|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 701 Records
-
2005 (3) TMI 791 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... under Section 29, the exemption is granted by the statute itself and is automatic in respect of the urban lands owned by the authorities or institutions referred to therein, the exemption under Section 27 is not so. For exemption under Section 27, power is vested with the State Government to exempt the lands or persons from payment of tax "if the Government is satisfied that the payment of urban land tax 005 005would cause undue hardship". Such power can be exercised by the Government only on specific application by the person or institution seeking exemption and on placing satisfactory material for exercise of such power. The exemption under Section 27 is not a matter of right and does not follow as a matter of course. No other contention was raised. There is absolutely no merit in the civil appeals. The appellant is not entitled to exemption from payment of urban land tax during the period 1965-1976 as prayed for. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
-
2005 (3) TMI 790 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
... ...
... ... ..... ext three of the questions could be said to be under consideration. But the same questions were not directly and substantially pending before the High Court or income tax authorities. There is no dispute that before the Authority the question for determination of the rate of tax for TDS is not involved. The earlier order of 22nd November, 2004 passed by the Authority was recalled on the sole ground of incorrect verification of the applications by the applicants. After the amendment of the applications, that defect has been cured as the verification read in light of the contents of the application cannot be said to be incorrect. 7. For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the bar under clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 245R is not attracted. We, therefore, allow the applications under sub-section (2) of section 245R of the Act for the purpose of pronouncement of rulings on the questions set forth in the applications as postulated under sub-section (4) thereof.
-
2005 (3) TMI 789 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... substance in the argument of learned Counsel for the applicant. In fact there is no conflict between Hindi and English version of the Notification No. 738, dated 31st January, 1985. In the English version in place of word "Paneei" word "Cheese" is used. It appears that Legislature has chosen the, word "Cheese" as English version of "Paneer" but the intent is clear to exclude paneer from the milk product. In the case of Garhwal Paneer Bhandar, Ghaziabad v. Commissioner of Trade Tax (supra) this Court has considered both English and Hindi version of the notification and also the meaning of the word "Cheese"and held "Paneer" as a soft cheese. In my view there is no difference in chena and paneer when chena is given shape it is called paneer. 7. Following the aforesaid decision. 1 do not find any error in the order of Tribunal, which is accordingly, upheld. 8. In the result, revision fails and is accordingly, dismissed.
-
2005 (3) TMI 788 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... upon would not arise. Neither the Family Court nor the High Court had directed payment of any interest on the ground of deliberate and wrongful withholding of the ornaments by the Appellant. Even on the said count, no interest could have been directed to be paid but what could be directed was payment of compensation. As this Court in its earlier judgment had no occasion to consider the effect of the judgment dated 9.10.1995 passed by the Family Court, Bombay and the judgment dated 20.1.2000 passed by the High Court of Bombay, the same did not attain finality. CONCLUSION We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court is not sustainable which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the Appellant to bear the costs of the Respondent in this appeal which is quantified at ₹ 10,000/-. The said sum shall be paid to the Respondent by the Appellant within four weeks from date.
-
2005 (3) TMI 787 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
... ...
... ... ..... accordingly. This ground for all these years is considered to be allowed for statistical purpose. 17. Ground No. 4 for the assessment year 1995-96 and Ground No. 5 for the assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98 are regarding disallowance made on account of personal utilization of telephone. 18. The respective disallowance are ₹ 5,000 for assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97 and ₹ 6,000 for the assessment year 1997-98. These grounds were not pressed, therefore, dismissed. 19. Ground No. 4 for the assessment years 1996-97 and 1997-98 relates to disallowance in respect of 1/4th motor car expenses and depreciation. It was pleaded on behalf of the assessee that the disallowance upheld by the CIT(A) is excessive and therefore be reduced. 20. After hearing both the parties, we direct the Assessing Officer to restrict disallowance on account of motor car expenses and depreciation to 1/5th. These grounds are partly allowed. 21. In the result the appeals are partly allowed.
-
2005 (3) TMI 786 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... aside the impugned order and remit the matter back to the Tribunal to consider the question of unjust enrichment. The appellant to intimate the respondent about this order. The Appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
-
2005 (3) TMI 785 - SUPREME COURT
Election petition - Barred by limitation - whether an election petition presented at 4.25 p.m. on 27.8.2003, the last date of limitation, admittedly 10 minutes after the Judge had risen from the open court but was available in chambers within the court premises can be said to be a valid presentation so as to be within the period of limitation? - HELD THAT:- If the court is open, it is desirable that a formal presentation of the election petition is made to the Judge while sitting in open court. As the Judge himself is not expected to scrutinize the defects in the election petition presented to him, Rule 6 expects the election petition to be presented first to the Stamp Reporter of the court and then carried to the Judge for formal presentation. While presentation to the Stamp Reporter of the court is a presentation, the presentation before Judge in open court is a formal presentation. There would be nothing wrong if the election petitioner presents the election petition to the Stamp Reporter whereafter the election petition is carried to the Judge in open court either by the election petitioner or his counsel or by the Stamp Reporter or any official of the Registry under his directions.
The High Court, in its impugned judgment, seems to have thought that the election petition could have been presented only to the Judge and that too in the open court. The Judge would ordinarily sit in open court upto 4.15 p.m. of the day as per the rules or practice of the High Court but that time is not the end of that day. The availability of time falling within the meaning of the word 'day', as provided by Section 81 of the Act, cannot be curtailed by making a provision in the rules contrary to the Act itself.
Ordinarily, no litigant and lawyer would like to delay the presentation till the fag end of the day and then present it at an odd time to the inconvenience of the Judge wherever he may be. However, exceptional situations cannot be completely ruled out. It would be better if the ministerial act of receiving the election petition presented to the High Court is left to the administrative or ministerial staff of the High Court either by clarifying or by making a suitable amendment in the Rules of the Patna High Court.
The learned designated Election Judge of the High Court has erred in holding the presentation to be barred by limitation. The view so taken cannot be countenanced.
The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 10.9.2003 is set aside. The election petition is held to have been filed within prescribed period of limitation. The High Court shall now proceed to deal with the petition in accordance with law.
-
2005 (3) TMI 784 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... .P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Rajendra Singh and others to contend that there was a fraud played upon the court and the fraud unravels everything. As a general proposition, the proposition is right. But fraud must necessarily be pleaded and proved. In the entire history of litigation nothing was pleaded, much less proved, as fraud. We cannot countenance the plea of fraud without any basis. In the result, we are of the view that the High Court grossly erred in entertaining the revision petition and granting relief which was unjustified both in law and on facts. The impugned judgment of the High Court is quashed and set aside. Considering that the respondent has deliberately delayed the execution, the executing court shall dispose of the execution proceedings with utmost dispatch. In our view, the conduct of the respondent deserves condemnation which we indicate by imposition of exemplary costs of ₹ 20,000/- on the respondent.
-
2005 (3) TMI 783 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s to clear communication of the terms to the customer. Security was realised to ensure the return of the cylinder, normally, in this nature of business, namely, in the supply of L.P.Q. gas, customer is never intended to buy cylinder. Therefore, in respect of amount charged towards security applicant was bailee and the transaction was only in the nature of bailment. Amount of security which was forfeited on account of non-return of cylinder in view of the decision of United Breweries Limited v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) was in the nature of damages and not in the nature of sale price. At no stage, either of the party intended to enter into a contract for selling and buying of cylinder. The intent was to supply L.P.Q. gas in cylinder. It is seen that in normal course, cylinders are always returned. Therefore, the view of the Tribunal upholding the levy of tax on the forfeited amount is erroneous. 13. In the result, revision is allowed. Order of the Tribunal is set aside.
-
2005 (3) TMI 781 - SUPREME COURT
Validity Of Sanction - disproportionate of assests to his known source of income - Burden to proof - acquittal of the appellant accused u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 - HELD THAT:- In the present case, a perusal of the sanction order itself shows that Shri C.S. Krishnamurthy's income from all known sources between the period from May 25, 1964 to June 27, 1986 was ₹ 7,91,534.93 that income was from salary, GPF advances, rental income, interest amount from bank accounts and loan amount received from LIC towards house constructions, the dividend income, interest amount and gain in respect of chits received from Navyodaya Sahakra Bank, Vyyalikaval House Building Co-operative Society, Vishalam Chit Funds and Reliance Industries loan received from friends and family members, gain towards sale of scooter/car, sale proceeds of jewellery and income received by family members and the total expenditure incurred by the accused during these period is ₹ 2,41,382.85 and the total assets acquired by the accused both movable and immovable from May 25, 1964 to June 27, 1986 is ₹ 9,51,606.66 ps. Therefore, the accused has to account for difference between the two.
In the present case the learned additional sessions Judge took a very narrow view that all the papers were not placed before the Court to show that there was proper application of mind by the sanctioning authority. The view taken by learned Special Judge was not correct and the learned Single Judge correctly set aside the order.
In the present case, the sanction order itself discloses the facts that the incumbent is being prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act for accumulating moveable and immovable assets which is disproportionate to his known source of income and he has failed to give satisfactory account for the same. In the present case, facts mentioned in sanction order are eloquent for constituting prima facie offence u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, there is due application of mind by sanctioning authority and the sanction is valid.
Learned counsel for appellant submitted that offence was alleged to have been committed in 1986, now after lapse of almost 19 years would it be advisable to proceed with the matter. It is a matter of corruption and we cannot give any latitude in such matters. Therefore, under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court appears to be justified and there is no ground to interfere in the present appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. However, nothing said herein or the High Court excepting on the point of sanction should influence the trial court's decision on merits.
The adverse observations made against the trial Judge are deleted.
-
2005 (3) TMI 780 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... y explanation is given. Even otherwise there is no merit of these petitions. These are accordingly dismissed.
-
2005 (3) TMI 779 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... cannot be used as such and he relied on the CEGAT's decisions, where credit was disallowed on Forged Tail Bar, treating them as construction material. 3. However, in the present case, I find that the issue has already been decided by the Tribunal in the case of U.P. State Sugar Corpn. (supra) allowing credit on mill roller shafts after grooving and shelling of cast iron on the shafts for making them useable in sugar factory. In the present case, proof machined shaft has been received for using in the machinery, For fitting it into the Mill roller, some process was required to be undertaken to make them suitable to be fitted in the Mill roller. Such activity cannot disallow the appellants from taking the credit. Therefore, following the ratio of the decision of the Tribunal in case of CCE, Meerut v. U.P. State Sugar Corporation (supra), the appeal is allowed and the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is set aside. Order dictated and pronounced in open Court on 17.3.2005.
-
2005 (3) TMI 778 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he detaining authority is satisfied that such material exists either in the form of report of the Chemical Examiner or otherwise copy such material should also be given to the detenu to afford him an opportunity to make an effective representation. Therefore, while holding that dealing with arrack which is dangerous to public health would become an act prejudicial to the maintenance of public order attracting the provisions of the Act. It must be held that it is obligatory for the detaining authority to provide the material on which it has based its conclusion on this point. Therefore, we are in agreement with the High Court that if the detaining authority is of the opinion that it is necessary to detain a person under the Act to prevent him from indulging in sale of goods dangerous for human consumption the same should be based on some material and the copies of the such material should be given to the detenu. For the reasons stated above this appeal fails and is dismissed.
-
2005 (3) TMI 777 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s at item nos.1 to 9, 22 to 26 and 29 of the Plaint A Schedule properties were Joint Hindu Family properties available for partition or not. The High Court could hear the appeal on the question of law formulated and not on any other point without framing additional substantial question of law which it did not do. Since there was no substantial question of law framed either at the time of the admission or later regarding the validity and genuineness of the settlement deed and the will the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to set aside the findings recorded by the courts below regarding the validity or the genuineness of the will executed by Mottaya Poosali. The findings recorded by the High Court regarding the validity and genuineness of the will are thus vitiated and cannot be sustained. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed and the judgment under appeal is set aside and that of the first appellate court is restored. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (3) TMI 776 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... s profit is higher than the gross profit normally shown in yester years. In view of the above discussions, we uphold the addition of ₹ 36,818." From the order of the Tribunal reproduced above, we are of the considered opinion that as the purchases made by the applicant had been found by all the authorities to be bogus and not genuine the Assessing Officer was justified in adding the sum of ₹ 36,818 towards its income. Further as the purchases were held to be not verifiable the Tribunal was justified in holding that no such purchase was made and, therefore, the benefit to set off could not have been granted. We, accordingly, find that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are based on appreciation of evidence and material on record and cannot be said to have suffered from any infirmity. 6. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (3) TMI 775 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... stage, does not appear to me to be a confession at all. In fact, the statement discloses that the petitioner did not know of the contents of the packet. 17. This being the case, it does appear that the petitioner was not in conscious possession of the said contraband. Therefore, I am satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the petitioner is not guilty of the offences for which he has been charged. As regards the question as to whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail, no circumstance has been brought to my notice which would indicate that there is such a likelihood. It is also not the case of the State that the petitioner has been involved in any other NDPS related cases. In this view of the matter, the petitioner is directed to be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹ 50,000/- with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned trial court. The application stands disposed of. dusty.
-
2005 (3) TMI 774 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... habad v. Himtaj Ayurvedic Udyog Kendra reported in 2003 (154) E.L.T. 323 (S.C.) and Commnr. of C. Ex. Calcutta (IV) v. Pt. D.P. Sharma reported in 2003 (154) E.L.T. 324 (S.C.). In these cases it has been held that “Himtaj Oil” is classifiable under Tariff Item 30.03. We are in respectful agreement with these decisions. The Appeals therefore fail and stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (3) TMI 773 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... by non-consideration of relevant material and evidences as were on record ?" 3. The Reference relates to the assessment year 1988-89. 4. We have heard Sri R.K. Upadhyaya, learned standing counsel for the revenue. Nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondent-assessee. 5. So far as the reference at the instance of the revenue is concerned, we find that in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. P.J. Chemicals Ltd. 1994 210 ITR 8301, the amount of capital subsidy is not to be deducted while computing the actual cost under section 43(1) of the Act. 6. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 7. As nobody has appeared on behalf of the assessee to press the questions referred at its instance, the questions referred to us on behalf of the assessee are returned unanswered. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (3) TMI 772 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and machinery under section 32A of the Act which was disallowed by the Assessing Officer. However, in appeal, the appellate authority had directed the assessing authority to allow the investment allowance which order has been upheld by the Tribunal. 3. We have heard Shri A.N. Mahajan, the learned counsel for the revenue. Nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondent-assessee. 4. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. N.C. Budharaja & Co. 1993 204 ITR 4121 wherein it has been held that an undertaking engaged in the construction activities does not answer the expression of the industrial undertaking nor they produce any article or thing so as to entitle the investment allowance under section 32A of the Act, the respondent-assessee is not entitled for investment allowance. 5. We, accordingly, answer the question of law referred to us in negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2005 (3) TMI 771 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... roduction of any article or thing within the meaning of section 32A of the Act. Therefore, to such contractor's investment allowance is not allowable. 4. Respectfully following the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, we answer the question No. 1 in negative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessee. 5. So far as the question No. 2 is concerned, the learned standing counsel fairly submitted that similar question has been answered in ITR No. 41 of 1987 decided on 8th April, 2004 and in ITR No. 274 of 1991 decided on 11th March, 2005 against the department. 6. Respectfully following the said decision, we answer the question No. 2 in affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. 7. As regards the questions referred at the instance of the assessee, none appeared to press the questions on behalf of the assessee. The questions referred at the instance of the assessee are returned unanswered. 8. The reference is decided as above.
........
|
