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Case Laws
Showing 241 to 260 of 292 Records
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1992 (1) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... nt between the parties for payment of interest. That being so, interest could not be said to have accrued in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly set aside the orders of the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Sri Bhupeshwar Dayal, learned standing counsel for the Revenue, however, submitted that the agreement to pay interest to the assessee should have been presumed by the Tribunal in view of the fact that interest was being charged by the assessee in the previous years. We are unable to agree. The assessee is admittedly not a money-lender. In the case of money-lenders, perhaps, such a presumption might be raised. No such presumption is, however, available in the case of other assessees, there being no material pointing to a contrary conclusion. In the premises, we answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The assessee will be entitled to its costs Which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1992 (1) TMI 51 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Short-term Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... some temporary injunction may be granted in a case, it would have necessarily the effect of frustrating a contract involved in that case. For the reasons indicated above, we are of the view that the Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that there was no frustration of the contract and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was no assignment made by the assessee. In this view of the matter, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and against the assessee. It is not disputed that, once it is held that there is no frustration of the contract and that there was cost of acquisition of the rights of the contract, the assessee would be liable for the tax on capital gains in respect of Rs. 9,00,000 received by it in consideration of the assignment of the contract and, therefore, in view of our answers to questions Nos. 1 and 2, question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The reference stands disposed of accordingly, with no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 50 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decide that the property should be purchased by the Central Government or issue a no objection certificate. The Division Bench further held that, upon the failure to exercise jurisdiction under section 269UD(1), within the prescribed period, the jurisdiction of the appropriate authority to direct purchase of the property by the Central Government stands extinguished and the petitioners are entitled to secure a no objection certificate. (See also Satuvant Narang v. Appropriate Authority 1991 188 ITR 656 (Delhi)). Therefore, I have no hesitation in quashing the impugned orders dated June 12, 1989, and October 25, 1990, and I direct the respondents to issue the no objection certificate under section 269UL(3) of the Act in respect of the transfer of the premises in terms of the agreement between the petitioners and the transferee being annexure B to the writ petition within two weeks from date. The application is, accordingly, allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 49 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ern Newspaper Society v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 996, the Supreme Court has held that the report of the internal audit party of the Income-tax Department is no information within the meaning of section 147(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Supreme Court has further held In every case, the Income-tax Officer must determine for himself what is the effect and consequence of the law mentioned in the audit note and whether in consequence of the law which has now come to his notice, he can reasonably believe that income has escaped assessment . Thus, in the present case, there was no information as required by law before the authorities nor the condition precedent before issuing notices under section 148 has been satisfied as the officer did not apply his mind and come to his own conclusion before acting on the audit report. The impugned notice dated March 23, 1978, is thus contrary to law and is hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. Rule made absolute. Counsel s fee Rs. 1,000.
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1992 (1) TMI 48 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s tax. Thus, the Tribunal confirmed the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Thereafter, the assessee made an application for making this reference. Sri Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, reiterated the same contentions and Sri H. Raghavendra Rao, learned counsel for the Revenue, submitted that, in view of the decisions referred to above and particularly in view of the decision of this court in CIT v. Kabbur Brothers 1981 128 ITR 43, the question referred is to be answered in favour of the Revenue. After careful consideration, we find sufficient force in the submission made by learned counsel for the Revenue and, in view of the clear legal position stated in CIT v. Kabbur Bros. 1981 128 ITR 43 (Kar) and also in Motilal Ambaidas v. CIT 1977 108 ITR 136 (Guj), we hold that the question is to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue.
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1992 (1) TMI 47 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
False Statement In Verification, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... ed that, in view of the finding of the Tribunal that there was no concealment and no inaccurate accounts were filed by the petitioners, the criminal proceedings against the petitioners could not continue and were to be quashed. In the present case also, the finding recorded by the Tribunal in its order dated April 29, 1986, is also to the same effect as recorded by the Tribunal in Prakash Chand s case 1982 134 ITR 8 (P and H). In view of the discussion made above, the trial court has not committed any error of fact or law in passing the order of acquittal in favour of the accused. The approach of the trial court is just and legal. Various provisions of law have been correctly interpreted and applied to the facts of the case. Even otherwise, the matter relates to the assessment year 1978-79 and the accused have faced the agony of proceedings before the Department and criminal courts throughout this long period. The State appeal being devoid of merit is ordered to be dismissed.
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1992 (1) TMI 46 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Assessment, Exemptions, Wealth Tax, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... essing any opinion upon this question since the matter is pending before the appellate authority against the assessment made on the petitioner. The petitioner can raise all these contentions before the appellate authority and obtain a decision. If the petitioner does not succeed in persuading the appellate authority, he may have such recourse against that order as available to him under the law. We accordingly dispose of this writ petition with direction to the appellate authority to dispose of the petitioner s appeal in the light of the aforesaid discussions and after considering the authorities mentioned above. The writ petitions are disposed of without any order as to costs in these terms. In Civil Writ Petition No. 3071 of 1990, learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he had raised additional objections before the assessing authority. If that is so, the assessing authority shall take those objections into consideration and decide the matter in accordance with law.
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1992 (1) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust, Exemptions, Investment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... e for the benefit of persons referred to in section 13(3), if any, occurred prior to June 1, 1970, and hence the proviso to section 13(1)(d)(iii) applied. The assessee was entitled to claim exemption in respect of dividends from the said shares. In this case, the Tribunal found that the assessee did not advance any loans to the companies in which the donors were interested. In fact, the loan bonds were received by the trust as donations between 1963 to 1966. That being the position, the provisions of sections 13(2)(a) and 13(2)(b) are not applicable. In our view, the principles in Birla Charity Trust 1988 170 ITR 150 (Cal), will govern the case. If the shares are exempt under the Income-tax Act, the assessee will be entitled to exemption in respect of its net wealth in terms of section 5(1)(i). For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J. -I agree.
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1992 (1) TMI 44 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Compensation To Workmen By Contractee ... ... ... ... ..... right to receive the amount. On the other hand, it was disputing the quantum and was insisting that, if there was any liability, the same was of the Rourkela Steel Plant. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the amount in question constituted the income of the assessee. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Before parting with the case, we shall deal with a submission of Mr. Kar for the Revenue. He has submitted that, pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal for subsequent periods, allowance may have been granted when payments were made to the workers. We make it clear that, in view of our answer to the question referred to us, if any allowance has been granted for the subsequent periods, the same shall be withdrawn and the assessments shall be modified accordingly. The reference is, accordingly, answered. No costs. S. K. MOHANTY J. -I agree.
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1992 (1) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ceding assessment year, which was an ex parte assessment order made under section 144 of the Act. It is true that the past history might be legitimate material, but that by itself may not be sufficient to sustain an assessment order in every case without something more. Learned standing counsel was unable to invite us to any material in the assessment order or otherwise on record in justification of the impugned assessment. The propriety and justification of the addition to the returned income was considered at length by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and he found no justification for any addition made by the Assessing Officer. This was confirmed by the Tribunal. The order of the Tribunal is based on appreciation of the material on record with which no fault could be found. The order of the Tribunal does not give rise to any question of law. For what has been stated above, this application has no merit and is, accordingly, rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 42 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... d, therefore, the income has been rightly assessed in the hands of the assessee. Unfortunately, the Tribunal did not consider the applicability of the proviso on which the departmental authorities based their conclusions. If the proviso has application, the question whether the Explanation 1 as amended with effect from April 1, 1980, would be applicable would be only of academic interest. The Tribunal appears to have made out a new case which was not the case of either the assessee or the Revenue. In that view of the matter, instead of answering the questions referred to us, we direct the Tribunal to rehear the appeal and to adjudicate about the applicability of the proviso to section 64(1)(ii), as held by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Thereafter, if a necessity arises, it shall consider the applicability of the Explanation 1 as amended with effect from April 1, 1980. The reference is, accordingly, disposed of. S. K. MOHANTY J. -I agree.
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1992 (1) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... brothers of Smt. Nafeesa Beevi and the affidavit filed by the seller of the ticket on which reliance was placed by the Appellate Tribunal to hold that the deceased Nafeesa Beevi was only the part owner of the ticket and not the full owner and she is liable to be assessed only on one-fifth of the prize amount is the only possible conclusion that could be reached on facts. We are of the view that no question of law arises out of the appellate order of the Tribunal dated June 22, 1981. The questions formulated in paragraph 7 of the original petition are all questions of fact and they centre round the only point as to whether it could be said that Smt. Nafeesa Beevi was only a part owner of the ticket and not the full owner. On this aspect, the Appellate Tribunal held in favour of the assessee relying upon the materials available before them. We are of the view that no question of law arises out of the appellate order of the Tribunal dated June 22, 1981. We reject this petition.
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1992 (1) TMI 40 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business, Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... ally entitled to claim refund of Rs. 1,81,427. The payment of Rs. 1,81,427, which the assessee had received on August 8, 1975, was subject to the decision in the review or revisional proceedings. Having regard to the facts and circumstances stated above, in our opinion, the assessee obtained the refund of the excise duty amount only on April 30, 1976-the date on which the review or revisional proceedings were dropped. The year of account of the assessee is the financial year and, therefore, the refund of excise duty of Rs. 1,81,427 became includible in the assessee s total income for the assessment year 1976-77 under section 41(1) of the Act. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in holding that the said amount of Rs. 1,81,427 was not chargeable to income-tax in the assessment year 1974-75. In the light of the above discussion, both the questions referred to us are answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Reference answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 39 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Co-operative Society, Gifts To Members By Co-operative Society ... ... ... ... ..... t be treated as rebate as rebate is defined by section 2(16) to mean any payment made in cash or kind, out of the profits of a society, to member or any other person, on the basis of his contribution to the business of the society. In fact, the value of the articles of presentation is in no way linked up with the contribution of the concerned recipient to the business of the society. Consequentially, the contention on behalf of the Revenue that this expenditure is not permissible business expenditure cannot be accepted. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench of this court in CIT v. Dascroi Taluka Co-operative Purchase and Sales Union Ltd. 1980 126 ITR 413, lays down good law. The question referred for the opinion of this court in the present reference, therefore, will have to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Order accordingly. Pronounced in the open court today.
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1992 (1) TMI 38 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Government, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... he amount with interest. No such provision is pointed out. On the contrary, proviso to section 214(1) reads as under Provided that in respect of any amount refunded on a provisional assessment under section 141A, no interest shall be paid for any period after the date of such provisional assessment. The proviso indicates that no interest shall be paid for the period after the date of provisional assessment. Hence, the petitioner could be entitled to interest till the order of provisional assessment is passed. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated January 12, 1981 (annexure H ), passed by the Income-tax Officer, Circle II, Ahmedabad, is quashed and set aside. The respondent is directed to pass appropriate orders under section 214(i) of the Income-tax Act by considering that regular assessment would include revised assessment as per the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 37 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Firm, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... ess and the impugned complaint and the resultant proceedings were quashed against the partner. Similarly, in the authority reported as Murari Lal v. ITO 1985 154 ITR 227 (P and H), prosecution was launched under section 278B of the Incometax Act, 1961, against four partners of the firm and the firm itself. It was found that only one of the partners was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. It was held that proceedings against the remaining three partners amounted to an abuse of the process of the court and the same were quashed. In the present case, there are no allegations that the petitioners were in charge of or were responsible for the conduct of the business at the time of the commission of the offence so they cannot be held liable for any culpable act. As a result, I allow this petition and quash the complaint, annexure P-1, order annexure P-2 and charge-sheet annexure P-3 as against the petitioners only. The trial court be informed.
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1992 (1) TMI 36 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ovision made by the assessee were otherwise deductible under section 28 or section 37 of the Act, the same would not be deductible in view of section 40A except in the circumstances indicated therein. A somewhat similar view has been expressed recently by their Lordships of the Madras High Court in the case of Tuttapullum Estates v. CIT 1991 191 ITR 131. In order, therefore, that the provision for payment of gratuity be admissible as a deduction, it must be shown that the provision was made strictly in the manner laid down in clause (b) of section 40A(7). As already observed, in the present case, the deposit was not made in approved gratuity scheme as found by the Tribunal. Indeed, the application for recognition of the gratuity fund itself was allowed later making it effective from May 24, 1978. We, therefore, answer both the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Revenue shall be entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 250.
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1992 (1) TMI 35 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... before the Wealth-tax Officer at the time of the original assessment, it is difficult to accept the contention that the Wealth-tax Officer had not at all applied his mind to the question whether rent due at the end of the year was not assessable to wealth-tax. The assessment orders were made under section 16(3) of the Wealth-tax Act after issuing notices under section 16(2) to the petitioner. Therefore, it is difficult to presume that the Wealth-tax Officer had completed the assessment without looking at the material placed before him. There is no other material which constitutes information for reopening the assessment which is finalised. In this view of the matter, this petition is allowed. The notices (annexures D-1 to D-7) issued under section 17 of the Wealth-tax Act on February 18, 1981, are quashed and set aside. The respondents are restrained from taking any action in pursuance of the said notices. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 34 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Reassessment
... ... ... ... ..... ons have not disclosed the primary facts fully and truly for the assessment year 1973-74 so as to give jurisdiction to the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under section 148 of the Act. The petitioners had disclosed the primary facts that they have constructed jointly a house at Nargole after withdrawing certain amounts from the firm named V. Raj and Company. At the time of assessment under section 143 of the Act, the Income-tax Officer ought to have verified whether the statement made in the returns for the cost of construction of the house at Nargole was understatement or not. If he had any doubt, he has to call for a valuation report at that time. In the result, these petitions are allowed. The notice issued on each petitioner on August 11, 1981, under section 148 of the Act is quashed and set aside. The respondent is restrained from taking any further action in pursuance of the said notice. Rule is made absolute in each petition accordingly with no order, as to costs.
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1992 (1) TMI 33 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, New Industrial Undertaking, Ship, Special Deduction, Taxes ... ... ... ... ..... pment Fund Committee, the assessee would not have been able to acquire the ship. The borrowing by the assessee in this case would undoubtedly be in the nature of a debt incurred in acquiring the ship, that is, a debt incurred by the assessee in the process of acquiring a ship, though the borrowing had not been applied directly for the purchase and acquisition of the ship. We are of the view that the amount of Rs. 24,82,000 taken by the assessee from the Shipping Development Fund Committee would fall within the scope of a debt incurred by the assessee in acquiring the ship, under the latter part of rule 19A(5) of the Income-tax Rules and the amount of Rs. 19,85,600 outstanding as on the computation date has necessarily to be deducted while applying rule 19A(5) of the Rules in working out the relief under section 80J of the Act. We, therefore, answer the third and the fourth questions in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
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