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Showing 61 to 80 of 520 Records
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2004 (5) TMI 564 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... cent of total purchases made at concessional rate of tax have been used in the course of manufacture goods covered under Schedule I and printing and labour job in respect of the periods 1992-93. Similarly, it is construed that 77.52 per cent and 80.05 per cent of total purchase made at a concessional rate of tax in respect of the periods 1993-94 and 1994-95 have been used in the course of manufacture of goods covered under Schedule I and printing and labour job done . The petitioner since failed to produce the relevant documents the learned Commercial Tax Officer had no other alternative but to find out the percentage of exempted sales from the total purchase made against the declaration forms. There is nothing wrong in the impugned order passed by the learned Commercial Tax Officer and it needs no interference. Therefore, the present application is liable to be dismissed without costs. It is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. A. DEB. (Technical Member). - I agree.
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2004 (5) TMI 563 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ce of law. By virtue of section 20 of the U.P. General Clauses Act where the power to issue any statutory instrument is conferred the expiration used in the statutory instrument shall, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, for the same respective meaning as in the Act conferring the power. Section 7 of the U.P. General Clauses Act will be applicable in the present case read with section 20 by virtue of supersession of Notification No. 6946 dated September 30, 1977 by the Notification No. 1672 dated May 1, 1981 the earlier notification shall not be revived. Meaning thereby the notification, which has been superseded by another notification the later notification having been rescinded, the earlier notification would not be revived. In the result the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. The revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the second appeal of the dealer - opposite party before the Trade Tax Tribunal stands dismissed.
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2004 (5) TMI 562 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... te of tax, effected two years earlier. In the case in hand, there is also no dispute about the rate of tax or classification of goods. Therefore, on facts, the present case is nearer to the facts of Qureshi Crucibles Centre case 1993 89 STC 467 (SC) 1993 UPTC 901. Learned counsel for the dealer-opposite party has placed reliance upon another judgment of Supreme Court given in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation 2002 127 STC 258 1999 UPTC 1. The said judgment is distinguishable as there was classification dispute with regard to commodity which is ordinarily resolved in assessment proceeding and if resolved against the assessee he is to make payment of difference amount of tax as required by section (1A) of section 8 of the Act. In view of the above I find sufficient force in the revision. The revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal so far as it relates to deletion of interest under section 8(1) of the Act is concerned, is set aside.
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2004 (5) TMI 561 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the Limitation Act, 1963 under section 5 of it is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice, that being life principles for the existence of institution of courts. The apex court has laid down six principles to be adopted in such matters in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anant Nag v. Mst. Katiji 1987 66 STC 228 AIR 1987 SC 1353. It may be noticed that again the same view has been reiterated with greater force by the apex court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh 2000 5 JT SC 389. It has considered the matter in great detail in paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 13. The Tribunal shall keep in mind the law as declared by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid pronouncements while reconsidering the matter after remand. In the result the revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded for reconsideration to the Tribunal in the light of the observations made above.
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2004 (5) TMI 560 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has come to the definite findings that the dealer has manufactured super heavy tubes. Under section 4B of the Act manufacturing of super heavy rickshaw tubes would not be permissible. They are different from the cycle tubes. This part of the finding has not been specifically set aside by the tribunal. The view of the Tribunal that tyres of tricycle will cover the tyres meant for rickshaw cannot be accepted. The tricycle as mentioned in the aforesaid notification is meant for children and it will not include rickshaw. Some assistance can be taken from the fact that in the notification under consideration tricycles is used alongwith perambulators and bicycles . Perambulators means a light carriage for a child. Tricycles here means a light carriage for a child having three wheels. Rickshaw in common parlance is not called or treated tricycle. The order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. The revision is allowed and the order of the tribunal is set aside. No order as to costs.
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2004 (5) TMI 559 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ng becomes pointless. The ratio of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Oriental Rubber Works 1984 145 ITR 477 (SC) is that such reasons must be communicated expeditiously and non communication will vitiate the order passed. We are of the view that this ratio is equally applicable to a case under section 14(3A), proviso (b) of the BFST Act, 1941. In view of the findings made above we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated February 27, 2004 is not sustainable under the law. The order therefore, is set aside. The respondent No. 2 is directed to return the seized records and documents immediately. However, liberty is given to the respondents to get the xerox copies of the seized documents prepared at their own costs within a period of fortnight before returning the documents. If so required, they may get those xerox copies certified by the petitioner and continue their investigation, if at all necessary. The application being No. RN-124 of 2004 is also allowed without costs.
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2004 (5) TMI 558 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 2 ELT 513. The Supreme Court held that rexine manufactured by the dealer, containing only 8 per cent cotton fabrics remaining 92 per cent being quoting material, PVC resin, plasticizers and other fillers is cotton fabrics. It has been observed that may be rexine cloth is not called or dealt with as cotton fabrics in commercial world or in common parlance, but that does not prevent from treating it as cotton fabrics. It has taken into consideration tariff item No. 19 before its amendment in 1969 to arrive at the above conclusion.Therefore the authorities below committed illegality in levying tax on rexine, which is an exempted item. In Sales Tax Revision No. 872 of 1994 penalty under section 15A(1)(o) of the Act was levied. I have held that rexine is not taxable under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. There cannot be any intention to evade payment of any tax. Therefore, levy of penalty under section 15A(1)(o) of the Act cannot be sustained. In the result both the revisions are allowed.
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2004 (5) TMI 557 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... P 27) and July 21, 2003 bearing Nos. 487 and 489 (annexures P 34 and P 35) subject to condition that the petitioner will deposit Rs. 5,000 for restoration of each revision, i.e., in total six revisions. In all, therefore, the petitioner will be required to deposit a sum of Rs. 30,000 by way of costs as a pre-condition to get the hearing of the revisions on merits. Let the costs be deposited within a month with the Commissioner of Commercial Tax, who is seized of the revisions, which are accordingly restored to file and now to be heard finally by the Commissioner within a period of six months from the date of deposit of the costs as an outer-limit strictly in accordance with law. This court has not made any observation nor has it applied mind to the factual aspect of the matter, which has subject-matter of the revisions. The Commissioner will, therefore, decide the revisions uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this court on merits. Certified copies within a week.
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2004 (5) TMI 556 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to the cut-off date. This plea of the appellant cannot be accepted. Admittedly, the lease deed was executed on October 28, 2000 and it was executed between the husband and the wife. The owner of the land is the husband of the proprietrix and, therefore, a recital in regard to the oral delivery of possession cannot be accepted. The learned single Judge was right in holding that the appellant did not acquire the land prior to the cut-off date. Even the application made to the financial institution for financial support was made on February 10, 2000 which was beyond the cut-off date. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the appellant does not satisfy the conditions of the aforesaid clause. It, thus, follows that the appellant is not entitled to claim the exemption. In this view of the matter, no fault can be found with the order of the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. In the result, the writ appeal fails and the same stands dismissed.
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2004 (5) TMI 555 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... different. Even if gitti, kankar, stone ballast, etc., may all be looked upon as separate in commercial character from stone boulders offered for sale in the market, yet it cannot be presumed that entry 40 of the notification is intended to describe the same as not stone at all. In fact the term stone is wide enough to include the various forms such as gitti, kankar, stone ballast. In that view of the matter, we think that the view taken by the majority of the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court stands to reason. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the same. The aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court has been followed in State of Maharashtra v. Maha Laxmi Stores 2003 129 STC 79 (SC) 2003 1 SCC 70. In view of the aforesaid judgments I am of the opinion that grinding of sabut masala does not amount to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(e-1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In the result there is no merit in the revisions. Both the revisions are dismissed.
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2004 (5) TMI 554 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rtificate at the concessional rate of tax and will reduce the mention of goods in the registration certificate a mere formality which cannot be the intention of law. It will nullify section 7(2) of the Act. Therefore, I have no option but to sustain the order of penalty levied on the purchase of P.C. computer system with keyboard and monitor. Learned counsel for the assessee could not show me anything to hold that this item is covered under machinery . The levy of penalty on P.C. computer system with keyboard and monitor is confirmed and to that extent the order of the Tribunal is set aside. 10.. In the result, the revision is allowed in part as indicated above. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration of levy of penalty in the light of observations made above on electronic weigh bridge and to record necessary findings. The order of penalty on electronic weigh bridge with P.C. computer system with keyboard and monitor is confirmed. Petition allowed in part.
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2004 (5) TMI 553 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... orted in the Central Sales Tax Act. The same view has been taken in the case of Fairdeal Agencies v. State of Haryana 1979 44 STC 231 (P and H). It has been held that in view of section 9(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act, the imposition of penalty for excess collection of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act can be levied by invoking the provisions of the provincial Sales Tax Act. 14.. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal on both counts is liable to be set aside. Since the question of levy of penalty was not considered by the Tribunal and was also not argued before me, it is desirable that the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal for this limited purpose only. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for consideration of the levy of quantum of penalty. No other point shall be open to the parties or the Tribunal. 15.. In the result the revision is allowed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal as indicated above. Petition allowed.
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2004 (5) TMI 552 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d any finding on this vital issue it is necessary that the matter may be remitted to the Tribunal for recording its finding on this issue alone. 15.. It is made clear that the findings recorded in this judgment under points Nos. 1 and 2 shall not be open for consideration by the Tribunal. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal only for a limited purpose to record a finding as to whether the third parties for whom the job of printing by the use of imported ink against form C was done by the dealer have actually sold the goods or not. 16.. The inevitable conclusion is that the revision is based on terra termia and the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained. 17.. In the result all the revisions are allowed as indicated above. The penalty order as modified by the appellate authority on items other than ink is hereby confirmed. The question of determination of penalty on ink is remitted back to the Tribunal to record the necessary finding as indicated above. Petitions allowed.
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2004 (5) TMI 551 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r consideration. When the language of two Acts are different, then the law laid down in that case will have no bearing. It is then of little help for interpreting the other section. It is only when the wording of both the Acts/ section/rules are in pari materia the help can be taken to interpret the concerned sections at par. Such is not the case here when we look to the phraseology of section 8(3)(b) of the Act that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court and the one that has fallen for interpretation in this case. 9.. In our opinion, the provision relating to conferring benefit in payment of tax at a concessional rate calls for strict interpretation. In other words, it is necessary for the assessee to satisfy each and every condition required to claim the benefit of concessional rate of tax. 10.. In view of aforesaid discussion, we answer the reference in affirmative and against the assessee and in favour of Revenue. No costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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2004 (5) TMI 550 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1979 Delhi 1, such charges were held to be a part of sale price? 4.. The finding of fact recorded by both the authorities below is that the dealer-opposite party realised Rs. 300 to Rs. 385 per fridge towards the service charges after one year of sale of fridge. The said service contract is quite optional. 5.. Rajasthan High Court in the case of Commercial Taxes Officer v. Kelvinator India 1993 90 STC 336 and Commercial Taxes Officer v. Weston Electroniks Ltd. 1992 87 STC 522, has held that if the dealer is charging one sale price irrespective of warranty for the second and subsequent years then the position may be different, but if it is optional to the purchaser to avail the benefit of warranty or not to avail in the second and the subsequent years, for which separate payment is made in addition to sale price then separate payment, cannot be included in sale price. 6.. In view of the above I do not find any merit in the revision. It is hereby dismissed. Revision dismissed.
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2004 (5) TMI 549 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cts and as such the order of the Full Bench does not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record and therefore no review can be granted on that score. 14.. In view of the foregoing discussion, we need not dilate upon other authorities cited at the Bar as they are not material or germane for deciding the controversy involved in the present case. Thus, we hold that in view of the facts as found by the Board of Revenue, Full Bench rightly answered the reference in favour of the assessee even without referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. 1973 31 STC 426. Thus, no case for taking a different view in this review is made out and the same is dismissed as such but with no order as to costs. Before parting with the case, we must record our sincere appreciation for Shri G.M. Chaphekar, learned Senior Counsel, who rendered invaluable assistance as Amicus Curiae. Petition dismissed.
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2004 (5) TMI 548 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Sunmica nor Formica and, therefore, it cannot be said that Oral it is covered by entry No. 34 of the said Act. He however, admitted that the sheets are laminated sheets. We have to look to the entry. It refers to all types of laminated sheets like Sunmica, Formica, etc., then it goes without saying that the sheets which are laminated are included by whatever name is known or sold in other brand name. There may be various manufacturers having their own brand names in the market. It is not necessary to include all the brand names. Even if it would have only been mentioned- all types of laminated sheets , it would serve the purpose, but with a view to illustrate if the names are given, it does not mean that the entry is restricted for the brand names indicated therein. 6.. In our opinion, the question is required to be answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Accordingly, the reference is disposed of with no orders as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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2004 (5) TMI 547 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... free to raise all contentions including the applicability of the Act of 1989 and/or otherwise also whether the judgment of this Court in Matushree Textile Limited 2003 132 STC 539 could be attracted or not in the facts of the concerned case. Obviously, in the said assessment proceedings, the concerned officer shall scrutinise the nature of contract and find out the dominant intention between the contractor and the customer and on the basis of that finding pass an appropriate order. If the assessee is aggrieved by such order, he shall be at liberty to challenge the assessment order in the statutory remedy of appeal as provided under the Act of 1989. 12.. In view of what we have said above, we are satisfied that this is not fit case for invocation of writ jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India and each case shall be decided by the assessing officer in the light of its own facts and in accordance with law. 13.. Dismissed in limine. Writ petition dismissed.
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2004 (5) TMI 546 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lue of Rs. 4,83,832.62 and the assessing officer has levied penalty at the rate of 12 per cent on Rs. 22,213, on Rs. 4,04,621.82 at the rate of 15 per cent and on Rs. 36,168 at the rate of 18 per cent. There is some substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that the minimum penalty should have been levied as the applicant is a unit of State Government, namely, U.P. State Sugar Corporation and is run by officers and there is no personal gain to them by making false representation. Therefore the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for levy of minimum amount of penalty, i.e., equivalent to the difference amount of tax which has been avoided by issuing form C. 13.. In the result, the revision is allowed in part as indicated above. The Tribunal shall pass a consequential order under section 11(8) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act and levy the minimum amount of penalty under section 10-A of the Central Sales Tax Act in accordance with law. Petition allowed in part.
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2004 (5) TMI 545 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Clauses Act, 1898 (as applicable to State of Haryana). 10.. The said view was applied in respect of amendment made by the State of Punjab in Oswal Agro Mills Ltd.s case 2005 139 STC 51 (P and H) as well. 11.. The substituted section 11 created a substantive right in favour of an assessee to get his assessment finalised within the time prescribed. Therefore, keeping in view the above principles laid down, the provisions of the amending Act would be applicable to the proceedings pertaining to the assessment year 1997-98 as the last date prescribed for the last return was after the promulgation of the Ordinance. 12.. Consequently, we find that notice dated July 4, 2002, annexure P-2, could not be issued by the Assessing Authority for the purpose of completion of assessment after the expiry of period of three years from April 30, 1998. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed and notice dated July 4, 2002, annexure P2, is hereby quashed with no orders as to costs. Petition allowed.
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