion cannot take place of proof. Keeping this principle in mind as well as the entire facts and circumstances, no error is found in the conclusion arrived at by the learned Commissioner (Appeals) for allowing depreciation for use of machinery at Rs. 10,93,465 for use of machinery owned by it for a period of less than 182 days. There being no substance in the ground of revenue, the same stands rejected." 3. Thus, the Tribunal, inter alia, held that collusion was not proved. The issue in this appeal is one purely of facts. No substantial question of law arises and hence the appeal is dismissed.
-
2004 (11) TMI 615 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... weeks. 11. Defendant No. 10 is present in person. He states that he has not entered into any Agreement to Sell either with Defendants No. 1 & 2 or with the plaintiff. He prays that he should be struck off from the array of parties. In this connection Bawa Shiv Charan Singh submits that if Defendant No. 10 had not been impleaded, it would have been arguable that, since he is a half owner of the property, the contracts are not enforceable either in favor of the plaintiff or in favor of Defendants No. 1 & 2. This contention only fortifies the view that the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction. As there is no privity of contract whatsoever between the plaintiff and Defendant No. 10, and admittedly no relief is sought against Defendant No. 10, he is struck off from the array of parties. 12. The plaintiff shall pay cost of ₹ 10,000/- for today's hearing. The cost be paid within four weeks to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund. 13. Refortify on 10.3.2005.
-
2004 (11) TMI 614 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nreported cases of recent antisocial and criminal activities exist, and the Court held that the particulars prejudicial to the detenu played over the judgment of the authorities but the petitioner never knew of such notorious information and could not answer back, that communication of facts is the cornerstone of the right of representation and orders based on uncommunicated materials are unfair and illegal. 19. In the premises, when the aforesaid two grounds have been found to be fatal for the continued detention of the detenu and the writ petition succeeds accordingly, it does not appear to be necessary to go in for discussion of other grounds. 20. In the result, the application be allowed. The impugned Order of Detention passed against the detenu Manas Kumar Moitra be set aside. The said detenu is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case. The respondents are directed to set the detenu free at once. N.A. Chowdhury, J. 21. I agree.
-
2004 (11) TMI 613 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... with the said finding of the Delhi High Court and are of the view that the present petition is liable to be dismissed even on the ground that it involves disputed questions of facts. Even otherwise, the law regarding invocation of Bank Guarantee is very settled and unless there is fraud or irretrievable injustice, the Court should not grant any injunction against invocation of Bank Guarantees. No such allegation is made in the present case. 27. Before concluding this judgment, we observe that the decision of the respondent authorities not to accept the Bank Guarantees which are issued or to be issued by the petitioner No. 1 Bank shall remain in operation till the amounts claimed by them under the Bank Guarantees in question are not paid by the petitioner No. 1 Bank. Once the said amounts will be paid, the ban imposed by the respondent authorities would automatically be lifted. 28. With these observations and directions, the petition is dismissed without any order as to costs.
-
2004 (11) TMI 612 - COMPANY LAW BOARD
... ...
... ... ..... ion 402 of the Companies Act contemplate such power on the CLB. So there cannot be any difficulty in accepting the proposition that the CLB is having such inherent power to grant injunction in a given case if it has jurisdiction to deal with the same." It is, therefore, beyond doubt that the CLB's inherent power under Regulation 44 to grant injunction is subject to its jurisdiction to deal with the matter in dispute, notwithstanding the facts that the proceedings of Section 167 will be rendered nugatory and that the applicant may be left with a barren success in the proceedings before the CLB. There is no need for me to consider whether the application made under Section 224(3) is premature or whether the application has been made by the proper party under Section 224(3). These issues are entirely left to the authority vested in the third respondent under Section 224(3) and shall not be interfered in the present proceedings. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
-
2004 (11) TMI 611 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... e ratio of that decision ‘Hard disk’ cannot be characterised as tangible software has not been apparently raised before the Tribunal. Hence, we are not inclined to go into that question now. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
-
2004 (11) TMI 610 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the appellant was beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we consider such a course to follow as a futile exercise resulting in needless waste of public time. On the admitted and undisputed facts, we are satisfied, as already indicated hereinabove, that the impugned Award is a nullity and hence liable to be set aside and that is what we declare and also do hereby, obviating the need for remand. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Award given by the Arbitrator alongwith the appointment of the Arbitrator and reference made to him are all set aside as void ab initio and nullity. The respondent shall be at liberty to seek enforcement of his claim, if any, by having recourse to such remedy as may be available to him under law and therein pray for condonation of delay by seeking exclusion of time lost in the present proceedings. No order as to the costs.
-
2004 (11) TMI 609 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... n execution of warrants, would be the competent Court within the meaning of Section 188 of the Code as that Court would find the accused before him when he appears. The finding has to be by the Court. It has neither to be by the complainant nor by the Police. The section deems the offence to be committed within the jurisdiction of the Court where the accused may be found. It is correct that as a result of the aforesaid interpretation, it is possible for a complainant to file a complaint against an accused in any Court in the country. But then we cannot compare the question of convenience of the accused at the cost of victim's convenience. Between the two, the convenience of the latter has to prevail. Regarding the abuse of such wide option to the victim, there are enough provisions in the Code for redressal of any particular abuse. Whether a particular case is an abuse or not would depend on its own facts. In view of the aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
-
2004 (11) TMI 608 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Delete
... ... ... ... ..... n to have been instituted in the name of the firm. A sole proprietorship firm is not a legal entity which can sue or be sued in its own name. Such suit relating to or against the affairs or claims of a proprietorship concern has to be brought or made against the person who is the sole proprietor of the firm. The plaintiff was described to be a proprietorship firm and represented through Shri Amitabh Sharma. Shri Amitabh Sharma had neither signed the plaint nor he signed the power which was filed in the present case. 12. In that view of the matter, we agree with the findings and the conclusions recorded by the trial court that the suit was not instituted by a duly authorised person. Accordingly, we find no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned trial court dismissing the suit on the ground that the suit was not properly instituted. We accordingly dismiss the appeal. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case we leave parties to bear their own costs.
-
2004 (11) TMI 607 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... offence committed by him. The evidence of Dr. D.K. Satpathy (PW-16) is very relevant to decide the question. He found that the injuries were confined to the skin and upper level of the body. Grievous injuries were not found on vital parts of the body like head, liver, spleen, heart, lungs etc. The duration of the injuries were widely variant. The right lung of the deceased was TB affected. The combined effect of alcohol and the injuries shortened the period of death and resulted in a quicker death. That being so, the conviction in terms of Section 304 Part II IPC cannot be faulted. His appeal fails and is dismissed. He shall surrender to custody to serve remainder of his sentence. So far as other accused-appellants Bahadur Singh, Pooran Singh and Dhanraj Dubey are concerned, the prosecution has not been able to bring home the accusations. Therefore, their appeals deserve to be allowed which we direct. Their bail-bonds are discharged. 31. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
-
2004 (11) TMI 606 - JHARKHAND HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... k. But, since it has been found that appellant Bank has illegally and arbitrarily withheld the payment of money on FDRs even after their maturity, the main issue has been decided in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and hence appellants-defendants are liable to pay interest on the FDRs illegally and arbitrarily withheld. However, the rate of interest allowed to the plaintiff-fespondent @ 21.75% with quarterly rests is modified and is allowed to the FDRs, holder at the rate of interest, which is allowed to the FDRs' holder at that time on the date of maturity of the FDRs without quarterly rests and other terms will remain the same. 40. From the discussions made above, I am of the view that the judgment of the learned Court below does not require any interference in this appeal save and except the finding of this Court on the interest matter is concerned. 41. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with modification in the interest part. There will be no order as to costs.
........
|
