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Showing 161 to 180 of 217 Records
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1980 (2) TMI 57 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Exclusion, House Rent Allowance, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... 5 empowers the Commissioner to relax the provisions of r. 4(c) and to permit the crediting by the employers to the individual accounts of the employees of the periodical bonuses or other contributions of a contingent nature. If bonus were to form part of the salary of the employee, the proportionate contribution has to be automaticallv credited by the employer and there is absolutely no necessity, for this provision for relaxation of the rules. It is also significant that bonus is specifically referred to as a contribution of a contingent nature. We are, therefore, unhesitatingly of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that bonus paid to the assessee did not form part of his salary . The question referred is accordingly answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment, under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar, will be forwarded to.
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1980 (2) TMI 56 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... statement Dwarka Prosad Jhunjhunwalla has stated that the transactions prior to 1966 were bogus, whether under such circumstances the confession can be relied upon as the material for reopening the assessment prior to 1966 ? 2. When the confession of Dwarka Prosad Jhunjhunwalla refers to another confession of his son which has not been referred to in the affidavit of the Income-tax Officer, whether such confession can be looked into by the writ court under article 226 of the Constitution particularly when in the said confession the specific year of the bogus transactions and the parties including the assessee are mentioned ? We reject the aforesaid application, for, we have looked into the confessional statement of the son of Dwarka Prosad and we have allowed this appeal by following the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. Operation of the ordering portion of this judgment will remain stayed only for six weeks as prayed on behalf of th e revenue. R. N. PYNE J.-I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 55 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d attached to annex. P-4, the order impounding the document, and there was no other list of documents on the record which is alleged to have been served on Pawan Kumar along with annex. P-2. It is, therefore, evident that before the service of annex. P-2, the documents had, in fact, been seized and impounded and it was only thereafter that the notice, Ex. P-2, was served to bypass the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 133A of the Act. We have, therefore, no doubt that the account books in the present case were seized and removed by the respondent while acting under s. 133A in violation of the provisions of sub-s. (4) of the said section. In the result, this petition is allowed, the impugned order annex. P-4, quashed and direction issued to the respondent to return the books contained in annex. P-3 to the petitioner within fifteen days from today. The petitioner shall also be entitled to the costs of this petition which are assessed at Rs. 250. BHOPINDER SINGH DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Possessory Mortgage ... ... ... ... ..... quiry into the Legislature s competency to enact s. 4(2) of the Act, and I refrain from doing so. The 1st respondent in O. P. No. 4358 of 1977 has issued ex. P-1 preassessment notice proposing to assess the petitioner therein taking into account also s. 4(2) of the Act. The petitioner therein has preferred ex. P-2 objection there to. There shall be a direction that the 1st respondent therein will dispose of ex. P-2 objection in the light of this decision. The 1st respondent in O. P. No. 141 of 1978 has likewise issued preassessment notices in respect of assessment years 1974-75 to 1976-77 proposing to assess the petitioner therein also on the basis of s. 4(2) of the Act. The said notice is not marked herein. The 1st respondent herein is directed to afford an opportunity, to the petitioner therein to file objections there to and to dispose of the same in the light of this decision. The two writ petitions are allowed to the above extent. There will be no order as regards costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 53 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er filed a writ petition challenging the order of the Commissioner. It was held that if the conditions in cls. (a), (b) and (c) of s. 271(4A) of the Act were satisfied, the Commissioner could not refuse to reduce or waive the amount of minimum penalty imposable. After taking into consideration all the aforesaid circumstances, I am of the opinion that the Commissioner has taken into consideration irrelevant matter, i.e., that the petitioner was assessed to tax for a number of years prior to the assessment year in question and by submitting the returns under s. 139(1) of the Act after the due date he cannot be considered to have made any disclosure in terms of s. 271(4A) of the Act, and, therefore, his order is liable to be quashed. He may, however, consider the matter afresh after taking notice of the relevant considerations as provided in s. 271(4A) of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, I accept the writ petition with costs and quash the impugned order. Counsel fee Rs. 200.
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1980 (2) TMI 52 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Embezzlement Loss, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... again irrelevant. It is well settled that if the loss is not known, and it comes to be known during a particular assessment year, the adjustment can be claimed in the assessment year when it came to be known. The material produced by the assessee before the Tribunal was not at all considered by the Tribunal from a true perspective. It is, therefore, obvious that irrelevant considerations got in and the Tribunal without considering the material rejected the claim of the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, we feel that it is not possible for us to answer question No. 1. Since the decision of question No. 2 is directly linked with question No. 1, therefore, it is also not possible for us to answer the same. For the reasons recorded above, we direct that the case be sent back to the Tribunal which shall decide the appeals of the assessee afresh keeping in view the propositions which find enunciated by us. We order accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 51 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Depreciation, Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... ection with legal proceedings taken by an assessee by way of a writ for escaping tax liability consequent upon the discovery of concealed income. The Delhi High Court too in a Division Bench case, D.S. Bist and Sons v. CIT 1972 85 ITR 254, has held that the expenses incurred by an assessee in payment of professional fees to chartered accountants in connection with representation to the Central Board of Revenue and other legal proceedings in appeals and in connection with settlement of old assessments with the Directorate of Inspection were allowable as business expenditure under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. In view of this chain of decisions, we are unable to interfere with the order of the Tribunal holding that the sum of Rs. 8,679 claimed by the assessee as legal and court expenses for preparation and pursuing of income-tax appeals was permissible. Question No. 2 is answered in favour of the assessee. Looking at the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ce so far as depreciation allowance was concerned, s. 40A(7) so far as gratuity was concerned, s. 80J relief and the question of s. 80M. On none of those four points was information forthcoming from the audit party within the meaning of s. 147(b) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society s case 1979 119 ITR 996. Hence, it is obvious that the condition precedent for the exercise of powers under s. 147(b) was absent in the instant case and the notice issued by the respondent on February 23, 1978, was illegal and void in law and must be quashed. Under these circumstances, this special civil application is allowed and the rule is made absolute with costs. The notice dated 23rd February, 1978, is quashed and set aside and the respondent is restrained by permanent injunction from giving effect to the said notice. Copies of the audit objections regarding the four points discussed in the course of this judgment to be kept on the record of this case.
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1980 (2) TMI 49 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Partner In Firm, Share In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... they had, in response to the notice issued under r. 73(1), not failed to appear before the TRO. In this view, the relief in respect to which the petitioners have now confined their submission, is clearly involved in the two writ petitions and an appropriate order can be made in that regard. In the result, the petitions are allowed only to this extent that the TRO is directed not to take steps to get the petitioners arrested in pursuance of the warrants alleged to have been issued on 26th March, 1976, and not to commit the petitioners to civil custody under r. 76 without first disposing of the proceedings as contemplated by r. 74. It is, however, made clear that if in the meantime the conditions mentioned in sub-r. (2) or (3) of r. 73 of the Second Schedule to the I.T. Act happened to come into existence, it will be open to the TRO to deal with the petitioners under those rules. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in these petitions.
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1980 (2) TMI 48 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penal Interest, Return ... ... ... ... ..... that there was no full and true disclosure of his income. However, we express no opinion about it but just because of the variation between the income returned and the income determined which is mentioned in the order, Ex. L , it cannot be said that there was no disclosure of full and true particulars of income by the assessee. The order, Ex. L , therefore, was passed on considerations which were not germane to the factors which were required to be considered by the respondent while passing the order under s. 273A. We, therefore, quash and set aside the order, Ex. L , and direct that no action should be taken in pursuance of that order. The matter will now go back to the respondent for disposing of the application under s. 273A for waiver of interest under s. 139(8) and s. 217 in accordance with law and in accordance with what has been stated in the course of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs of this special civil application. Rule made absolute accordingly.
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1980 (2) TMI 47 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company ... ... ... ... ..... nt compensation to those two directors on their retirement as settled between them. It also says that an agreement, in that behalf, has to be entered into by the assessee with those two directors. The agreement was entered into on the 3rd August, 1963. Under the agreement the compensation was payable by twenty monthly instalments and the first of such instalments was payable on or before 10th September, 1963, as found by the ITO. This finding was not challenged by the assessee either before the AAC or before the Tribunal. The payments were also made after the accounting year in terms of the aforesaid agreement. This is also the finding of the authorities below. In view of the aforesaid facts, it must be held that the liability to pay the aforesaid amount did not arise in the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1964-65. In the premises, we answer question No. 2 in the negative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. R. N. PYNE J.-I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 46 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... The adjective charitable occurring before the word objects qualifies both the objects as well as purposes and it would not be correct to read charitable with objects and not with purposes. In fact, here the words. objects and purposes mean the same thing. This contention raised on behalf of the revenue is also without force. Thus, having regard to the terms of the trust deed and to the correct interpretation of the term charitable purpose in s. 2(15) of the Act (as interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association 1980 121 ITR 1), we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative in both the references, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of our decision of the question referred to us in the two references, the Income-tax cases under s. 256(2) of the Act have become infructuous and are hereby dismissed as such. The parties are left to bear their own costs in all the cases.
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1980 (2) TMI 45 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Gratuity, Profits Incidental To Business ... ... ... ... ..... ing to show that it was intended to be a purchase of the securities-cum-interest (by paying the face value as price and Rs. 21,110 towards interest as against Rs. 23,481 accrued till then). But, even otherwise, whatever may be the justification from the point of view of accountancy principles, in making notional entries towards interest calculated as having accrued up to the point of sale, in order to ensure that the company s liability towards the interest payable in respect of debentures gets fully reflected in the books, we think, for the reasons already discussed, that in law, the entire payment made by the assessee was capital in nature being the price paid for the debentures. We, therefore, answer the last question referred to as in the negative and against the assessee. To sum up, the questions are answered as follows Q. No. 1. Yes. Q. No. 2. No. Q. No. 3. Yes. But only to the extent indicated. Q. No. 4. No. In the circumstances, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 44 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... So far as question No. 3 is concerned, it appears to be incongruous and unnecessary. The Tribunal held that the assessee had adequate opportunity for showing cause against levying penalty before the AAC. The question whether the assessee had opportunity before the AAC was in no way germane to the case. What was being canvassed by the assessee was that the WTO did not afford him any opportunity. The learned counsel for the assessee submitted that he was aggrieved by the fact that the WTO had not given him adequate opportunity. He pointed out that the Tribunal in its order says that it did not want to decide that question and merely observed that the assessee had opportunity before the AAC. In these circumstances, it appears that question No. 3 is wholly unnecessary, and we decline to answer the same. So far as question No. 4 is concerned, the matter, is covered by decision of this court in CWT v. C. S. Manvi 1978 114 ITR 417 and we answer the said question in the affirmative.
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1980 (2) TMI 43 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Exemptions, HUF, Partition, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... with any ownership or interest in agricultural land. There is no force in the submission put forth on behalf of the petitioner. During the course of the arguments, a question was debated as to whether the right to receive areca by way of owelty could be considered as an asset at all existing on the relevant valuation dates and whether it would fall within the definition of asset under s. 2(e) of the Act and if at all only the value of 10 candies of arecanut, if it existed in the hands of the assessee on the relevant valuation dates, could be included in the computation of net wealth. As this was not the question in regard to which a reference had been made, the matter was not pursued to any finality. In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal is correct and we answer the question as follows That the right of the assessee to receive 10 candies of arecanut per as owelty was not entitled to exemption under s. 5(1)(iva) of the I.T. Act, 1957. Parties to bear their own costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 42 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... this practice, for, we find that in 1973 the Government of India had again to request the assessee not to indulge in this practice. Moreover, counsel for the assessee has not been able to make out that under the Securities (Contracts) Regulation Act, 1956, the Govt. of India could have imposed an the assessee any condition of this type. On the contrary, if the Government had been able to impose the restriction by way of a condition, it would have perhaps done so under threat of withdrawal of recognition granted to the assessee under the said Act, and would not have been merely writing recommendatory or persuasive letters pleading with the assessee to discontinue the practice. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Tribunal was clearly right in coming to the conclusion that the assessee was not eligible for the exemption. The questions referred are answered in the negative and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to one set of costs. Counsel s fee, Rs. 300.
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1980 (2) TMI 41 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Fresh Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... found that the reopening of the assessment by the ITO was as a matter of fact not based on any such information gathered from the Tribunal s decision. We find no ground whatever which would justify the said finding arrived at by the Tribunal being characterised as unreasonable or perverse. Such being the factual and legal position obtaining in respect of the matter, we answer the first question in the affirmative, that is, against the department and in favour of the assessee, and we answer the second question in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. In the light of the conclusions recorded by us on questions Nos. 1 and 2, it is unnecessary for us to answer question No. 3 and we decline to answer the said question. The reference is disposed of as above. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal, as required by law.
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1980 (2) TMI 40 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... terial before the ITO to connect the case of the petitioner so as to have reason to believe that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. As is clear from the averments made in the returns, the books of account which were recovered from the custody of Shri Harbans Lal did reveal the relevant material to enable the ITO to form the requisite opinion. The evidentiary value to be attached to the material on the basis of which the notices have been issued is a matter for further enquiry and if the assessee is able to show that the material sought to be relied upon is irrelevant or is not reliable, it will be a determination of the merits of the case, but keeping in view the averments made, it is difficult for us to hold that the notices which are sought to be impugned in these petitions, are without jurisdiction. For the reasons recorded above, there is no merit in both these writ petitions and the same are hereby dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs
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1980 (2) TMI 39 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income From Undisclosed Sources, Onus ... ... ... ... ..... it was held (p. 4) ... that the onus of proving the source of a sum of money found to have been received by the assessee is on him. If he disputes liability for tax, it is for him to show either that the receipt was not income or that if it was, it was exempt from taxation under the provisions of the Act. In the absence of such proof, the Income-tax Officer is entitled to treat it as taxable income. In view of this authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court, in the absence of adequate explanation of the sources of all the amounts in dispute, the ITO was entitled, in law, to treat it as income. The question referred to us, therefore, has to be answered in the negative and against the assessee. But as the Tribunal did not go into the adequacy of the assessee s explanation as to the source of the amount in dispute, the case is remanded for a fresh decision. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. BHOPINDER SINGH DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... s disposed of without answering them. As the Tribunal has failed to decide the issues, Mr. B. L. Pal, learned counsel for the revenue, submits that by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Indian Molasses Co. Pvt. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 474, we should direct the Tribunal to take additional evidence on those issues while disposing of the appeal under s. 260(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961. Mr. Pranab Pal, the learned counsel for the assessee, faintly submits that we should not give any such direction, but we are unable to accept it in view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. The Tribunal shall now dispose of the appeal in terms of the aforesaid submissions of Mr. B. L. Pal under s. 260(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961, and the Tribunal shall do so after giving a reasonable opportunity to both the parties of being heard and the parties will be at liberty to make such arguments as they may be advised. There will be no order as to costs. R. N. PYNE J.-I agree.
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