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Showing 41 to 60 of 175 Records
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1982 (1) TMI 175 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s the same in spite of the change brought about in section 11 by U.P. Acts Nos. 11 of 1978 and 12 of 1979. By these amendments, the procedural delays in seeking a reference to the High Court of questions of law arising in the case have been obviated by enabling the dealer or the Commissioner, Sales Tax, to approach the High Court directly for determination of those questions. The Tribunal has not gone into the merits of the claim made by the dealer for rectification of the earlier order subjecting his turnover to tax at a higher rate on its view that the application for rectification made by him was incompetent. That view has not been found to be correct. As such, the Tribunal deserves to be required to go into the matter on merits. The revision succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter sent back for hearing and decision afresh in accordance with law. The dealer would be entitled to costs which shall be Rs. 300. Petition allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 174 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s and rendering of service is merely incidental then the transaction may amount to sale. But if on the other hand, there is a transaction in which service is coupled with supply of food-stuffs, and supply of food-stuffs is part of and incidental to the service, then the transaction may not amount to sale. We are, therefore, of the view that it will be for the assessing authority to ascertain the facts in each case and then to determine upon such facts whether a sale of food-stuffs or drinks was intended and decide the matter in the light of the aforesaid decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court. As only a notice to show cause has been served upon the petitioners and an enquiry to ascertain the facts is yet to be made on the basis of which alone the nature of the transactions could be determined, we are unable to entertain the writ petitions at this stage. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed subject to the observations made above. Petitions dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 173 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... amount of tax which is to be realised from him. Mr. S.C. Bhandari, the learned counsel for the revenue, assures this Court that if an application for stay is moved by the petitioner before the appropriate authority, viz., the Commissioner of Sales Tax, then the application shall be reasonably considered. We hope that the appropriate authority will decide the stay application of the petitioner and shall take into consideration all the relevant circumstances including the one that the entire business of the petitioner may not be completely ruined. We also feel that the appeal preferred by the petitioner should be disposed of expeditiously. We are of the view that the appellate authority should dispose of the appeals expeditiously, say, within three months. With the aforesaid observations the writ petition is dismissed as the petitioner is already availing of an alternative remedy of appeal available to him. We do not wish to express any view on the merits. Petition dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 172 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing the precision prescribed by the customer, it would not be commercially expedient for the manufacturer to carry out his manufacturing activity in the larger sense of the term as is explained by the Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. s case 1965 16 STC 563 (SC). It is this test which is to be applied and unless the facts are gathered, placed and correlated so as to justify the conclusion that the activity of putting machinery in the crates so as to transport them to the site without disturbing their precision it would not be possible to answer the question which has been referred to us. In the circumstances, therefore, we decline to answer the question and leave it to the Tribunal to adjust its judgment accordingly under section 69(4) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, after applying the test in view of the evidence that may be placed by the rival parties. The result is that we decline to answer the question referred to us with no order as to costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 171 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the case of Kurban Hussein Ibrahimji Mithiborwala v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat 1968 68 ITR 407. That was a case of reassessment under section 34 of the Income-tax Act. The Bench held that a valid notice under section 34 specifying with clearness and particularity of the assessment year, for which the assessment is sought to be reopened, is a condition precedent to the commencement of reassessment proceedings. The defect or mistake in such a notice cannot be waived by the assessee. This authority directly applies to the facts of the present case. Here, it is undisputed that the assessment year to which the notices relate was not at all mentioned in either of the two notices. This defect was fatal and went to the root of the jurisdiction of the authority. In the circumstances it is unnecessary to dilate upon the second point. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned notices are quashed. The parties may bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 170 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... antial identity and neither as a result of the mixture in the first variety, nor as a result of some application of chuna in the second variety a transformation has taken place so that it can be said that a new and a different article has emerged having different name, characteristic or use. The collective compendious name given to the goods does not make them a distinct commercial commodity in view of what we have stated above. Instead of taking these different constituent elements separately if they are eaten together to have the ingredients more palatable, it cannot be urged that a transformation of articles has taken place and an end-product having different commercial character, use or name has come into being. In view of the above we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the State Government. The State Government shall pay the costs of this reference to the assessee. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1982 (1) TMI 169 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nswer the reference or to proceed to answer the reference in spite of such a request, subject to the rider, however, that where such request is made before the reference is fully heard and argued, the court will have to accede to the request unless it is manifest that the acceptance of the request would amount to defeating, in some sort, a vested right, if any, which has come into existence in favour of the other party. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that in the instant case the State is entitled to request that the reference should not be answered and that such request is required to be granted because it is made before the hearing is concluded and it is not shown that any vested right has come into existence in favour of the assessee before the request was made. In the result, the reference is disposed of with no order as to costs, with the question left unanswered as the applicant does not desire the court to give the answer. Reference unanswered.
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1982 (1) TMI 168 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n pursued by any of the authorities. The result has been entirely unsatisfactory at each stage of the proceedings, no matter which decision was come to by which authority. We, therefore, deem it necessary to set aside not only the order of the Board but also the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the assessment order. We direct the assessing authority to consider the case afresh in order to find out whether the article dealt in by the assessee is taxable at multi-point or whether it would come within the mischief of entry 3 of the First Schedule. The decision of the assessing authority has got to be arrived at after instituting the objective inquiry, not turnover-wise by an analysis of the assessee s turnover, but trade-wise, on a study of the nature of the article and its general adaptability according to prevailing manufacturing trends. In the result, this appeal is allowed on the terms aforesaid. There will be however no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1982 (1) TMI 167 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... articular matter only, then also the other questions touching the legality and propriety of the order or the proceedings of the subordinate authority, can be gone into and that the Tribunal was not justified in upholding the decision of the joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner in precluding the petitioner from raising the points which were decided against him (petitioner) by the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Patiala, in the proceedings initiated by him under section 21(1) of the Act. Hence, question No. (i) is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In the view we have taken on question No. (i), the learned counsel for the parties state at the Bar that the other two questions need not be answered as the matter has to be decided afresh by the joint Commissioner. Consequently, we return these two questions unanswered. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1982 (1) TMI 166 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is universally well-known, the claim made that there is no numeral known as international numerals, is an unreasonable one and is hereby rejected. There is no requirement that in respect of every aspect, provision should be made in the enactment itself. The right to use Gujarati numerals not being a guaranteed right and even in the Constitution except for official purposes of the Union, even in respect of States, it had not been considered necessary to refer to the use of numerals there is no need to provide for any such right on this aspect in the Act itself. This is an aspect which can be left to be dealt within the ambit of the rule-making powers conferred under the Act, and in the instant matter it forms part of what could be prescribed relating to maintenance of purchase bills or accounts of purchases and sales by dealers, as provided under section 53(2)(n) of the Act. Hence for the reasons above stated, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 165 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. If the terms in entry No. 21 are interpreted in accordance with the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, mash could never be said to cover lobia and rajmash . Moreover the fact that several varieties of pulses are specifically mentioned in the item would also show that the intention was to exclude the other varieties of pulses which are not specifically mentioned. As no attempt was made before us by the learned counsel for the assessee to argue that lobia and rajmash would be covered by the term dried peas , we find no reason to differ with the view of the Tribunal and the question is accordingly answered in the affirmative. No costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1982 (1) TMI 164 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tchen garden goes in the classification of vegetables and it is common experience that very often garlic finds place in the kitchen garden. That was the logic applied for holding chilli to be vegetable. That was also the reasoning advanced for treating ginger to be vegetable. If exception was not made in the Government notification, possibly by the same logic, garlic would have continued to be a vegetable also for the purpose of sales tax. We are inclined, therefore, to agree with the Tribunal that garlic should go under vegetable until by specific notification the Government excluded it for the purpose of exemption. At the relevant time the entry was different and the Tribunal, in our view, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that garlic continued to be in the classification of vegetables. We would accordingly answer against the revenue. As there is no appearance for the other side, there would be no order for costs. BEHERA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1982 (1) TMI 163 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 84. Therein a different view has been taken. In view of the categorical decision of the Supreme Court, to which unfortunately no reference has been made by the Delhi High Court, we do not think it would be appropriate for us to prefer the view indicated by the Delhi High Court to State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers 1967 19 STC 24 (SC). We accordingly follow the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court and hold that sugar-candy would come within the meaning of sugar and since admittedly sugar is a tax-free article, sugar-candy at the relevant time being included in the sugar would also have the advantage of being treated as a tax-free article. The question, therefore, must be answered against the revenue and we hold that the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion. Since there is no appearance for the other side, there would be no order for costs. BEHERA, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Delhi v. Puran Chand and Sons 1981 48 STC 284.
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1982 (1) TMI 162 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ourt. I have carefully perused the records in this behalf. Search and seizure took place on 16th January, 1981. Sixty days would have expired on 16th March, 1981. Records disclose that permission was sought for retention beyond 60 days for another period of sixty days on 10th March, 1981. On the same day permission has been granted by the higher authority. Periodically further permission has been asked for and obtained by the respondent. I, therefore, do not see any merit in this contention either. 21.. In the light of the above discussion and for the reasons given by me on the facts of this case and on the material placed before me I am unable to hold that the search and seizure in the case of the petitioner made on 16th January, 1981, was illegal. 22.. This petition was heard at the stage of preliminary hearing in detail after notice. In the circumstances, it is unnecessary to issue rule and the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 161 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Share capital - Further issue of, Power to close register of members or debenture holders ... ... ... ... ..... rence by this court. Having regard to these features of this case we are unable to accept the submissions made in respect of the cross objection. Therefore, the cross-objection filed on behalf of the respondent also fails. In the result, the appeal as well as the cross-objection fail and both the appeal and the cross-objection are dismissed. The order of the learned trial judge is confirmed. The board of directors will now call a fresh annual general meeting in accordance with law and will not take into consideration the increased share capital but proceed on old basis in accordance with law. Stay asked for is refused. The parties will be at liberty to act on the signed copy of the operative portion of the order of the minutes. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. Suhas Chandra Sen, J. mdash I agree. ------------------------- p 370 it is however................. dagger p 370 we have already................. Dagger p. 375 we now come to....... of 35 Comp. Cas. mdash Ed.
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1982 (1) TMI 160 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
General provisions with respect to memorandum and articles - Effect of memorandum and articles, Alteration of rights of holders of special classes of shares
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1982 (1) TMI 159 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Powers of Court to rectify register of members, Notice for Meeting ... ... ... ... ..... as not been disputed that Parkash Chand Aggarwal was not a shareholder of a company and, therefore, Smt. Raj Rani could not transfer the shares in his name unless the procedure mentioned in articles 20 to 23 was followed. Admittedly, no such procedure was followed. Thus, the transfer by Smt. Raj Rani in his favour is also illegal. Issue No. 5 is decided accordingly. Issue No. 6 In view of the aforesaid findings, I hold that Raghbir Singh was rightly shown as the owner of shares Nos. 601 to 700 and 701 to 800, along with the petitioner in the register of members, that the transfer of shares by Raghbir Singh in favour of Smt. Raj Rani is valid but that in favour of Usha Rani is invalid and that the transfers of shares by Smt. Usha Rani and Raj Rani in favour of Parkash Chand Aggarwal are invalid. I, therefore, partly accept the petition and direct that the registers of the company be rectified accordingly. In view of the partial success of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1982 (1) TMI 157 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... between what has been admitted and what has been claimed. It is not proper, in such a circumstance, to decide the same in this summary proceeding. Normally, the petitioner-firm should have approached a civil court the moment the amount claimed was denied by the respondent-company. Instead of doing that the petitioner has approached this court under section 433 of the Act. This court, having jurisdiction under section 433 of the Act, is not a court which is essentially meant for settling money disputes between parties. This jurisdiction of the court is to sub-serve the object of winding up the companies which have not paid their debts or which are unable to pay their debts. Therefore, the first pre-requisite must be to establish prima facie a debt against the respondent. But when a claim or debt is disputed, the proper forum for that is a civil court. I, therefore, reject this petition reserving liberty to the petitioner to approach civil court in regard to the disputed debt.
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1982 (1) TMI 133 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... lise but as per the letter of the M/s Maruti Ltd. the assessee was entitled to 10 per cent interest on the deposit that was made and therefore the assessee did have intention to carry on business in dealing with the motor cars. We hold that the Madhya Pradesh High court judgment reported in (1981) 127 ITR 727(MP) is very much on the point and we hold that the assessee is entitled to benefits of continuation of registration. We have gone through section 184(7) and we hold that the requisite conditions as laid down by law have been satisfied by the assessee firm and therefore the assessee is entitled to continuation of registration. We see much force in the arguments of Shri Doshi and we hold that the assessee did carry on business and that office was established and that the business was brought into existence by getting dealership of M/s Maruti Ltd. Therefore we see no justification to interfere with the order of the AAC. It is upheld and the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1982 (1) TMI 130 - ITAT PUNE
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... carrying on of business and, therefore, amounted to overriding title. The payment was also essentially wholly and exclusively for the carrying on of the business. The fact that quantum of the payment to the two grandsons appeared to revenue to be excessive is not very material. The testator had indicated the consideration for the user of goodwill and the continuing partners had accepted the obligation to make that payment. The testator had 40 per cent share in the firm and he had indicated payment only to the extent of 20 per cent of share of profits to the minor grandsons in lieu of user of his share of goodwill and this, therefore, would not appear to be unreasonable. Thus, Rs. 11,802 out of profits of the firm of about Rs. 60,000 appear to be quite reasonable and even section 40A(2) would not be attracted. We would, accordingly, vacate the orders of authorities below and hold that deduction of Rs. 11,802 as claimed by the assessee should be allowed. The appeal is allowed.
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