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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 241 Records
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1983 (1) TMI 81 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... the assessee are either found to be bogus or non-existent, he cannot forestall the reassessment on the plea that he had fully and truly disclosed all the material facts, Where is the question of truthfulness about a fact or a material fact, which, to the knowledge of the assessee, was non-existent or not there at all. Further, I am of the considered opinion that the facts or the material placed by the petitioner-concern before the ITO at the time of its initial assessment does not amount to any disclosure in the light of the Explanation to s. 147 of the Act. This Explanation reads Production before the Income-tax Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Income-tax Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of this section. For the reasons recorded above, I find no merit in these two petitions and dismiss the same with costs, which I determine at Rs. 300 in each case.
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1983 (1) TMI 80 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... have been held that an incorrect return was filed by the assessee as a result of fraud, gross or wilful neglect. The IAC has come to the conclusion against the assessee only for the reason that he had not challenged the addition of the cash credit amount in the assessment. In our opinion, merely on this circumstance, a fraud or gross or wilful neglect on the part of the assessee cannot be inferred. Bench of this court in the case of CIT v. Binod Company 1980 122 ITR 832 expressed a similar opinion. The facts of that case were very similar to the facts of the present case. The Tribunal, therefore, in our view, has rightly deleted, on the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the penalty imposed on the assessee by the IAC. In the result, we must answer the question referred in the affirmative and hold that the Tribunal was correct in deleting the penalty imposed under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. In the circumstances of the case, however, we shall make no order as to costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 79 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Authorised Representative ... ... ... ... ..... vate candidate does not even entitle a candidate to seek admission to LL. B. (Professional) Part III. It is on these grounds that the learned counsel submits that a degree of LL. B. (Academic) cannot be termed as a degree in law. We are afraid, we are unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel. There can be no gainsaying that a degree of Law has been conferred on respondent No. 5. Rule 51 does not draw any distinction between a degree of law (Academic) and a degree of law (Professional). The only requirement of the rule is that a person should possess a degree in commerce or law. In this situation, as earlier observed, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No. 5 is not entitled to practice before the I.T. authorities. Consequently, this petition is dismissed in limine. The oral prayer made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for certifying this case to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court is declined.
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1983 (1) TMI 78 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF, Partition, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... cision on the said fact. The Tribunal held that having regard to the provision of s. 39(1) of the Act the share of the deceased in the joint family property consisting of himself and his wife would be one-half. This view of the Tribunal is not in conformity with the ratio of the aforesaid Full Bench decision. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, our answer to the questions referred to us is as follows 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was in law not justified in holding that one-half share of the property passed on the death of Mohanlal. Two-thirds of the property held by the deceased, Mohanlal, passed on his death. 2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was in law not justified to hold that Smt. Kessarbai was entitled to 1/2 share at the moment of the death of Mohanlal. She had one-third share at the moment of the death of Mohanlal. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (1) TMI 77 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Property Deemed To Pass ... ... ... ... ..... 515, whereby the Tribunal was directed to submit an additional statement of case giving its finding regarding the acquisition of property in question. The Tribunal has now submitted the supplementary statement of case. The finding of the Tribunal is that the properties in question are the properties of the HUF of which the deceased, R. B. Tiwari was the karta. In view of the finding of the Tribunal, the property in question shall be deemed to pass on the death of the deceased as provided by s. 7 of the Act. In this view of the matter, it must be held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the value of the two properties could not be charged to estate duty. Our answer to question No. 1, therefore, is in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In view of our answer to the first question, question No. 2 does not arise. We, therefore, decline to answer the second question. The reference is answered accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (1) TMI 76 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... tal. Though the actual details of the balance-sheet are difficult to determine from the circumstances or material included in the statement of case, we find that no contingency can be located which existed at the time which would make us feel that the contingency reserve was meant to be a provision for existing liability. On the other band, it appears to us that it is merely a description of the reserve. It was not in respect of a contingency but in respect of a possible contingency that may arise in the future. In other words, it was a reserve, properly speaking. Turning to the charity reserve, it is clearly apparent that there was no existing liability and, therefore, this was a reserve properly speaking. As long as the amount remained with the company it would be a part of the capital of the company. We would, accordingly, answer all the three questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department, but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 75 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the manufacture or at least processing the goods. We, therefore, answer the question in the negative and against the assessee. The tax cases are disposed of accordingly. We make no order as to costs. Regarding the request of the assessees for a remand on the ground that the Tribunal made an erroneous approach in concentrating itself on the understanding of the word , business as governing the manufacture or processing of the goods, we find, there are no valid grounds to sustain any order of remand. It is seen from the records that in some of the cases, the assessees took the trouble of disclosing a series of processing in which the assessee was directly involved. So far as the facts are concerned, it is the primary duty of the assessee or any party to the proceedings to disclose without any demur. If he had not chosen to disclose, he should take the responsibility on himself but that cannot be urged as point in his favour. We, therefore, decline the request made for remand.
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1983 (1) TMI 74 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l for the assessee placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Prem Kumar v. CIT 1980 121 ITR 347, in which the assessee, who received his share of income from the joint Hindu family on partition after his marriage, claimed that the income should be taxed in the hands of the HUF consisting of himself and his wife. It was held that after the marriage of the assessee an HUF came into existence and the income derived by the assessee could not be assessed in the hands of the assessee as individual. However, the decision of the Supreme Court in Surjit Lai Chhabda s case 1975 101 ITR 776 has not been noticed by the Allahabad High Court. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the aforesaid decision of the Allahabad High Court. As a result of the discussion aforesaid our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and in favour of the Department. In the Circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (1) TMI 73 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Law Applicable To Penalty Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... s were stopped from contending that the impugned action was ultra vires arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. However, we have not brushed aside the contentions based on the said two articles on this narrow ground but have dealt with them as pure questions of law to make this judgment complete. Our thanks are due to the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the Revenue for the able assistance rendered to us. Mr. Rawal, the learned counsel for the petitioners, prays for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under art. 133(1) of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that substantial questions of law of general importance, which need to be decided by the Supreme Court arise in this group of writ petitions. We, therefore, direct the issue of a certificate of fitness as prayed for and further direct that the interim relief will continue for a period of eight weeks from today to enable the petitioners to obtain appropriate orders from the Supreme Court.
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1983 (1) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ry return was filed in the status of an association of persons, it could not be treated as if a voluntary return had been filed in the status of an individual. If the WTO thought that the correct status in which the assessee could be charged with wealth-tax was that of an individual, he should have issued a notice under s. 14(2) of the W.T. Act, to the assessee, and should have required it to file a return. Admittedly, this was not done. The limitation for issuing such a notice is prescribed in s. 17 of that Act. It is four years in certain circumstances and eight years in other cases. Admittedly, the period of limitation by now has expired. It is, therefore, unnecessary to send the case back, as submitted by the learned counsel for the Revenue, for the issuance of a requisite notice. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to costs which we assess at Rs. 200, one set.
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1983 (1) TMI 71 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee could not have assumed or known it at the time of filing the return. And, this was the first year of business. It cannot, therefore, be held that there was no reasonable cause for not filing the return. Learned counsel for the Department argued that the finding on the question of bona fide is a finding of fact and the Tribunal having held that the assessee had inflated its expenses, this court is bound by it in its advisory jurisdiction. Therefore, the question referred should be answered in the affirmative. Bona fides of an assessee or the failure to file return without reasonable cause are inferences which arise out of the facts of each case. If on the material the Tribunal has drawn an incorrect inference we see no reason why this court cannot interfere. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1983 (1) TMI 70 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Cost Of Acquisition Of Capital Asset, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... t be added the notional cost of the bonus shares. They justified their conclusion on the basis that bonus shares have some value independent of the cost of acquisition of the original shares. This last observation of the Tribunal is destructive of the very principle of averaging by attributing to the bonus share a notional cost. As we earlier stated, there is neither principle nor logic nor any statutory warrant for the decision of the Tribunal. We, therefore, uphold the decision of the ITO as the correct one. The question of law framed at the instance of the Department is as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the method adopted by the Tribunal for valuing the cost of the shares for purpose of arriving at the taxable capital gains is correct in law ? For the reasons already stated, our answer to the question of law is in favour of the Department and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Department. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1983 (1) TMI 69 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Debt Due, Deduction, Net Wealth, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... directing the WTO to allow debts secured on life insurance policies held by the assessee as deductions. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal allowed the appeals. Aggrieved by that order, the assessees ought a reference and it is at the instance of the assessee that the aforesaid question of law has been referred to this court for its opinion. Learned counsel for the parties conceded that the matter arising in this reference is covered by two decisions of this court in CWT v. Premnarayan Garg 1982 134 ITR 315 and CWT v. Narayandas J. Hemani (Misc. Civil Case No. 40, of 1979- 1983 143 ITR 87). In these decisions, it has been held that a loan secured on the life insurance policy could not be deducted as a debt while computing the net wealth. We respectfully agree with these decisions. For these reasons, our answer to the question referred to us is in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (1) TMI 68 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Deduction, Derived From Export, Incentive For Business Of Export Of Goods ... ... ... ... ..... ove. The Madras High Court has not taken notice of the decision of the Privy Council in Kamakhaya Narayan Singh s case 1948 16 ITR 325, and we respectfully differ from the view taken in the Madras case. The observations of the Tribunal about double advantage in respect of the items in question are wholly irrelevant and the learned standing counsel has also not supported the said observations. For the reasons, given above, we answer the questions as follows (1) The Tribunal was not right in not including Rs. 1,41,402, being drawback of customs duty, and Rs. 86,526, being refund of excise duty in calculation of turnover of profits from exports, within r. 2(3) for computation of qualifying income. The Tribunal was, however, right in excluding the item of Rs. 28,81,308 representing profits from import entitlements in the calculation of turnover of exports under the said rule. (2) The question of double advantage is irrelevant. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1983 (1) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance ... ... ... ... ..... r, Moradabad, dated 15th August, 1977, and it was urged that at least there was no reason to accept the explanation given by the assessee in respect of this transaction. This certificate was also examined by the Tribunal and it found that cash payment had to be made by the assessee because it did not retire the railway receipt through the Bank of Baroda and thereafter it was sent by the supplier to its distributor who retired the same and delivered the goods against cash payment. It is true that in this case the exceptional circumstances arose because of the assessee s own conduct in not retiring the RRs. but the Tribunal having believed it as an exceptional circumstance under r. 6DD, we do not think we would be justified in interfering with the finding. For the reasons stated above the question of law referred to us is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1983 (1) TMI 66 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Taxable Gift ... ... ... ... ..... to the, provisions of this Act may not be quite apposite while we are engaged in discussing cases of gifts or settlements of joint family property by the karta of the family in favour of unmarried daughters of the family as and by way of marriage provision. The statutory obligation of a Hindu father under s. 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, has nothing whatever to do with the nature and incidence of the joint family property or with the powers of alienation of joint family property exercisable by the karta of the family for a provision for the marriage of the daughter. We have, therefore, desisted from making further reference to the statutory provisions in the discussion of the question in the present case, which, as we earlier indicated, arises in the assessment of an HUF. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question of law is in favour of the assessee and against the Department. The assessee is entitled to his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1983 (1) TMI 65 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Chargeable Profits, Company, Dividends, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... is true that in this case the dividend income has not borne tax only because of the interest charges being of such amount as to swallow the entire dividend income. Even so, the fact remains that no income-tax is payable on the dividend income. It follows, therefore, that no adjustment can be made in terms of r. 2(i)(a) for arriving at the chargeable profits of the assessee in this case. The conclusion of the Tribunal in their order was that no adjustment need be made under r. 2(i)(a) of the First Schedule having regard to the facts of the present case. Our reasoning is fundamentally different, although it leads to the same conclusion. We have shown that on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, r. 2(i)(a) has no application at all for the simple reason that no tax is payable on the dividend income in this case. The result, however, is that the assessee succeeds in this reference. The Department will pay the assessee s costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1983 (1) TMI 64 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... s. 139 for the assessment year to the ITO, or (b) to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment for that year. In our opinion, having regard to what is discussed above, the present case would be directly covered by our decision in Aryodaya Spg. s case decided on January 17, 1983 ( 1983 144 ITR 817), wherein we have dealt with in detail the various contentions raised on behalf of the Department. In our opinion, there are no features which distinguish the present case from the said case. In our opinion, the reasons recorded by us in Aryodaya Spg. s case would govern the present case also. Therefore, for the reasons discussed above and the reasons recorded in our decision in Aryodaya Spg. s case (Special Civil Application No. 1940 of 1979, decided on January 17, 1983- 1983 144 ITR 817), this petition must succeed. In the result, we allow this petition and quash and set aside the notice, annex. I , dated March 28, 1982. Rule made absolute with costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 63 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... orked out by the petitioner without taking into account the waste of cotton in the manufacture of yarn. These are the only features which, according to the respondent, distinguish the present case from the case of the assessee in Special Civil Application No. 1940 of 1979. However, the questions which are raised for our consideration in the present case are identical with those raised in Special Civil Application No. 1940 of 1979.In our opinion, our decision in Special Civil Application No. 1940 of 1979 will govern the present case also. In the result, for the reasons recorded in our judgment in Special Civil Application No. 1940 of 1979 (Aryodaya Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. v. ITO 1983 144 ITR 817), we hold that the impugned notice issued by the respondent under s. 148 read with s. 147 of the I.T. Act, 1961, on March 30, 1978 (annex. C to the petition), is invalid and we quash and set aside the said notice. We accordingly allow this petition and make the rule absolute with costs.
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1983 (1) TMI 62 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... arn in process. It is obvious that this error, if any, is discovered on a reappraisal of the same material without anything more. Here what seems to have happened is that the respondent has upon a review of the material on record, arrived at a different conclusion on the above aspects of the case. This is, therefore, case of mere change of opinion which does not give power or jurisdiction to the respondent to reopen the assessment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no jurisdiction for reopening the assessment for the assessment year 1974-75 under s. 147(b) of the Act. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the impugned notices issued by the ITO for the assessment years 1970-71 and 1974-75 are void and without jurisdiction. In the result, this petition succeeds. The impugned notices dated March 19, 1979, and March 29, 1979, Exs. C-3 and C-1, respectively, are quashed and set aside. Respondent shall pay the costs of the petitioner. Rule made absolute accordingly.
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