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Showing 1 to 20 of 604 Records
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2005 (5) TMI 697 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ept one injury, all others were lacerated injuries. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that there is no evidence to show that the appellant Mishrilal and appellant Lallu @ Lalaram caused injury with an axe on the head and there is no corresponding incised injury on the head and hence the medical evidence is in conflict with the evidence of the eye-witnesses. That plea also is not correct as the post mortem certificate shows that there was injury on his head which must have been caused by the appellant Mishrilal. Injury no. 1 and 3 are on the left fronto-temporoparietal region and mid parietal region. The blunt edge of the axe must have been used to cause these injuries. The evidence of these three witnesses coupled with the medical evidence satisfactorily proved that the appellants had committed an offence as alleged by the prosecution. There is no reason to interfere with the conviction sentence and the appeal is without any merits and is accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (5) TMI 696 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife can have no better claim in the property of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar. 25. Therefore, as a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras is correct that the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar and the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the orders of the two courts below. Since we cannot decide this appeal without deciding the right of the respondent No. 1 as the right of the appellant flows therefrom as his wife i.e. the plaintiff. Therefore, it was necessary for us to first decide whether the respondent No. 1 could succeed or inherit the estate of his deceased father. When son cannot succeed then the wife who succeeds to the property through the husband cannot also lay a claim to the property of her father-in -law. The appeal is thus dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 695 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t subsequent to the impugned judgment in this case. Even otherwise as held by us hereinabove, that is a material to be taken note of by the investigating agency or the court before which the charge-sheet is filed. The learned counsel then sought to place reliance on various judgments of this Court like in State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982)1 SCC 561 1982 SCC (Cri)283 (1982)3 SCR 121, and Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 1988 SCC (Cri) 234 (1988)2 SCR 930, etc. We think on the facts of this case and the stage at which the challenge is made in this case under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, these judgments do not help the respondent in defending the impugned order. 10. For the reasons stated above, we allow these appeals and quash the impugned order of the High Court and direct the Mahila Police Station, Bikaner to proceed with the investigation of the case, FIR No. 33 dated 1.6.2001. 11. The appeals are allowed.
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2005 (5) TMI 693 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ision of this Court and as a consequence thereof, the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities for cancelling the entry No. 8569 in toto deserves to be quashed and set aside with the direction that the entry No. 8569 shall continue to remain in revenue record with the qualification and clarification that the same shall be subject to the outcome of the proceedings of Civil Suit No. 497/2002. 9. So far as Special Civil Application No. 8559 of 2005 is concerned, the same will be the situation, except that there will be change in the number of entry being Entry No. 8570 and, therefore, the entry No. 8570 shall continue to remain in revenue record with the qualification and clarification that the same shall be subject to the outcome of the proceedings of Civil Suit No. 497/2002. 10. Both the petitions are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. Considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. Direct service is permitted.
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2005 (5) TMI 692 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appears that in giving directions on February 16, 1984, this Court acted per incuriam inasmuch it did not bear in mind consciously the consequences and the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the 1952 Act and the binding nature of the larger Bench decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar case which was not adverted to by this Court. The basic fundamentals of the administration of justice are simple. No man should suffer because of the mistake of the court. No man should suffer a wrong by technical procedure of irregularities. Rules or procedures are the handmaids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. Ex debito justitiae, we must do justice to him. If the man has been wronged so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice that wrong must be remedied. This is a peculiar fact of this case which requires emphasis." 7. In my opinion, it will be incorrect and unjust to quash the complaint. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (5) TMI 691 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t disclose that there were sufficient funds in the account. As per the complaint the payment was stopped which for the present is sufficient to summon the petitioners. For examining the complaint in the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. this court can only see whether the allegations in the complaint as substantiated in the pre-summoning evidence were sufficient to summon the petitioners. No inherent defect of any kind has been depicted by the petitioners. 6. The petitioners have produced a copy of the certificate from the Bank of India showing that there was sufficient funds for honouring the three cheques. However, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of MMTC (Supra), this court cannot call for evidence to prove the certificate or to enquire as to whether there was any pre-existing debt or liability. 7. The petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no strength. I am, therefore, constrained to dismiss the same. The petition is dismissed accordingly.
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2005 (5) TMI 690 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... slation. The section is dependent on the issue of notification by the Central Government. The words used in the notification are plain and unambiguous. Therefore, the words must be applied as they stand, even if there is a suspicion that the result may not represent the real intention of the legislature. In the present case, notification issued clearly states that it comes in to force from the date of issuance of the notification. That only means, it is prospective. Therefore, by interpretation retrospective operation cannot be attributed to the notification and if it is done, in our view, it not only leads to absurdity and runs contrary to the language employed in the notification. Therefore, we are unable to accept the findings and conclusion reached by the Tribunal. 50. In the result, the two questions of law referred by the Tribunal for our opinion are answered in negative and against the assessee. Accordingly, reference proceedings are disposed off. No order as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... apers for engrossing of the decree or there is no time limit fixed by law, does not mean that the party can furnish stamp papers at its sweet will and claim that the period of limitation provided under Article 136 of the Act would start only thereafter as and when the decree is engrossed thereupon. The starting of period of limitation for execution of a partition decree cannot be made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree on the stamp paper. The engrossment of the decree on stamp paper would relate back to the date of the decree, namely, 7th August, 1981, in the present case. In this view the execution application filed on 21st March, 1994 was time barred having been filed beyond the period of twelve years prescribed under Article 136 of the Act. The High Court committed illegality in coming to the conclusion that it was not barred by limitation. 27. In view of the above, the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed. Parties shall bear their own costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 688 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which is relevant the High Court would be at liberty to draw adverse inference against them or pass such other order or orders as may be found necessary. We have passed this order having regard to the fact that the directions to produce documents have been passed without hearing the parties and without taking into consideration the hardship which may be faced by the State and/ or Bombay Municipal Corporation. 39. We, by our order dated 18th April 2005 directed the matter to be placed on 23rd August 2005 for hearing but keeping in view of the fact that in these appeals we were called upon to deal with an interim order, we are of the opinion that no purpose would be served in keeping the matters pending. We, therefore, dispose of these appeals and the intervention applications on the aforementioned terms. 40. Having regard to the directions issued, it is not necessary to pass any separate orders on the applications for impleadment and/or intervention. 41. No order as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 687 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the basis of evidence adduced at the trial without in any manner being prejudiced thereby". If we apply the probability test that has been propounded by this Court to the facts of the present case it is difficult to reach a tentative conclusion that the appellant in all probability will be convicted of the offence. Probability of conviction, so to say, is not bright, when we leave out of consideration the confessional statements. So also, the material on record does not justify the conclusion at this stage that the appellant would indulge in similar offence of an organised crime if she is released on bail. As already noticed, she has been in prison for about 15 months so far. In the circumstances, we set aside the order of the High Court and direct the appellant to be released on bail on furnishing personal bond for ₹ 20,000/- and a surety for like sum to the satisfaction of the 1st Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
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2005 (5) TMI 686 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others." (See Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Ors. AIR2004SC1923 13. When a particular person is the object and target of a petition styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or some other mala fide object. Since in service matters public interest litigation cannot be filed there is no scope for taking action for contempt, particularly, when the petition is itself not maintainable. In any event, by order dated 15.4.2002 this Court had stayed operation of the High Court's order. 14. Judged in the above said background the High Court was not justified in entertaining the Writ Petition. The judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is therefore set aside. 15. The appeals are allowed with no orders as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 685 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ices they will not be able to play the games and participate in the sports in a proper planner. Further, in our view, it is inherent in the duties of a PHYSICAL DIRECTOR that he imparts to the students various skills and techniques of these games and sports. There are large number of indoor and outdoor games in which the students have to be trained. Therefore, he has to teach them several skills and the techniques of these games apart from the rules applicable to these game." 17. The Tribunal has rightly held that the goods and apparatus meant for amusement park do not fall within the category of sport goods under the aforesaid notification. 18. Before saying omega to this case, it may be noticed that the applicant realized tax from its customers at the rate of 10% treating the goods in question as unclassified items, as mentioned in the assessment order. 19. In the result, there is no merit in the revisions. Both the revisions are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 684 - KARNTATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e findings and conclusions. Before we conclude, we intend to observe, may be at the cost of repetition, that in the present case, M/s. Lakkanna and Sons, a HUF - assessee had filed its return of income for the assessment year 1980-1981. Even before the completion of the assessment proceedings, the assessee had intimated the Income Tax Officer the disruption of the HUF. At no point of time, HUF had been assessed to tax under the Act. In view of this factual position, the procedure prescribed under Section 171 of the Act will have no application, as the assessee was not 'hitherto assessed' as HUF and so the fiction created under that Section to deem it, as HUF will not arise. Therefore, the assessment made on the assessee as HUF is not valid. 32. In the result, both questions of law referred for our opinion are answered in the affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Accordingly, the reference proceedings are disposed off. Ordered accordingly.
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2005 (5) TMI 683 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es causing huge economic loss. Many an accused lived and die with a stigma. It is hoped that this elite Investigating Agency will be more responsible in future. 67. From what has been noted and discussed above and on the basis of the statements made by the prosecution, no case can be proceeded with in respect of the Hinduja Brothers or the Bofors Company. I, accordingly allow Crl. M.A. 169/2005 and 170/2005 in Crl. Rev. 271/2004, Crl. M.A. 171/2005 and 172/2005 in Crl. Rev. 272/2004, Crl. M.A. 173/2005 and 174/2005 in Crl. Rev. 273/2004 and Crl. M.C. 763/2005. I quash all proceedings against the Hinduja Brothers emanating from FIR/Case No. RC-1(A)/90-ACI-IV/SIG/New Delhi and discharge them from the case. I also quash order dated 26.3.2004 of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate framing charges against the Bofors Company and discharge the Company from the case. The bail bonds and surety bonds shall stand discharged. The record received from the trial court be sent back forthwith.
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2005 (5) TMI 682 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... o resident of the place from where the dealership license is to be issued and it is not permissible to have casual connection or temporary residence at that place. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the view that the High Court has committed an error in construing the term 'resident of Kangra District' does not require a person to be a permanent resident of that place and his casual connection to the district would fulfill the necessary mandatory criteria provided in the ad. notice. As the approach of the High Court in deciding the second appeal against the appellant was based on its interpretation of the criterion of residence and as we have taken a different view of the matter, we set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court and remand the matter back to the Court for fresh consideration of the appeals in the light of interpretation given by us to the term 'resident of Kangra'. The appeals are disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 681 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... keeping tracks of each and every transactions/transportations of the Petitioners which might take through different routes. If the Petitioners are entitled to get refund of the excess amount, the proper remedy for them is to get the same as per the procedure laid down in the Acts and the Rules. They cannot make a demand of something which is not envisaged under the Acts and the Rules. 42. In view of the aforesaid discussions, reasons and conclusions, I am of the considered opinion that the relief prayed for by the Petitioners in this batch of writ petition cannot be granted. There being no illegality on the part of the Respondents in demanding additional security towards issuance/counter singing the road challans, the challenge made in all the writ petitions merit dismissal. Accordingly all the writ petitions stand dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The interim orders passed in each of the writ petitions stand vacated. 43. The writ petitions are dismissed.
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2005 (5) TMI 680 - SUPREME COURT
Non-grant of back wages - Challenged the Judgment and order dated 10.2.2003 passed by the High - Award passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, directing the workman to be reinstated in service with the benefit of past service without any back wages - bipartite settlement - HELD THAT:- A bare perusal of the said settlement would show that on receipt of a notice contemplated thereunder, the workman must either : (1) report for duties within thirty days; (2) give his explanation for his absence satisfying the management that he has not taken any employment or avocation; and (3) show that he has no intention of not joining the duties. It is, thus, only when the workman concerned does not join his duties within thirty days or fails to file a satisfactory explanation, as referred to hereinbefore, the legal fiction shall come into force. In the instant case except for asking for grant of medical leave, he did not submit any explanation for his absence satisfying the management that he has not taken up any other employment or avocation and that he has no intention of not joining his duties.
Thus, we do not see any reason as to why the Bank could not arrive at a satisfaction that the workman had no intention to join his duties. It is interesting to note that though the said order was passed on 17.5.1984, a representation to the Bank was made by the workman to reconsider the said decision after a period of 3 years and 2 months by a letter dated 31.7.1987 Yet again a dispute was sought to be raised by issuance of a legal notice on the Bank only on 6.4.1989.
Mere sending of an application for grant of leave much after the period of leave was over as also the date of resuming duties cannot be said to be a bona fide act on the part of the workman. The Bank, as noticed hereinbefore, in response to the lawyer's notice categorically stated that the workman had been carrying on some business elsewhere.
Therefore, we have ourselves considered the pleadings of the parties as also the materials on records, it is not necessary to remit the matter to the Tribunal as it would not serve any purpose. So far as the appeal preferred by the workman is concerned, it is not necessary to entertain the same as it is evident that Section 17-B of the of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot now be applied in view of the fact that the workman did not file an affidavit before the learned Single Judge in support of his contentions and as required under law.
Thus, we are of the opinion that the appeal preferred by the Bank should be allowed and that of the workman should be dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the Appellant, admittedly another agreement was entered into in terms whereof the amount of consideration was raised. The Appellant furthermore misled the plaintiffs-Respondents by representing that he had the requisite authority to enter into an agreement for sale on behalf of his sister, which was found to be incorrect. In this situation, we are of the view that the equity lies in favour of grant of decree for specific performance of the contract in respect of the share of the Appellant rather than refusing the same. In any event if the Appellant and/or his sister have claim as regard the arrears of rent, the same can be adjudicated upon by the appropriate court in an appropriate proceeding. We are, therefore, unable to accept the said contention of Mr. Talwar. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (5) TMI 678 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... outside India. Our directions essentially relate to Indian officials. But it cannot be lost sight of that law cannot ever be a combination of meaningless and purposeless combination of words. The judicial system reaches its pinnacle when it serves the ultimate object of all laws; i.e. delivering justice to the recipient who deserves it, not shackled by pitfalls and landmines of technicalities. Within the four corners of legal framework, the reliefs can be moulded to achieve the ultimate objective, that is to deliver justice. We, therefore, dispose of this writ petition with the direction that the authorities shall continue the efforts to find out the actual position and expeditiously intimate the petitioner, the results of the efforts/inquiries made by them. Though we are disposing of the writ petition, let status report indicating the latest development in the matter be filed within three months, which shall be placed before us. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
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2005 (5) TMI 677 - CESTAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... by obtaining the clarification from the Singapore suppliers. That the present appellant were given the differential as their profit advantage and they have not been burdened with the warranty/& quantity in sales effected to than as sole dealers. We find no merits in the order of the Commissioner in arriving at undervaluation, misdeclaration and thereafter on confiscation and penal liability in the facts of this case as we cannot share the findings on undervaluation. (e) The appellants have relied upon the order of Commissioner (Sahar), Air Cargo, Mumbai on similar imports, where the charges after examining the correspondence with M/s. EPSON in the undervaluation charge, in a similar notice were not upheld. We find no reasons not to appreciate the finding of CC (Sahar) in their case & to, find no reason to uphold the finding in the order impugned. It is to be set aside. 3. Appeals are therefore allowed after setting aside the impugned order. (Pronounced in court)
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