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Showing 101 to 120 of 844 Records
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1967 (11) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT
Appellant-society, a bank - exemption - interest received from the Govt. securities - business was to deal in money and credit and was not restricted to receiving deposits and lending money to its members or other societies, therefore the High Court was in error in treating interest derived from deposits as not arising from the business of the bank and therefore not falling within the income exempted under the notification - Revenue's appeal dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Reopening of the assessment - notices under s. 34(1)(a) - limitation - notices issued after March 31, 1956, were not barred by time and there was material before the ITO which justified his belief that the income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment - Assessee's appeal dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Assessee-firm was not a partner in B House and had been receiving interest in the capacity of a banker, the ITO decided to take action under s. 34(1)(b)- Reopening of the assessment - jurisdiction to issue notice under s. 34(1)(b) of the IT Act - Assessee's petition is dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Tribunal omitted to consider the facts stated for the first time in petition for reference u/s 66(2)- Tribunal was right in law by basing their decision on a part of the evidence ignoring the statement made in petition for reference - High Court was incompetent to direct the Tribunal to state the case on the question which was directed to be referred and dealt with by the High Court - revenue's appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside
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1967 (11) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Sale of entire block of shares - Profit was not a capital accretion but business income - entire excess received by assessee over cost price was profits from business - Assessee's appeal is dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Resale of parts of land and buildings purchased from government, within short time - Interest on loans taken to pay purchase money was far in excess of income from property - transaction was an adventure in the nature of trade - Assessee's appeal is dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT
Capital gains derived by the sale of the asset by the wife to whom the assets were transferred - income derived directly or indirectly from asset transferred includible in the income of husband - - Assessee's appeal is dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT
Payments made under the lease deed were expenditure of revenue nature - expenditure incurred by the assessee was not related to the acquisition of an asset or a right of a permanent character - Assessee's appeal is allowed
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1967 (11) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT
Company - buying and selling shares - buying and selling of shares amounted as business - Assessee's appeal is dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT
Exclusion of Govt. servants from the exemption given under s. 4(3)(xxi) of the IT Act, 1922, and later on under s. 10(26) of the IT Act, 1961 - exclusion of Govt. servant from exemption is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India - Revenue's appeal is dismissed
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1967 (11) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT
Dissolution of firm - the cinema was returned to original owners - `sale` and `sold` are not defined in the IT Act: those expressions are used in s. 10(2)(vii) in their ordinary meaning - amount received should not be included in total income under the second proviso to s. 10(2)(vii) - Revenue's appeal is dismissed
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1967 (10) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... t case are almost identical with those in V.D. Dhanwatey v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1968 68 ITR 365 (SC), judgment in which has been pronounced today. For the reasons elaborately set out in that case we hold that the decision of the question of law in the present case is governed by the decisions of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kalu Babu Lai Chand 1959 37 ITR 123, and in Mathura Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1966 ITR 428 (SC). We are accordingly of the opinion that the question referred to the High Court was rightly answered against the assessee and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Hegde, J.-I agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brothers. For the reasons stated in my judgment in Civil Appeals 1372 and 1373 of 1966, V.D. Dhanwatey's case (supra). I am unable to subscribe to the observation in the majority judgment that the material facts of the present case are almost indentical with those in V.D. Dhanwatey's case (supra).
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1967 (10) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... rom the date of grant of the certificate, and it is expressly provided that the right, title and interest of the landowner in the said land shall determine. In the context the word "owner" is very comprehensive indeed, and it implies that all rights, title and interest of the landowner pass to the tenant. Further, it seems to us that it would lead to utter confusion if the contention of the learned counsel is accepted. There would be interminable disputes as to the rights of the erstwhile landowners to go on the lands of erstwhile tenants and cut trees or take the fruit. Moreover, under s. 15 of the Act we would, following the same reasoning, have to hold that the trees on the land of the landowner did not vest in the State. This could hardly have been the intention. 12. For the aforesaid reasons we must uphold the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, although for different reasons. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 13. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (10) TMI 71 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... d expenses of the Official Assignee. The purchasers to continue in possession of the shop in question and the Official Assignee to refund the sum of ₹ 7,000 deposited as security to the purchasers. The other properties of the debtors to be returned by the Official Assignee to the debtors on his costs, charges and expenses being satisfied. If the petitioning-creditor does not pay the costs, charges and expenses, the Official Assignee to recover the same from the amount which is in his hands and if he so recovers it from the amount which is in his hands, the debtors to be at liberty to recover the same from the petitioning-creditor. The sum of ₹ 39,000 deposited with the Official Assignee by Khona and Suryakant, Attorneys for the 1st mortgagees being surplus of the sale-proceeds be returned to Mr. Dhanuka's clients (debtors); however, before withdrawing the said amount the debtors should give notice to Aibara & Co., Attorneys for the alleged 2nd mortgagees.
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1967 (10) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... counsel for the appellant. A Hindu son governed by the Mitakshara law is liable to pay the debts of his father even if they are not incurred for purposes of legal necessity or for benefit to the estate, provided the debts are not avyavaharika or illegal. But there is no evidence that the appellant is sought to be rendered liable for a debt which is avyavaharika or illegal. In raising his contention counsel assumes that Lachhmi Narain had misappropriated the jewellery entrusted to him, but for that there is no support. Granting that the appellant was, after the death of Lachhmi Narain, unable to trace the jewellery entrusted by the plaintiff, it cannot be inferred that the jewellery was misappropriated by Lachhmi Narain. The burden of proving that there was a debt and that the debt was avyavaharika or illegal lay upon the appellant. There is no evidence to prove that the debt was avyavaharika or illegal. 17. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 18. Appeal dismissed.
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1967 (10) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the exercise of his general powers of management the General Manager had clearly the power to issue a notice inviting applications from intending candidates, It is not alleged that he made any appointment pursuant to the notice. The respondent also contended that he had the right to be promoted to a class II junior post. But there is nothing on the record to show that he has any vested right of promotion to the post. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 3032 of 1967 filed by the respondent asking for liberty to adduce additional evidence and to raise new contentions is dismissed. In the order dated August 17, 1967 granting special leave to the appellant, the Court directed that the appellant must pay the costs of the respondent in any event. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. The appellant shall pay the costs of the appeal to the respondent pursuant to the order dated August 17, 1967. Appeal allowed.
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1967 (10) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... refore of the view that the High Court was in error when it held that sec. 6 notification was not in accord with that section and that proceedings taken thereafter were vitiated. We may mention that Counsel for the 1st respondent Society cited certain authorities and also attempted to canvass the issue as to mala fides on the part of the Government. As to the authorities cited by him we think that they were neither relevant nor of any assistance to him. As regards the question of mala fides, we do not think there is any justification for reopening the concurrent finding of the Trial Court and the AdditiOnal District Judge. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the High Court’s judgment and decree are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Addl. District Judge dismissing the suit of the 1st respondent Society are restored. The 1st respondent Society will pay to the appellant the costs in this Court as also in the High Court.
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1967 (10) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... and members go but the club goes on for ever. That is true in a sense. We are not concerned with members who go out. The club belongs to members for the time being on its list of members and that is what matters. Those members can deal with the club as they like. Therefore, the club is identified with its members at a given point of time. Thus it cannot be said that the club has an existence apart from the members. It is said that the case of the club is indistinguishable from the Hospital 1960 2 S.C.R. 866 case. That case is one which may be said to be on the verge. There are reasons to think that it took the extreme view of an industry. We need not pause to consider the Hospital(1) case because the case of a members' club is beyond even the confines established by that case. In our judgment the Madras Gymkhana Club being a members' club is not an industry and the Tribunal was right in so declaring. The appeal fails and is dismissed but we make no order about costs.
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1967 (10) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... tors and as regards interest on damages awarded by them. We need not however say anything about these two questions as ultimately they were not pressed by him. The last contention raised by him was that the arbitrators awarded damages on the basis of the market rate at ₹ 51 per maund instead of ₹ 65 which was the export price fixed by the Government of Pakistan. The argument was that such a basis was contrary to the public policy laid down by the Government of Pakistan and it would not be expedient on our part to give our imprimatur to an infringement by the arbitrators of such a policy. There is, in our view. no merit in the argument. The Government of Pakistan cannot lay down any public or economic policy for this country. If the arbitrators found the prevalent rate A on January 2, 1959 in Calcutta to be ₹ 51 a maund there can be no objection to their adopting that rate for adjudicating the quantum of damages. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1967 (10) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... 6, 1950 lay claim to that property which was vested in the Aligarh University by the 1920-Act and say that the 1965-Act merely because it made some change in the constitution of the Court of the Aligarh University deprived the Muslim minority of the property, for the simple reason that the property was not vested in the Muslim minority at any time after the 1920-Act came into force. The argument that there has been breach of Art. 31(1) has therefore no force. We are therefore of opinion that there is no force in any of these petitions. It is not disputed that the 1951 and 1965- Acts are within the competence of Parliament unless they are hit, by any of the constitutional provisions to which we have referred above. As, they are not hit by any of these provisions, these Acts are good and are not liable to be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution. The petitions therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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