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Showing 141 to 160 of 1466 Records
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1976 (11) TMI 206 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... der under any of these sections of the Code in respect of such offences could be passed. For these reasons, therefore, we think that the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the instant case, as also in its Division Bench decisions in Criminal Revision No. 285/74 (State v. Shantilal & Others) and Criminal Revision No. 286/74 (State v. Manoharlal & Ors) mentioned in the order under appeal, was wrong in law, and therefore these deci- sions are hereby overruled. I, therefore, concur with the judgment proposed by my brother Bhagwati, J., and accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dismissing the application of the petitioner in limine and direct the High Court to re-admit the petition and decide the same on merits in the light of the observations made by us. The parties are di- rected to appear before the High Court which shall hear the petition and dispose it of. Until the decision of the High Court on merits, the appellant will continue on bail.
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1976 (11) TMI 205 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ave been sufficient to disprove the allegations, had sufficient and convincing evidence been led to prove them. The High Court also failed to consider that the appellant had examined some of the persons who, according to the witnesses for the second respondent, accompanied the appellant whom the offending documents were distributed, and they have denied the allegation. In any case we have found that the evidence led in support of the allegation of corrupt practice is neither sufficient nor convincing. Not only the oral evidence led on behalf of the second respondent lacks assurrance from any "unlying circumstances" or "unispeachable documents", the evidence suffers from serious infirmities which make it quite unsafe to rely on. On such evidence it is impossible to hold that the allegation of corrupt practice has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the appeal must be allowed and the election petition dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 204 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... igatory. The application and the order of Deshpande, J. did not dispense with that procedure. (20) Counsel referred me to a decision of Prakash Narain, J. in Munshi Lal v. Delhi Administration, (C.W. No. 433-D of 1961 decided on December 10, 1970) (2). That was a case under s. 48 of the Act. There Mr. Dharam Vira, the then Chief Commissioner made an G order under s. 48 releasing the petitioner's land. His successor Mr. Vishwanathan decided not to release the land. The learned judge held that an order having once been made under s. 48 of the Act and communicated to the petitioner it was not open to the successive Chief Commissioner to revise or reverse that decision and to revive the acquisition proceedings. That case in my opinion has nothing to do with the point involved in the present writ petition the decision of which turns on the validity of the cancellation of the notification under s. 6 of the Act. (21) For these reasons I would allow the writ petition with costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 203 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
... ... ... ... ..... dence for such application more time is spent which could have been utilised to dispose of the suit itself. ( 5. ) In the result, the rule is made absolute, but the restoration will be on the following terms -- "The petitioner will pay to the respondent the costs of the Miscellaneous Application, of the Misc. Appeal and of this revision petition as well as the costs thrown away on 29th June, 1974, quantified in the aggregate at ₹ 350/-, before the date of effective hearing of the suit. Such payment of costs will be condition-precedent to the petitioner being allowed to further appear in the suit." The petitioner through his Advocate also undertakes that he will file the Vakalatnama of some Advocate in the Khed Court on or before 15th November, 1976. I further direct the Khed Court to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and in any case on or before 15th January, 1977. Records and proceedings and the writ be sent down forthwith. Rule made absolute.
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1976 (11) TMI 202 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... e mean time a number of other appointments were also made to Indian Administrative Service by promotion from the State Civil Service, some of the officers received promotions to higher posts in that service and may even have retired. Those who continued to serve could justifiably think that as there was no challenge to their appointments within the period prescribed for a suit, they could look forward to further promotion and higher terminal benefits on retirement. The High Court therefore erred in rejecting the argument that the writ petition should be dismissed because of the inordinate and unexplained delay even though it was "strenously" urged for its consideration on behalf of the Government of India. 7. In the view we have taken, we do not think it necessary to examine the controversy on the merits. The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment dated April 11, 1975 is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. There will however be no order as to the costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 201 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... lf of the revision petitioners (the heirs of the said Joseph and those who took under the settlement deed dated 15.6.1957) that levy under the Kerala Rice and Paddy (Procurement by Levy) Order, 1966, has been collected from each of the shares under the deed of 1957, that land tax has been imposed on each of the shares separately and agricultural income-tax collected on the income of the properties of each of the sharers". We do not think it is necessary to go into any other question. The High Court was of opinion that some facts had still to be ascertained when the case goes back to the Land Board for proceeding on the footing determined by the High Court. We think that we should make it clear that matters to. be still determined could not, in view of our finding, involve determination of any question of adverse possession of the claimants, the children of M.T. Joseph. For the reasons given above, we dismiss these appeals. We make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 200 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... . must necessarily fall. The conviction under s. 447 I.P.C. as also that under ss. 324/34 and 323/34 I.P.C. cannot be interfered with in view of the evidence of assault made by the appellants on the witnesses Ram Khelawan, Manohar, Sarabjit, Mewa Lal, Satrohan with their respective weapons. Having regard to the fact that the appellants made a concerted attack either with a Biroo or lathis respectively on the aforesaid prosecution witnesses they had undoubtedly a common intention to cause simple hurt to these witnesses. For these reasons, therefore, we would affirm the convictions and sentences passed on the appellant Ram Sajiwan but allow the appeal of the other appellants viz. Ram Rattan and Ram Samujh to this extent that their convictions and sentences under ss. 326/34 I.P.C. are set aside, but their convictions and sentences under ss. 324/34, 323/34 and 447 I.P.C. will stand. If the appellants have already served out their sentences they may be released. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 199 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ection will be determined by such deemed date of selection. No employee has any right to have a vacancy in the higher post filled as soon as the vacancy occurs. Government has the right to keep the vacancy unfilled as long as it chooses. In the present case, such a position does not arise because of the controversy between two groups of officers for these years. The seniority list which is the basis for the field of choice for promotion to the post of Assistant Commissioner was approved by this Court on 16 April, 1974. Promotions to the post of Assistant Commissioners are on the basis of the selection list prepared by the Committee and are to be made prospectively and not retrospectively. For the foregoing reasons the judgments and orders appealed against are set aside. The selection list made by the Departmental Promotion Committee forming the subject matter of these appeals is held to be correct, lawful and valid. Parties will pay and bear their own costs. Appeals allowed.
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1976 (11) TMI 198 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... it is difficult to ignore. As stated elsewhere in the judgment, we cannot also be oblivious of the fact that all workmen of the company have accepted the settlement. o p /o p Besides, the period of settlement has since expired and we are informed that the employer and the 3rd respondent are negotiating another settlement with further improvements. o p /o p These factors, apart from what has been stated above, and the need for industrial peace and harmony when a union backed by a large majority of workmen has accepted a settlement in the course of collective bargaining have impelled us not to interfere with this settlement. o p /o p That being the position, we unhold the settlement as fair and just and order that the award of the Tribunal shall be substituted by the settlement dated October 18, 1973. o p /o p The said settlement shall be the substituted award. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. o p /o p B.P.R. Appeal dismissed. o p /o p
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1976 (11) TMI 197 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... w of the fact that it contained allegations of mala fides against the respondents. We are unable to accept this contention. It has been held time and again by this Court that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investiga- tion into the allegations of mala fides if necessary partic- ulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the writ petition. Keeping in view the well estab- lished rule that the burden of establishing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and considering all the allegations made by the appellant in regard thereto, we do not think that they could be considered as sufficient to establish malus animus. The High Court was, therefore, not wrong in dismissing the petition in limine on seeing that a prima facie case requiring investigation had not been made out. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 196 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ng stay of dispossession is set aside. 11. Counsel for the appellants suggested that some time should be given to the appellants to bottle the liquor manufactured and lying at the Distillery for disposal. Rule 10 of the Punjab Distillery Rules 1932 is as follows If a license be revoked, cancelled or determined the licensee shall dispose, under the conditions of his license of his stock of spirit, apparatus, storage vessels and other distilling plant in such manner as the Financial Commissioner may direct. 12. The Financial Commissioner will give suitable directions in accordance with Rule 10 of the Punjab Distillery Rules, 1932 for disposal of the stock of spirit, apparatus, storage vessels and other distilling plant. 13. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is accepted and the order of the High Court granting stay of dispossession is set aside. We do not propose to pass any order on the application for initiating proceedings for contempt. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (11) TMI 195 - SUPREME COURT
... ... ... ... ..... hagmal Jain on behalf of the appellant, we see no cogent ground to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. There cannot, in our opinion, be any doubt on the point that the extent of purity of the gypsum won by the appellant is a question of fact. It has also been brought to our notice that after the dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court, the appellant has filed a suit, in which he has agitated the same question which is the subject matter of the writ petition. In our opinion, the appellant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time. Mr. Sobhagmal points out that the suit brought by the appellant has been dismissed in default and that an application for the restoration of the suit has been filed in the trial court. Learned counsel for the. respondents state that they would not oppose the application for restoration of the suit. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 194 - SUPREME COURT
defence against recovery of amount on dishonour of a cheque drawn by partner. - leave under Order 37, Rule 2, of the Code to defend.
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1976 (11) TMI 192 - CESTAT KOLKATA
... ... ... ... ..... The circumstances, therefore, are not such as lead to a clear-cut conclusion that the appellants were trying to evade duty. In the light of these circumstances the Board considers that the penalty of ₹ 1,00,000/- was excessive. Taking into account the sum of ₹ 18,276/- which has been appropriated against the amount which might have been imposed as fine in lieu of confiscation of the seized 85 pumps, the Board considers that a personal penalty of ₹ 10,000/- would meet the needs of the case. Accordingly, the personal penalty is reduced from ₹ 1,00,000/- to ₹ 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only). 21. The Board also, having regard to the extenuating circumstances, sets aside the fine of ₹ 5,000/- in lieu of confiscation of the appellants’ land, factory etc. The appeal is allowed to this extent only and is rejected otherwise and specifically in regard to the amount of ₹ 18,276/- appropriated in lieu of the value of the 85 pumps.
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1976 (11) TMI 191 - THE APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NEW DELHI
... ... ... ... ..... ove dirt and grease effectively.” Thus according to the advertisement of the appellants themselves all the three products are used for the care of the hair. They are therefore rightly assessable under Item No. 14-F(ii) of the Central Excise Tariff. 4. This leaves the question of time-bar to be considered. The demand has been made after a period of more than one year of the removal of the goods. The officers below approved the classification list holding the above three products to be non excisable. There is no evidence to show that the removal of the goods by the appellants was clandestine and without the knowledge of the Central Excise Officers. This being the position rule 10A would not apply and the enabling rule to recover the short levy was rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules. Under Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules his demand is time-barred. Therefore on this question of time bar I vacate the order of the Assistant Collector and allow consequential relief.
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1976 (11) TMI 190 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a quota prescription, willy nilly, does postulate exnecessitate a rota process in practice?
Held that:- The quota system does not necessitate the adoption of the rotational rule in practical application. Many ways of working out 'quota' prescription can be devised of which rota is certainly one. While laying down a quota when filling up vacancies in a cadre from more than one source, it is open to Government, subject to tests under Art. 16, to choose 'a year' or other period or the vacancy by vacancy basis to work out the quota among the sources. But once the Court is satisfied, examining for constitutionality the method proposed, that there is no invalidity, administrative technology may have free play in choosing one or other of the familiar processes of implementing the quota rule. We, as Judges, cannot strike down the particular scheme because it is unpalatable to forensic taste.
Seniority, normally is measured by length of continuous, officiating service--the actual is easily accepted as the legal. This does not preclude a different prescription, constitutionally tests being satisfied. A periodisation is needed in the case to settle rightly the relative claims of promotees and direct recruits. 1960-62 forms period A and 1962 onwards forms period. B. Promotees regularly appointed during period A in excess of their quota, for want of direct recruits (reasonably sought but not secured and because tarrying longer would injure the administration) can claim their whole length of service for seniority even against direct recruits 'who may turn up in succeeding periods.
Promotees who have been fitted into vacancies beyond their quota during the period B--the year being regarded as the unit--must suffer survival as invalid appointees acquiring new life when vacancies in their quota fall to be filled up. To that extent they will step down, rather be pushed down as against direct recruits who were later but regularly appointed within their quota - On this basis, the judgment of the High Court stands substantially modified, but preparation of a new seniority list becomes necessitous - Appeal allowed.
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1976 (11) TMI 189 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... either in the appeal, which was pending at the time or in a particular appeal which has already been decided, they can always approach the High Court on a reference so that the matter can be ultimately decided or they can come to the High Court in the exercise of the revisional powers. Under these circumstances, this contention based on section 20(2-A) cannot help the petitioner. In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that each of the three contentions urged by Mr. Dasaratharama Reddi on behalf of the petitioner must be decided against the petitioner. Each of these petitions therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each case. We wish to make it clear that we are not deciding any of the points except those which we have specifically dealt with, and it is open to the petitioner to raise the contentions other than those specifically dealt within this judgment when the matter is argued before the Deputy Commissioner. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 188 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... s Private Ltd. v. State of Mysore 1967 19 S.T.C. 290., Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Asha Watch Company 1971 28 S.T.C. 395., Variety Body Builders v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat 1971 28 S.T.C. 339. and State of Madras v. Champion Motor Works 1974 34 S.T.C. 338. It may be pointed out that the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Variety Body Builders 1976 38 S.T.C. 176 (S.C.). is against the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Variety Body Builders v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat 1971 28 S.T.C. 339. In view of the facts of this case, we have come to the conclusion that the Tribunal was right in holding that the supply of spare parts amounted to sales within the meaning of the sales tax law. Under these circumstances, each of these tax revision cases is decided against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The tax revision cases are, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 187 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... the record nay the part of the order. It is not as if any other material was being relied on by the authority of which any notice was required to be given. After perusing the record, we find ourselves unable to hold that any defect of want of particularised notice can affect the order made. In the result, we find no merit in the present petitions and the same would stand dismissed with costs. Mr. Manohar prayed for leave to appeal under article 133 of the Constitution of India. Though the question is one of jurisdiction, we feel that we have decided the same by applying the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court and the prayer, therefore, cannot be granted. Leave is refused. Samesaid points are urged with regard to the orders made by the revisional authority for the period 1st January, 1965, to 31st December, 1965, in Special Civil Application No. 200 of 1970. For the above reasons, the said petition and prayer for leave is also dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1976 (11) TMI 186 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... learned counsel for the petitioners next submits that in any view of the matter the taxing authorities have no jurisdiction to attach the properties belonging to person or persons other than M/s. Kar Brothers and, in the instant case, it is submitted by the learned counsel that the properties belonging to some other person, namely, M/s. Raja Stores, have been attached. This is a disputed question of fact and we do not like to enter into it, but we would like to observe that if there are any taxes due under the Act by M/s. Kar Brothers, those may be realised in accordance with law from M/s. Kar Brothers, the dealer, or its partners. But the taxes due under the Act by M/s. Kar Brothers cannot be realised from persons other than M/s. Kar Brothers or its partners. In the result, we find that this petition has no merits and it is rejected. The rule is discharged. The stay order stands vacated. We, however, make no order as to costs. IBOTOMBI SINGH, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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