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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 658 Records
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2008 (10) TMI 733 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ON hearing counsel the Court made the following Learned counsel for the petitioner prays to withdraw the petition. Pr ayer made is accepted. The special leave petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
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2008 (10) TMI 732 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... warrant an order of demolition. Respondent No. 1's contention that only an area of 14 sq. ft. was the subject matter of unauthorized construction should have been considered by the appellant and an appropriate order thereupon should have been passed. It was in a situation of this nature, the appellant was statutorily obligated to apply its mind in regard to the nature and extent of unauthorized construction, if any. 18. We would, however, proceed on the basis that the plan was sanctioned. It would, therefore, be proper to direct that the appellant should be directed to restore such constructions for which order of sanction had been obtained. To the said extent the impugned order is modified. 19. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeal is dismissed subject to the aforementioned modifications. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellant will pay and bear the costs of the respondent No. 1. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lacs only.)
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2008 (10) TMI 731 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stry has been sick or not. If it is found that the industry is not in a position to bear the financial burden, an appropriate award, as a result whereof the equities between the parties can be adjusted, should be passed. 15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the respondent was employed for a short period and that too in two different spells, viz., from 1987 to 1990 and from 1995 to 1997. Having regard to the fact that the respondent has not worked for a long period and the appellant does not have any capacity to pay as it is a sick unit, interest of justice would be subserved if in stead and place of an award of reinstatement with full back wages, a compensation for a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) is directed to be paid. The said sum would be over and above the amount which the appellant has deposited in terms of the order of the High Court under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act. 16. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions. No costs.
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2008 (10) TMI 730 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... espondent no.1. 8. We have noted the appellant s grievance regarding payment of interest to the shareholders but are not separately dealing with it in view of the direction that we are going to issue to respondent no.1 to send a fresh communication to the appellant. 9. In the result, we do not consider the calculation of the offer price by the appellant to be correct and accordingly dismiss the appeal. At the same time we set aside the impugned communication and direct respondent no.1 to issue a fresh communication within a period of two weeks from the date of this order incorporating 28.6.2008 as the reference date for calculation of the offer price and allowing the appellant a reasonable time for opening the offer before imposing the liability for payment of interest keeping in view the time required for the amended public offer to reach the shareholders and the time required by them to consider their option afresh, given the change in the offer price. No order as to costs.
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2008 (10) TMI 729 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ent of requirements. In Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University 1990 2SCR273 this Court held where the candidate was admitted to the Law course by Law College and University also permitted him to appear for Pre- Law and Intermediate Law examinations, the college and the university were estopped from withholding his result on the ground that he was ineligible to take admission in Law course. Having regard to the above we are of the view that irrespective of the fact that M.A. English (OUS) degree secured by first respondent from Annamalai University through distance education, may not be recognized as an equivalent to the Master's degree of the appellant university, his admission to the law course should not be cancelled. The appellant University is directed to treat the admission as regular admission and permit the first respondent to appear for the law examination and if he has already appeared for the examination, declare his result. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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2008 (10) TMI 728 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... primary item of his income. Other income which can conceivably be income qua the public servant will be in the regular receipt from (a) his property, or (b) his investment. A receipt from windfall, or gains of graft, crime or immoral secretions by persons prima facie would not be receipt for the "known sources of income" of a public servant. 16. The legislature has advisedly used the expression "satisfactorily account." The emphasis must be on the word "satisfactorily" and the legislature has, thus, deliberately cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also to satisfy the Court that his explanation was worthy of acceptance. 17. The analysis made by the trial Court and the High Court and evidence on record leave no manner of doubt that the conviction as recorded does not suffer from any infirmity. We find no infirmity with the order of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 727 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... owever, the petitioner may take recourse to such remedies which are available to him in law. If the petitioner files an appeal and an application for condonation of delay the same may be considered in accordance with law upon taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner had been pursuing his remedies before the High Court as well as before us. The special leave petitions are dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 726 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... itself not using the trade mark and the plaintiff has applied in wrong form to the Registrar, hence the delay. I find that if the defendant had any grievance with respect to any of these aspects, the defendant ought to have approached the Registrar. The defendant without doing so, cannot raise such pleas which are in the domain of Registrar, when an action for infringement is brought against it. 24. I find plaintiff entitled to interim order. The application is allowed. The defendant, its directors, assignees, distributors, dealers are, during the pendency of suit restrained from manufacturing, selling or dealing in medicinal preparations under the trade mark THEOBID-D or any other trade mark as may be deceptively similar with trade mark THEOBID of the plaintiff. However, in view of prima facie extensive use by defendant since 2007, and so as to enable the defendant to without disturbing its business, effect the change, this order shall be operative w.e.f., one month hereof.
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2008 (10) TMI 725 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lant, the accused cannot be made liable. The reasons given by the learned Judge for taking the contrary view in R. Gopikuttan Pillai and the apprehensions voiced by the learned counsel for the appellant to concerning part payment, cannot be accepted, in view of the provisions contained in Section 56 read with Section 15 of the Act. If the drawee made endorsement regarding the part payment on the cheque and claimed only the balance amount and if it bounced, the offence under Section 138 would have been made our and the 1st respondent accused would have liable for punishment. In the absence of any vagueness in the provision, we find it difficult to accept any other view. In the result we overrule the decisions in R. Gopikuttan Pillai v. Sankara Narayanan Nair, Cri. Appeal No. 270/1997; and Thekkan and Co. v. Anitha, 2003 (3) KLT 870. We find nothing wrong with the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the 1st respondent. Accordingly, the criminal appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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2008 (10) TMI 724 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r and ordinary sense of the word as denoting an unlooked for mishap or an untoward event which is not expected or designed. The above view of Lord Macnaghten was qualified by the speech of Lord Haldane, A.C. in Trim Joint District School Board of Management v. Kelly as follows I think that the context shows that in using the word "designed" Lord Macnaghten was referring to designed by the sufferer. 22. Furthermore, the rights of the parties were required to be determined as on the date of the incident, namely, 9-10-1996. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that a subsequent event and that too by raising a presumption in terms of Section 108 of the Evidence Act can give rise to fructification of claim, save and except in very exceptional cases. 18. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. 19. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2008 (10) TMI 723 - ITAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... al income of the assessee and tax payable by the assessee on such total income shall be the amount of income tax @ 75% ?" Similarly, we find that the Hon'ble Tribunal while deciding the issue in Vishnu Sugar Mills has taken into consideration the Apollo Tyres Ltd.'s case and also sub-section (2) of section 115JB. The case law relied on by the Ld. Departmental Representative in the case of Karnataka Small Scale Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. -Vs- CIT reported in 258 ITR 770 is not related to section 115JB of the Act. Therefore, we find no merit in the arguments advanced by the Ld. Departmental Representative and following the decision of the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of Vishnu Sugar Mills Ltd. cited supra, the ground nos. 1 and 2 of appeal of the assessee are allowed. 7. Ground No. 3 was not pressed, hence dismissed. 8. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed. 9. Order pronounced in the open Court on 31.10.2008
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2008 (10) TMI 722 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ad proved that the amount of the cheque was not legally recoverable, cannot be faulted. In my considered opinion, the lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the accused had successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. The lower Appellate Court was right in holding that the learned Magistrate had clearly erred in convicting and sentencing the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 11. I do not deem it necessary to deal with the submissions made regarding the applicability of the Goa Money Lenders Act, 2001 since the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the grounds stated above. I also do not deem it necessary to refer to several authorities cited by both sides in view of the findings given by me that the accused has discharged the burden of rebutting the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is dismissed. The bail bond executed by the respondent No. l, shall stand discharged.
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2008 (10) TMI 721 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... interference at the threshold with the F.I.R. is to be in very exceptional circumstances as held in R.P. Kapoor and Bhajan Lal cases (supra). 10. Ultimately, the acceptability of the materials to fasten culpability on the accused persons is a matter of trial. These are not the cases where it can be said that the FIR did not disclose commission of an offence. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in the concerned cases. 11. Keeping in view the principles of law as enunciated above, the action of the High Court in quashing the FIR in each case cannot be maintained and are set aside. 12. Learned counsel for the State submitted that there shall be early investigation in the matter and submission of Report under Section 173 of the Code shall be done without delay and in any event, not later than the end of February, 2009. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. 13. All the appeals are allowed, as indicated above.
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2008 (10) TMI 720 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... burden is always on the Plaintiff to prove that the case is covered by Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Plaintiff will have to lead evidence to substantiate that the earlier suit was prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith. By merely amending the Plaint, the same cannot be proved that the prosecution of the suit was with due diligence and in good faith, which can be established only by leading evidence. Admittedly, in this case, the Appellants chose not to lead evidence. Hence, it is clear that the Appellants cannot claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by merely amending the Plaint, but without adducing any evidence. Hence, even with regard to the second issue, the Appellants cannot succeed. 26. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we do not find any error or illegality in the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 20.01.2006. Hence, the Appeal is devoid of merits and the same is dismissed, however with no order as to costs.
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2008 (10) TMI 719 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the earlier round of litigation is not in question and it cannot be said that he acted beyond his authority. 44. If such a stand had taken in the earlier round of litigation we fail to see any reason as to why the concession made by it should not be given effect to. If a right has accrued to the respondents for maintaining a writ so as to compel the State to give effect to an earlier order passed by the Court as has been held by this Court in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah AIR2007SC3100 , the same should not be denied to respondent herein. 45. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case in its entirety and having regard to the legal propositions as noticed hereinbefore, we are of the opinion that these are not the cases in which this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The appeals are dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at ₹ 50,000/- in each case.
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2008 (10) TMI 718 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ts' house and resided there. In her testimony, the complainant has deposed that since no one from the family of the accused came to enquire about her welfare, she decided to lodge the First Information Report. No explanation worth the name for delay in filing the complaint with the police has come on record. We are of the opinion that this circumstance raises considerable doubt regarding the genuineness of the complaint and the veracity of the evidence of the complainant (PW-1) and her father (PW-3), rendering it unsafe to base the conviction of the respondent upon it. Resultantly, when the substratum of the evidence given by the complainant (PW-1) is found to be unreliable, the prosecution case has to be rejected in its entirety. 20. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court, acquitting the respondent, does not suffer from any infirmity, warranting our interference. The appeal is devoid of any merit and is dismissed accordingly.
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2008 (10) TMI 717 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI
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... ... ..... vestors. This again is a serious matter and the appellant company cannot be allowed to operate the schemes. 6. In view of what we have observed hereinabove, it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions raised on behalf of the respondent Board. 7. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The appellant will now wind up the schemes in accordance with the provisions of the Regulations and repay the investors in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 73. 8. We make it clear that the appellant will send to its investors fresh information memoranda after getting the same vetted from the Board. As soon as the information memoranda are finalised and sent to the investors, the Board shall release the amount of ₹ 50 lakhs lying with it together with interest accrued thereon to the appellant company to be utilised for repayment to the investors. The Board shall have its costs from the appellant which are assessed at ₹ 25,000.
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2008 (10) TMI 716 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to form part of the Estate of the deceased at the time of their death. 13. We, therefore, have little hesitation in holding that the High Court had not committed any error in allowing the amendments to the plaint which had the effect of impleading the appellants as parties to the administration suit filed by the respondent No. 1 and permitting the respondent No. 1 to question the transactions entered into by the owners of the Estate with third parties. The order of the High Court does not warrant any interference and the appeal must, therefore, be dismissed. 14. We, accordingly, dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment and order of the High Court allowing the amendments to the plaint for impleading the appellants as parties to the administration suit filed by the respondent No. 1 and for scrutinizing the transactions which were alleged to have been concluded by the parents of the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 during their lifetime. 15. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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2008 (10) TMI 715 - ITAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of the Supreme Court divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete law declared by the Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before the Court. A decision of the Supreme Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and, while applying the decision to a later case. Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision. Hence, clearly the revenue has erred in relying on these case laws, which in fact support the view taken by us. On the anvil of aforesaid discussion and precedents, we hold that the learned Commissioner (Appeals) was correct in holding the impugned rectification order as invalid, being time-barred. 15. In the result, this appeal filed by the revenue is dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 714 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and set aside. While parting with this order, it is to be noted that temporary injunction applications have to be considered and by the Court at the first instance under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC. Order XXXIX Rule 3A of CPC puts limitation of such exercise i.e. thirty days. While considering the Misc. Civil Appeal, the appellate court shall have regard to the legislative intent that such interlocutory matters have to be decided expeditiously though there is no such limitation imposed upon the lower Appellate Court by the Code. In the case on hand, Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2008 is still pending before the first appellate court. 20. Writ Petition is therefore, allowed. Impugned order is quashed and set aside with further direction to the lower appellate court to decide and dispose of the Misc. Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2008 expeditiously and after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned. 21. Rule made absolute in above terms with no order as to costs.
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