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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 1801 Records
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1978 (12) TMI 52 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Cotton spindles — Regularisation of — Spindles — Meaning of — Appeal — Powerlooms ... ... ... ... ..... evident that the impugned proviso tends to rely on the power exercisable by the Textile Commissioner under sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 of the Order. This apart, the impugned proviso if independent of sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 of the Order, is also violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and liable to be struck down for want of guidelines like sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 of the Order. Point No. 3 is decided accordingly in favour of the petitioners. 29. In result, we set aside the impugned order of the Textile Commissioner declining to regularise the unauthorised converted cotton spindles of the petitioners in all the petitions except C.W.P. 743 and 4380 of 1974. We further strike down sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 of the Order being violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as a result of which the second proviso of Rule 174 of the Rules shall stand rendered inoperative. All the writ petitions are consequently accepted with no order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 51 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Primary gold or ornaments - Words and phrases - Gold ornaments - Seizure - Gold (Control) Act - Repeal of Enactment - Writ jurisdiction - Writ petition
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1978 (12) TMI 50 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Excess Production Scheme - Fixation of date for enforcement - Limitations of judicial review - Classification of goods - Courts jurisdiction - Fiscal statute - Canons of interpretation - Powers of legislature - Judicial review - Scope - Taxation - Delay - Suppression of facts - Judicial competence
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1978 (12) TMI 49 - SUPREME COURT
Whether on February 18, 1962, an opportunity was given to Tharad and Purohit to explain the markings on the packages?
Held that:- In the present case, the statement alleged to have been recorded of some person from the shop of M/s. Dayalji Bhawanji was not made available to Purohit. The name of the person who made the statement was not even disclosed. Even though a request was expressly made, the person who made the statement was not brought before the Collector of Customs for examination, and even the person who had recorded the statement did not appear before that authority. The story of Purohit that he had travelled on August 6, 1961 from Pandu to Shillong was disbelieved without giving him a hearing on the evidence collected, especially after he had insisted that the clerk who had made the statement should be examined.
It is again not clear whether any explanation relating to the markings on the packages from which inferences were raised was asked for. Thus the High Court was therefore right in holding that the proceedings of the Collector of Customs were vitiated because the enquiry held by the Collector violated the rules of natural justice. Appeal dismissed.
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1978 (12) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Refunds - Duty paid under mistake of law - Admissibility of refunds - Blended yarn ... ... ... ... ..... ourt declaring the law under which it was paid to be invalid, be it a hundred years after the date of payment. Nor is there any provision under which the court could deny refund of tax even if the person who paid it has collected it from his customers and has no subsisting liability or intention to refund it to them, or, for any reason, it is impracticable to do so . 18. In view of my finding that there has been delay in the filing of the writ petitions and, as such, the petitioners cannot be granted the extraordinary relief of mandamus in these proceeding, but must be directed to seek their remedies by means of civil suits if they are so advised, all the writ petitions will have to fail. They will, accordingly, stand dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. In the event of the petitioners filing suits in the civil courts, the period of pendency of these writ petitions will stand excluded for computing the period of limitation under Section 17 of the Limitation Act.
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1978 (12) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Cotton fabrics, woven out of bleached/dyed yarn - Taxing statute - Connotation of - Alternate remedy
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1978 (12) TMI 46 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Khandsari - Compounded Levy Scheme ... ... ... ... ..... hen centrifugal stops working finally. For availing of benefit of proviso (2) (c) of Rule 92B in between commencement and closure of the manufacturing operation of the season, the unit would have to remain closed entirely for the continuous period of not less than 15 days. In this case, the factory has commenced production under Sub-rule 4 of Rule 92B ibid, prior to 22-2-1976. The party then had intimated the department that their factory would remain closed from 22-2-1976 till further intimation, but except sealing of the centrifugal they were carrying on other activities. Accordingly they are not entitled of the benefit of Rule 92B(2)(c). 7. In view of the reasons set out at pare 6 above, Govt. of India set aside the order in appeal 2479-CE/76, dated 20-11-1976 passed by the Appl. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi and restore the order of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Moradabad No. 30/KHD/25/76 issued under C. No. V(I) (15) 30/76/12514-17, dated 7-9-1976.
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1978 (12) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT
How far and to what extent is the State bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel ?
Held that: We do not think that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is necessary for the promisee to show that he suffered detriment as a result of acting in reliance on the promise. But we may make it clear that if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee which would result if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise.
It is true that taxation is a sovereign or governmental function, but, for reasons which we have already discussed, no distinction can be made between the exercise of a sovereign or governmental function and a trading or business activity of the Government so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned. Whatever be the nature of the function which the Government is discharging, the Government is subject to the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of this rule are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it. We are, therefore, of the view that in the present case the Government was bound to exempt the appellant from payment of sales tax in respect of sales of vanaspati effected by it in the State of Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of the production and was not entitled to recover such sales tax from the appellant. Appeal allowed.
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1978 (12) TMI 44 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... tal authorities. All questions, whether of law or of facts, which relate to the assessment of the assessee may be raised before the Tribunal. If, for reasons recorded by the departmental authorities in respect of a contention raised by the assessee, grant of relief to the assessee on another ground is justified, it will be open to the departmental authorities and the Tribunal to grant that relief. The right of the assessee to relief is not restricted to the plea raised by him. It is thus apparent that the claim for gratuity could be sustained on a footing other than that on which it was based before the lower departmental authorities. Before the Tribunal, the assessee could justifiably change the ground. The Tribunal was under a duty to entertain this submission and decide on merits. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee will be entitled to costs which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (12) TMI 43 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Valuation Officer ... ... ... ... ..... s are otherwise in accordance with law, mentioning of a wrong section will not vitiate them. The other aspect of the matter referred to by the learned counsel for the department is that the information sought for by the Valuation Officer from the company is in the interest of the latter. Learned counsel further stresses that the ITO has been quite fair to the company in not launching proceedings under s. 147 of the Act straightaway. Instead, he has chosen a very fair course to associate the company in ascertaining the value of the mill and it may be that if the company furnishes the required information the need for reopening the assessments starting from 1972-73 may not arise. In view of the discussion above, the question formulated, in the beginning of the judgment, is answered in the affirmative. The writ petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. S. S. SANDHAWALIA C.J.-I agree. PREM CHAND JAIN J.-I also agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 42 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Bona Fide, Recovery Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... nery, plant, shares, securities and fixed deposits in banks, to the extent to which any of the assets aforesaid does not form part of the stock-in-trade of the business of the assessee. We do not think we should get involved in a discussion of the scope of the change introduced by the amendment, or the purpose or object underlying the same nor need we consider whether the amendment is declaratory of the real meaning of the section. It is enough to notice that, even after the amendment, the rule covers only cases of charge created or transfer effected before the service of notice under r. 2 of the Second Schedule. Even after the amendment the section operates in a sphere different from the rule. We are of the opinion that the learned judge was wrong in interfering with ext. P-1 and in allowing the writ petition. We allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned judge. The result is that O.P. No. 880 of 1974 will stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 41 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Expenditure Incurred, Income Tax Act, Wholly And Exclusively ... ... ... ... ..... ing agent had in fact deposited the said sum of Rs. 10,000 and had further undergone any disability or restriction by not purchasing or receiving for sale similar goods as those manufactured by the assessee. The assessee rested its case solely on the payment made by it to the sole selling agent and the fact that the sole selling agent had been paid commission through these years. The onus was on the assessee to establish that there were facts in existence which entitled it to a deduction and it was for the assessee to adduce evidence to show what services, if any, were rendered by the sole selling agent. It cannot be said that the Tribunal has misdirected itself or omitted to consider any evidence or has relied on any irrelevant material in arriving at its conclusion. For the reasons given above we answer the question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 in the negative, both in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.-I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 40 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Accounting Year, Attributable To Priority Industry, Deduction From Profits And Gains, Income Tax Act
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1978 (12) TMI 39 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Bona Fide, Secret Profits, Write Off ... ... ... ... ..... nt of any debt to be a gift to the extent to which it has not been found to have been made bona fide. The position is that, even in a case of release, discharge, surrender, abandonment, etc., of a debt, the value becomes liable to gift-tax only in so far as the release, discharge, surrender, abandonment, etc., is not bona fide. If the write-off is bona fide, then for that reason alone it becomes exempt from gift-tax. It is hence a futile exercise to look into the differences in legal implications of the ideas behind release, discharge, surrender, forfeiture or abandonment. Assuming that the write-off in the present case amounts to abandonment, yet it will not be a gift within the meaning of cl. (c) of s. 4(1) of the G.T. Act, because the finding is that the entire write-off was bona fide. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to his costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (12) TMI 38 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Mercantile System, Sales Tax Liability ... ... ... ... ..... sment was made and the demand for sales tax was created. In the circumstances, it was held that the excess amount was an allowable deduction in the year in which the assessment was made. On the facts this case is clearly distinguishable from the present case. There are some more cases on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the assessee, but we do not propose to refer to them here, as, in our opinion, they have no bearing on the controversy in the present case. For these reasons we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the claim for Rs. 26,453 representing liability to Central sales tax for the year 1969-70 was an allowable deduction in the assessment year 1974-75. Accordingly, question No. 2 also has to be answered against the assessee. In the result, our answer to the questions referred to us is in the negative, in favour of the department and against the assessee. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs, which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1978 (12) TMI 37 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Commission Paid To Directors, Interest On Arrears, Political Party, Purchase Tax
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1978 (12) TMI 36 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Central Government, Failure To File Return, Mens Rea, Reasonable Cause, Tax Deducted ... ... ... ... ..... n. There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint and there is also no evidence on record on the point as to whether the respondents acted without any reasonable cause or excuse. In the absence of any allegation and any evidence it is not possible for this court to come to the conclusion that the late filing of the return or late deposit of the money was the deliberate act of the respondents. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant must, therefore, be repelled. In the view which I have expressed, it is not necessary to embark upon a discussion of the other points raised by the parties in this case. For the reasons already expressed, I hold that the prosecution has failed to prove that any offence was committed by the respondents. Although this ground was not taken by the accused-respondents in the court below, I think the order of acquittal can be upheld on this ground alone. I, therefore, hold that the appeal has no merit. Accordingly, it fails and is dismissed.
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1978 (12) TMI 35 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
1922 Act, 1961 Act, Income Tax, Rectification Proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... thority passing such order may amend the said order by way of rectification in relation to any matter other than the matter which has been so considered and decided Thus, the questions which are expressly raised before or decided by the appellate or revisional authority cannot be reagitated and no rectification proceedings will be maintainable in respect thereof, under s. 154 of the 1961 Act, before the ITO in the garb of amending his own order. Therefore, in these two Writ Petitions Nos. 132/63 and 133/63, the ITO had no jurisdiction to rectify his orders which have already stood merged with the order passed by the AAC and the rectification orders passed by the ITO in the case of these two petitioners are without jurisdiction. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the Writ Petitions Nos. 132 of 1963 and 133 of 1963 are allowed, while the remaining 13 writ petitions are dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1978 (12) TMI 34 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Bonus Shares, Capital Gains, Cost Of Acquisition, Fair Market Value ... ... ... ... ..... ubsequent issue of bonus shares will not affect the said opted cost. This apparent distinction does not appeal to us. When an assessee elects to adopt the market value as on the 1st January, 1954, for the purpose of computation of capital gain or loss in the transfer of its originally acquired shares he is in effect substituting the original cost of acquisition of such shares by another amount as allowed by the statute. If subsequent issue of bonus shares affects, alters or dilutes the original cost of acquisition there can be no reason why such subsequent issue should not affect, alter or dilute the substituted amount, that is, the market value of the original shares on the 1st January, 1954. For the above reasons and applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shekhawati General Traders Ltd. 1971 82 ITR 788, we uphold the contentions of the assessee. The question is answered in the negative. There will be no order as to costs. BIMAL CHANDRA BASAK J.--I agree.
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1978 (12) TMI 33 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Application For Reduction Or Waiver, Assessment Order, Delay In Filing Return, Failure To File Estimate, Financial Year, Late Filing, Law
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