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Showing 41 to 60 of 79 Records
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1975 (4) TMI 39 - ITAT COCHIN
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... ... ..... We are of opinion that they are entitled to the development rebate at 35 per cent. It has been agreed by the ITO that in letting out the plant and machinery at their Bombay branch, the assessee is still doing business. The hire charges received has been assessed only under the head business and not under the head other sources . The only way in which the plant can be used for business is in the processing of frozen fish and fish products. This plant cannot be used in any other way. How this business asset would be exploited in the business is left to the assessee. He may himself use it or he may exploit it by letting it on hire to others. So long as it is accepted that it is a business asset and that income arising therefrom is business income, the assessee s claim that the machinery is used in one of the items mentioned in the Fifth Schedule cannot be rejected. We will, therefore, direct the ITO to allow development rebate at the higher percentage. 4. The appeal is allowed.
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1975 (4) TMI 38 - ITAT CALCUTTA-D
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... ... ..... x distributed the income to herself, or applied the income for the benefit of herself, as residuary legatee when she credited the income to her personal account in the bank. The Appellate Asstt. Commissioner found that the estate duty, the first charge on the estate, was not paid before the expiry of the years under appeal and the administration of the estate was not yet complete. This finding is not controverted before us. The executrix s Act of depositing the income of the estate into her personal bank account cannot by any means be regarded as distribution of the income to herself, application of the income for the benefit of herself, as a legatee. We are therefore, in agreement with the finding of the Appellate Asstt. Commissioner that s. 168 (4) has no application to this case and the income of the estate is not liable to be assessed in the hands of the assessee as an individual for the assessment years under appeal. 9. In the result, the appeals fail and are dismissed.
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1975 (4) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Tariff value ... ... ... ... ..... Rs. 130 and Rs. 125 respectively per quintal for sugar falling under sub-item (1) of Item I of the First Schedule to the Act and chargeable to duty ad valorem. The values so fixed being on the average actual all India prices basis, such tariff values are not fixed in accordance with and as directed by the provisions of Section 4, which have to be followed in fixing the tariff values to be notified under Section 3(2). These notifications cannot, therefore, afford legal basis for levy of duty under Section 3(1) on sugar, the actual price of which even at the control price under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, varies from State to State and even place to place. 7. We, therefore, direct that the tariff value for ad valorem charge on free sugar of the appellant s factory be fixed in the light of the provisions of Section 4. On that view, we make no directions on the other prayers in the writ petition. The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 36 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income Tax Return ... ... ... ... ..... he liquidation work had been completed by the voluntary liquidator. The only work that is statutorily entrusted to the official liquidator is to scrutinise the books and records of the company and submit a report. In other words, he is assisting the court, but is not either managing or administering the company. He has no control over the company or its assets or its affairs. Indeed, he has no concern whatever with its management or administration. It is not, therefore, proper to call the official liquidator, who is discharging the functions under section 497(6) of the Companies Act, the principal officer , within the meaning of section 2(35) of the Income-tax Act. If he is not a principal officer, he has no liability or duty to file any income-tax return. Consequently, this application for directing the official liquidator to file the income-tax return on behalf of the company is untenable. It is, accordingly, dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs.
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1975 (4) TMI 35 - HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT
Income Tax Return ... ... ... ... ..... w the two amounts were treated by the assessee. It is also urged for the assessee that as the expression provision has not been used in the Super Profits Tax Act, it should not be taken into account in disposing of this reference. The expression provision is a well-known expression in commercial accountancy, and may legitimately be employed in this case for the purpose of drawing a distinction from the expression reserve . In our opinion, the amount of Rs. 2,98,035 shown as provision for taxation can be treated as a reserve only to the extent that it exceeds the tax liability which had already arisen on August 1, 1961. It will be for the Appellate Tribunal to enquire into this aspect of the case when disposing it of conformably with this judgment. As regards the amount of Rs. 70,000 shown on account of proposed dividends, this amount cannot be treated as a reserve. The question referred is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs.
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1975 (4) TMI 34 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Profits ... ... ... ... ..... cree amount itself. This court held that a money decree is not an asset which one could acquire for keeping it for his enjoyment and the intention of the assessee must have been to realise the decree amount. The purchase in those circumstances was an adventure in the nature of a trade. This court also was of the view that having regard to the nature of the business of the assessee as money-lender the transaction shall also be treated as in the line of his business. A similar view was also taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jallu Manikyala Rao v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which also related to a case of assignment of decree. It was held that the transaction was a clear case of loaning out money with a view to reap a profit and an adventure in the nature of trade. We are, therefore, of the view that the profit made by the assessee is liable to be assessed. The reference is accordingly answered in the affirmative and against the assessee with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 33 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... come-tax Officer shall have power to allow so much of the expenditure incurred by the firm for payment for the services of a partner to the firm, which the Income-tax Officer considers to be reasonable having regard to the fair market value of such services. We are unable to accept the above contention of Sri Srinivasan. As observed by Rowlatt J. in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, in taxation we have to look simply at what is clearly said there is no room for any intendment, we imply nothing but we look fairly at what is said and what is said clearly. The second contention also, therefore, fails. In the result, the question referred to this court is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The answer is On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the salary payment of Rs. 12,000 to N. M. Anniah by the firm was not an admissible deduction in the computation of its business income.
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1975 (4) TMI 32 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Additional Super Tax, Law Applicable, Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... that the petitioner only purchased the stock-in-trade and the ownership of the firm was not transferred to him and according to section 170 of the Act he can be assessed only if he has succeeded to the ownership of the firm and if the predecessor-firm cannot be found out by the department. It is contended by the petitioner that notice should have been served on the transferor-firm so as to apportion and quantify the amount of assessment. In the assessment proceeding, notice was served on the petitioner on the footing that he was the transferee. Whether he merely purchased the stock-in-trade or was the transferee is a question of fact to be determined by the assessing authority. The petitioner not having raised objection on a question of fact at that stage, cannot raise it in the writ application. This point fails. In the result, both the points raised by the petitioner fail and the writ petition is dismissed with costs. G. K. MISHRA C.J.--I agree. P. K. MOHANTY J.--I agree.
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1975 (4) TMI 31 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ar State with the Province of Orissa with effect from January 1, 1948, the State Income-tax Regulations were repealed by virtue of section 7(1) of the Taxation Laws (Extension to Merged States and Amendment) Act, 1949 (67 of 1949), because the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was brought into force also in the territories of ex Keonjhar State with effect from April 1, 1949. The court held that by virtue of article 372 of the Constitution, the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, became applicable with effect from April 1, 1949, and since all allowance was not exempted by any notification issued under section 60 of that Act, it was exigible to income-tax. As a result of the foregoing discussion, I hold that the appellant is liable to pay income-tax in accordance with law on the maintenance allowance of Rs. 2,000 per month received by him. This appeal deserves to fail and I order accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. R. S. NARULA C J.--I agree.
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1975 (4) TMI 30 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Burden Of Proof, Finding Of Fact, Income Tax Act, Return Filed Beyond Time, Writ Petition ... ... ... ... ..... lu Valley s case was with reference to law as it existed under the 1922 Act and is not applicable to the provisions under the Act. We do not subscribe to such a bald proposition though the conclusion was correct. We would, therefore, answer the question referred to us by saying that the Tribunal was not right in relying on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kulu Valley Transport Co. Ltd. for holding that the assessee must be deemed to have complied with the provisions of section 139(1) and that no penalty for default in complying with the provisions of section 139(1) is exigible under section 271(1)(a) of the Act. The answer is in the negative. In view of our conclusions on questions Nos. (1) to (3), the writ application is dismissed. Question No. (4) arising in S.J.C. No. 17 of 1973 has been answered in favour of the revenue. The reference is accepted. Parties to bear their own costs. Records be sent back to the Tribunal at once. P. K. MOHANTI J.--I agree. N. K. DAS J.--I agree.
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1975 (4) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Balancing Charge, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... sidered the merits of the assessee s claim regarding the adjustment of Rs. 75,161 and rejected it. It was submitted that the Tribunal should have gone into the question for itself and should not have merely rejected the assessee s objection in limine. Having regard to the language of section 263 no exception could be taken to the order of the Tribunal in so far as it rejected the assessee s claim for adjustment of Rs. 75,161 in limine. The fact that the Commissioner had made certain observations on the merits of the admissibility of the adjustment of the sum of Rs. 75,161 cannot stand in the way of the Tribunal looking into the provisions and finding out whether the assessee s claim deserved to be entertained or not. There is no question of estoppel in such a matter. For the reasons mentioned above, we answer all the three questions in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Commissioner will have his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250. Question answered in the affirmative .
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1975 (4) TMI 28 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Mitakshara HUF, Taxing Statute ... ... ... ... ..... he decisions dealing with economic regulation indicate that the courts have used the concept of purpose and similar situations in a manner which give considerable leeway to the legislature. This approach of judicial restraint and presumption of constitutionality requires that the legislature is given the benefit of doubt about its purpose. It may be mentioned that the counsel for the revenue referred to two decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Komanduri Seshamma v. Appellate Controller of Estate Duty and N. Krishna Prasad v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, in support of his submission that section 34(1)(c) of the Act was not violative of article 14 of the Constitution. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in these cases. We, therefore, hold that section 34(1)(c) does not violate article 14 of the Constitution. No other point was raised before us. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1975 (4) TMI 27 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Question Of Fact ... ... ... ... ..... deceased was not entitled to anything could change the situation or alter the legal effect of passing. Either the accountable person had defaulted in enforcing the right of the deceased or a share in the goodwill, or she had made a gift of the goodwill itself to the surviving partners. In either case, the liability to estate duty is not affected. Further, these subsequent events of not enforcing the right or gifting away the same or the reconstitution of the firms had no effect on the passing of goodwill as an asset of the deceased. Once it is found that the deceased had an interest at the time of his death, it should be taken to be property passing on his death, as held by this court in Controller of Estate Duty v. Ibrahim Gulam Hussain Currimbhoy (Tax Case No. 269 of 1968) to which one of us was a party. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the reference in the affirmative and against the accountable person. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Entertainment Expenditure, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... or it may consist of providing some other sort of entertainment. In Bentleys, Stokes and Lowless v. Beeson (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) a firm of solicitors incurred expenses in entertaining clients. The entertainment consisted of providing lunch to the clients. It was held that expenditure was incurred wholly and exclusively for purposes of business and was an allowable deduction. The same is the position in the instant case. The petitioner has been providing to its customers refreshments and this constitutes an expenditure in the nature of entertainment expenditure .The entire expenditure would have been allowed but for the amendment introduced by section 37(2A) which restricts the allowance of such an expenditure to a maximum limit of Rs. 5,000. We, accordingly, answer the question in the affimative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner of Income-tax is entitled to the costs which we assess at Rs. 200. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1975 (4) TMI 25 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Income Accrual ... ... ... ... ..... not escape liability to tax. In the case before the Supreme Court the assessee was entitled to remuneration under the managing agency agreement for the years 1954 and 1955. For the relevant years the assessee relinquished the commission, and the question was whether the relinquishment affected the taxability of the amount that had already accrued. The Supreme Court upheld the assessment on the ground that the income having accrued was liable to tax, even if it was subsequently waived. The waiver in such a case would only be an application of the income. It is this principle which applies here. 8. Applying the principle of the decision cited above, we are satisfied that in the present case the income was rightly brought to tax by the ITO, as it had already accrued and as it was waived only after it had accrued. 9. In the result, we answer the question referred in the negative and in favour of the Department. The Department will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 24 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Estate Duty Gift ... ... ... ... ..... ecious and the donor gives the most when he gives the best. If all these aspects are borne in mind, the object of section 10 becomes appreciable. Though at a glance the provisions of section 10 may appear to be rigorous, they are not so when they are tested on the anvil of the object of the Act which is intended to rectify the unequal distribution of wealth. The gift can be genuine as well as colourable. The intention of the Legislature is to include the gifted properties to the estate passing in cases where the donee does not assume bona fide posession and enjoyment of the gifted properties and where the donor is not excluded from the property and from any benefit by contract or otherwise, and if in a given case these provisions become applicable, it cannot be contended that they are harsh and are being interpreted against public policy. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the department. No costs. Advocate s fee of Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 23 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Estate Duty Gift ... ... ... ... ..... nt used the identical language in this provision also as in the proviso to section 4(1)(a). A reading of section 33(1)(o) makes it clear that the words for any assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March, 1964 in that provision refers to the assessment year under the Gif t-tax Act, the Estate Duty Act itself not contemplating any assessment year as such. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the words, for any assessment year commencing after the 31st day of March, 1964 qualify the gift made and chargeable or not chargeable with reference to that assessment year under the Gift-tax Act and not to any assessment year under the Wealth-tax Act. If that is so, only gifts made in the relevant assessment year commencing after the 31st March, 1964, or subsequent assessment years will be excluded from the net wealth of the individual. Accordingly, we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the assessee, with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act ... ... ... ... ..... of the debt is to take place in future. Looking at the matter from another point of view, in the instant case the company having declared its dividends, the amount set apart for such payment has become charged for the purpose and as such the same cannot be treated to be wealth in the hands of the company. If we hold that the same amount cannot also be treated as wealth in the hands of the shareholders then this fund and/or amount cannot be held to be part of anybody s asset or wealth. We cannot hold that the Wealth-tax Act contemplated such a situation. By reason of the aforesaid we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the revenue. We hold that the dividend declared on the 26th March, 1965, constituted an asset assessable under the Wealth-tax Act in the hands of the assessee as a shareholder of the company on the valuation date, 31st March, 1965. In the facts and circumstances, we make no order as to costs. DEB J.--I agree. Question answered in the negative.
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1975 (4) TMI 21 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Carrying On Business, Two Partners ... ... ... ... ..... reference to the ordinary law of partnership. But as observed by us earlier, the meanings of the expressions firm , partner and partnership having been statutorily imported into the Income-tax Act from the Indian Partnership Act, there is no reason why the position should be any different in cases arising under the Income-tax Act. We have already said that the circumstance that a firm may be taxed as a unit under the Income-tax Act does not endow the firm with a juristic personality. The effect of incorporating the meaning of the expression firm into the Income-tax Act from the Partnership Act is not got rid of by the circumstance that a firm is treated as a taxable unit under the Income-tax Act. In our view, the same principles apply to cases arising both under the Income-tax Act and the Excess Profits Tax Act. In the light of the foregoing discussion we answer the question referred to us in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1975 (4) TMI 20 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Service Of Notice ... ... ... ... ..... aid view of the learned judges. Sri Rama Rao relies upon the ruling of the Gujarat High Court in Madanlal Mathurdas v. Chunilal, Income-tax Officer . But Bhagwati J. (as he then was) held in Induprasad Devshankar Bhatt v. J . P.Jani, Income-tax Officer that the view taken in Madanlal Mathurdas v. Chunilal, Income-tax Officer was no longer good law, and that its authority must be deemed to have been impliedly overruled having regard to the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Banarsi Debi v. Income-tax Officer. In the instant case, it is admitted that though notices were issued within four years, they were not served on the assessee within the same period, in which case the proceedings initiated by the Income-tax Officer, under section 147 of the Act, would be without jurisdiction. In this view, the questions referred in these references are answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each.
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