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Showing 101 to 120 of 150 Records

• 1992 (6) TMI 53 - ITAT CALCUTTA-D
  

  Advance Tax, Interest Payable By Assessee

  
  
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  ... ... ..... e reasons given above, we are unable to hold that the assessee was a defaulter liable to pay interest under section 216. 6. Shri S. C. Sen, vehemently contended that the assessee himself filed an estimate of advance tax at the time of payment of second instalment which was an under estimate and, therefore, cannot now plead no default . The assessee further cannot claim that there was no obligation to revise the estimate of advance tax at the time of payment of second instalment. We do not find any merit in these submissions. As pointed out above, interest is to be charged for under estimate of advance tax and for not following statutory provisions relating to payment of advance tax. If requirements of provisions are satisfied, as is the present case, there is no question of charging any interest under section 216 of the Act. We, therefore, uphold the order of the CIT(Appeals). though on different reasons. 7. In the result, the departmental appeal fails and is hereby dismissed

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• 1992 (6) TMI 52 - ITAT CALCUTTA-D
  

  House Property, Immovable Property, Movable Property, Purchase Price

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ductions available in computing the income under the head Income from house property . 13. In the view we have taken of the assessability of the rental income derived from the property, we do not think it necessary to deal with the contention of Mr. Poddar that if the rental income cannot fall under section 22 of the Act, it cannot be brought to tax at all, on the principle of Supreme Court decision in Nalinikant Ambalal Mody s case. That contention really becomes academic. The principle of the decision in Mody s case, followed by the Bombay High Court in Smt. T. P. Sidhwa s case, is applicable only if it is found that the income does not fall under a particular head that principle can have no application to the present case, since we have held that the rent derived by the assessee from the property at Ghusuri falls to be assessed under section 22 of the Act under the head Income from house property . 14 to 23. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 51 - ITAT CALCUTTA-C
  

  Appeal To AAC, Original Assessment

  
  
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  ... ... ..... to an irresistible conclusion that the notices under section 17 for each of the assessment years involved in these appeals were hopelessly barred by limitation as contended by the assessee s counsel. The WTO, therefore, had no jurisdiction to issue notices under section 17 of the Act and to proceed further in making reassessments. We find much force in the argument of the learned counsel for the assessee that the plea of jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and, he is, as such entitled to challenge, in these appeals, the reopening action of the WTO by invoking the provision of section 17(1)(b) of the Act. We, therefore, hold accordingly. 14. In view of the discussion made by us above we also hold that the WTO had no jurisdiction, power or authority to issue notices under section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act. We, therefore, quash the orders of both the authorities below in so far as it relates to the assessment years 1970-71 to 1973-74 and allow the assessee s appeals

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• 1992 (6) TMI 50 - ITAT CALCUTTA-B
  

  Accounting Year, Assessing Officer, Best Judgment Assessment, Financial Year, Plant And Machinery, Previous Year

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• 1992 (6) TMI 49 - ITAT CALCUTTA
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... turned on their own facts and the case of the present assessee would also depend upon the entire facts and circumstances established in the present case. The assessee s learned counsel relied on the following decision (1) K.P. Varghese vs. ITO and Anr. (1981) 24 CTR (SC) 358 (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC) (2) Mysore Rolling Mills P. Ltd. vs. CIT (1992) 103 CTR (Kar) 33 (1992) 195 ITR 404 (Kar) (3) ITO First vs. M.R. Dhanalakshmi Ammal 1978 CTR (Mad) 197 (1978) 112 ITR 413 (Mad) (4) Sivakshmi Co. P. Ltd. and Ors. vs. CIT (1972) 83 ITR 311 (Mad) In my view, it is not necessary to refer to any of these decisions because on the facts I am satisfied with the genuineness of the loss claimed by the assessee and there is no material placed by the Revenue to establish its case of alleged device stated to have been adopted by the assessee in the present case. I, therefore, agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the CIT(A) and confirm his order. 5. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 48 - ITAT CALCUTTA
  

  Income From House Property

  
  
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  ... ... ..... e her any right to reassume either directly or indirectly power over the assets or the income of the property for her own benefit. Such an intention on the part of the assessee, is totally absent, as could be seen from the terms of the Trust Deeds, I, therefore, respectively follow the decisions of the Supreme Court and the Calcutta High Court, referred to above, and confirm the orders of the Dy. Commissioner(Appeals) holding that the Trust Deeds in question are not revocable transfers and that, therefore, the income from this property settled on trust is not assessable in the hands of the assessee, except to the extent they are hit by the provisions of section 64 of the Act in respect of the three minor sons of the assessee who are also beneficiaries under these Trust Deeds. In fact, the Dy. Commissioner had taken care to see that such income of the minor beneficiaries is included in the income of the assessee for purposes of tax. 20. In the result, the appeals are dismissed

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• 1992 (6) TMI 47 - ITAT BOMBAY-C
  

  Assessing Officer, Net Wealth, Original Assessment, Right To Receive, Valuation Date

  
  
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  ... ... ..... . In the appeal for assessment year 1985-86, first ground appearing in appeals for other years regarding reopening under section 17(1) is not involved, and other grounds actually involved are similar to those taken for the earlier years. They are rejected for the reasons given hereinabove. 14. Assessee s all the six appeals are dismissed. 15. In Department s appeals, only substantive ground as taken in appeal for assessment year 1977-78 reads as follows-- On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the learned CWT(Appeals) erred in directing AO to value the professional annuities at the discount rate of 25 per cent to arrive at the present value of the future receivables as the market value on the valuation date. The CWT(Appeals) has followed Tribunal s decision cited in his order. Therefore, this ground of the Department deserves to be rejected. We do so. 16. Department s all the six appeals are dismissed. 17. In effect, all the twelve appeals are dismissed

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• 1992 (6) TMI 46 - ITAT BOMBAY-C
  

  Capital Gains, Capital Reserve

  
  
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  ... ... ..... hall stand rejected. 12. The question which next requires consideration is the valuation of the property as on 1-1-1974. The first valuation was made by the Assessing Officer at Rs. 19,77,700. Pursuant to the rectification order passed by the learned Commissioner(Appeals) during the pendency of the present appeal before the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer has passed a fresh order on the issue and revised the valuation to Rs. 1,02,84,070. We were informed during the course of arguments that no appeal against the revised order of valuation has been preferred either by the department or by the assessee. The revised valuation has thus become final and the issue no longer survives for our consideration. 13. In the result, this appeal by the assessee fails subject however to the order dated 4-12-1991 passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle 2(1), Bombay revising the valuation of the land as on 1-1-1974 at Rs. 1,02,84,070. The appeal shall stand decided accordingly

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• 1992 (6) TMI 45 - ITAT AMRITSAR
  

  Assessing Officer, Film Distribution Business

  
  
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  ... ... ..... Producers is not disputed and the net receipts from the exhibition/distribution of films are also not doubted by the Assessing Officer, we are of the opinion that the Assessing Officer as well as the learned first appellate authority were not justified in disallowing the claim of loss suffered by the assessee in the business of film distribution/exhibition amounting to Rs. 4,74,655. Accordingly the order of the learned first Appellate Authority is reversed and the Assessing Officer is directed to allow the claim of loss to the assessee amounting to Rs. 4,74,655 in the film distribution business. 11. Ground of appeal No. 7 relates to the charging of interest under section 215. No specific arguments were advanced in support of this ground, which is accordingly dismissed. The Assessing Officer, however, will recalculate the interest chargeable under section 215, if any, after giving appeal effect to this order. 12. In the result the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed

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• 1992 (6) TMI 44 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
  
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  ... ... ..... orkmen s Compensation Act were allowed as permissible deductions. In this view of the matter, the expenditure was claimed to be allowable under s. 37(1). We find substance in these arguments and we allow the point in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There is another reason as to why the point is being allowed in favour of the assessee. The provisions of s. 40A(7) are applicable in respect of any provision made for gratuity, but the prohibition does not extend to payment of any gratuity which is allowable under sub-cl. (b) of s. 40A(7). In this case, the amount represented an actual payment and it was not a provision for gratuity. In these circumstances, we hold that the amount was allowable under s. 37(1) and we further hold that the prohibition contained in s. 40A(7)(a) was not applicable to the facts of the case. On the contrary, the assessee s case is covered by the exception provided in s. 40A(7)(b)(i). In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 43 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
  
  ... ...
  ... ... ..... ndicate that the development officer would not have incurred 40 expenditure to earn incentive bonus. If such material is brought on record then expenditure at less than 40 would be allowable. Everything would depend upon what material the ITO brings on record. In the present case, the learned Comissioner was not justified in directing the ITO to withdraw the entire deductions allowed for earning the incentive bonus. On facts of the present case, when we are dealing with appeals against revision orders, we do not find justification for not allowing 40 of the incentive bonus as had been allowed in several cases which were cited before us. However, at the same time, we see no reason for allowance of higher deduction at 50 as had been done by the ITO. We, therefore, modify the order of the learned Commissioner and direct the ITO to allow 40 of the incentive bonus as deduction and include the net amount after such deduction in the salary income. 9. The appeals are partly allowed.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 42 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
  

  Short-landing - Natural justice

  
  
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  ... ... ..... s paid that the SCNs as pointed out by the Collector (Appeals) did not give essential details of the short-landing and finally the respondents were not given adequate opportunity to defend themselves and there is no indication that whether the requirements of considering the questions of satisfactory nature of the respondent s explanation at all engaged the attention of the adjudicating authority. 22. In the result, the orders of the lower authorities are set aside and the cases referred to the Assistant Collector for deciding the same de novo. While doing so he shall give necessary details of the short landing of the goods as discussed above, hear the respondents and consider their evidence/pleas. Only if he is not objectively satisfied with the explanations, he shall proceed to decide on quantum and impose a penalty. The same shall be relatable to the duty involved and not quantum of compensations paid by the Air India. 23. The Review Proposal is disposed of in above terms.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 41 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI-LB
  

  Appellate Tribunal

  
  
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  ... ... ..... the Members of the Bench doubt the correctness of the earlier decision. But his power can be construed to be wide enough to enable the President to make a reference to resolve difference of opinion by constituting a Larger Bench. From this authoritative pronouncement, there is no doubt that the Hon ble President of the Tribunal has the power to constitute a Larger Bench. This power of the President is absolute. Its (Larger Bench) composition cannot be challenged by either party on the ground of propriety before the Larger Bench so constituted. In our considered opinion if any party is of the view that the propriety demands that the composition of the Larger Bench should be otherwise and not as constituted by the Hon ble President, he may approach the Hon ble President if law or procedure permits but certainly he cannot challenge the composition of the Larger Bench before the Bench itself on the ground of propriety. In view of the above, we overrule the preliminary objection.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 40 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI-LB
  

  Refund

  
  
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  ... ... ..... as to be taken to be covered by the scope of Rule 173L. As the Tribunal noted in the J.G. Glass Ltd. s case (supra), there is no other way of remaking in respect of such goods. It also can be concluded from the ratio of the case law cited supra that sheet glass received and that cleared would be of the same class to goods for the purposes of Rule 173L. It is, therefore, concluded that the meaning of the word remade used in the Rule 173L is of wider import and would cover a process of transformation and implies remaking in the sense of making once again or manufacturing once more, that is, remanufacture. It is also noted that it is the understanding of the Departmental authorities also based on the Law Ministry s advice that the process of remaking under Rule 173L would amount to remanufacture. The difference of opinion is disposed of accordingly. FINAL ORDER In view of the majority opinion, all the four appeals are allowed with consequential relief, if any, to the appellants.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
  

  Writ jurisdiction - Show cause notice to petitioner

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ursuant to the said show cause notice an adjudication order has already been passed which is appealable before the CEGAT and in fact as stated hereinabove the petitioner has already filed an appeal before the CEGAT. Thus, the action of the respondents in issuing the impugned show cause notice was neither without jurisdiction nor unwarranted in law. 6.Besides, the question whether there was any fraud, collusion, wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts, is a question of fact which could be adjudicated only by the authority created under the statute for this purpose. To adjudicate upon findings of facts, the writ jurisdiction of High Court cannot be invoked. In this connection reliance can be placed on M/s. Jaishree Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1989 (40) E.L.T. 214 (SC) 1989 (2) SCC 439. 7.For the reasons stated hereinabove, we are of the view that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
  

  Reference to High Court

  
  
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  ... ... ..... Tax also deserves mention. Delivering the judgment of the Bench, Beaumont, C.). stated the law thus I think clearly open to this Court on an application under sub-section (3) of Section 66, to direct the Commissioner to refer some question other than that which the parties have formulated. But generally I think the Court should be slow to go outside the question which the parties have themselves asked the Commissioner to state . But, in Narayan Atmaram Patker s case at least one question was formulated and what was sought to be argued was a different question. In this case, no question was formulated and the position is worse. 5. In the circumstances, we are of the view that this Original Petition, filed under Section 35G(3) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, in effect praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus compelling the Tribunal to refer certain questions of law for the decision of this Court, is ill-conceived and will not lie. 6. The Original Petition is dismissed.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
  

  Wharfage Rent Exemption Certificate

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ority was directed to allow clearance of the goods on the strength of exemption certificate upto 23rd October, 1991. No rent was to be charged after 23rd October, 1991 because non-clearance was attributable to the obstructive attitude of the Port. After this order was passed the goods were allowed to be cleared by the Port Authority. But the writ petitioner failed to clear the goods on one pretext or another. The failure of the writ petitioner to clear of the goods was entirely due to negligence of the writ petitioner. In fact, the matter was mentioned in the Court that even after Port Trust have allowed clearance of the goods on or after 4th February, 1992 the goods have not been cleared by the writ petitioner. 4. Under the circumstances, I direct that the writ petitioner will pay full port charges on and from 4th February, 1992 to the date of the clearance of the goods to the bonded warehouse. The earlier orders passed in this matter will stand modified only to this extent.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
  

  Short-landing - Customs

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat - AIR 1964 SC 1563. My attention was specially drawn to the observations of the Court in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said report in view of the ingredients of Section 116 of the Customs Act. It is not necessary, in my opinion, to discuss the principles laid down in the said decision in great detail in the instant case. 25. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the principles decided in the aforesaid decision in our view the Tribunal was not correct in holding that the sweeping emanating have no relation to the relevant consignment. On the basis of evidence on record we are of opinion that on proper interpretation of the relevant provision of the Customs Act the Tribunal should have held that the onus of proof was on the Customs authorities and that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt. 26. Both the questions are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the petitioner. 27. There will be no order as to cost.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 32 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
  

  Appellate Tribunal - Natural Justice - Writ Petition - Existence of alternative remedy

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ent on the face of the record under Section 35C(2) of the Act. I am not quite sure whether the matter would fall under Section 35C of the Act. Even assuming that a remedy was available to the petitioner under Sec.35C of the Act, I am not inclined to throw out this writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had an alternative remedy. The petition was admitted in 1984 and it was pending in this Court for over eight years. After such a long lapse of time if the petitioner is driven to another forum with some other petition to get redressal of his grievance, it would be a grave traversity of justice. 11. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal dated 1-6-1984 is quashed and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal shall give sufficient opportunity to the petitioner and rehear the appeal and dispose of the same in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.

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• 1992 (6) TMI 31 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
  

  Cloth - Refund - Interest - Bar of unjust enrichment

  
  
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  ... ... ..... on. It is for the Assistant Collector to examine the amount refundable and whether the Department is bound to refund the said amount in view of the amended provisions. We do not express any opinion on the merits of the contentions either of the Department or of the Company. 9. Accordingly, appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. We direct the Department to compute the amount of refund within the period of eight weeks from today. The Department is directed to complete the computation within period of eight weeks and pass speaking order. In case the Assistant Collector finds that amount is refundable, the said shall be refunded within four weeks from the date of the order. On July 26,1988 the Division Bench directed the Government to deposit sum of Rs. 75 lacs in this Court on Notice of Motion No. 1817 of 1988 taken out by the Department. In case such amount was deposited, then the same should be allowed to be withdrawn by the appellants, along with interest accrued, if any.

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