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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 1268 Records
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1977 (12) TMI 19 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Contingency Reserve, Industrial Undertaking, Net Wealth, Provision For Payment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... egard to this decision of the Supreme Court, it is difficult to find any error in the order of the Tribunal when the Tribunal took the view that the units Nos. 2 and 3 and the Carnac receiving station which had commenced operation after 1st April 1957, had to be exempted under section 5(1)(xxi). Consequently, question No. 5 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Accordingly, the answers to the questions referred are recorded as follows Question No. 1 is answered in the negative and against the assessee. Question No. 2 is answered in the negative and against the assessee. Question No. 3 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 4 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 5 is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Having regard to the fact that both the parties have succeeded partly and failed partly, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1977 (12) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... siness of purchasing and selling cotton, cotton yarn and cloth and other fibres, wholesale or retail, which necessarily implies a motive for profit. It would not fall within the meaning of charitable purpose mentioned in section 2(15) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the present case, the trustees have absolute discretion to utilise the funds of the trust to the one or the other of the several objects of the trust. Therefore, following the aforesaid Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court, we hold that the trust in the present case is a non-charitable trust and that the income realised by the trust from its business in cotton, cotton yarn, cloth, etc., in the assessment years 1964-65 to 1966-67 is not exempt from tax under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We, accordingly, answer the questions referred for our opinion against the assessee and in favour of the revenue. The assessee will pay the costs of the revenue in both the cases. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. One set.
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1977 (12) TMI 17 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Bona Fide, Business Profits Tax ... ... ... ... ..... of the Tribunal with the evidence on record we cannot accept the contention of the revenue that the Tribunal ignored any material evidence. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner came to a certain conclusion on the evidence on record on which the Tribunal has come to a different conclusion. The fact that the conclusion of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has not been expressly negatived by the Tribunal, in our opinion, makes little difference to the matter inasmuch as the Tribunal having considered all the relevant evidence before it reached its own conclusion. No authority has been cited on behalf of the revenue for the proposition that the Tribunal must deal in extenso with entire order appealed from and in our opinion it was not necessary for the Tribunal to do so. For the above reasons we answer the question referred in the negative and in favour of the assessee. On the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. C. K. BANERJI J. -I agree.
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1977 (12) TMI 16 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Activity For Profit, Charitable Purpose, General Public Utility ... ... ... ... ..... of general public utility would not be a charitable purpose within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Act, even if the business carried on by the assessee is not the main object of the assessee and is only an incidental object, for, even if the object is incidental, it would show that the incidental object is so linked or connected with the main object of the assessee that the main object of general public utility will cease to be charitable purpose within the meaning of section 2(15) of the Act. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal erred in law in holding that the object of the assessee constitutes charitable purpose as defined under section 2(15) of the Act and that the assessee was exempt from tax under the provisions of section 11(1) of the Act. We accordingly answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee shall pay the costs of the revenue. Advocate s fee Rs. 500 one set.
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1977 (12) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appellate Authority, Assessment Proceedings, Commencement Of Business, Income Tax, Previous Year
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1977 (12) TMI 14 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... vested by the terms of the will. If the only right which Ramavahu had was in her capacity as a member of the group and all that she could do individually was to see that the trustees applied the trust funds for the purposes of the trust, the extent of that right was immeasurable, its value could not be determined and, in such a case, it is difficult for us to hold that such a right could be treated as interest for the purposes of s.34(3). On the finding that Ramavahu had no beneficial interest during her lifetime, in our view, s. 34(3) of the E.D. Act would clearly be attracted and the value of the estate of Rs. 69,221 could not, in our view, be aggregated with the other estate in respect of which proceedings for estate duty, were taken. In this view of the matter, the question referred to us must be answered by observing that the entire residuary estate passed on the death of Ramavahu subject to it not being aggregable with the other estate. Parties to bear their own costs.
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1977 (12) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Fixed Assets, Net Wealth ... ... ... ... ..... nly question which is required to be answered is whether any adjustment could be made in favour of the assessee and the assets valued at a figure lower than that shown in the balance-sheet. The answer to this is obvious and would be in the affirmative provided the assessee was able to satisfy the revenue authorities that the assets were shown in the balance sheet at an inflated figure. There is a clear finding to that effect by the AAC. This finding is not challenged and proceeding upon that finding, the Tribunal has merely modified the adjustment originally allowed by the AAC. The method adopted by the Tribunal may not be fully justified, but since it is not required to be considered in answering the question referred to us, we express no final opinion about it in this reference. In the result, the question referred to us is answered, on the facts and circumstances of the case, in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The parties will, however, bear their own costs.
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1977 (12) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Industrial Company, Processing Of Goods ... ... ... ... ..... of contract other than a purchase. Here we are concerned with the scope of the definition occurring in section 2(6)(c) which requires the industrial company itself engaging mainly in the business of processing. A faint argument was advanced before us by the assessee that having regard to the Explanation occurring under the definition it would be entitled to the benefit of this definition. In our view, this contention is untenable because the Explanation contains a deeming clause which states if the income attributable to any one or more of the aforesaid activities , thereby suggesting that the activity should be carried on by the industrial company which seeks the benefit of the definition. Admittedly, it is not so in this case, since the fumigation and treatment with methyl bromide was done by Mysodet Private Ltd., Bangalore. In the result, we answer the reference in the negative and in favour of the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1977 (12) TMI 11 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... der also whether the deceased was competent to dispose of this right and could have disposed of it legally. If the answers to these questions are in the affirmative as suggested by the revenue and, in our opinion, these are the correct answers, the fact that the ascertainment or computation would take place subsequently and the actual amount would be determined much after the death of the deceased, would not seem to matter. Property passing on the death would include property passing either immediately on the death or after an interval, either certainly or contingently and in view of this very wide ambit of the statutory provisions, we are afraid that we must reject the contention advanced by Mr. Kolah which appears to be attractive at first blush but which must be rejected on closer scrutiny. In the result, the question referred to us must be answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The accountable person will pay to the Commissioner the costs of the reference.
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1977 (12) TMI 10 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Estate Duty Act ... ... ... ... ..... olding the office of the trustee under the waqf deed. This is not a case where the right to occupy the flat was created in favour of the settlors themselves, but that right could be availed of by any person who occupied the office of the trustee. Such a provision cannot be read as amounting to reservation of any interest by the settlors in the property settled by the settlors. The Tribunal has, in our judgment, rightly taken the view that the deceased was ill possession of the trust property in her capacity as a trustee and not as a settlor as such. It, therefore, appears to us that no error can be found in the approach made by the Tribunal so far as the provisions of s. 12 were concerned. In this view of the matter, the Tribunal must be held to be justified in holding that s. 12 of the E.D. Act was not attracted in the instant case and the question referred to us is, therefore, answered in the negative and against the revenue. The revenue to pay the costs of this reference.
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1977 (12) TMI 9 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Rules ... ... ... ... ..... l be sold on 20th December, 1974. The petitioner s objection is that the house in dispute did not belong to the assessee-firm, but to the HUF and it could not be sold for the income-tax dues against the assessee-firm. The respondents have stated that the two letters stated to be objections, were not in proper form and hence no action could be taken thereon. We have seen the objections of the petitioner. The only lacking point is that they do not mention the section or the provision under which they were made. In fact, these letters were objections of the petitioner for not selling the house in dispute and the TRO should have disposed of them on merits before proceeding actually to sell the house. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The TRO, Allahabad, is directed to proceed to decide the objections filed by the petitioner and not to sell the house in question, without first deciding the objections. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs.
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1977 (12) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Garnishee Proceedings, Income Tax Act, Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... holds or may hold money for or on account of him. In our opinion, the powers conferred upon the Income-tax Officer by section 226(3) are intended to be exercised with the greatest caution, and should be construed strictly. If we are to hold as contended by the revenue that since the law of limitation does not extinguish a right but merely bars the right to recover under the ordinary law, we would be conferring a greater power on the revenue which would be clearly against the spirit of the sub-section. That would cause a serious inroad into the rights of a person who himself is not the assessee, but who happens to owe money to the assessee or money may become due from him to the assessee. In the view taken by us, as above, we find that the reasoning of the CIT under the impugned order dated February 11, 1975, is hardly supportable. In the result, we allow the writ petition, and the rule nisi is made absolute. The petitioner will be entitled to her costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1977 (12) TMI 7 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
AAC And Tribunal, Advance Tax, Application For Rectification, Interest On Refund, Refund Of Tax, Writ Petition
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1977 (12) TMI 6 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Company Court, Income Tax Authorities, Winding Up ... ... ... ... ..... 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956. It has been further held that it would be open to the liquidation court then to decide how far, under the law, the amount of income-tax determined by the department should be accepted as a lawful liability, on the funds of the company in liquidation. At that stage, the winding-up court can fully safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors. In Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO 1974 94 ITR 11 (Raj), it was held that the ITO must take leave of the court before issuing notice under s. 178 of the I.T. Act. Taking into consideration the ratio decidendi laid down in the above referred rulings, leave is hereby granted to the petitioner to issue notice in connection with the advance tax pertaining to the year 1978-79 (accounting year 1977-78). It would, however, be open to the court, after the tax liability has been quantified, to pass such orders as are deemed fit and proper to safeguard the interests of the company and its creditors.
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1977 (12) TMI 5 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Original Assessment, Sale Proceeds, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... s are agricultural lands in India and observed that the trees that stood on agricultural land in India mentioned in s. 2(14)(iii) is not agricultural land in India and, therefore, property of any kind which will be capital asset . If this be so, the profits and gains arising from the transfer of such a capital asset are taxable under s. 45 of the Act, as capital gains. We follow this decision and hold that the gains arising to the assessee by the sale during the relevant previous years of the standing shade trees grown by him are assessable under s. 45 of the I.T. Act, in the assessment years with which we are concerned in this case. We, accordingly, answer all the questions in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the revenue s costs in these tax cases. Advocate s fee Rs. 250, one set. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the I.T.A. Tribunal, Madras.
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1977 (12) TMI 4 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Earned Income, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... t of the total income of the assessee for the purpose of calculating the special surcharge required to be paid under the Finance Act, 1960. In our opinion , there is no merit even in this contention advanced on behalf of the assessee. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the conclusion reached by the Division Bench in Misc. Civil Case No. 80 of 1969, decided on 5-11-1970 (CIT v. Kalekhan Jumman Khan-by legal representative, Shri Mohammad Hanif was correct. We have supplied additional reasons to support that conclusion in view of the correctness of the Division Bench decision being assailed on the above grounds. We, therefore, answer the reference in the negative, i.e., the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was wrong in holding that no special surcharge under the Finance Act, 1960, could be levied on the assessee s share of tax paid by the registered firm. The costs of the reference shall be paid by the non-applicant assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 300, if certified.
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1977 (12) TMI 3 - DELHI HIGH COURT
1961 Act, Application For Registration, Association Of Persons, Income Tax Act, Rate Purpose, Registration Of Firm
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1977 (12) TMI 2 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land ... ... ... ... ..... necessarily accrue to the assessee. Moreover, even so, it will not become an interest in property other than agricultural land. Even if this income accrues to the assessee for more than six years, it will be an income from agricultural land. The source of the income will not change to property other than agricultural land. We are unable to uphold this submission of the department. Comparing cl. (v) with cl. (i) of the same section, it is apparent that the property referred to in cl. (v) is other than agricultural land. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us by saying that s. 2(e)(v) refers to interest in non-agricultural land and that an interest in agricultural land is exempt under s. 2(e)(i) of the W.T. Act. We also answer the second question by holding that the capitalized value of sayar income could not be included in the net wealth of assessee as it was exempt under s. 2(e)(i) of the Act. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 250.
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1977 (12) TMI 1 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Limitation, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ct. The phrase under this Act was interpreted to mean that the provisions of s. 271 of the Act of 1961 will apply mutatis mutandis. Section 271 in its terms referred to the provisions of the 1961 Act. The Supreme Court in Jain Brothers v. Union of India 1970 77 ITR 107 held that the provisions of the old Act like s. 28 were also included within its purview. In other words, s. 271 was to be read as if it also referred to the relevant provisions of the repealed Act. This decision was followed by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Singh Engineering Works P. Ltd. 1970 78 ITR 90. On a parity of the reasoning there is no difficulty in reading into the term under this Act occurring in s. 150(1) to include within it proceedings under the repealed Act as well. Since s. 150(1) was applicable, the ITO was competent to issue notices under s. 148 without any limitation of time for the assessment years 1953-54 to 1961-62. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1977 (11) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... any right to claim any of the reliefs in this suit because of the total failure of his cause of action. It would be sufficient for us to say that none of these arguments was advanced in the appeal before the High Court and we do not find it possible to allow them to be raised in this second appeal for the first time. Even otherwise, the arguments have no bearing on the appeal before us. 21. There is thus no merit in this appeal and it deserves to be dismissed. It may however be mentioned that the High Court, perhaps by inadvertence, confined the decree for compensation at the rate of Rs. 5,275/- per month to the plaintiff who was, however, not the sole licensor. The plaintiff and defendant No. 3 being joint promises are equally entitled to the said compensation. Except for this modification in the impugned judgment and the decree of the High Court, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will however be no order as to the costs of this Court in the circumstances of the case.
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