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Showing 1 to 20 of 150 Records
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1992 (6) TMI 186 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... erits in the appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. All interim orders made in this appeal, save as provided hereinabove are vacated. The appeal has been heard for about seven days and in view, of the fact that the contentions that were raised in this appeal were not at all raised before the trial Court and were raised for the first time before the appeal court and in view of our judgment and order we assess the costs at 700 Gms. The costs are to be paid within a fortnight from the date of service of the signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment and order. 33. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant prays for stay of the operation of this judgment and order. We decline to grant any order for stay of this judgment and order. The prayer for stay is refused. 34. Department and all parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking. P.K. Majumdar, J. 35. I agree. 36. Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (6) TMI 185 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... think that there is any case to issue a temporary injunction restraining the respondent from disturbing the amenities enjoyed by the plaintiff in his house. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant also submitted that the lower Court has not considered at all the balance of convenience and irreparable injury in this case. No doubt it is true that the lower Court has dismissed the I.A. of the appellant only on the point of prima facie case. It has not discussed the question of irreparable loss or balance of convenience in this case. Even though the lower Court has not discussed this point in its order, no prejudice is caused to the appellant as it is seen by this Court that there is no question of any irreparable loss or injury being caused to the appellant for the reasons which are discussed above. There are no grounds to interfere with the order that is challenged in this Appeal. 11. Hence, I proceed to pass the following order The Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1992 (6) TMI 184 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... acceptance of the premium from any date other than the annual renewal date, all that it could do was to extend the time for making payment of the premium. Therefore, the contention advanced on behalf of the Corporation that it was accepted only with effect from October 27, 1989, cannot stand scrutiny. If this position is correct, then it must be held that on the date when the petitioner's husband died there was a valid policy in force. If that is so, the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought for. The petition is, therefore, allowed and the second respondent-Corporation is directed to make the payments due under the policy within a period of three months from today. Considering the nature of the stand taken by the Corporation, I think it appropriate to award interest on the amounts payable to the petitioner. The interest shall be paid at 18 per cent, per annum on the amounts from the date it became due till payment. Petition allowed. Rule made absolute accordingly.
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1992 (6) TMI 183 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , the above observations were made with reference to the facts before him. However, we are of the view that the learned judge was right in observing that countermanding of a cheque by a stop memo hardly affects the rights of the complainant to initiate proceedings under the Act. It is not necessary for us to consider the effect of the other observations made by the learned single judge in the above-quoted passage on the facts before us. 14. In the complaint filed before the court below the complainant had specifically stated that the accused had no amount in his account with the bank for honouring the cheque and that he mischievously and maliciously issued a direction to the banker to stop payment. The complaint makes out all the ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In such a situation, this court is not to quash the complaint in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. The petition fails. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1992 (6) TMI 182 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... may get relief under section 3(2) or 3(3) without approaching the Tribunal. It enables the Custodian himself to exclude the lands where it is due. It only provides an alternate forum for providing speedy relief to an owner by excluding the lands from the vesting even at the threshold This apparently is the reason why a very short period of terms was provided for making an application under those Rules namely on or before 25 August 1974. Failure to apply under those Rules cannot therefore deprive the owner of the benefit of an adjudication under section 8(1)(b). It is clear from the decision in Balan's case itself that this court had left the final determination of the questions arising under sections 2(f), 3(2) or 3(3) to the Tribunal. We do not therefore find any merit in any of the pleas raised by the learned Government Pleader. None of the grounds specified in section 8C (2) of the Act exist for us to entertain this application for review. It is accordingly dismissed.
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1992 (6) TMI 181 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... -74, 1974-75 and 1977-78. the assessment orders for each of these assessment years are long prior to 1st June, 1988. The order of the CIT(A) in respect of these assessment years are of 1981, while the orders under s. 263 of the IT Act, 1961 are of 1982. Hence, the ratio of our judgment dt. 15th June, 1992 in IT Appln. No. 557 of 1991 in the case of CIT vs. Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. Since reported at (1992) 107 CTR (Bom) 50 directly applies to the point at issue. The answer to the question being obvious, no useful purpose would be served by directing the Tribunal to frame the question and refer it to us. 3. Hence, rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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1992 (6) TMI 180 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... will have to be limited to the amount which was communicated in the Corrigendum given to the appellants during the hearing on 24.10.1988. We also make it clear, in view of the submissions of Shri Gujral during the hearing, that it is not permissible to confirm a demand for an amount higher than the one indicated in the show cause notice. In this case, the amount will have to be limited to what was communicated on 24.10.1988. 41. In deciding these appeals, we have seen all the case law that was cited before us and do not consider necessary to refer to each case separately in view of our findings on each of the issues which we have considered and decided. Thus, the appeal is allowed by remand. Considering that this is an old case and the demands for duly have been raised with effect from 1st November 1982, we hope that the Collector will expeditiously decide the matter and also hope that while doing so, it will not be necessary for him to issue corrigenda on amounts demanded.
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1992 (6) TMI 179 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lume as well as nature of suppressions, we feel that no exception could be taken to the orders of the Joint Commissioner under challenge before us in restoring the rate of penalty levied by the assessing authority and that the plea of the assessee that the revisional authority could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the appellate authority is far-fetched and cannot have our approval, at any rate in the cases before us. In view of our conclusion that the appellate authority failed to judiciously exercise its power and discretion and that the said authority acted erroneously without properly considering and assigning any reasons, the right of the Joint Commissioner to interfere in the matter by invoking his suo motu powers of revision cannot be denied to the said authority. For all the reasons stated supra, we see no reason or justification to interfere in the matter and the tax appeals therefore fail and shall stand dismissed. No costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1992 (6) TMI 178 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the decision reported in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1960 11 STC 827 has held that in order to claim the benefit of exemption the freight should (i) have been specified and charged for by the dealer separately and (ii) the same should not have been included in the prices of the goods sold. In the case before us, the second condition as stated above has not been complied with, which is one of the important conditions, which also finds a place under section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and which also deals elaborately with the sale price . 5.. In view of the conclusion reached by the apex Court in the decision referred to supra (Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1960 11 STC 827) the appellant before us is not entitled to exemption as claimed. The order of the Joint Commissioner passed in the revision cannot be assailed. The above tax case therefore fails and the same shall stand dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (6) TMI 177 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal therefore, is quashed and the matter is remanded back to the assessing authority to determine the factual position of the case and pass fresh order in accordance with the direction given above. Regarding the levy of penalty the appellate authority has already held that there was no mens rea on the part of the assessee and as such the penalty was set aside. I am also of the view that it is also not a fit case for levy of penalty since the transactions were duly recorded in the books of account and that there was a judgment earlier of the Board of Revenue that the adjustment could be taken of the purchases of the whole year of the tax-paid goods. Though this view has not been held by me as correct as mentioned above but in any case no case of levy of penalty is made out and, therefore, the order of the Tribunal setting aside the penalty is upheld. The revision petition is partly allowed. No order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 176 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hority. The order of the first appellate authority insofar as the leviability of the penalty has become final and therefore we proceed as if this is a case where penalty could have been levied. That position is not disputed before us. The short question, as already noted above, is the question pertaining to the quantum of penalty. The first appellate authority has taken into consideration all relevant factors and thought it fit to exercise its appellate power, while the original authority has not stated in the order as to why the maximum penalty should be levied. 7.. Having regard to the above facts, we are definitely of the view that the revisional authority could not have exercised his power under section 22A to set aside the order of the appellate authority and enhance the penalty to the maximum. 8. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The excess penalty collected from the appellants shall be refunded within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order. Appeals allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 175 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rged from the customer. There is no occasion to require the dealer to pay tax on an amount which is not charged from the customer as sale price, while replacing the tyre by way of exchange. No deduction is made from any sales tax charged on the entire sale price of the initial transaction. Therefore, the first appellate authority and the Tribunal were justified in holding that the dealer was not required to pay any extra tax in addition to what has been charged on the price of the replaced tyres. A similar view was taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Commercial Taxes Officer v. Ceat Tyres of India 1988 68 STC 53. It was not the case of the Revenue that the customer paid any value of tyre in the form of a used one. The accepted case is one of exchange. The question referred to does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal and we decline to answer it. The reference is accordingly disposed of. No costs. D.M. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Reference disposed of accordingly.
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1992 (6) TMI 174 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the Commissioner. Even if the instructions are opposed to the plain language of the statutory provision, still the instructions are binding on the subordinate authorities in view of section 3-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. 11.. In K.P. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer 1981 131 ITR 597 (SC) at page 613 AIR 1981 SC 1922, at page 1933, while considering a similar provision under section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Supreme Court held that the Circulars issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes are binding on all officers and persons employed in the execution of the Act even if they deviate from the provisions of the Act. 12.. In the view we have taken as above, this appeal deserves to be allowed. Appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the Joint Commissioner under section 22-A of the Act is set aside. 13.. It is clarified that this order would not come in the way of the Revenue taking action under clause 13 of the Circular, as interpreted above. Appeal allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 173 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... in Kishindas Agencies v. State of Mysore 1974 33 STC 65 at page 67 is entirely based on the language of the then entry No. 72 of the Second Schedule to the Act read with section 5 as it then stood. To exhaust the citation made before us we have to refer to another decision of this Court reported in Khoday Distilleries (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1991 82 STC 251. It was held therein that a component part need not be visibly identifiable in an end-product and that molasses used in the manufacture of an ethyl alcohol was a component part of the finished product since it was identifiable by chemical analysis. The view taken by the Commissioner in the instant case is the result of not only his failure to rely on the material placed by the appellant but also is the result of a wrong test and consequently the order of the revisional authority is liable to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. In the result these appeals are allowed. No costs. Appeals allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 172 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e force of defeating the object of the statute, cannot be considered to be either reasonable or justifiable. The requirement relating to the monetary limit in respect of more than one transaction for an individual C form in our view would at the most be a directory requirement and cannot be construed to be a mandatory one so as to undermine the very efficacy or validity of the C forms themselves warranting their rejection. Consequently, we are of the view that the reasons which weighed with the authorities below to reject the C forms cannot have our approval in law and the order of the Tribunal is therefore set aside. Since the C forms in question were rejected only on this sole ground and not on any other ground, we see no reason to remit the matter and we declare that the petitioner shall be entitled to the concessional rate of taxation in respect of the turnover covered by the sixteen C forms in question. The tax case (revision) stands allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 171 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e petitioner alone is discriminatory and cannot be supported. There is also no warrant in law in requiring the petitioner alone to obtain delivery note on each occasion for movement of goods across the check-posts. 6.. Counsel for the respondent submitted that this Court has already upheld the validity of section 29A(2B) authorising advance collection of tax. That decision is reported in Dunlop India Ltd. v. Officer-in-charge of Sales Tax Check Post, Walayar 1992 87 STC 15. I am not concerned with the validity or otherwise of section 29A(2B) in this case. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to delivery notes and in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules aforesaid, I have no doubt in holding that the petitioner is entitled to get the delivery notes. Therefore, I allow the original petition and direct the first respondent to issue delivery notes to the petitioner on payment of specified fee. Petition allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 170 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... nganathan v. Government of Madras). Following that principle, the correct interpretation will be that cashewnut seed is not covered by either the first part or the inclusive part of the Notification No. 2252F.T. dated June 9, 1969. In the result, the application succeeds. The seizures dated November 27, 1989 as well as on May 17, 1992, are quashed. The amount of penalty of Rs. 25,300 already deposited shall be refunded to applicant No. 1, Sk. Mekail. Respondent No. 4, Commercial Tax Officer, Midnapur Charge, is directed to refund the said amount to applicant No. 1 within three months from this date. The sum of Rs. 15,000 which was deposited as security in terms of our order dated May 4, 1992, be refunded to the applicants through the applicant No. 1, Sk. Mekail within three months from today by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, West Bengal. The main application is thus disposed of without any order for costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 169 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hancement. We are afraid we can countenance such a plea in the teeth of a well-considered decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Panayappan Leather Industries 1981 47 STC 88, wherein it has been held very clearly that on the language contained in section 36(3)(a)(i) of the Act, the power to enhance the assessment is vested in the Tribunal itself, and that the procedure of filing an enhancement petition is merely by way of putting the assessee on notice that in the appeal preferred by the assessee the Revenue is going to request the Tribunal to enhance the assessment, so that the assessee may not be taken unaware if the Tribunal proceeds to concede the request of the Revenue and enhance the assessment. Consequently, the said submission of the learned counsel also fails. The tax case (revision) fails and shall stand dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (6) TMI 168 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... are there to carry out the purposes of the said statutory provision and not to inhibit, restrict or circumscribe it. The main section cannot be allowed to become cribbed and cabined by the rules to the extent that it almost turns sterile. If, because of its inadequacy or for any other reason, a rule stands in the way of implementation of, or carrying out the purposes of, a specific statutory provision in a particular case or class of cases, it should be treated as inoperative in so far as that case or that class of cases is concerned. Also, a rule which seeks to impose a condition, which is impossible of fulfilment in a particular class of cases, viz., non-registered dealers, cannot be treated as mandatory. It would, therefore, be wrong to hold that declaration is imperatively the only mode of evidence prescribed for the purpose. Other relevant evidence, which can satisfy the Commissioner with regard to the claim, is enough for the disposal of this case. Application allowed.
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1992 (6) TMI 167 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tries Commission, to entitle it to the exemption. In view of the finding definitely entered by the Appellate Tribunal that the institution which manufactured the soap in question was one recognised by the Khadi and Village Industries Commission, there can be no doubt that the goods are eligible for exemption under the notification in question. 2.. The Government Pleader faintly argued that the recognition of the institution was only for the year ending March 31, 1984 and that it did not enure for the years with which we are concerned, namely, 1984-85 and 1985-86. Such a contention was not raised before any of the authorities below, nor again in these revision cases. The point raised is essentially one of fact, which, if true, should have been raised before the authorities. We are not therefore inclined to entertain this plea made for the first time before us at the stage of arguments. The tax revision cases therefore fail. They are dismissed accordingly. Petitions dismissed.
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