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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 447 Records
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1958 (12) TMI 51 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... (7) of section 123 have not been established. Even if one of them had been established and not the other the provisions of section 123(7) would not apply to such a person. In our opinion, the High Court erred in supposing that because a Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat under the Orissa Act exercised governmental duties he must be regarded as a person in the service of the Government. The High Court did not given any clear finding that a Sarpanch, even if a person in the service of the Government, was either a revenue officer or a village accountant. In our opinion, the provisions of section 123(7) do not apply to him. Therefore, it cannot be said that any corrupt practice under section 123 had been established in the case and the election of the appellant could not be set aside on the only ground on which his election had been set aside by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs and the election petition of respondent No. 1 is dismissed. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to point out that the rules seem to contemplate the granting of exemption from the operation of some of the relevant tests to co-operative societies; and that shows that the intention of the Legislature is to encourage small traders to form co-operative societies and carry on export trade on behalf of such societies; and so it would not be possible to accept the argument that the impugned rules would lead to a monopoly in the trade. It is thus clear that the main object which the rules propose to achieve is to remove the anomalies and malpractices prevailing in the export trade of coir commodities and to put the said trade on a firm and enduring basis in the interest of national economy. We are, therefore, satisfied that the challenge to the impugned rules on the ground of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution must also fail. 9. In the result we hold that there is no substance in the petition. It accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. 10. Petition dismissed.
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1958 (12) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ument was addressed before us against the adequacy of compensation provided in the Thekedari Act. In the circumstances, the Thekedari Act being within the powers of the legislature and complying with the provisions of Article 31(2) is a valid piece of legislation to which no exception can be taken. No other point was urged before us in this connection. There is no force, therefore, in these Petitions and appeals relating to thekedari and pattedari lands, and they must be dismissed. 11. We, therefore, dismiss all the Petitions and appeals relating to jagirs, zamindaris and muafis; but in the circumstances pass no order as to costs in them. 12. We further dismiss all the Petitions and appeals relating to thekedari and pattedari lands and order one set of costs to the State of Uttar Pradesh in them. 13. C.As. Nos. 530, 540, 569, 600, 601 and 617 of 1957 have abated and are hereby dismissed. 14. C.As. Nos. 547, 553, 555, 578, 595 and 598 of 1957 are dismissed for non-prosecution.
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1958 (12) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he view contended for by the Department will also produce this result. Of two persons whose earned incomes are equal, the person who has suffered a loss in other respects can get exemption only on a smaller amount than the one who has suffered no loss at all. No doubt where the language used in a taxing statute is clear questions of hardship and inequalities cannot be considered. But, where they are not clear such considerations may be properly taken into account. 9. A taxing statute must be construed strictly because no one is bound to pay more than the law clearly requires him to do. If the position is ambiguous the tax payer is entitled to the benefit of that ambiguity. On tin's ground also the decision in this case must be in favour of the assessee. 10. In our judgment the assessee is entitled to earned income relief in respect of ₹ 31,006, subject to statutory maximum of ₹ 4,000. The assessee will be entitled to his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250/-.
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1958 (12) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , neither the notice nor the documents enclosed with the notice disclose that the petitioner published the speech, including the expunged portion mala fide, or even with the knowledge that any portion of the speech was directed to be expunged. As I have pointed out, the Legislature has the privilege of preventing only mala fide publication of the proceedings of the Legislature and, as in this case the petitioner is not alleged to have done so, the Legislature has no power to take any action in respect of the said publication. 78. In the result, the petition is allowed. A Writ of Prohibition will issue restraining the respondents from proceeding against the petitioner for the alleged breach of privilege by publishing in the issue of the "Searchlight", dated May 31, 1957, an account of the debate of the House (Legislative Assembly, Bihar) of May 30, 1957. ORDER 79. In view of the judgment of the majority, the petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1958 (12) TMI 46 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... continued from the beginning without a break. 8. The learned Subordinate Judge has also held that in taking accounts of the partnership from 1926, it would be open to look into the earlier accounts for the purposes of ascertaining the capital contribution in view of the fact that the parnership between the respondent and Viswanatha was in continuation of the old partnership which Muthuraman had with the latter. Although there has been a dissolution of the partnership between Muthuraman and Viswanatha on 13-4-1926 by reason of the death of the former the entire assets of that firm were taken over by the business which was subsequently carried on by the respondent with Viswanatha. For ascertaining the exact assets which were brought or could be deemed to be so brought into that firm it would be necessary to look into the accounts of the previous partnership. The conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge is, there fore, correct. This appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1958 (12) TMI 45 - PRIVY COUNCIL
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... ... ..... the normal procedure. This explains the fact that section 72 contains a prima facie limitation of seven your whereas section 71 contains no limitation. On the respondent's argument this seems inexplicable. On the other argument it seems reasonable that there should after a certain time be no reopening of what has been settled unless there has been fraud or wilful default. The constriction also gains support from the words "ought to have been charged," when they occur for the second time in section 72. They there apply to "such amount" as well as "such additional amount." Before making the assessments, therefore, the "time allowed" under section 71 had to elapse. It is common ground that it did not and their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal be allowed and the assessments set aside. The respondent must pay the appellant's costs throughout. Solicitors A. L. Bryden & Williams ; Charles Russell & Co.
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1958 (12) TMI 44 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... if the driver presses the accelerator without switching on the engine. The essential prerequisite of initiating proceedings for recovery, viz., the issue of a notice of demand under section 29, not having been complied with, it is -impossible to hold that the Income-tax Officer has set in motion the machinery for collection. In the result this writ petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus will issue directing the respondents to forbear from proceeding to recover from the petitioner any portion of the tax due under the assessment order dated March 15, 1954, made on the firm of Unni & Company, on the strength of the certificate against the said firm issued by the first respondent to the second respondent. This order will not, however, exonerate the petitioner from his liability to pay the tax or prevent the first respondent from taking such other steps as may be permissible under the law for the recovery of the said tax from the petitioner. We make no order as to costs.
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1958 (12) TMI 43 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessee firm, so that he was not in a position to make the deposit by utilizing the income of the firm itself. In the case of Channalal, there were thus no circumstances from which an inference could have been drawn by the Tribunal that this sum of ₹ 13,700 belonged to the assessee firm and were the revenue of the assessee liable to income-tax. As a result our answer to the question referred by the Tribunal is that there was material to warrant the finding that the sum of ₹ 15,200 were profits of the assessee liable to tax, while there was no material to warrant the finding that the sum of ₹ 13,700 were profits of the assessee liable to tax. Let this answer be returned to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In view of the fact that our opinion in respect of one amount is in favour of one party and in respect of another amount in favour of the other party, we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this references. References answered accordingly.
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1958 (12) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed and encouraged by the leaders of the nation, shifting the same to some other State, perhaps to Calcutta," It is difficult to understand what was intended by this statement. In any event, our attention has not been invited to any evidence on the record of the case which supports the view that the medicines or substances which are used for the preparation of Vivigan Ointment and Menthostrine Pain Balm are exclusively used or prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani system of medicine. 13. In our view, there is no substance in the contention that the charge was in any manner vague. 14. We are of the view that the learned trial Magistrate was right in convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 18(c) read with Section 27 of the Drugs Act. The sentence imposed upon the appellant cannot be regarded as excessive. We, therefore, confirm the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and dismiss the appeal. 15. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (12) TMI 41 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sheik Abdul Kadir. As observed in that case, what is required under section 28 is that the discovery by the Officer or the satisfaction of the Officer should be before the proceedings are closed. That alone could be said to be the limitation imposed under section 28(1) of the Act. Further it would not be correct to say that the notice issued in the first instance by the Income Tax Officer and the subsequent notice which is sought to be questioned now are identical. The first notice was with regard to the imposition of penalty and the notice that was issued on January 12, 1956, was a notice giving an opportunity to the assessee to appear and show cause why penalty should not be imposed on him as required by sub-section (3) of section 28 of the Act. For these reasons, I am of the opinion, that there are no merits in this writ petition. The writ petition is therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100.
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1958 (12) TMI 40 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nxiety of the Collector to safeguard the interests of the Panchayat is certainly praiseworthy. But the action taken by him was misconceived, as it was not warranted by the provisions of the Ordinance. The petitioner's term as Sarpanch expired on 31-12-1957. It was, therefore, urged that the present petition has become infructuous. I do not agree. By the order of the Collector, a serious aspersion was cast on the petitioner's private and public character. If that aspersion were to remain, he would be presumed to be guilty with a tarred refutation. Under these circumstances, it is not de-sirable that the said order of the Collector should be allowed to remain on record, which would be in derogation of the petitioner's reputation for all time to come. I, therefore, agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that the order of the Collector deserves to be quashed. In addition to the illegality of the said order, I would, however, add that it was misconceived and unjustified
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1958 (12) TMI 39 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... According to his statement in the affidavit he has not claimed any exemption on this amount of ₹ 10,000 under the Agricultural Income-tax Act. As I find that there is no authority on the part of the Department to apportion the said contribution between the agricultural income and the non-agricultural income, I am of opinion that the petitioner-assessee can claim a rebate on the entire sum of ₹ 10,000 under section 15B of the Indian Income-tax Act. I would, therefore, answer the question referred to this court that in the circumstances of this case the assessee was entitled to a rebate on the entire sum of ₹ 10,000 paid to the institution approved under section 15B of the Indian Income-tax Act and not on ₹ 1754 deemed to be the proportionate amount paid out of the non-agricultural income. The reference is answered accordingly. But in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. BARMAN, J.--I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (12) TMI 38 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... which he asked for in his application and in respect of which the rule nisi was issued. I think it will be proper, however, to give him relief by the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the notice that was issued under section 22(4) dated the 3rd June, 1957, and also commanding them to forbear from proceeding in the matter of assessment of the appellant on the assumption that there has been valid service of the notice under section 34. Whether or not a fresh service of the notice that was already issued under section 34 will give the Income-tax Officer jurisdiction to proceed with the assessment is a question on which we express no opinion. I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order made by the learned Judge and order that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued with the directions as indicated above. The appellant will get the costs of the appeal. R.S. BACHAWAT, J.--I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1958 (12) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stances relied upon by the appellant may be acts of acquiescence attributed to the respondent but they would be important only if they were brought to bear upon the question which depended upon preponderance of evidence. If the facts are once ascertained, presumption arising from conduct cannot establish a right which the facts themselves disprove See Tayamal's case, (1865) 10 M.I.A. 429 at p. 433. Presumptions cannot sustain an adoption even though it might have been acquiesced in by all concerned when as in the present case, the evidence shows that the adoption did not take place. Another fact on which the appellant relied was that on October 30, 1933, Badrinarayan, his wife and his sons partitioned their family property. That is not an act of the respondent and cannot affect her rights if they are otherwise enforceable. On the whole we are of the opinion that the judgment of the High Court is sound and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1958 (12) TMI 36 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ut of the claim for deduction of ₹ 12,000 on account of the 'salary paid to him also cannot be justified. 21. In the result, the answer to question No. (i) is that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the proviso to section 13 of the Income-tax Act was attracted to this case ; and the answer to question No. (ii) is that the disallowance of ₹ 18,000, out of the amount of ₹ 36,000 paid as salary to the general manager and the disallowance of ₹ 3,000 out of the amount of ₹ 12,000 paid as salary to the cashier (manager of the Alleppey office) cannot be justified on the ground of reasonableness under section 10(2), clause (x); and the disallowance of ₹ 5,000 paid to the general manager as allowances is justifiable under section 10(2), clause (x). The two questions are answered accordingly ; and the Department is ordered to pay the costs of the assessee including an advocate's fee of ₹ 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (12) TMI 35 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the respondent having failed to pay the amount due by him in respect of translation and printing charges he would not, as provided by Chapter XIII, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court, be heard in the appeal, it would proceed ex parte against him. The previous order of this court has been carried into effect by us and we have not heard the learned counsel for the respondent, even though Mr. P. N. Katju, learned counsel far the respondent made a request to be heard. His request could not be granted in view of the earlier order of this Court and also because even upto this date there has been no payment of the deficiency of the sum of ₹ 192/9/- due in respect of printing and translation charges. 27. The result is that we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and send the case back to the court below for disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations herein before made; the costs herein and hitherto will abide the result.
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1958 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... le to him and without indulging in feats of the imagination." Another objection taken was in regard to compensation for the lift. The High Court awarded ₹ 77 but on what basis it is not clear. In our opinion this claim of ₹ 125 per mensem was not excessive considering that two departments of the Government were using this lift, which is clear from the fact that an overhead bridge had been constructed for going from premises No. 9 Chittaranjan Avenue to the other building which the Government had also requisitioned. This will work out to ₹ 3,175. In the circumstances ₹ 3,200 per mensem would be a fair compensation and we would therefore enhance the compensation to that figure and the appeal would be allowed to that extent. Although the appellant has not succeeded in getting the whole-of his claim decreed, there is no reason for depriving him of his costs proportionate to his success. We accordingly allow proportionate costs. Appeal partly allowed.
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1958 (12) TMI 33 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... transaction. Apart from the sixth annual report, there is no other evidence on record and, in fact, no other circumstance has been relied upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. Further, it will not follow as a matter of law from the report that the company was carrying on business in shares. Therefore, our answer to question No. (2) is that the transaction relating to sale of shares in this case is capital appreciation and not a revenue receipt. Our answer to question No. (1), as already mentioned, is in the affirmative but subject to the directions mentioned in the earlier portion of the judgment when dealing with that question. Our answer to question No. (2) is that the transaction relating to the sale of shares in this case is not one involving revenue profit, but is only capital appreciation not liable to tax. As the assessee has succeeded substantially, he will be entitled to costs of this reference fixed at ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1958 (12) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ere. The end and purpose of the legislation furnishes the key to connect it with the State List. Our attention was not drawn to any enactment under Entry No. 31 of the Union List by which the ownership and possession of amplifiers was burdened with any such regulation or control, and there being thus no question of repugnancy or of an occupied field, we have no hesitation in holding that the Act is fully covered by the first cited Entry and conceivably the other in the State List. The Judicial Commissioner's order, with respect, cannot be upheld, and it must be set aside. We allow the appeal and reverse the decision, and we declare the Act in all its parts to be intra vires the State Legislature. As the matter is four years old we do not order a retrial and we record that the State does not, as a result of the reversal of the decision under appeal, propose to prosecute the respondents, and that a statement to this effect was made before us at the hearing. Appeal allowed.
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