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Showing 21 to 40 of 90 Records
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1972 (8) TMI 127 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ken as 25 per cent. of the turnover returned by the assessee. We are of the view that the Tribunal was not justified in adopting an entirely different basis without having any nexus to the suppressions found. In this case, it has not been shown that there has been any other consignment of camphor suppressed, either before or later. Therefore, we feel that the actual turnover found suppressed can be taken to be the total extent of suppression. On the facts and circumstances of this case, in modification of the amount of suppression as ascertained by the Tribunal, we take the suppressions of the assessee as Rs. 29,500, which is the value of the camphor actually seized from the three premises by the Central excise authorities. Therefore, we partly allow the tax case and restrict the addition to Rs. 29,500 towards suppression and delete the rest of the addition towards suppressed transactions. In other respects, the Tribunal s order will stand. No costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 126 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e of Mak and Co. v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow 1970 26 S.T.C. 455. The facts of the case of Mak and Co. 1970 26 S.T.C. 455. are closely similar to the facts in the present case and counsel for the respondents has not been able to point out any fact which would distinguish the decision given in Mak and Co. 1970 26 S.T.C. 455. from the facts as have been found in the present case. Following the principles laid down in that case, it must be held that the petitioner is not a dealer in respect of the goods sold by it at the auction. The petitioner as such cannot be assessed to tax in respect of the turnover represented by the auction money collected at the auction. The petition is accordingly allowed. The assessment orders passed by respondent No. 2 in respect of the years 1969-70 and 1970-71 (annexure 5 to the petition) and the demand notices dated 30th November, 1971 (annexure 6 to the petition) are quashed. The petitioner is entitled to its costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 125 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assessee will come under item 7(a) of Schedule II. If it comes, then the assessee cannot escape the levy of tax under that item. The question whether item 52 of Schedule I will apply or not arises only when the assessee is charged on his first sales of reptile skins. It may be that at that stage he may succeed in establishing that the first sales of reptile skins cannot be taxed at all as reptile skins have been subjected to tax at the purchase point or that the sales have been effected in the course of export. We, therefore, feel that the Tribunal is right in not going into the question whether the sales of reptile skins by the assessee will come under item 52 of Schedule I but mainly confining itself to the question whether the purchase of reptile skins by the assessee will fall under item 7(a) of Schedule II. In our view the Tribunal has come to the right conclusion in this case. The tax case is, therefore, dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 124 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... counsel that the amending Act is clarificatory or declaratory in nature. The statement of objects and reasons given in the relevant Bill shows that the Government decided that the fertiliser mixtures should be subjected to single point tax at the rate of 3 frac12 per cent. at the point of first sale in the State on the turnover relating to components thereof which have not already suffered tax under the said Act. This shows that the Government took a decision for the first time that the fertiliser mixtures should be subjected to single point tax on the first sale only on the turnover relating to components if it had not already suffered tax under the said Act. Therefore, it cannot be said that even before the amending Act, the Legislature had intended to give such benefit as the one contemplated by the amending provision, even earlier. The result is, we agree with the view taken by the Tribunal. The tax case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 123 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... such industry which still mostly continues to be in crude form although big efforts are being made to modernise this cottage industry. The intention of the Government in granting exemption from sales tax is clear and it is to provide protection to this essentially small-scale cottage industry. We are fortified in our view by a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner, Sales Tax v. Ballabh Das 1970 25 S.T.C. 372. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the learned judge was in conclusion right in holding that since hand-spun silk yarn is exempted from tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, notices issued for the purpose of revising the assessments already made by bringing transactions in hand-spun silk yarn for assessment are misconceived. The writ of prohibition, in our view, in these circumstances was rightly issued in all these cases. As a result, the appeals are dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 in each appeal. Appeals dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 122 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... goods to the buyer in whose name the import licence stood. The other factors such as the goods being manufactured to the specification of the buyer and the provision for inspection by the buyer s representative were all referred to for the purpose of showing that the goods were specifically intended for a particular buyer and that the importer had no power to sell the goods to other persons. We are of the view that the facts of the present case squarely fall within the scope of the decision of the Supreme Court in Khosla and Co. (P.) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Madras 1966 17 S.T.C. 473 (S.C.). as also the decision of this court in Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras 1967 20 S.T.C. 150., which follows the decision of the Supreme Court. In our view, the decision of the Board of Revenue cannot be upheld. The tax case is allowed with costs and the order of the Board of Revenue is set aside. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 121 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d the other relating to the erection of the same in the customers premises. The property in the trusses passed to the customer only when it has been erected in the customer s premises and there is no question of passing of property in the trusses at any anterior point of time, so that it could be said that there was an anterior sale of the trusses before the work of erection was completed. Though the Tribunal took the disputed turnover in relation to these transactions as Rs. 1,66,693.93, the learned counsel for the assessee concedes that two items covering a turnover of Rs. 2,850 can be treated as a sale of goods, and that he may not be able to attack the findings of the Tribunal in that regard. In view of that concession, we have taken the disputed turnover as Rs. 1,63,843.93. Following the decisions referred to above, this tax case has to be allowed and it is allowed in part. The assessee will get the costs from the revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition partly allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 120 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ions made above. We would, however, like to make it clear that the directions of the Deputy Commissioner that the del credere agents were not dealers, that their registration was void ab initio and, therefore, the declarations furnished by them were of no consequence, are entirely erroneous and, therefore, are hereby quashed. 32.. The petitions are, therefore, hereby allowed and the assessment orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax in pursuance of the remand order of the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax dated 29th April, 1966, are hereby quashed. So far as this petition is concerned, the assessment order of the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax is dated 19th September, 1966, which is hereby quashed. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax shall make a fresh assessment in the light of the observations made above. We make no order as to costs, in the circumstances of the case. The outstanding security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 119 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n America, indeed, they tend to acquire all but statutory effect because of the great deference which the courts normally pay to them, where the governing legislation is not wholly clear. As stated by the Supreme Court, it is the settled rule that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous or doubtful statute that has been acted upon by official charged with its administration will not be disturbed except for weighty reasons . The above passage makes it clear that the interpretation placed on a statutory provision by the Government cannot altogether be ignored, and this is the view taken by the Bench of this Court in Simpson and Company Ltd. v. State of Madras 1969 23 S.T.C. 374. We, therefore, hold, agreeing with the view taken in the said case, that the bodies built on chassis supplied by the customers will not be attracted by item 3 of Schedule I before its amendment in 1965. The tax case is, therefore, allowed. But, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 118 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es tax and for that levy adopted the machinery of different States Acts and this amounted to abdication of its legislative function by Parliament and, therefore, the said provision was invalid and inoperative and it could not be resuscitated by a subsequent amendment. The argument advanced in support of the contention was similar to that advanced for attacking section 8(2)(b) of the said Act. It is not necessary for us to consider the validity of section 9 before it was amended because, as pointed out by my Lord the Chief Justice in paragraph 12, the argument would have carried some force if the entire Act could be assailed as invalid and inoperative. The invalidity of a single provision can be easily rectified by subsequent amendment without affecting the Act as a whole. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the section as it stood prior to the amendment was invalid, the defect has been cured by subsequent amendment without affecting the Act as a whole. Petitions dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 117 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d continue to occupy the field. According to that decision, sales tax could not have been collected on the turnover of exercise books, account books, etc. Since that seems to have been done under the assessment orders in question, we have no hesitation in quashing that portion of the assessment orders which impose tax on such turnovers and to that extent direct refund of the tax so collected from the petitioner by the department. The same facts are almost repeated in all other writ petitions. The abovesaid decision would govern those cases also. For the reasons stated above, we would allow the writ petitions and quash the portions of the assessment orders in all these writ petitions which relate to the exemption of tax on the turnover of exercise books, account books, etc., and direct the department to refund the tax they have collected on the basis of such assessment orders. We leave the parties to bear their own costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 116 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w that there had been reassessments, the matters have to be remitted to the trial court for finding out whether the reassessment covers the entire period and the transactions in dispute and to dispose of the cases in the light of the consideration of the above material. Therefore, C.R.P. Nos. 1749, 1823, 1824, 1825 and 1826 of 1970 are remanded to the trial court for fresh disposal. The documents filed in the above civil revision petitions will be sent to the trial court and the trial court is directed to receive the same and consider the matters afresh in the light of the oral evidence that may be adduced by the parties in relation thereto. The other civil revision petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in any of these petitions. This decision will not prejudice the right of the defendants to get back the amounts decreed as and when they are reassessed and forced to pay the sales tax on the transactions involved in any of the suits. Ordered accordingly.
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1972 (8) TMI 115 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at follows is that this commodity being timber and falling under item 63 cannot come within the purview of section 5(1) of the Act. The Government has no power to treat those goods as general goods and direct them to be taxed under section 5(1) of the Act. It was a common ground that since timber is taxed at first point of sale, when the Forest Department sells the standing timber trees, it is the first sale, and the sale by the timber merchants in the form of planks, rafters and cut sizes, etc., cannot be taxed a second time, as item 63 permits levy of tax at the point of first sale. The timber having suffered tax once cannot be taxed again. We would therefore declare the position of law as stated above and direct the respective tribunals to deal with each individual case in the light of what is laid down above. For the reasons given, we allow the writ petitions accordingly. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 50 in each case. Petitions allowed.
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1972 (8) TMI 114 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... gate amount for which goods are bought or sold, or supplied or distributed, by a dealer, either directly or through another, on his own account or on account of others whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration, provided that the proceeds of the sale by a person of agricultural or horticultural produce, other than tea grown within the State by himself or on any land in which he has an interest whether as owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant or otherwise, shall be excluded from his turnover. This definition makes the position clear that all the transactions effected by the agent, either on his own account or on account of others, should be aggregated for finding out the turnover of the agent as a dealer. We are, therefore, of the view that the definition of turnover in section 2(r) squarely answers the contention put forward on behalf of the assessees. The result is the tax case is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 113 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ing those quarters, the assessee did effect sales. There does not seem to be any material on record to hold that the assessee has effected sales. Our answer to the first question, therefore, shall be that on the basis of the materials on record we hold that no material is available to hold that the assessee has effected any sale of timber at all. 4.. In view of the aforesaid finding, that there is no material to hold that the assessee effected any sale, the question as to whether such sale was outside the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer, Dhenkanal Circle, does not fall to be determined. Such a question would require answer provided there would be sales. We, therefore, decline to answer the second question as it is academic and does not arise for determination in view of the finding that the revenue has failed to establish that any sales were effected by the dealer. 5.. We direct both parties to bear their own costs. B.K. RAY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (8) TMI 112 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... S.C.). 6.. Learned counsel for the dealer, however, contended that out of the order of the Board of Revenue another question also arose, namely, that on account of the cotton yarn being a declared goods under the Central Sales Tax Act, this tax could not be charged. That question has not been decided by the Board of Revenue, as already stated, and that question has not been referred to this court. This court cannot, therefore, go into that matter. However, when the answer to the question referred is returned to the Board of Revenue, the dealer may ask the Board to decide the question which it had found unnecessary to decide on the previous occasion, if that is open to the dealer according to law. 7. Our answer to the question referred to this court is that on the facts and circumstances of the case, dyeing of white yarn is manufacture within the meaning of section 2(j) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. Parties will bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1972 (8) TMI 111 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ling upon a dealer to give security for prompt payment of tax unless there is legal sanction to visit the dealer with penal consequences if he fails to furnish security. Otherwise, the provision for the furnishing of security will be rendered ineffective. 9.. The fact that the particular penalty prescribed by the legislation prevents a dealer from carrying on his trade or profession will not make it a non-regulatory measure. 10.. There is also no substance in the plea that the provision is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. An order under section 14(4) can be passed only for good and sufficient reasons which have been highlighted in rule 6 of the Rules. The order in question can also be revised at the instance of the dealer by the Deputy Commissioner under section 36 or by the Board of Revenue under section 38 of the Act. 11.. We are, therefore, of the view that the appeal is without substance and we dismiss the same. We make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1972 (8) TMI 110 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the bull- dozers, dumpers and tipping wagons were chargeable with sales tax at the full rate or at the preferential rate under section 8(3)(b) of the Act?
Whether in the circumstances of the case penalty under section 10A of the Act can be imposed upon the dealer for non-payment of the tax at the full rate on the above goods?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Unless it is shown that he had made such a false representation, section 10A is not attracted. Two Judges of the High Court and one Member of the Board of Revenue have come to the conclusion that the respondent was entitled to the preferential rate which he claimed. That is the view of the law taken by them. Assuming, without deciding, that the view taken by them is incorrect, even then it is impossible to say under the circumstances of the case that the respondent was guilty of making any false representation. The view of the law, which he is contending for is supported by the view taken by two Judges of the High Court and one Member of the Board of Revenue. Hence, we fail to see how such a view of the law can be taken as false representation.
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1972 (8) TMI 109 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Palmolive shampoo (large size) sold under Bill No. 505 dated July 15, 1964, is a toilet article within the meaning of entry 21A of Schedule E or is soap within the meaning of entry 28 of Schedule C or is covered by entry 22 of Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, and liable to tax accordingly?
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case Colgate tooth-paste and (2) Colgate tooth-brush sold under Bill No. 505 dated July 15, 1964, are toilet articles within the meaning of entry 21A of Schedule E or are covered by entry 22 of Schedule E to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, and liable to tax accordingly?
Held that:- Appeal allowed part. Set aside the judgment of the High Court in so far as it relates to tooth-paste and tooth-brush. Both of them, in our opinion, are toilet articles within the meaning of entry 21A of Schedule E to the Act. We, however, uphold the judgment of the High Court in so far as the High Court has held that shampoo is soap within the meaning of entry 28 of Schedule C to the Act.
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1972 (8) TMI 91 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Company – Membership of, Notice for meeting, Oppression and mismanagement ... ... ... ... ..... isation of the amount due to him and not with the management of the company s affairs. We are of the opinion that the argument of the learned counsel is clearly wrong. The legislature, while providing exception in clause (b) of section 398(1) of the Companies Act, clearly visualized that cases might occur in which financially hard-pressed companies might save themselves by arranging with their creditors to become shareholders and directors in lieu of remaining creditors for the whole or part of the amount due to them and that such a change occurring in the management will not afford a cause of action to any member under section 398 of the Companies Act. In the present case, admittedly, the change in the management was brought about by and in the interests of a creditor of the company and the decision of the learned single judge on this point, with respect, is correct, which is upheld. For the reasons given above, we find no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed with costs.
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