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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 1888 Records
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1979 (11) TMI 272 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... length and has the advantage of a complete statement of facts and discussion of law in the judgment under appeal, limits itself to a severe economy of words in the statement of its reasoning. We regard this as a wholesome step. Natural justice necessitates full hearing, not a flood of words of forbidding length. 7. We direct that a decree be passed that the plaintiff-appellant do deposit within six months from to-day the entire sum of ₹ 3,45,000 together with interest due upto date at the rate of 11 per cent, together with an undertaking that she would give up all her rights under the mortgage decree passed in her favour in O.S. No. 154 of 1968, except to the extent of the amount actually paid to the South Indian Bank for taking the assignment. If these two conditions are fulfilled, the appeal will stand allowed and a final decree for specific performance passed. In the event of non-compliance with either of these conditions the appeal will stand dismissed with costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 271 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e said to be "keeping' the same within the meaning of Section 11. Crompton, J. answered this question thus "It seems to me that it is not made out that the mere halting in London, for the purpose of sending from one railway to another, when it is necessary that there should be halting in some place or other, is a 'keeping'.....I think there can be no keeping within s. 11, when it is in course of transit." On parity of reasoning, a vehicle in transit through the State of Mysore or even making a necessary halt for a short interval during transit, cannot be said to be a vehicle 'kept' for use on roads in the State of Mysore. In the light of all that has been said above, we uphold the interpretation put by the High Court on Section 3 of the Taxation Act, and answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment in the negative, and dismiss this appeal, leaving the parties to pay and bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 270 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s no evidence of actual deception. But that is not necessary. Kerly in 'Trade Marks and Trade Names', 10th Edn. CIL 17, paragraph 38, page 478 says "Proof of actual deception, if the mark is in the opinion of the Tribunal likely to deceive or if it has been substantially copied from another, is unnecessary. Nevertheless, if one or more cases of actual deception are made out to the satisfaction- of the court, this will, of course, afford very strong evidence that the resemblance of the marks in question is so close as to be likely to deceive". 14. Even intentions to deceive need not be proved. As regards damages claimed by the plaintiff, I must point out that there is no evidence of damage. 15. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree are set aside and the suit to decreed for declaration and injunction prayed for by the plaintiff with proportionate costs throughout. The claim for damages is disallowed. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 269 - ITAT INDORE
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... ... ..... or the purposes of the assessee's business and the running expenses were also being incurred and claimed as deduction by the assessee. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the AAC was quite justified in taking the view that the assessee is entitled to the claim of depreciation in respect of these vehicles. 15. As regards the disallowance of interest on the amount of advances made to the assessee Directors for the purchase of the vehicles, we accept the finding of the AAC that the said advances were made by the assessee company for the purposes of its business, namely, for the purchase of the vehicles, which were used by the assessee company for its business. We, therefore, uphold the decision of the AAC on this point, also, whereby he has deleted the disallow ance of interest made by the ITO for the Asst. yrs. 1976-77 and 1977-78. 16. In the result, the two appeals, filed by the assessee, are allowed, while the other two appeals, filed by the Department, are dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 268 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gency and, therefore, the so called bias of respondent 6 becomes wholly irrelevant. It must, however, be pointed out that if an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, the mala fide of the informant would be of secondary importance if the investigation produces unimpeachable evidence disclosing the offence. We, therefore, consider the aspersions cast on the character of respondent 6 and the allegations of mala fides made against him virtually accepted by the High Court in entirety as uttery irrelevant and the same may be treated as expunged for the purposes of this appeal. We accordingly allow Criminal Appeal 301/79, quash and set aside the order of the High Court and restore the order passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur, dated February 24, 1979. In view of this order it is not necessary to pass any final order in the cognate appeal (Criminal Appeal 300/79) preferred by respondent 6. V.D.K. State Appeal allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 267 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... workmen could not be regarded as orders of their dismissal and were, on the other hand, orders of discharge simpliciter properly passed under. M.S.O. 23; (b) that the arbitrator could not exercise the powers conferred on a Tribunal under Section 11-A of the 1947 Act and could not, therefore, interfere with the punishment awarded by the Management to the workmen (even if the discharge could be regarded as punishment), and (c) that in any case the High Court exceeded the limits of its jurisdiction in interfering with the said punishment purporting to act in the exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution on India. the judgment of the High Court must be reversed and the order of the arbitrator restored. There three appeals are decided accordingly, the parties being left to bear their own costs throughout. ORDER OF THE COURT 194. The appeals are dismissed substantially with such modifications as are indicated in the decretal part of the judgment of the majority.
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1979 (11) TMI 266 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... argument has no substance as the error has crept in the order not because the assessee did not argue the point but because of amendment in law and order passed by this Court. The jurisdiction to rectify is conferred if there is an error apparent on the record. If after substitution of an Explanation II whole dal and split dal became one and the same commodity, it is obvious that purchase tax was leviable only when Mills purchased the whole grain. As no tax was leviable the orders were erroneous. The leviability did not depend on claim of assessee but on applicability of law. The imposition of tax on such a purchase, therefore, was erroneous and it was open to assessee to move an application to get the same rectified. 3. In the result, this revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by Additional Judge (Revisions) is set aside. The assessee shall be entitled to its costs which is assessed at ₹ 300/-. The fee of the Standing Counsel is assessed at ₹ 100/-.
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1979 (11) TMI 265 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or analysis should be specially mentioned if all manner of sales are included in the definition. It is only to prevent the argument that sale for analysis is not a consensual sale and hence no sale, an argument which was advanced and rejected in Mangaldas vs. State of Maharashtra(1). We are therefore of the opinion that the sale of gingelly oil mixed with groundnut oil is punishable under s. 16(1)(a)(i) read with s.2(1)(a) notwithstanding the fact that the seller had expressly stated at the time of sale that it was intended for external use only. We declare the illegal position as indicated in the earlier paragraphs but we refrain from passing any further order in the appeal which we accordingly dismiss. We have not referred to any of the decisions of the various High Courts which were considered by us and all of which, we may add, have been studiously collected and scrupulously considered by Madhusudana Rao, J. in Public Prosecutor v. Rama Chandra Raju(2). Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ds and a Mana who was a member of the sub-tribe of Gonds alone was entitled to the privileges conferred by the Schedule to the Scheduled Tribes Order. We therefore agree with the High Court that the appellant, merely because he belonged to the Mana community amongst the Marathas, is not eligible to stand as a candidate for election to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly from the reserved seat of the Armori constituency in Gadchiroli tahsil of Chanda District." The position has not since changed even though the Schedule to the Order is substituted by a new Schedule. There has only been a re-arrangement of the Schedule with slight modification which has no effect on the question at issue in this case. The High Court was, therefore, right in rejecting the case of the appellant that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe, and in setting aside his election to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 263 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... oo rigorous application of some of the provisions of the Act may itself occasionally result in frustrating the very objects of the Act instead of advancing them. It is to provide for such situations that the Government is invested by s. 60 with a power to relax the occasional rigour of the provisions of the Act and to advance the objects of the Act. Section 60 empowers the State Government to exempt a registered society from any of the provisions of the Act or to direct that such provision shall apply to such society with specified modifications. The power given to the Government under s. 60 of the Act is to be exercised so as to advance the policy and objects of the Act, according to the guidelines as may be gleaned from the preamble and other provisions which we have already pointed out, are clear. We are therefore of the view that s. 60 is not void on the ground of excessive delegation of legislative power. We so declare and otherwise dismiss the appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 262 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n connection with the investigation into another theft case had led the police to interrogate Patrick, the appellant very cleverly tried to foist previous possessions of the watch on Roop Chand. We are not prepared to accept the appellant's explanation. Even so, it was urged, the recovery was too remote in point of time to be linked with the robbery and the murder. It is true that there was a considerable time-lag. We might have found it difficult to link the recovery of the watch with the robbery and the murder had this been the only circumstance. But, we have the other vital circumstance that a writing made by the appellant was left on the deceased's table that night. That circumstance coupled with the recovery of the dead man's watch at the instance of the appellant, are sufficient, in our opinion, in the absence of any acceptable explanation to hold the appellant guilty of the offences of which he has been convicted. The appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1979 (11) TMI 261 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ard will deposit within 10 days from today a sum of ₹ 5,000/- before the Registrar for the preliminary expenses of publicity and other incidentals for the implementation of the directions given above. Any unexpended amount, at the end of one year, will be repaid to the respective State Marketing Board. IX. We further direct that the unclaimed amounts, if any, shall be permitted to be used by the respective Marketing Committees for the purposes falling within the statute as interpreted by this Court in the CA No. 1083/77. These appeals and writ petitions are disposed of on the above lines, the winners being both the sides before us, the invisible small consumers and above all, justice, equity and good conscience to the inarticulate community, which is the functional triumph of law in action within hailing distance of each other. We wind up with a word of satisfaction that each one has had his meed and in recognition thereof we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 260 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... awn-broker to give the number of Pawnees whose unreturned and articles remain unreasoned and the number and weight of such ornaments and articles. That form did not require the pawn broker to give the fineness of the gold or the actual quantity of the gold but it required, in my opinion, only the gross weight of the ornaments or articles, as it is, but it mixed with any other metal or whether it contained lac or any other substance. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Badri Prasad’s case (supra) the arguments of Mr. Ghosh cannot be accepted and respectfully following the said, decision of the Supreme Court, I hold that the Rule must fall and should be discharged. Accordingly, the Rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated. The petitioners will, however, be entitled to file necessary returns within two month from today and all subsequent returns in accordance with the provisions of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968. There will be no order as to costs.
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1979 (11) TMI 259 - GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... o in para 2 above to the effect that the demand for duty had not actually yet been quantified and hence the time for preferring the appeal could not be deemed to have expired till they got an intimation regarding the exact amount due from them in terms of the Assistant Collector’s order. The limitation period for preferring an appeal in a case of this type should count from the date of order or the date of D.D. 2 whichever is later. 4. Accordingly, Government set aside the Appellate Collector’s order with directions for de novo disposal of the appeal after principles of natural justice are complied with.
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1979 (11) TMI 258 - COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... as such in view of the provisions of rule 10 of the said Rules, the demands are time barred. 3. I have gone through the records of the case. Keeping in view that the emulsified R.D.O. as well as sizing paste have no shelf value, I hold that the same cannot be treated as goods within the meaning of Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and hence the same cannot be charged to duty. These material can at best be described as in-process materials. This is, however not applicable in the case of steam which is commercially known and marketed to a limited extent as goods. However, in view of the Govt. of India’s order, though the steam manufactured by the said company was liable to duty, but the duty already paid is hereby remitted. I, therefore, set aside the demand letters and order that the duty already paid by the said company on the aforesaid three products shall be refunded and that the demand of duty already raised but not honoured shall be vacated.
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1979 (11) TMI 257 - APPELLATE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... t or furnish the best possible evidence. He cannot ensure that the best possible decisions or even straight forward decisions would be given by the statutory authorities whom he cannot avoid or that they would come and give their decisions promptly enough. If any benefit to which he is eligible depends on the clearance of (a) with the “No objection” of (b) at all then certainly the benefit should not be denied if breach of merely technical requirements is attributable to something to which the citizen did not contribute in any material way. 13. This appeal is allowed. The appellant did everything within his power, and promptly enough to secure the benefit of Project Import Regulations. He cannot be denied the same based on either unwarranted delays or refusals of other authorities or on an unwarranted interpretation of the Project Import Regulations by the Customs. His contracts shall be registered and benefit of Project Import Regulations shall be extended.
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1979 (11) TMI 256 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rticle 226 would not have been there, in a case of, present type where the petitioner has filed this writ application challenging the notification of 1975/76 after a period of bout two years, it would not be expedient in the interest of justice to stay the implementation of the Housing Board Schemes for providing home to homeless during the pendency of the writ application. Violations alleged in this case are of technical nature even if any of them succeeds on technical pleas, the respondents can still take fresh proceedings to remove those lacunae, if any, and therefore, it is not also in the interest of the petitioner Society to invest any money during the pendency of the writ application by way of allotment of land to its members and to permit them to make constructions. 34. Thus, looking from any angle, I am of the opinion that the present stay application deserves to be dismissed. The petition is, therefore, dismissed and the interim stay passed by this Court is vacated.
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1979 (11) TMI 255 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... We considered a mere or less identical case in P.P.M. Thangiah Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu (T.C. No. 220 of 1977) 1980 46 STC 67 and the arguments addressed in that case cover the contentions taken in the present appeal also. Except for the difference in the figures, there is no difference in the facts. For the reasons stated in our judgment in the said T.C. No. 220 of 1977 (P.P.M. Thangiah Nadar v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 46 STC 67), we hold that the provisions of section 7-A do not apply to the facts here, because these transactions do not satisfy one of the two tests or conditions prescribed in section 7-A. The transactions in the present case, though they are export sales, are inside sales within the meaning of the Act. In these circumstances, section 7-A(1)(b) of the Act was not satisfied and therefore the transactions are not liable to be brought within the scope of section 7-A. In the result, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 254 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... made on 24th June, 1976, within the period of five years contemplated by the statute. It is only that part of the Board s order which aggregated the turnover assessed under the assessment order dated 27th November, 1970, and the order dated 20th March, 1971, that is now challenged. As the order of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer dated 27th November, 1970, cannot be the subject of revision by the Board of Revenue in 1976, the Board s order in so far as it affected the finality of the said order will be bad. We, therefore, hold that the revision of the Board s order will be restricted to bring to tax the sum of Rs. 30,637.50 under section 7-A. In so far as the order directs the total turnover the order cannot be sustained. The assessee will continue to have the benefit of compounding for this year in accordance with section 7 granted by the order dated 27th November, 1970. The result is, the appeal is partly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed.
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1979 (11) TMI 253 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Sales Tax Reference No. 24 of 1977 It may be pointed out that the additional question No. (2) in this reference has not been pressed by Mr. Kaji on behalf of the assessee, and question No. (1), in the light of the discussion above, is answered as follows Supply of sugarcane by grower-members of the society to the society amounted to purchase of sugarcane by the society. Sales Tax Reference No. 10 of 1976 The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Sales Tax Reference No. 8 of 1976 Question No. (1) In the affirmative. Question No. (2) The transactions were transactions of purchase so as to attract the purchase tax. In view of the fact that the position after the decision in the Khedut Sahakari Ginning and Pressing Society s case(1) was not very clear, there will be no order as to costs in all these references. References answered accordingly.
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