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Showing 21 to 40 of 288 Records
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1993 (10) TMI 355 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (10) TMI 354 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... opposed to the very basis on which the Central Government withdrew the Price Control Orders; such an approach, I am of the view is not in the public interest. In the circumstances, I am constrained to hold that the price fixed at ₹ 8.50 per litre of rectified spirit under Rule 17 of the Rules is unreasonable, unfair and arbitrary. 45. For the reasons stated above, these Writ Petitions are allowed. It is declared that Rule 17 of the Karnataka Excise (Manufacture and Bottling of Arrack) Rules 1987, in so far as it governs the rectified spirit, is unconstitutional and consequently to that extent it is unenforceable. It is also declared that the price fixed by the State Government for the sale of rectified spirit for the manufacture of arrack, at ₹ 8.50 per litre is arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair and consequently it is void as offending Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The Writ Petitions are allowed accordingly. Rule made absolute. No costs.
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1993 (10) TMI 353 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the General Manager, Telecom District, Hyderabad, a department of the Central Government in the Ministry of Communications. We find this Court will, therefore, have jurisdiction in the matter. We could certainly have directed the petitioners to approach the Andhra Pradesh High Court which also has jurisdiction in the matter since the telephone directories were required for Hyderabad Telecom District and the contract was to be entered there and the records were also maintained there in Hyderabad. We could decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such a matter in spite of the fact of our having jurisdiction in the matter. However, since the arguments were addressed at length we do not think any useful purpose will be served by sending the petitioners to Hyderabad. 34. The result of the discussion is that the petitioners have no case. This petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 35. Rule is discharged. 36. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (10) TMI 352 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ty has expressed views thereon without alerting counsel appearing and others concerned. A lot can be said against such views of the majority out for the present the comment be kept reserved. I would rather desist conviction on the subject and prefer to remain advised. So, in my view, on this aspect, the opinion is obitor. Consideration on these points was wholly unnecessary on the rigid terms of the reference. For such view I am with respect in disagreement with the majority. 541. On the question of justiciability of the Judge-strength, I have nothing useful to add. 542. While parting with this opinion, I join hands with my learned brethren in recording my sense of gratitude to the galaxy of men who addressed us at the bar in this venture, which could aptly be called a labour of love, and to have enlightened us on the subject with their professional skill, analysis and wisdom. 543. I agree to the disposal of the reference leaving however a note of skepticism Was it worth it?
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1993 (10) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd irretrievable damage to the interest of the country as opposed to the loss of money to the borrower/plaintiff. There was no question of defendant 4 not making any demand. The instalments for repayment of the loans had already been fixed and liable to be paid without demand by defendant 4. Defendant 12 is under a duty to pay the instalments regularly on a fixed date without any demand to defendant 4. 90.We may make it clear that our views are only tentative and prima facie for the purpose of the decision of the application for injunction and should not be construed as expression of opinion at all on the merits of the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendants. 91.For the reasons stated above the appeal is accepted; the judgment and order of the High Court dated October II, 1991 is set aside and that of the trial court dated August 14, 1991 is restored and the application of the borrower/plaintiff for interim injunction against the lenders is dismissed with costs.
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1993 (10) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Since the finding of the executing court was adverse to the respondents regarding the origin of their tenancy, unless and until that finding was upset, the High Court had no power to interfere with the order of the executing court in revision, and to have deviated the matter to the Tribunal for settlement of the issue as to whether there existed a tenancy or not under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The exercise in our view attempted by the High Court was likely to be of no use even if it was assumed that the respondents had been inducted as tenants in possession in the manner found by the executing court over the questioned land. This being a finding of fact not disturbed by the High Court in revision, would govern the field meriting dismissal of the revision petition. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and dismiss the objections of the respondents. Let the execution proceed further without delay. No costs.
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1993 (10) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... very wide. It appears to us that the amendment was made out of abundant caution and it does not mean that the consent decree was not otherwise covered by the definitions given in Section 2(g) or 2(1) of the Act. As stated earlier it depends on the terms thereof. Merely because an agreement is put in the shape of a consent decree it does not change the contents of the document. It remains an agreement and it is subject to all rights and liabilities which any agreement may suffer. Having a stamp of court affixed will not change the nature of the document. A compromise decree does not stand on a higher footing than the agreement which preceded it. A consent decree is a mere creature of the agreement on which it is founded and is liable to be set aside on any of the grounds which will invalidate the agreement. 16.We are thus in agreement with the reasonings and conclusion of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. The appeals consequently fail and are dismissed with costs.
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1993 (10) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
Offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Act, 1988 comitted
Held that:- The post-dated cheque becomes a cheque under the Act of the date which is written on the said cheque and the six months period has to be reckoned for the purposes of Section 138(a) from the said date. One of the main ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act is, the return of the cheque by the bank unpaid. Till the time the cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, no offence under Section 138 is made out. A post-dated cheque cannot be presented before the bank and as such the question of its return would not arise. It is only when the post-dated cheque becomes a "cheque", with effect from the date shown on the face of the said cheque, the provisions of Section 138 come into play. The net result is that a post-dated cheque remains a bill of exchange till the date written on it. With effect from the date shown on the face of the said cheque it becomes a "cheque" under the Act and the provisions of Section 138(a) would squarely be attracted. In the present case the post-dated cheques were drawn in March 1990 but they became "cheques" in the year 1991 on the dates shown therein. The period of six months, therefore, has to be reckoned from the dates mentioned on the face of the cheques.
Even otherwise we agree with the reasoning adopted by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. Section 138 has to be construed with reference to the context. If the object of bringing Section 133 of the Act on the statute has to be fulfilled then the only interpretation which can be given to Clause (a) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act is that a post-dated cheque shall be deemed to have been drawn on the date it bears. Appeals allowed.
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1993 (10) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there exists arbitrable dispute between the parties. Clause 57 of the contract providing arbitration?
Held that:- It is not shown to us that the Chief Construction Manager was competent to acknowledge the liability or an authority to refer the dispute for arbitration. So neither his letters binds the respondent nor operates as an estoppel. Admittedly the full and final satisfaction was acknowledged by a receipt in writing and the amount was received unconditionally. Thus there is accord and satisfaction-by final settlement of the claims. The subsequent allegation of coercion is an after thought and a devise to get over the settlement of the dispute, acceptance of the payment and receipt voluntarily given. In Russal on Arbitration, 19th Ed., p. 396 it is stated that "an accord and satisfaction may be pleaded in an action on award and will constitute a good defence." Accordingly, we hold that the appellant having acknowledged the settlement and also accepted measurements and having received the amount in full and final settlement of the claim, there is accord and satisfaction. There is no existing arbitrable dispute for reference to the arbitration. The High Court is, therefore, right in its finding in this behalf. The appeals are dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.
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1993 (10) TMI 345 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... llant has offered that should the respondent be held entitled to back wages only, the Management is prepared to pay a further sum of Rs 20,000 to close the issue. We find this offer to be more apt and reasonable. Therefore, we alter the orders of the High Court as also that of the labour court in denying to the respondent reinstatement but holding him entitled to the back wages till date plus another sum of Rs Twenty thousand as offered by Mr Mehta. The appeals are allowed accordingly with the aforesaid terms. The respondent be paid the sum he is entitled to within six weeks, subject to adjustments, if any. No costs.
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1993 (10) TMI 344 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e basis of weight, then weight is necessary. In the present case, the Tribunal has rightly come to the conclusion that without actual weighment of goods, the penalty was not justified. Another additional factor, which was taken into consideration was that the assessee was not registered with the department after a period of 10 years. That may be a relevant factor for the purpose of conduct, but not relevant for the purpose of imposition of penalty. It is necessary as to whether various ingredients which are required to be established by the assessing authority have been established or not. The basis on which seizure has been effected has not been established and therefore, the provisions of section 22(6) cannot be invoked. Accordingly it is held that the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and setting aside the penalty. 8.. The revision petition has no force and is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (10) TMI 343 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m a registered dealer who is liable to pay tax under the Act, which has been duly done in the present case. I may incidentally indicate here that one of the dependable modes for ascertaining the said fact can be as to whether the payment to the selling dealer has been made by crossed cheque or crossed bank draft as mandatorily required under section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The word expenditure under the said section includes price paid for purchases of stock-in-trade as held even by this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ram Chand Gobind Prasad reported in 1985 156 ITR 766. 26.. For the reasons aforesaid the question No. 1 is answered in negative, i.e., against the department. As discussed above, question No. 2, as framed, need not be answered. No costs. 27.. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, for needful. AFTAB ALAM, J.-I agree. Question No. 1 answered in the negative. Question No. 2 not answered.
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1993 (10) TMI 342 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has been rejected merely on the ground that production of declaration form IX-C is a mandatory pre-requisite for entertainment of such a claim. 5.. The question at hand, after due deliberations, has been answered by us in favour of the assessee in the case of Food Corporation of India v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Taxation case No. 1 of 1981) disposed of today, wherein it has been held that requirement of production of form IX-C is merely directory and if from other evidences forming part of the records, it is ascertained that the dealer is a second or subsequent seller then the transaction in his stock of the said goods cannot be subjected to special tax twice. See 1999 116 STC 173 (Pat.) supra. 6.. For the reasons aforesaid, the question at hand is answered in negative, i.e., against the department. No cost. 7.. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, for needful. AFTAB ALAM, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1993 (10) TMI 341 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... employed in the cadre below than the Lower Division Clerk. It cannot be assumed that the Legislature intended to confer power of such magnitude and discretion to the employees of such a lower category to the exclusion of the officer ordinarily authorised to exercise the power of assessment and levy of penalty under the Act. Giving any other interpretation to the provision would be opening the flood gates of misuse or abuse of the power in the hands of such lowly placed persons who are not otherwise trained to discharge quasi-judicial functions requiring exercise of discretion with judicial restraint. 6.. It may also be seen that the term used is officer -in-charge and not the person -in-charge of the check-post or barrier. This is also suggestive of the fact that it is only an authority not below the cadre of officer , is empowered to take action under section 22A(7) of the Act. I, therefore, find no merit in the petition and the same is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1993 (10) TMI 340 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... October 31, 1975 and November 1, 1975 to March 31, 1976 are quashed. The appellate orders dated August 10, 1979 and August 17, 1979 for the periods from August 1, 1974 to December 31, 1974 and January 1, 1975 to October 31, 1975 respectively in Case No. RN-150(T) of 1992 are set aside. The respondents are restrained by a writ in the nature of prohibition from giving any effect to the impugned orders of assessments in Cases Nos. RN-149(T) of 1992 and RN150(T) of 1992. The interim order dated February 12, 1982 in C.R. 479(W) of 1982 RN-149(T) of 19921 and interim order dated February 12, 1982 in C.R. No. 478(W) of 1982 RN-150(T) of 1992 are vacated. The applicant in each of the two cases is discharged from the bank guarantees furnished in pursuance of the aforesaid interim orders dated February 12, 1982 passed by the High Court. There will be no order as to costs. S.N. MUKHERJEE (Judicial Member).-I agree. P.R. BALASUBRAMANIAN (Technical Member).-I agree. Applications allowed.
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1993 (10) TMI 339 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... and three months in the disposal of the application for granting of eligibility certificate was unreasonable. 21.. As the matter stands, the application for granting eligibility certificate to the applicant has been rightly rejected by the respondent No. 2 and the revisional application against that order of the respondent No. 2 dated July 31, 1991, has rightly been rejected by the respondent No. 3 on February 1, 1992. The application is, thus, dismissed without any order as to costs. Order by the Tribunal as per majority judgment- ORDER The application is allowed. The impugned orders dated July 31, 1991 and February 1, 1992, are quashed with the direction upon respondent No. 2 to grant the eligibility certificate to the applicant as prayed for within a period of four weeks from date. There shall be no order for costs. On the verbal prayer of the learned State Representative the operation of this judgment and order is stayed for a period of eight weeks. Application allowed.
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1993 (10) TMI 338 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... TC 56, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the cess paid by the assessee-manufacturer to the Rubber Board is not includible in its purchase turnover. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding so. 6.. On the second aspect, the Appellate Tribunal found that the finding of the assessing authority that the assessee had used synthetic rubber in the manufacture of tread rubber is based on no material. The plea of the assessee that it has not done so was accepted. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) was held justified in holding that the assessee is liable only to pay 10 per cent tax. Before us, counsel for the Revenue was not able to point out any material to show that the Appellate Tribunal committed any error of law on this score. 7.. The common order passed by the Appellate Tribunal does not disclose any error of law nor has the Appellate Tribunal failed to decide any question of law. The revisions are without merit. They are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1993 (10) TMI 337 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 1991 and as such the retention from June 16, 1991 to June 18, 1991, was illegal and the later approval granted on July 15, 1991 will not validate the retention between June 16, 1991 to June 18, 1991. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Parasadamal Saktumal 1983 UPTC 1091 and we find ourself in full agreement with the law laid down in the above case and we feel that the controversy involved in the instant case is squarely covered by the decision given in the case of Parasadamal Saktumal 1983 UPTC 1091 and hence the petition deserves to be allowed. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondent No. 3 is directed to return the seized documents to the petitioner which were seized on January 31, 1991, from the premises of the petitioner within a period of two weeks from the date of presentation of a certified copy of the order of this Court. Parties shall bear their own costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1993 (10) TMI 336 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... me of assessment shall be read. as may , making production of the declaration in form XXXE as optional for the dealers of iron and steel goods within the meaning of section 14(iv) of the 1956 Act for proving their claim under section 5(2)(a)(v) of the 1941 Act. Thus, rule 27C(1) will be a merely directory provision. The dealers of the above class will be at liberty either to produce declaration in form XXXE along with other documents, or to adduce alternative evidence and other documents before the assessing authority at the time of assessment to prove the said claim. The proviso to rule 27C(1)(b) is hereby struck down. The trade circular No. 3/92 dated May 20, 1992, should also be read in terms of this judgment, but the circular will not be binding in any way on the quasi-judicial authorities. The main application is thus disposed of. No order is made for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.R. BALASUBRAMANIAN (Technical Member).-I agree. Application partly allowed.
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1993 (10) TMI 335 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to whether the cause which has been shown is a reasonable cause or not is primarily a question of fact and if the assessing authority is not satisfied then the appellate authority has to examine for the reasons which are recorded, as to whether it could be considered as reasonable cause. The Sales Tax Tribunal has considered it to be a reasonable cause and also taken into consideration the conduct of the assessee in the past. I have considered over the entire circumstances, in which the Sales Tax Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was a reasonable cause on the part of the assessee and therefore, no penalty under section 7AA of the Act could be levied. I am in agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal and accordingly, it is held that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the assessee had reasonable cause and no case for invoking the provisions of section 7AA is made out. The revision petitions are dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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