|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 632 Records
-
2006 (1) TMI 673 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ntext, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e., for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the recourse to law' stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made with regard to the first party's protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff's failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law. 29. In view of the foregoing discussion, both the propositions advanced by Mr Kaul cannot be sustained. As a result is No. 2061/2005 is dismissed and is No. 4326/2006 is allowed.
-
2006 (1) TMI 672 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... arrears of salary for the period prior to July, 1996 as such right was clearly barred by limitation. 22. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed in part. It is observed that the employee is not entitled to any arrears of salary on the basis of pay protection. However, the employee is entitled to revised pensionary benefit with effect from 19.10.2001 by notionally giving benefit of pay protection and by fixing his initial pay at Rs. 128/- in December, 1964 and thereafter notionally calculating the pay payable to him. The arrears of pension on the basis of such revised calculation shall be payable with effect from 19.10.2001. The arrears on the aforesaid basis till the end of March, 2006 shall be calculated and paid within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the present order. The revised pension on the basis of such order for the month of April, 2006 always shall be paid regularly with effect from the due date applicable. There shall be no order as to costs.
-
2006 (1) TMI 671 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... hat Moallium-e-Urdu degree for teaching Urdu in Junior / Senior basic schools is equivalent to B.T.C.. It is settled law that the qualification should have been seen which the candidate possessed on the date of recruitment and not at a later stage unless rules to that regard permit it. The minimum qualification prescribed under Rule 8 should be fulfilled on the date of recruitment. Equivalence of degree of Moallium-e-Urdu, Jamia Urdu Aligarh with that of B.T.C. in the year 1994 would not entail the benefit to the appellants on the date they were appointed. The appellants could not have been appointed to the post of Asstt. Teachers without having training required under Rule 8. That being the case, the appointments of the appellants were de hors the Rules and could not be treated to be continued. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any substance in the appeals and are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2006 (1) TMI 670 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... R.V. Raveendran, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
2006 (1) TMI 669 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nal Appeal No. 759 of 2002 are not strangers to the sole appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 2002. Even if one comes to the conclusion that the conspiracy, as required by law, is not established, this Court does not find any difficulty in concluding that in any view of the matter, the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 759 of 2002 had abetted the sole appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 660 of 2002 in commission of offence punishable under the Act. Therefore, the conviction of the two appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 759 of 2002 with the aid of Section 29 of the Act cannot be regarded as erroneous so as to warrant interference of this Court in instant appeal. 10. The discussion above makes it clear that there is no merits in any of the above numbered appeals. Therefore, both the appeals are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. Muddamal be disposed of in terms of directions given by the learned Judge of the Trial Court in the impugned judgment.
-
2006 (1) TMI 668 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... for the petitioner has no objection, subject to the request that in the meantime the impugned Show Cause Notice may be kept in abeyance. 2 In light of the aforesaid position the respondent authorities are directed to keep the impugned Show Cause Notice in abeyance till the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Sidharth Philaments Pvt.Ltd., pending before the Tribunal. After the order of the Tribunal is available, the respondent authorities shall grant reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner upon the pending Show Cause Notice and thereafter pass necessary adjudication order in accordance with law. In the meantime, the Show Cause Notice shall not be proceeded with. 3 Needless to state that the matter shall not necessarily rest only in light of the decision of the Tribunal and it will be open to both the sides to take all contentions as are available, both in facts and in law. 4 The petition is disposed of accordingly. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
-
2006 (1) TMI 667 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... punishment and time limitation for disposal of the matters. In my view, in this case whatever defenses are being raised in this court should be raised before the trial court and this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot examine the documentary and oral evidence which may have to be led before the trial court and which has to be tested by cross examination. It is established law that this court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can intervene only in extraordinary circumstances where there is manifest injustice on the face of the record. 19. Considering all the facts and circumstances, I do not find any justification for interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petition is, Therefore, dismissed. 20. Trial court is, however, directed to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within 4 months. 21. Nothing said herein will tantamount to expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
-
2006 (1) TMI 666 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... contended that certain grounds urged before Tribunal were not taken before AO/CIT(A) by Revenue and hence, a question of law is made out entitling this Court to set aside the impugned order. We do not find any merit in this submission. Firstly, no such question of law is framed so as to examine the same from that point of view. Secondly, even assuming that this Court can go into this submission by virtue of powers so conferred upon the High Court by Section 260A then also it does not have any merit. Thirdly and in any event, the basic question being question of fact, the same could be answered only on appreciation of facts and not on law. As observed supra, it was gone into and answered against the assessee by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, no help can be taken of all the aforesaid authorities relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant. 9. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal is found to be devoid of any merit. It is accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
-
2006 (1) TMI 665 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ion 14 of the Limitation Act. I have already observed above that the matter in issue in both the suits is the same. It is the case of the plaintiffs also that the matter in issue in both suits is the same and therefore obviously the cause of action for instituting the present suit arose in 1994 and as the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim benefits of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by the law of Limitation. Issue No. 1 is, therefore, answered accordingly. As I have found that the suit as framed and filed is barred by the law of limitation, the suit is dismissed with no order as to costs. As the suit is dismissed, Notice of Motion does not survive for consideration. Hence, disposed of. At the request of the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs, it is directed that despite disposal of the Notice of Motion, ad-interim order passed in this Notice of Motion which is presently operating shall continue to operate for a period of four weeks from today.
-
2006 (1) TMI 664 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... . Accordingly, the following ORDER I. Without going into the merits or demerits of the appellant company's case, the appeal is disposed off. II. The appellant company is permitted to make an appropriate application, if it so desires, before the Advance Ruling Authority, as provided under Section 4 of the Act r/w Rule 27 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Rules. III. Liberty is also reserved to the appellant company to produce such material, which are available with it including the material produced before this Court, before the Advance Ruling Authority. IV. If and when, such an application is filed by the appellant company, the Advance Ruling Authority is directed to consider the same without being influenced by any one of its observations, findings, conclusion reached by it in case No. AR.CLR.SR.25/04-05, dated 24.8.2004 in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant/appellant's Counsel/appellant's representative. Ordered accordingly.
-
2006 (1) TMI 663 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y fatal to the relief of partition. In my view, absolutely no question of law, nevertheless a substantial question of law, is involved in the matter and the judgment of the first Appellate Court in coming to a conclusion as if it is not proved that the plaintiff has taken a "Kasu Malai" from the first defendant and therefore, non-inclusion of "Kasu Malai" in the schedule will not affect the relief claimed in the suit is not sustainable. What is important is whether such a property should be included for partition when once it has come to the knowledge of the parties that the said property is available and it is not material as to whether the same is in possession of the plaintiff or the defendant. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court is liable to be set aside and the decree and judgment of the trial court is confirmed. Consequently, the second appeal is dismissed as absolutely no question of law involved in this matter. No costs.
-
2006 (1) TMI 662 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not a claim for specific performance of the agreements and for that view of the matter learned Single Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had sought for an injunction seeking to specifically enforce the agreement. Such an injunction is statutorily prohibited with respect of a contract, which is determinable in nature. The application being under the provisions of Section 9(ii)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, relief was not granted in view of Section 14(i) (c) read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. It was rightly held that other clauses of Section 9 of the Act shall not apply to the contract, which is otherwise determinable in respect of which the prayer is made specifically to enforce the same. 5. In view of the clear position of law as stated above in the aforesaid decision, the reliefs claimed in the present application under Section 9 cannot be granted and, Therefore, this petition stands dismissed. No order as to costs.
-
2006 (1) TMI 661 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... nce. The Full Bench held that under Section 17-A all assessments prior to 1.4.1993 and not completed as on that date shall be deemed to be pending as on 1.4.1993 and it is open to the Revenue to complete such assessments in accordance with law notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority. 12. In view of the above mentioned circumstances, we are inclined to allow the appeal filed by the Revenue and hold that the mandate of Rule 32(21) will not enable the assessee to withhold the books of accounts and if no accounts are produced, it is open to the assessing authority to proceed with the assessment and complete the assessment on best judgment on the basis of available records. The assessing authority would complete the assessments within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, if the same has not been completed already, since the assessment relates to the years 1979-80 to 1992-93.
-
2006 (1) TMI 660 - SUPREME COURT
Unlawful assembly - Offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 307/149, 324/149 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code - Power of the Appellate Court - appeal against acquittal - HELD THAT:- The trial court was of the view that absence of an independent eye-witness in the background of previous enmity, was a serious lacuna. But what the trial court failed to notice is that previous enmity was not denied and the prosecution case is that Kallu and other accused came in a group to Sadruddin's house specifically to beat him up. Therefore, the mere fact that there was enmity between Sadruddin and Kallu cannot be a ground to reject the clear evidence of the eye-witnesses - PWs 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10 who were the injured, and PW-3. The High Court has, therefore, rightly held that the appellants and other accused were the assaulting party; that they had come together with weapons and had acted jointly and had run away after injuring Sadruddin and four female members of his family.
We find that the High Court has not interfered in the matter in a routine manner merely because a different view is possible. The High Court has interfered rightly, in our view, because the trial court unreasonably disbelieved the evidence of six eye-witnesses on insufficient grounds. The High Court has also assigned reasons for interfering with acquittal. We find no error in the decision of the High Court.
The accused before the trial court were 27 in number. PW- 4 specifically named 22 persons and further named the four out of them who landed him the blows. PW-3 names 12 persons who came as a group. Other eye-witnesses also clearly stated that the appellants with other accused who were present in court had come to attack Sadruddin. As noticed, the trial court chose to acquit all the 27 accused. In the appeal filed by the State, leave was granted by the High Court only in regard to five of the accused, as they were specifically named as the persons wielding weapons and causing injuries to Sadruddin and others and as the names of others were mentioned only as being members of the assembly without any specific act being attributed to them.
The High Court gave benefit of doubt to one of the five (Anwar) though his presence as a member of the group was accepted. This resulted in conviction of only four. This does not mean that there is no finding that there was an unlawful assembly. When the evidence clearly shows that more than five persons armed with swords, spears etc. had come to the house of Sadruddin with the common object of causing injury, and injured him. The mere fact that several accused were acquitted and only four are convicted, does not enable the four who are found guilty to contend that Section 149 is inapplicable.
We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.
-
2006 (1) TMI 659 - KERALA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ot with standing anything contained therein, the liability of the petitioner, under the Bond is restricted to ₹ 20 lakhs. Contention was raised before the earned single Judge that petitioner should pay the entire Charges including pay revision etc. to the Customs staff posted on cost recovery basis at the Container Freight Station. 2. The only question to be considered is whether the petitioner is liable to pay the Amounts due to the Customs staff because of the pay revision. In the bond executed there is no clause obliging the petitioner to meet the additional burden due to revision of pay. In such the circumstances the learned single judge took the view that the petitioner is not obliged to meet the revision of pay on the basis of Vth pay commission report. We find no infirmity in the view taken by the learned single judge. In these circumstances we find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned single judge. The Writ Appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.
-
2006 (1) TMI 658 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... the default or failure of the purchaser/bidder. Clauses 10 and 28 of the terms and conditions practically covered all situations in which the contract can fall through on account of any mistake on the part of such bidders. There is nothing to the contrary in the terms of the contract to avoid application, of forfeiture clause and hence, on default committed by the bidders, the Official Liquidator is entitled to forfeit said earnest. 20. The Official Liquidator is, therefore, entitled to forfeit and retain Earnest Money Deposit of Rs. Six Lakh Fifty thousand only i.e. ₹ 6,50,000/-placed with him each by Bhaskar Exxols Ltd. and Sankh Impex Pvt. Ltd. respectively. Prayer "c" in OLR 46/2003 is allowed. In view of these orders and as the property is already sold, the proceedings in OLR 10/2003 and 46/2003 are hereby disposed off accordingly. Bhaskar Exxols Ltd. and Sankh Impex Pvt. Ltd. to pay ₹ 5000/- each to the Official Liquidator as costs in OLR 46/2003.
-
2006 (1) TMI 657 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... , for the reasons stated in order of even date in Tax Appeal No.1922 of 2005 in case of Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) v. Shailesh R. Patel, the appeal and civil application are rejected.
-
2006 (1) TMI 656 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... not arise at all and in the absence of specific consideration of the contention which would substantially decide the dispute of the parties it is clear that the order passed by the Additional Commissioner is perverse for non-consideration of the material question arising for determination and wherefore the order is liable to be set aside and remitted to the competent adjudicating authority with a direction to consider the contentions of the petitioner and thereafter pass orders in accordance with law as per the discussion made in the body of this order. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The order dated 29.12.2003 issued on 31.12.2003 vide Annexure-D aside and the matter is remitted to the competent adjudicating Authority with a direction to reconsider the case with reference to the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the shoe cause notice by the respondent and pass fresh orders in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in the body of this order.
-
2006 (1) TMI 655 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... f the IPC. In these circumstances, it is clear that recovery of contraband recovered in the present case is not free from doubt. I have examined the finding of the learned Trial Court in this regard. The learned Trial Court has not considered the mandatory provisions of Sub-section 5 of Section 50 of the Act and further failed to consider the provisions of Section 51 of the Act as well as Sub-section 4 and 8 of Section 100 Cr.P.C. Therefore, in these circumstances, the Judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court cannot be allowed to be sustained. The Trial Court has committed an illegality in convicting and sentencing the accused appellant for the reasons as mentioned above. 19. Consequently, I allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the Trial Court and acquit the accused appellant from the offence, he was charged. The accused appellant is in custody, therefore, it is directed that he be released forthwith, if his custody is not required in any other case.
-
2006 (1) TMI 654 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... ince the application for rectification is already pending before the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed only on this grounds.
........
|
