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Showing 61 to 80 of 1159 Records
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2012 (7) TMI 1108 - SUPREME COURT
Maintainability of plaint - maintainability of the application questioned on the ground that once the court is seized of an application filed by him under Order VII Rule 11 CPC - The trial Court allowed the application of the appellant/defendant No.1 filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the plaint was barred under the provisions of Order IX Rules 8 & 9 CPC and Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) & 4 (b) of CPC. The said order of the trial Court was set aside by the first appellate Court on the ground that the trial Court had taken the pleas from the written statement of the defendant which is not permissible under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and the High Court in the second appeal confirmed the judgment of the first appellate Court.
The trial Court, suit which was dismissed for default had been restored by the trial Court even at the time of filing of the application by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and it is also brought to our notice that the said proceedings are going on. In view of the same, the provisions of Order IX Rules 8 and 9 CPC are not applicable to the said suit. Even otherwise, the relief sought in the suit (which was earlier dismissed for default) and in the present suit are with regard to different properties. For the same reasons, the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) & 4 (b) of CPC are not applicable.
HELD THAT:- the High Court is fully justified in confirming the decision of the appellate Court remitting the matter to the trial Court for consideration of all the issues. In view of the fact that the suit is pending from 2002, we direct the trial Court to decide the suit in its entirety considering all the issues, after affording adequate opportunity to both the parties, and dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.
The civil appeal is dismissed with the above direction. No order as to costs.
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2012 (7) TMI 1107 - SUPREME COURT
Remand in favour of the investigating agency, without seeking any specific prayer challenging the remand orders - HELD THAT:- When the accused appellant in the instant matter had already been enlarged on bail by the High Court, it was all the more essential and judicial duty of the Judicial Magistrate to ensure and ascertain as to why the appellant was required to be taken into police custody/police remand for conducting further investigation specially when revival of the investigation was done not even at the instance of the complainant but by a third person, namely, Sri Parmar whose locus-standi for revival of the investigation is itself not clear. We find sufficient force in the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants that the plea for grant of police remand should be an exception and not the rule and the investigating agency ought to advance strong reasons seeking police remand for further investigation specially in a matter where the alleged accused had been enlarged on bail and the dispute had practically come to an end when the complainant had arrived at a compromise with the accused persons and subsequently withdrew the complaint; yet the investigation was revived at the instance of a stranger, namely, Randhirsing Deepsing Parmar who admittedly is a third party unconnected with the dispute and is alleged to have demanded money from the appellants by taking undue interest in the matter and getting the investigation revived without the consent of the complainant who herself had entered into a compromise with the appellant and had not sought revival of the complaint.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the learned Magistrate as also the High Court appears to have adopted a casual or a mechanical approach permitting police remand of the appellants without scrutinizing the reasons ignoring the fact that the appellants had already been enlarged on bail by the High Court and the dispute with the complainant Surjaben who had lodged the complaint had already been settled. Thus, the existing facts and circumstance prima facie were clearly not so grave or extraordinary justifying police remand which could have been overlooked by the High Court even though it was for three days only as it was bound to have ramification not only affecting the liberty of the person who was already granted bail but also the magistrate nullifying the order of the High Court granting bail even if it was for a period of three days only.
We are of the considered opinion that the High Court as also the Judicial Magistrate were not legally justified in permitting the police remand of the appellants even for three days in the wake of the existing facts and features of the matter narrated hereinbefore. Consequently, we set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court as also the order dated 31.3.2011 passed by the Principal Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate First Class, Valod permitting police remand of the appellants and thus allow this appeal.
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2012 (7) TMI 1106 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... ues back to the file of AO to decide the same afresh after giving the parties adequate opportunity of being heard afresh. Following our order in the case of Shri suresh Nanda we set aside the issues back to the file of AO accordingly to decide afresh along with the issues as to whether any addition at all is called for and, if so in which case the addition is to be made. 5. Apropos remaining grounds, it is pleaded that the disallowances have been made on ad hoc basis without considering the explanation furnished by the assessee and the ITAT judgment in its own case. 6. Since we have set aside the main issues back to the file of AO, interest of justice will be served if the remaining issues in these appeals are set aside back to the file of AO to decide all these issues after considering the explanation given by the assessee and ITAT order. 7. In the result, all the appeals filed by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in open court on 24-7-2012.
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2012 (7) TMI 1105 - SUPREME COURT
Release of wheat - illegal storage of subsidized food grains - Quashing of confiscation proceedings - Essential Commodities Act, 1955 - No legal owner or claimant of confiscated goods - black marketing - In the present case, The SDO and other officers from the local police raided the premises of the said flour mill (respondent) and found off loading of wheat from Truck. It was found that the grains bags had the seal of Food Corporation of India, (FCI). The seized material made it apparent that there had been diversion of FCI grains for the purpose of black marketing.
HELD THAT:- We are at pains to observe that the High Court has dealt with the issue in most casual and caviler manner without any application of mind showing complete disregard of the legislature enacting the provisions for general welfare. In the subsequent order dealing with the ownership of the wheat the High Court has only taken note of the fact that as the respondents herein were prepared to furnish adequate/sufficient security to the satisfaction of the court below for release of the wheat in question, the wheat could have been released by the CJM, there was no justification for the High Court to issue directions for release of such material merely because applicant could furnish the security. The High Court has totally ignored the fact that any order passed under Section 6-A is appealable under Section 6-C of the EC Act. Therefore, to consider such an application for release of the goods was totally unwarranted at least at that stage.
Learned counsel for the parties are not in a position to reveal the status of the criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents. In such a fact-situation, as has been suggested by learned counsel for the parties we set aside the aforesaid judgments and orders dated 15.3.2011 and 29.4.2011 and remand the case back to the High Court to consider afresh after examining all factual and legal issues involved in the case. Till the disposal of the case afresh, interim order passed by this Court on 31.10.2011 shall remain operative.
The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
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2012 (7) TMI 1104 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... about such change. 5. The respondent no.5-Department had issued Notice on 30.03.2009 u/s.34 of the said Act for assessment of VAT and CST for the Assessment Year 2006-2007. However, no response was received from respondent no.2 in that regard nor any representation was made against such Notice. Therefore, the respondent-Department passed the ex-parte order on 21.03.2011 raising the demand of ₹ 1,28,97,733/-. Since respondent no.2 failed to pay the amount, proceedings under the Bombay Land Revenue Code were initiated by the respondent-Department and ultimately, it registered its first charge on the property, as per the provisions of Section 48 of the VAT Act. 6. Considering the facts of the case and the provisions of the VAT Act, I am of the opinion that the first charge over the property shall be of the respondent-Department. I do not find any illegality or impropriety in the decision of the respondent-Department. Hence, the petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged.
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2012 (7) TMI 1103 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... (s) None ORDER Leave granted. The appeals will be heard on the SLP Paper Books. Additional documents, if any, may be filed by the parties. Tag with Civil Appeal No.3345 of 2012.
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2012 (7) TMI 1102 - TELANGANA AND ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Delete - duplicate case
... ... ... ... ..... ealt by it. In view of the same, it is made clear that the petitioner shall not operate any other current account or any account for its day to day operations at any place in the name of any person or company contrary to the orders passed by this Court. In fact, the petitioners or the respondent should have brought to the notice of this Court about the collection accounts and payments accounts being operated by the petitioner at 19 locations. It is made clear that the condition imposed in this order as above and other conditions enumerated in the earlier order have to be strictly complied with. Thus, all the revenue receipts from various bank accounts, either by way of collection account, payment account or any other account, shall be operated strictly in compliance with the earlier orders dated 23.05.2012 passed by this Court. In view of the orders passed above, the 19 collections and payment accounts of the petitioners stands defreezed. This petition is ordered accordingly.
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2012 (7) TMI 1101 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es this Court from extending the grant of bail to the petitioner by way of an interim measure on 27.1.2012. So far as the other two aspects of the matter, i.e., tampering with the evidence as well as fleeing away from the processes of law are concerned, I am not going into the same as the very first parameter is not satisfied. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, I do not feel that this is a fit case where the petitioner deserves to be enlarged on bail. Accordingly, interim bail dated 27.1.2012 is not extended. The petitioner is directed to surrender before the learned ACMM, New Delhi today itself, who shall act in accordance with law. A copy of the order is given to the petitioner free of cost. However, expression of any opinion here in above shall not be treated as an expression on the merits of the case. The petitioner is given liberty to move an application for the grant of bail after the examination of material witnesses as the charge sheet has been filed.
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2012 (7) TMI 1100 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... dent (s) Mr. S. Ganesh, Sr.Adv., Mr. Akhil Anand, Adv., Mr. Mahesh Agarwal, Adv., Mr. Rishi Agrawala, Adv., Mr. E.C. Agrawala, Adv. Mr. Ankur Saigal,Adv. Mr. Abhinav Agarwal,Adv. ORDER Delay condoned. Leave granted.
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2012 (7) TMI 1099 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... s held that much importance should not be attached to the statement about the manner in which undisclosed income has been derived and mere non-statement of the manner in which such income was derived would not make explanation 5(2) to sec.271(1)(c) of the Act inapplicable. Keeping in view the decision of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Mahendra C. Shah (supra) as well as that of Allahabad High Court in the case of Radha Kishan Goel (supra) and having regard to the facts of the case, we are of the view that the penalty imposed by the AO u/s.271(1)(c) was rightly cancelled by the Ld. CIT (A) allowing the benefit of immunity contained in the provisions of Explanation 5 to sec.271(1)(c). In that view of the matter, we uphold the impugned order of the Ld. CIT (A) cancelling the penalty levied by the AO and dismiss this appeal filed by the revenue. 9. In the result, appeal of the revenue is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on this day of 25th July 2012.
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2012 (7) TMI 1098 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gs Ltd.(supra), and by the Karnataka High Court in Vikrant Tyres Ltd. (supra) in so far as they holds that an independent proceeding underSection 48 of the Act cannot be maintained, unless the foreign award is sought to be enforced in legal proceedings. 53. The submission based on a distinction sought to be drawn between the expressions "enforced" and "invoked", in my view, tantamounts to a resort to hairsplitting. Invocation of the award, in the context of the Act only means the act of seeking its enforcement - as defined in the wider sense in the Act. 54. For all the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the present petitions are not maintainable at this stage, since the respondent, Videocon Industries Ltd., has not initiated any enforcement proceedings in respect of the foreign award. 55. The petitions are accordingly dismissed as not maintainable, while allowing the preliminary objection of the respondents. 56. Parties are left to bear their respective costs.
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2012 (7) TMI 1097 - SUPREME COURT
Grant of lease of iron-ore mines to the public sector undertakings - legality of the decision of the State Government seeking to withdraw its recommendations for mining leases, and the subsequent decision of the Central Government to reject those very recommendations - Whether the Notifications dated December 21, 1962 (1962 Notification) and February 28, 1969 (1969 Notification) issued by the State of Bihar and the Notification dated October 27, 2006 (2006 Notification) issued by the State of Jharkhand are legal and valid? - Memorandum of understanding (MOU) was arrived at between the Government of Jharkhand and Monnet, for the establishment of an integrated steel plant - Jharkhand Government vide its letter dated 6.8.2004 recommended the proposal of Monnet to Union of India Under Section 5 (1) and 11 (5) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 ("MMDR Act") - 58 applications were received, seeking grant of the mining leases over an area of 3566.54 hectares in Ghatkhuri reserved forest - letter also stated that priority was being given to Monnet in terms of Section 11 (3) of the Act on the basis of its technical mineral based industry and financial capacity - Government of India, summarily rejected the same.
ORDER - R.M. Lodha - HELD THAT:- We may record that the Government of Jharkhand had issued one more notification subsequently, dated 27.10.2006, by which it was decided that the areas described in the 1962 and 1969 notifications will not be given to anyone, except to the public sector undertakings or joint venture projects of the State.
No fundamental right in mining - The Appellants have applied for mining leases in a land belonging to Government of Jharkhand (erstwhile Bihar) and it is for iron-ore which is a mineral included in the First Schedule to the 1957 Act in respect of which no mining lease can be granted without the prior approval of the Central Government. It goes without saying that no person can claim any right in any land belonging to Government or in any mines in any land belonging to Government except under 1957 Act and 1960 Rules.
No person has any fundamental right to claim that he should be granted mining lease or prospecting licence or permitted reconnaissance operation in any land belonging to the Government. It is apt to quote the following statement of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in M/s. Hind Stone [1981 (2) TMI 239 - SUPREME COURT].
State Government's ownership in mines and minerals within its territory and the power of reservation - The admitted position is that the State Government (erstwhile Bihar and now Jharkhand) is the owner of the subject area. Mines and minerals within its territory vest in it absolutely. As a matter of fact it is because of this position that the Appellants made their application for grant of mining lease to the State Government.
The State Government had full power to recall the recommendation made to the Central Government for some good reason. Once 1962 and 1969 Notifications issued by the erstwhile State of Bihar and 2006 Notification issued by the State of Jharkhand have been found by me to be valid and legal, the submissions of Mr. Ranjit Kumar pale in insignificance and are not enough to invalidate the action of the State Government in recalling the recommendation made in favour of Monnet. The valid reservation of subject mining area for exploitation in public sector disentitles Monnet -as well as other Appellants -to any relief.
It is well settled that no one has legal or vested right to the grant or renewal of a mining lease. Monnet cannot claim a legal or vested right for grant of the mining lease. It is true that by the MOU entered into between the State Government and Monnet certain commitments were made by the State Government but firstly, such MOU is not a contract as contemplated under Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India and secondly, in grant of mining lease of a property of the State, the State Government has a discretion to grant or refuse to grant any mining lease. Obviously, the State Government is required to exercise its discretion, subject to the requirement of law. In view of the fact that area is reserved for exploitation of mineral in public sector, it cannot be said that the discretion exercised by the State Government suffers from any legal flaw.
The recommendation in favour of Monnet to the Central Government was simply a proposal with certain pre-conditions. For withdrawal of such proposal by the State Government, in my view, no notice was legally required to be given. Moreover, no prejudice has been caused to it by not giving any notice before recalling the recommendation as it had no legal or vested right to the grant of mining lease. The area is not available for grant of mining lease in the private sector. For all these reasons, I do not find that the case of Monnet stands differently from the other Appellants.
Therefore, there is no merit in these appeals and they are dismissed.
H.L. Gokhale, J. - HELD THAT:- In M.A. Tulloch and Company [1963 (8) TMI 42 - SUPREME COURT], the Constitution Bench was concerned with legality of certain demands of fee under the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952, and the same question arose as to whether the provisions of the Orissa Act were hit by the MMDR Act, 1957 in view of Entry No. 54 of the Union List. The validity of the state act was canvassed under Entry No. 23 of the State List and was accepted as not hit by the provisions of the MMDR Act, 1957. The Court held the Orissa Act and the demand of fee to be valid.
In Baijnath Kadio [1969 (8) TMI 82 - SUPREME COURT], this Court was concerned with the validity of second proviso of Section 10 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1964 for being in conflict with the provisions concerning miner minerals under the MMDR Act, 1957. The Court followed the propositions in Hingir-Rampur Coal Company [1960 (11) TMI 115 - SUPREME COURT] and M.A. Tulloch Company and found that the field was not open to the State Legislature, since it was covered under the Central Act.
As can be seen from these three judgments, if there is a declaration by the Parliament, to the extent of that declaration, the Regulation of mines and minerals development will be outside the scope of the State Legislation as provided under Entry No. 54 of the Centre List. Presently, we are not concerned with the conflict of any of the provisions under the MMDR Act, either with any State Legislation or with any Executive Order under a State Legislation issued by the State Government. The submission of the Appellant is that the Jharkhand Government was not competent at all to issue the notifications of 1962 and 1969 reserving the mine areas for public undertaking. The answer of the State Government is that it is acting under the very MMDR Act, and the notifications are within the four corners of its powers as permitted by the Central Legislation.
All these issues raised by the Appellants have already been decided by a bench of three Judges of this Court in Amritlal Nathubhai Shah v. Union of India [1976 (8) TMI 175 - SUPREME COURT]. In that matter also the Government of Gujarat had issued similar notifications dated 31.12.1963 and 26.2.1964 reserving the lands in certain talukas for exploitation of bauxite in public sector. The applications filed by the Appellant for grant of mining lease for bauxite were rejected by the State Government. The revision application filed by the Appellant to the Central Government was also rejected by its order which stated that the State Government was the owner of the minerals within its territory and the minerals vest in it, and also that the State Government had the inherent right to reserve any particular area for exploitation in the public sector. The Gujarat High Court had accepted this view.
In view of the discussion as above, the judgment in Amritlal (supra) cannot be said to be stating anything contrary to the propositions in Hingir-Rampur Coal Company, M.A. Tulloch and Company and Baijnath Kadio (supra), but is a binding precedent. The notifications impugned by the Appellants in the present group of appeals were fully protected under the provisions of MMDR Act, and also as explained in Amritlal (supra).
Desueutde - The submissions with respect to the two notifications suffering on account of Desuetude has also no merit, as the law requires that there must be a considerable period of neglect, and it is necessary to show that there is a contrary practice of a considerable time. The Appellants have not been able to show anything to that effect. The authorities of the State of Jharkhand have acted the moment the notifications were brought to their notice, and they have acted in accordance therewith. This certainly cannot amount to deusteude.
Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations - In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot be used against a statutory provision or notification.
What the Appellants are seeking is in a way some kind of a specific performance when there is no concluded contract between the parties. An MOU is not a contract, and not in any case within the meaning of Article 299 of the Constitution of India.
Mines and minerals are a part of the wealth of a nation. Article 39(c) mandates that state should see to it that operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. The public interest is very much writ large in the provisions of MMDR Act and in the declaration Under Section 2 thereof. The ownership of the mines vests in the State of Jharkhand in view of the declaration under the provisions of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 which act is protected by placing it in the Ninth Schedule added by the First Amendment to the Constitution.
What is being submitted by the Appellants is that the State Government cannot issue such notifications for the reasons which the Appellants have canvassed. We, however, do not find any error in the letter of withdrawal dated 13.9.2005 issued by the State of Jharkhand, and the letter of rejection dated 6.3.2006 issued by the Union of India for the reasons stated therein. In our view, the State of Jharkhand was fully justified in declining the grant of leases to the private sector operators, and in reserving the areas for the public sector undertakings on the basis of notifications of 1962, 1969 and 2006. All that the State Government has done is to act in furtherance of the policy of the statute and it cannot be faulted for the same.
Therefore, we do not find any merit in these appeals and they are all dismissed. The interim orders passed therein will stand vacated.
Iron is a mineral necessary for industrial development. In view of the pendency of these appeals, and the stay orders sought by the Appellants therein, grant of lease of iron-ore mines to the public sector undertakings could not be made for over six years. The State of Jharkhand and the people at large have thereby suffered. In view thereof we would have been justified in imposing costs on the Appellants. However, considering that important questions of law were raised in these appeals, we refrain from doing the same. The parties will therefore, bear their own costs.
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2012 (7) TMI 1096 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) - proceedings of Director of Enforcement - proceeds of crime - entitlement to take possession of the properties - provisional orders of attachment - offences u/s 420 read with Section 511 IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978 - HELD THAT:- all the contentions of the writ petitioners are bound to fail, except the contention relating to the entitlement of the respondents to take possession of the properties immediately after the orders of the Adjudicating Authority. While the orders of attachment passed by the Deputy Director and the orders of confirmation passed by the Adjudicating Authority are liable to be upheld, the direction issued by the Adjudicating Authority to the Director to take possession of the properties alone is liable to be set aside.
the writ petitions are allowed to a limited extent, confirming all other portions of the impugned orders of the Deputy Director and the Adjudicating Authority, except the portion relating to actual physical possession. The respondents are directed to put the petitioners back into possession of the properties. However, the legal and constructive possession of the properties shall be deemed to remain with the Deputy Director/Director and the petitioners cannot alienate, encumber or part with possession of the properties until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against the accused and until the conclusion of the confiscation proceedings that may be taken up after the decision of the Criminal Courts. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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2012 (7) TMI 1095 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ell, holding that no disallowance is liable to be made under section 40(a)(i). 17. So far as TDS on freight at ₹ 1,28,23,566/-, it has been shown that there was no contract as such, with the transporter and the assessee. In absence of any contract, TDS provisions cannot be attracted, hence, the disallowance is deleted. 18. On the TDS on sales promotion expenses at ₹ 1,89,85,166/- the AR reiterated that wherever it was applicable, TAS was deducted and wherever the amounts were below the threshold limit, no TAS was required to be deducted, hence, the provisions were not applicable. 19. We find that the decision of the CIT (A) is based on facts which we endorse. 20. We, therefore, delete the disallowance sought for by the AO. 21. In the result, the appeal filed by the department is dismissed. Appeal by the department in ITA No. 2824/Mum/2010 is dismissed. Appeal by the department in ITA No. 5869/Mum/2010 is dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court on 25.07.2012.
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2012 (7) TMI 1094 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... hat the matter may be restored to AO as the assessee is expecting to get the approval at any time from DSIR in the prescribed form and the AO be directed to grant deduction to the assessee u/s.35(2AB) of the Act on the basis of that certificate. Ld D.R. submitted that he has no objection if the matter is restored to AO to decide the claim of the assessee as per law. 3. Considering the above submissions of ld representatives and the fact that assessee is following up the matter with DSIR for its approval for inhouse R&D facility for incurring all the expenditures, we consider it prudent, in the interest of justice, to restore the matter to AO with a direction that if the assessee gets the approval from DSIR, the claim of the assessee be allowed as per provisions of the Act. Hence, grounds of appeal taken by the assessee are allowed. 4. In the result, appeal field by the assessee is treated as allowed for statistical purposes. Pronounced in the open court on 18th July, 2012
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2012 (7) TMI 1093 - ITAT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... ason that the assertion of the assessee in this regard has not been examined either by the AO or CIT(A). 22. We also find that identical issue has been considered by the Tribunal in the case of M/s. SAP Labs India Pvt. Ltd., in ITA Nos.1414 to 1416/Bang/2012, dated.15.07.2013, for the assessment years 2008-09 to 2010-11 (Wherein the undersigned are parties). 23. For the reasons given above and also following the above order of the ITAT, we do not find any grounds to interfere with the order of the CIT(A). Consequently, these appeals by the Revenue are dismissed. 24. In respect of the appeal for the assessment year 2009-10 on the order u/s.154 of the Act, since in the main appeal on the issue of demand u/s.201 and interest charge u/s.201(1A), the appeal has been decided in favour of the assessee, it becomes infructuous and is dismissed. 06. In the result, all the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed. Order pronounced in the open court at the end of hearing on 16.07.2013.
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2012 (7) TMI 1092 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Whether the absence of a seat reserved for the depositors in the Managing committee under the bye-law of the Sreekandamangalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Society), the Election Commission can provide it as a statutory requirement by operation of Section 28(1C) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act (Act) - HELD THAT:- Court feel procedural compliance is required by the Registrar to re-classify the Society and issue fresh certificate under the category Primary Credit Society, the Managing committee of which compulsory requires one representative from the depositor's constituency. It is for the Registrar to direct the Society to first suitably amend the bye laws particularly object clause, for re-classifying it as a Primary Credit Society with corresponding changes and constitution of the Managing Committee by providing a seat for depositors quota in terms of Section 28(1C) of the Act. This shall be done at the earliest. However, we make it clear that since Note (ii) of Rule 15 provides only prospective effect for re-classification we make it clear that except for the election upheld by us the Registrar's order on re-classification will have prospective effect in terms of Note (ii) of Rule 15 as stated above. It is for him to consider the transactions already entered by the Society particularly in regard to rate of interest on deposits accepted and loans advanced and make arrangements without retrospective effect on transactions adversely affecting depositors and borrowers. Similarly if RBI sanction is required under the Banking Regulation Act, Registrar will give sufficient time to the Society to take approval from RBI which will apply for application for future operations.
Writ appeals are allowed vacating the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge and by disposing of writ petitions as above. We feel the Registrar should arrange for a close scrutiny of the operations of all the Societies in the State and consider whether the societies function under the bye-laws and under the Act and if not, to take corrective measures including de-classification as required in this case.
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2012 (7) TMI 1091 - ITAT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... efore us and raised following grounds of appeal 2. Whether the learned CIT(A) is right in holding that the provisions of Sec.195 are not applicable for payment of commission. 3. Whether the learned CIT(A) is right in holding that the provisions of Sec.40(a)(i) are not applicable for commission paid by the assessee to non-residents. 4. Any other ground that may be urged at the time of appeal hearing. 14. We heard both the parties and perused the record. We find that the decision DCIT Vs. Divis Laboratories Ltd. (131 ITD 271) is in favour of the assessee and the same has been followed by the coordinate bench of the Tribunal in the case of DCIT Vs. M/sDivya Sakthi Granites Ltd. for AY 2007-08 in ITA No. ITA No.700/Hyd/2008, order dated 21st September, 2011. Respectfully following the decision of the coordinate bench, we dismiss the grounds raised by the revenue on this issue. 15. In the result, appeal of the revenue is dismissed. Pronounced in the open court on 30th July, 2012.
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2012 (7) TMI 1090 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ssee to file an additional affidavit. The Court wants to know from the assessee whether he had communicated to the Assessing Officer the actual conversion factor which it had applied for converting the number of cakes into weight. The Court also wants to know the conversion factor applied by the assessee for the last three years.
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2012 (7) TMI 1089 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... hen entrance fees was at ₹ 1,78,780/- and ₹ 1,51,650/-, which does not tally with the ratios prescribed in the bye-law, he could not explain. Assessee has no objection if this aspect also was examined by the AO. Since the very nature of the amounts received could not be reconciled before us, we were unable to give any finding whether the membership fees or entrance fees accounted as such in the books of account was capital receipt or revenue receipt. Therefore, in the interest of justice, we restore the issue to the file of the AO to examine the nature of receipt of these amounts and how the amounts are calculated and the ratio thereon, to decide the issue whether the amount do pertain to revenue in nature. Issue is accordingly remitted to the file of the AO and orders of the AO and CIT (A) on this issue are set aside for redoing according to facts and law. 7. In the result, these two appeals are allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in open court on
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