Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 489 Records
-
2006 (10) TMI 520
... ... ... ... ..... tained. 13. Coming now to the plea of learned Counsel that Respondent No. 1 has been appointed in August, 2005, in our opinion, is not of much significance. If he has been appointed pursuant to the order of the High Court, the same invariably would be subject to the result of this appeal. Respondent No. 1 did not have any legal right to be appointed even out of the said panel. His position was at Serial No. 4 and not even at Serial No. 1. Therefore, there were three persons in the panel above him. The High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in issuing the impugned directions. Sympathy alone, in our opinion, cannot be a ground to allow the High Court judgment to be sustained, although, it is ex facie illegal. See Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal and Ors. 14. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
-
2006 (10) TMI 519
... ... ... ... ..... ents in public sector in order to meet the efficiency and as a matter of fact, Section 10(10C) is by way of an incentive. The learned senior counsel Mr.S.R.Ashok relies on a judgment of Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd. (1999) 3 SCC 632 to canvass that the basic rule of interpretation was that the purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect and the entire Statute must be read as a whole and purpose construction should be given to the Legislation. There is no quarrel with that principal and that principle has not been given a go-bye while deciding this case. In fact, Section 10 (10C) has been created to give an added relief to those who come under a voluntary scheme framed under the provisions and Section 89 of the Act is applicable to everybody and is not by way of any relief, whereas Section 10 (10C) gives a relief. For these reasons, we allow the writ petitions, quash the impugned orders and dismiss the I.T.T.As.
-
2006 (10) TMI 518
... ... ... ... ..... their own employees instead of accusing and disregarding the report and affidavits of the Complainants as to the value of the contents kept in the locker. It was a great shock to the family when they found the entire contents of their locker vanished. The assurance of the Bank that they will provide complete security becomes a myth when the Bank takes a consistent stand of finding fault with the consumer. 35. In the result, the complaint is allowed. We direct that the Opposite Parties No. 1, the Punjab and Sind Bank, shall pay Rs. 17,51,489/- with interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date of filing of the complaint, i.e. 29th October, 1998, till the date of payment. This order shall be complied with within four weeks time, alongwith an amount of Rs. 25,000/- to compensate the costs in pursuing the claim from the year 1998, for mental agony and harassment caused to the Complainants by the opposite party, Punjab & Sind Bank. The Original Petition is allowed accordingly.
-
2006 (10) TMI 517
... ... ... ... ..... the cancellation deed that such cancellation deed does not alter the rights. Further some of the parties filed suits and obtained status quo orders. 131. It is also to be seen that there are many disputed questions of fact, which this Court cannot delve under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Further it is not as though the petitioners are without any remedy, they have alternative remedy before the competent civil Court, which will be in a position to adjudicate based on the evidence both oral and documentary available on record and, therefore, when an alternative and efficacious remedy is available, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. 132. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed as opined by the learned brother Justice V.V.S. Rao. Judgment of the Court by Majority The writ petitions are dismissed with no costs. Since substantial questions of public importance are raised, leave to file appeal to Supreme Court, as prayed for, is granted.
-
2006 (10) TMI 516
... ... ... ... ..... er judgments noticed above, we cannot resist the conclusion that the instant petition lacks merit and is, thus, liable to be dismissed. We are further of the view that departmental proceedings cannot be permitted to wait endlessly till the conclusion of criminal trial, which may take its own time because it would not be in the interest of respondent department that a person like the petitioner, who is charged with serious misdemeanour should be continued in the disciplined force indefinitely which the criminal proceedings are likely to consume. Staying the proceedings at this stage would only serve the interest of the accused. On the basis of the aforementioned factors it is not possible for us to accept the plea raised by the petitioner that the departmental proceedings shall remain stayed till the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the instant petition. For the reasons aforementioned, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.
-
2006 (10) TMI 515
... ... ... ... ..... he amounts due under the instrument, he holds. Section 43 has, therefore, to be read in conjunction with Section 36 of the Act. The rights conferred to a holder in due course under Section 36 are not intended to be defeated on the ground that a prior transaction relating to the instrument was bad for want of consideration. The latter part of Section 43, thus, is to preserve intact the rights conferred on a holder in due course under the general provision contained in Section 36 of the Act. I am entirely in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge in the above decision. 17. As already seen, the defendant has failed to prove the absence of consideration for the pronotes. The plaintiff as a "holder in due course" is entitled to recover the amounts due under the promissory notes from the "drawer of the instrument" viz., the defendant. The points are answered accordingly. 18. There are no merits in the appeals and the same are dismissed. No costs.
-
2006 (10) TMI 514
... ... ... ... ..... not put forward. On overall consideration of the matter, we find that there is absolutely no substance in the contention that the applicant would undergo any financial crisis by depositing the amount of ₹ 12 lakhs. 6. The applicant-assessee was required to pay ₹ 49,04,116/- by way of Service tax and penalty of like amount was also imposed. Therefore, the pre-deposit of ₹ 12 lakhs, as ordered, comes hardly to 12% of the amount payable by the applicant under the impugned order. We do not find any justification whatsoever for modification of the stay order on any of the grounds urged before us. 7. The learned authorised Representative for the applicant seeks time to make the pre-deposit. We grant four weeks time to the applicant from today to make the pre-deposit as ordered, failing which the appeal will stand dismissed The present application is disposed of accordingly. Post the matter for compliance on 7-11-06. (Pronounced and Dictated in the Court)
-
2006 (10) TMI 513
... ... ... ... ..... hers to move an appropriate application before this Court for modification or clarification if required. 21. Having regard to the averments made in the petition, the material placed on record and the affidavit filed and reply of the Regional Director and the Official Liquidator, the petition is allowed subject to the above observations. I am satisfied that the prayer made in the petition deserves to be allowed. I do not find any legal impediment not to sanction the scheme of amalgamation. Hence subject to the above observations sanction is hereby granted to the above mentioned scheme of amalgamation under Sections 391-394 of the Act. The transferee company will comply with statutory requirements. Certified copy of this order will be filed with the Registrar of Companies within five weeks from the date of the order. Upon the scheme becoming effective from the appointed date, the transferor companies shall stand dissolved without being wound up. 22. The petition is disposed of.
-
2006 (10) TMI 512
... ... ... ... ..... nt case, is committed by the Police Officer, the ground of delay of disposal of cases or otherwise would not scuttle the miscarriage of justice. Similarly, we are of the view that in the given facts and circumstances of this case, the accused themselves would be liable to be blamed for the delay, if any. With regard to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the complainant has not challenged the non-framing of charge under Section 395 IPC, the same is not borne out from the record. In fact, an application was filed by the learned Public Prosecutor before the trying Magistrate under Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for alteration of charge under Section 395 of the IPC, which was rejected by the trying Magistrate, which in our view erroneously. In the view that we have taken, we do not see any infirmities in the impugned order of the High Court which would warrant our interference. The appeal is devoid of merits and is, accordingly, dismissed.
-
2006 (10) TMI 511
... ... ... ... ..... company. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any illegality in passing the impugned order of conviction. But in so far as the amount to be paid, the learned Magistrate has awarded ₹ 34,65,000/-. Of course though it is permissible to award double the amount as fine or compensation, no reasoning has been assigned why so much of fine is imposed above the cheque amount. Might be that it is towards interest or for delay in payment. 32. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, while modifying the order of sentence to pay fine, the 1st accused company and petitioners 1 and 2 shall pay ₹ 28,25,000/- out of which ₹ 23,000/- shall be towards fine and the remaining amount shall be paid to the complainant as compensation. The amount of ₹ 10 lakhs said to have been deposited before the trial court by the petitioners shall be released in favour of the respondent. Accordingly, petition is allowed in part.
-
2006 (10) TMI 510
... ... ... ... ..... gs under this Act. 4. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid provision that passport could be seized if in the opinion of the competent officer, it would be useful for, or relevant to, any proceedings under this Act. In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, the same are already over and has resulted in conviction, as mentioned above. As far as penalty, which is imposed upon the petitioner by the adjudicating authority, is concerned, if the same is not paid, the respondent can recover the amount in accordance with the procedure contained in Section 142 of the Customs Act. Since that is a procedure provided, it would be open to the respondent to take appropriate steps in accordance thereto. However, it cannot be said that the passport would be relevant for those proceedings. Therefore, the respondent cannot now continue to hold the passport of the petitioner. The respondent shall accordingly release the passport of the petitioner. 5. This petition is disposed of.
-
2006 (10) TMI 509
... ... ... ... ..... State Government have been exempted from the provisions of the Act. Arguing further, he submitted that the words in Section 2(b) and 2(a) are so clear and unambiguous that no further interpretation need be made to amplify the same and that the provisions made in the enactment of 1989 make it clearer that the respondent institution is a recognized educational institution managed by the private management and is within the effective management of the State Government and, therefore, it is entitled to be excluded from the applicability of the Central Act, 1952. learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in all the other appeals adopted the arguments of Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain. 22. For the foregoing reasons, all the civil appeals filed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner stand dismissed and the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court dated 16.09.2002 and all the judgments on different dates by different Division Benches stand affirmed. No costs.
-
2006 (10) TMI 508
... ... ... ... ..... customer by the respondents has to be tested on the touchstone of the principle of unjust enrichment. 4. We, therefore, dispose of the I.As with the following directions 1. Within a period of four weeks, respondents shall file an application before the appropriate authority praying for refund of the amount deposited by them; 2. While examining the claim the concerned authority shall keep in view the principles of "Unjust Enrichment" in respect of all amounts which have been passed on to any customer in essence that it has been collected from him; 3. Exemption shall not be extracted only in respect of cash payments and it shall also extend to the period for which the bank guarantees were furnished. If during the relevant period any collection has been made the authority shall examine whether by retention of the amount so collected by the respondents will there be unjust enrichment so far as the respondents are concerned. The applications are accordingly disposed of.
-
2006 (10) TMI 507
... ... ... ... ..... venience which are sought to be served by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation issued thereupon. It is, thus, now well-settled law that an application for grant of permission for construction of a building is required to be decided in accordance with law applicable on the day on which such permission is granted. However, a statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable time. See Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR 2006 SC 2652 . 11. For the views we have taken, the First Respondent is hereby directed to consider the application for grant of sanction or approval of the building plans submitted before it at an early date but not later than eight weeks in accordance with law. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there would be no order as to costs.
-
2006 (10) TMI 506
... ... ... ... ..... n to implement and commence the golf course project in due course of time and also the fact that it owns extensively immovable properties. In view of my foregoing conclusion and (i) in exercise of the powers under Sections 237(b)(i) and 402; (ii) to make appropriate orders bringing to an end the acts complained of and (iii) to regulate the conduct of the future affairs of the Company, it is hereby declared that- (i) the enhancement of authorised capital of the Company from ₹ 27 crores to ₹ 53 crores is illegal and void; (ii) the further issue of shares by the Company in favour of the eighth respondent impugned in the company petition, being illegal is set aside; and (iii) the Central Government will appoint one or more competent persons as inspectors to investigate the affairs of the Company and take the appropriate action if warranted, on receipt of the investigation report. With the above directions, the company petition stands disposed of. No order as to cost.
-
2006 (10) TMI 505
... ... ... ... ..... roperties vide Ex.D.50 dated 11.8.75 standing in the name of defendant No. 2 are joint family acquisitions wherein the plaintiff and the deft No. 9 as co-parceners can seek partition of their specific share in them. Thus, the finding arrived at by the trial court appears to us to be categorical finding which cannot be termed to be vague. Therefore, the view taken by the trial court appears to be justified and the finding given by the High Court is absolutely vague. Hence, we affirm the finding of the trial court and set aside the order of the High Court. 10. As a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion since the defendants- respondents herein have failed to prove that the properties mentioned in the aforesaid transactions were acquired by them as self-acquired property, the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court and affirm the order of the trial court. There would be no order as to costs.
-
2006 (10) TMI 504
... ... ... ... ..... n. Therefore, they constitute an agreement or promise by the debtor to pay the time barred debt, Since the accused has not paid the cheque amounts inspite of demand made by the complainant the accused has committed an offence under Section 138 of the Act. The learned Magistrate has committed an error in dismissing the complaint and recording and order of acquittal in favour of the accused. 14. For the foregoing reaons, I answer the point formulated for my consideration in the negative. In the result, the Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2001 made in C.C.No. 35100/1999 on the file of XVI Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Bangalore, is set aside and the respondent/accused is convicted for the offence under Section 138 of the Act and sentenced to pay a sum of ₹ 1,00,000/-, failing which the accused shall undergo S1 for six months. If the fine amount is recovered, the appellant/complainant shall be paid a sum of ₹ 90,000/-, as compensation.
-
2006 (10) TMI 503
... ... ... ... ..... confirmed. 4. The learned JDR defended the departmental view. 5. The learned Counsel Smt. Rukmani Menon relies on the ruling rendered in the case of M/s. BST Ltd. v. CCE, Cochin by Final Order No. 921/2006 dated 10-5-2006 2006 (4) S.T.R. 40 (T) and also relies on the rulings cited supra. 6. On a careful consideration, we notice that the demands of Service Tax become sustainable only after 16-8-2002 when the provisions of Rule 6 was amended. Therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) is justified in dropping the demands, as in the present cases, the amounts were all transferred prior to this date. This view has been confirmed by this Bench in the case of CCE v. Travancore Cochin Chemicals Ltd. Similar view has been expressed by the other Benches in the orders cited supra. Similar order has been passed by this Bench in the case of M/s. BST Ltd. (cited supra). There is no merit in these Revenue appeals and the same are rejected. (Pronounced and dictated in open Court)
-
2006 (10) TMI 502
... ... ... ... ..... s have actually been made by the assessee, as claimed by it, and if the payment has been made, its claim should be allowed. 6. We have heard Sri Shamboo Chopra, learned standing counsel for the Revenue. Nobody has appeared on behalf of the respondent-assessee. 7. In view of the order of the Tribunal confining the jurisdiction of the assessing authority to enquiry only regarding the genuineness of the payments made by the assessee, it was not open to the assessing authority to embark upon any other enquiry and to reopen the matter which had already been decided in favour of the assessee by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessing authority could not have gone into the question of disallowance of the incentive bonus under section 36(1)(ii) of the Act. 8. We are of the considered opinion that the order of the Tribunal does not raise any substantial question of law which requires consideration. 9. Both the appeals are accordingly dismissed in limine.
-
2006 (10) TMI 501
... ... ... ... ..... aire were to be put to Suresh Shah, but strangely the same questions had been put to all Respondents. Except one question, viz., "what you want to say in your defence?", not only similar questions had been put, similar answers had been recorded. Strangely enough, even questions required to be put to each of the accused persons separately have been made part of the same questionnaire. Such common questions framed and asked to all the accused persons did not subserve the requirements of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To the said extent, the High Court's observations cannot be said to be unsustainable. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are dealing with a judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court. If two views are possible, ordinarily this Court would not interfere therewith. The State has not been able to show any illegality in the judgment of the High Court. We, therefore, do not intend to interfere therewith. The appeal is dismissed.
........
|