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Showing 101 to 120 of 996 Records
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1973 (11) TMI 79 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ners apply for grant of interim stay before the appellate authority, the said prayer may be considered, taking note of the fact that this court, during the pendency of many of these writ petitions, granted interim orders of stay in their favour, which continued to be in force till today. 12.. In Writ Petitions Nos. 2238 to 2241, 2440, 1182 and 2463 of 1972, the petitioners have challenged the proposition notices issued to them. It is submitted by the learned counsel on both the sides that no order of assessment in pursuance of the proposition notices have been passed in these cases. Hence, these writ petitions are dismissed, reserving liberty to the assessing authority to take further action in pursuance of the proposition notices issued to the petitioners in accordance with law and in the light of the enunciation of law made in this judgment. 13.. Having regard to the circumstances of these cases, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs. Ordered accordingly.
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1973 (11) TMI 78 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... were formed. It must therefore necessarily follow that since the tax was levied and collected on watery coconuts, the persons who paid that tax alone are entitled to refund. The mention of any specific dealer to whom the tax should be refunded, in our view, was not necessary because the express language used makes it unnecessary. We therefore find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the proviso entitled only those who were taxed on watery coconuts out of which the dry coconuts were formed. Since the petitioners are dealers in dry coconuts, even though they paid the tax on their transactions, they are not the persons who have been declared by the proviso to be entitled to ask for refund of the tax levied and collected in respect of such watery coconuts from the dealers concerned. It is not, therefore, possible to allow the writ petition and issue the necessary writ. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 77 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... a fact is in dispute the assessing officer is entitled to enquire into it and would be required to give an opportunity to the assessee to substantiate his stand. In our view, the stand of the learned standing counsel is absolutely fair. We would, accordingly, while sustaining the assessments and rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for their annulment, quash the order of the assessing officer refusing the application for refund (annexure 3) and call upon him to redispose of the application for refund on the basis of the law contained in the amending Act of 1969. He will certainly give reasonable opportunity to the assessee to establish its contentions on questions of fact before a decision on the refund application is finally taken. 8.. This writ application is allowed to the extent indicated above by quashing annexure 3 and requiring the assessing officer to redispose of the application for refund. We make no order as to costs. PANDA, J.-I agree. Petition partly allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 76 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... xemption from sales tax under article 286(1) (b) of the Constitution and the view taken by the Commissioner is right. The alternative contention advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee that the sales were not sales in the course of inter-State trade or commerce but intra-State sales does not merit serious consideration. Under the terms of the contract, the ore had to be loaded into railway wagons at Papinaikanahalli in Mysore State for transmission to the M.M.T.C. at Cuddalore in Tamil Nadu State and it further provided that the charges for weighment, sampling and analysis at Cuddalore shall be shared equally by the parties. The contract envisaged movement of the goods from Papinaikanahalli in Mysore State to Cuddalore in Tamil Nadu State. Therefore, the sale was an inter-State sale so as to attract tax under the Act. As both the contentions urged on behalf of the assessee fall, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 75 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ng which the proceedings remained stayed under the orders of the Judge (Revisions), Sales Tax, dated 16th December, 1960, therefore, cannot be taken into consideration in computing the period of limitation for making the assessment. Accordingly, the assessment made after 3rd February, 1962, was barred by time. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for us to go into the further question whether in computing the period of limitation for making the assessment, the entire period between 16th December, 1960, and 7th May, 1961, when the Sales Tax Officer came to know about the order dated 23rd January, 1961, or that the period between 23rd January, 1961, and 7th May, 1961, alone can be taken into consideration. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee who will be entitled to his costs, which we assess at Rs. 100. Pronounced under Chapter VII, rule 1, of the Rules of Court. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (11) TMI 74 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purchasing dealer by misapplication of the goods after he purchased them, or for any fraudulent misrepresentation by him, penalty may be visited upon the selling dealer. I think what was said in connection with section 8(1) and (3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, applies with equal force to the situation before me. In that view, a selling dealer cannot be penalised for non-use of the goods purchased from him, after furnishing him with declaration forms. He cannot be held responsible if the goods have not been actually used in the manufacture for sale of goods specified in the First Schedule. He will not be, on that account, liable to pay tax more than at the concessional rate. The result is that there is no justification to reopen the assessment by exhibit P1 notice. Exhibit P3 order is bad and is liable to be quashed. It is accordingly quashed. The original petition is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to suffer costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 73 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... bans Lal, the learned counsel for the department, drew our attention to a single Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Shaw Bros. and Co. v. State of West Bengal 1963 14 S.T.C. 878., wherein it has been held that chopping of timber into firewood is a manufacturing process and, therefore, firewood is a manufactured article. With great respect we are unable to agree with this view for the reasons recorded in the earlier part of the judgment. In the light of the discussion above we hold that the business of firewood carried on by the assessee-firm could not be called a manufacturing business nor could the assessee-firm be called a manufacturer and the liability of the assessee-firm to pay the tax arose at Rs. 50,000. Consequently, the answer to the question referred to us is returned in the negative, i.e., against the department. The assesseefirm shall have its costs in both the references separately which are assessed at Rs. 150 each. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 72 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pose of the case in conformity with the opinion of this court because of technical difficulties pointed out above. In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that the assessment orders cannot be interfered with in a petition under article 226 of the Constitution. Whether or not a petition should be entertained against an assessment order would depend on the facts of each case. The facts of the present case are such that there is no other way of giving relief to the petitioner to which he has been found entitled. We, accordingly, allow this petition and direct that a writ in the nature of certiorari shall issue quashing the assessment orders dated 31st May, 1969, relating to the assessment years 1966-67 and 1967-68, copies whereof are annexures A and B to the writ petition. It will, however, be open to the Sales Tax Officer to pass fresh assessment orders in accordance with the law and the observations made herein. The petitioner is entitled to the costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 71 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s found by the Assessing Authority that the goods subject to the levy of purchase tax have been disposed of in one of the three methods stated in section 5(2)(a)(vi) within 6 months from the date of purchase, the deduction of the purchase value of those goods has to be allowed out of the gross turnover in order to determine the taxable turnover. It follows that the view taken by the Assessing Authority, while passing the impugned assessment order, with regard to the deduction in respect of the sale of cotton in the course of export out of the territory of India within six months from the date of purchase is wrong in law. Accordingly, I accept all these writ petitions and quash the impugned assessment orders passed by the Assessing Authorities and direct them to pass fresh assessment orders in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs since the matter was not free from difficulty. Petitions allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 70 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... paid for the motor cycles, and hence is not liable to sales tax has only to be stated to be rejected. The expression turnover is defined under the Act as the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold or supplied or distributed by a dealer, either directly or through another, on his own account or on account of others, whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration. It is not disputed that in the aggregate amount recovered from the customer, the freight charges incurred by the petitioner in transporting the goods from the place of manufacture to Bangalore have been included and unless they are permitted to be deducted under any rule framed under the Act or by any other provision of law, the petitioner cannot claim that such freight charges do not form part of the assessable turnover. We, therefore, reject the above contention also. In the result, this petition fails and it is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 69 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... question. In view of the abovementioned facts, the question whether the pulleys were hardware does not arise in the present case. We, therefore, reframe the question as under Whether, under the circumstances of the case, the pulleys manufactured by the assessee were liable to be taxed as machine parts at the rate of 6 per cent under Notification No. ST-7098/X-1012-1965, dated 1st October, 1965? The Judge (Revisions) found that, admittedly, the pulleys manufactured by the assessee were ordinary pulleys which connect shafts for transmission of power, etc., with electrical motors or oil engines. They cannot be treated as machine parts. On this factual view, it cannot be held that these pulleys were machine parts and liable to be taxed at 6 per cent. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. Since nobody appears for the assessee there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 68 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ery . In the dictionaries the term cutlery has been stated to mean the various types of knives and cutting instruments used for domestic and manufacturing purposes and includes butchers and cooks knives as well as carving forks and steel used for sharpening knives. In Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume VI, page 927, it has been further said that table forks and spoons form another trade although many manufacturers produce the whole range. It is thus clear that the spoons are not recognised in the commercial world to be included in the trade of cutlery. They form another trade. In our opinion, the departmental authorities took a correct view of law that the spoon was not included in cutlery. Our answer to the question referred to us is that the spoon is not included in cutlery and is not covered by entry No. 5 of Notification No. ST-3391/X-1012/1962, dated 1st July, 1962. As no one has appeared for the assessee there will be no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1973 (11) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t all. So if a person bona fide and with due diligence prosecutes the first proceedings and on being unsuccessful therein, files an appeal on merits, it can be said that he had sufficient cause for not filing an appeal during the period in which he was prosecuting his application under section 30. So there was good cause for condonation of delay. Having heard the learned standing counsel we are not satisfied that the revising authority committed any error of law in taking the view that the assessee was bona fide and with due diligence prosecuting the first proceedings under section 30 and on being unsuccessful therein filed an appeal on merits, which is a finding of fact. On the basis of the said finding the delay could reasonably and validly be condoned. Our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1973 (11) TMI 66 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 958. For the words the tax so levied , the words and tax has been paid under this Act in respect of the sale of such goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, the tax levied under such law were substituted. For the words shall be refunded to such person , the words shall be reimbursed to the person making such sale in the course of interState trade or commerce were substituted. The effect of this amendment is that the refund can only be claimed by the person, who effected the inter-State sale and by no other person. Admittedly, the petitioners did not effect the inter-State sale of the goods. Thus, according to this amendment, the contention of the counsel for the petitioners is without any force and is rejected. The petitioners are liable to pay the sales tax and the impugned notices were validly issued to them. There is no substance in this writ petition and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. D.K. MAHAJAN, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that this assertion in the writ petition has not as such been denied in the counter-affidavit, leads us to believe the case of the petitioner that de-oiled rice bran is used, inter alia, as cattle feed. The word fodder has been defined in the Chambers s 20th Century Dictionary as food supplied to cattle feed . Thus, it seems to us, that there is no material difference between cattle fodder and cattle feed . Anything, which is used as cattle feed, could as well be called cattle fodder within the meaning of the aforesaid notification. In our opinion, the de-oiled rice bran was covered by the expression cattle fodder in the aforesaid notification and was, as such, exempt from sales tax. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed to modify the assessment order dated 26th March, 1973, excluding therefrom the turnover of the petitioner in respect of the de-oiled rice bran. The petitioner would be entitled to his costs. Petition allowed.
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1973 (11) TMI 64 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wording. In Punjab also the department seizes the goods and releases them only on payment of penalty. So this distinction is without any effect. The learned single judge made certain further observations that in the present case the goods were being transported from one of its offices in West Bengal to its sub-depot in Jullundur and were not being carried as a result of sale . In view of the fact, that the provisions of sub-section (8) of section 14-B of the Act had been struck down because of the decision of the Supreme Court, it was hardly necessary, as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, to make any further observations. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any force in this appeal and dismiss the same. However, any observations made with regard to the nature of the transaction under which the goods were being transported, would not be taken into consideration in any further proceedings that may arise. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (11) TMI 63 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ision of law has been brought to our notice which rules out this possibility. The last contention urged by Mr. Ved Vyas is that if there is any doubt as to the interpretation of section 8(2A) of the Central Act, its benefit should go to the assessee. In the first place, we have no doubt on the matter and we have already expressed our opinion. In the second place, the assessee would not be entitled to the benefit of the doubt. The rule is firmly settled that if the assessee claims exemption, the burden of proof that he is entitled to it is on him and, therefore, there is no question of his getting the benefit of the doubt. See in this connection M/s. Sharma Sales Centre v. State of Haryana1973 R.L.R. 276. For the reasons recorded above, we answer the questions referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the department and against the assessees. In the circumstances of the cases, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. References answered in the negative.
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1973 (11) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Cost and expenses payable out of assets in a winding-up by Court ... ... ... ... ..... nding and to formally adjourn them for hearing on every date. These applications are only effective if any one of the contingencies mentioned in rule 101 occur. There is, therefore, no necessity to have replies at this stage, and there is no necessity to keep these applications pending till such time as the original petition fails or is likely to fail in the manner mentioned in rule 101. These applications are accordingly disposed of, but this order will remain on the file and as soon as the list in Form No. 10 has been filed by the petitioner s counsel, as separately directed, the applicants will be before the court (all 81 of them), to ask the court to be substituted as petitioners, as and when the contingencies provided for in rule 101 occur. This will, in effect, allow the applicants to get the relief they seek now, as and when the time for the grant of the same arises. This application and the 80 other applications of a similar type are disposed of. No order as to costs.
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1973 (11) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Winding up – Application of insolvency rules, Winding up - Preferential payments ... ... ... ... ..... cannot be allowed to be levied by the Board. It is obvious that the delayed payment charges aggregating to Rs. 1,999 are for the period July 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968, that is, after the company was ordered to be wound up by this court. In view of rule 156 of the Companies (Court) Rules, interest on the outstanding amount of the claim cannot be allowed as a debt provable in winding-up and under these circumstances the only debt which can be admitted to claim is the amount of the minimum charges aggregating to Rs. 38,295 for the period July 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968. The amount of Rs. 1,999 for delayed payment charges must, therefore, be disallowed. Under these circumstances, we allow the appeal and make the judge s summons absolute as regards the amount of Rs. 38,295 only and we disallow the claim of Rs. 1,999 for delayed payment charges. The official liquidator will pay the costs all throughout, that is, of the Company Application No. 76 of 1972 as well as of this appeal.
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1973 (11) TMI 45 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Dyes - Synthetic organic dyestuffs ... ... ... ... ..... to be on the assessee. It is, however, clear from the provisions of the said sub-clause (iii) of Section 4A(a) that the fact to be established by an assessee is by way of an exception and is one which could only be within the knowledge of the assessee himself. In our view, therefore, it was incumbent on the respondents to establish in the present case that the four varieties were manufactured after the midnight of 28th Feb., 1961 and they have failed to do so. 23. emsp In the result, the petitioners succeed and we allow the petition and set aside the order dated 22nd August, 1955 so far as the lot of 31958 kgs. is concerned, the earlier two orders dated 21st April 1962 and 4th September, 1961 having merged therein and direct the respondents to refund to the petitioners the sum of Rs. 90,803.78 wrongly collected by them from the petitioners. 24. emsp The respondents to pay to the petitioners the costs of this petition and the Civil Appeal No. 1218 of 1967 to the Supreme Court.
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