|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 2141 Records
-
1981 (12) TMI 20 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... respectful agreement with that view. The learned counsel for the Department contended that the order passed by the WTO merged in the order passed by the Commissioner under s. 18B of the Act and hence the jurisdiction of the AAC to decide the appeal preferred by the assessee is taken away. The contention cannot be upheld. The Commissioner, while exercising powers under s. 18B of the Act, does not exercise appellate or revisional powers. In exercising powers under s. 1BB of the Act, the Commissioner has to act on criteria different from those on which the appellate or the revisional authorities have to act. In these circumstances, the Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in holding that the AAC was not justified in dismissing the appeals summarily. For all these reasons, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1981 (12) TMI 19 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... icity) on which the learned Solicitor-General relied, it will be pertinent to observe that the legislature has deliberately used the expression attributable to and not the expression derived from . It cannot be disputed that the expression attributable to is certainly wider in import than the expression derived from . Had the expression derived from been used, it could have with some force been contended that a balancing charge arising from the sale of old machinery and buildings cannot be regarded as profits and gains derived from the conduct of the business of generation and distribution of electricity. What the Supreme Court has decided on the construction of s. 80E, applies to the interpretation of the identical expression in s. 80-I of the Act. Following the ruling of the Supreme Court, we will have to decide the question in the present case also in the affirmative and against the Department. We do so accordingly. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (12) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... he balance-sheet as on March 31, 1972, we must hold that their order cannot be upheld as laying down the proper basis for valuation. It is, however, not for this court to go into the question of valuation in this reference. The matter has got to be re-examined by the Tribunal. It is true that the GTO, in his assessment, had taken the balance-sheet as at March 31, 1972, as the basis for his valuation. But he had not considered whether in between the date of the gift, March 28, 1972, and March 31, 1972, anything had happened to the financial position or prospects of the two companies concerned. Nor have these factors been considered by the Tribunal. We think these matters will have to be examined afresh by the Tribunal. So, while formally answering the question of law against the assessee and in favour of the Department, it would be for the Tribunal to examine the question once again in the light of the observations we have made in this case. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (12) TMI 17 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... e contended that in the instant case, in view of the fact that there was a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, the Tribunal did not deem it proper to remand the case to the Commissioner for fresh disposal. This contention is not founded on facts. The decision of the Tribunal flows from the finding of the Tribunal that the order of the Commissioner was void ab initio. That is the only reason given by the Tribunal for not remanding the case to the Commissioner. As the finding of the Tribunal about the jurisdiction of the Commissioner was not justified, it must be held that the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to direct the Commissioner to pass an order under s. 263(1) of the Act, afresh, after giving due opportunity to the assessee. Our answer to question No. (4) referred to us is, therefore, in the negative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1981 (12) TMI 16 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF, Property Passing On Death ... ... ... ... ..... ble person also relied upon the cases of Gowli Buddanna v. CIT 1966 60 ITR 293 (SC) and N. V. Narendranath v. CWT 1969 74 ITR 190 (SC). These decisions relate to the question of status. There can be no doubt that for purposes of assessment of income-tax and wealth-tax the deceased and his wife constituted an HUF and could be assessed in that status. These cases decide that for constituting an HUF, it is not necessary that there must be more than one male member and such family may consist of a male member and his wife and daughters. These cases cannot be taken to decide that female members of such a family share the ownership in the property of the family. We have distinguished these cases on this ground in Smt. Rani Bahu s case 1983 142 ITR 843 (MP) FB . For the reasons given above, we answer the question referred as follows The entire property received by the deceased at the time of partial partition passed on his death. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
-
1981 (12) TMI 15 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... al was quite right in proceeding to decide the appeal on the basis of the evidence mustered by the Department on the question of concealment of income without reference to the Explanation. The Tribunal was also justified in following the decision of the Supreme Court in Anwar Ali s case 1970 76 ITR 696 having regard to the state of the evidence before them on the question of concealment. If the Tribunal had not referred to the Explanation to s. 271(1)(c) that was because the matter was never mooted. We disagree with the view of the Orissa High Court that even though a point has not been raised, it must be deemed to have been raised and the Tribunal is under a duty to decide not only points which are actually raised but also points which are not raised, but which must subsequently be deemed to have been raised before them. For all the reasons, we decide the question of law, in the affirmative and against the Department. The assessee will have his costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
-
1981 (12) TMI 14 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment, Limitation, Reference To Valuation Officer, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... tion orders hereby set aside include not only those orders having reference to the assets of the partnership firms in which the petitioners are partners, but also other valuation orders having reference to the petitioners own individual properties. We may further make it clear that while the valuation orders are set aside, there will be direction to all the valuation officers concerned to take up the proceedings de novo and proceed with the valuation in accordance with the law. In such proceedings, the petitioners will be at liberty to raise all contentions of law and fact, including those which they have raised in these writ petitions which we have not considered in this judgment. Subject to the directions aforesaid we quash the wealth-tax assessments for 1965-66 to 1974-75, made against the petitioners and also the valuation orders under s. 16A of the W.T. Act, on which the assessments are based. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (12) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... or putting up a substantial addition to the existing fixed assets of a factory or other industrial establishment. In all these cases, it can hardly be denied that the enduring benefit is a benefit in the capital field, to borrow the phrase from Bhagwati J. This is because the day-to-day operations of manufacturing business cannot be conceived without the pre-existence of a factory or other fixed asset, which is the very source for carrying on the business and earning profits. Although, the Sitalpur case 1963 49 ITR 160 (SC), is not expressly referred to in the Empire jute decision 1980 124 ITR I (SC), we have no doubt whatever that uprooting a factory and re-establishing it in a new place must be held to subserve an enduring advantage in the capital field, in the sense spoken of by Bhagwati J. Having regard to the consideration aforesaid, we answer the question referred to us in the present case in the affirmative and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (12) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessed Tax, Delay In Filing Return, Effect Of Amendment Of S. 271(1)(a), Legal Fiction, Penalty
-
1981 (12) TMI 11 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Penalty Or Interest, Waiver ... ... ... ... ..... re quasi-judicial in nature, and reasons have not been recorded for passing the final order. The contention of the petitioner is justified, in view of the decision of this court in the case of Paras Bhan Sadh v. CIT 1978 114 ITR 834. Following that decision, we allow the petition and quash the order of the Commissioner in so far as it relates to interest. The Commissioner should now decide the claim for waiver of interest made by the petitioner on merits and in accordance with law. Parties to bear their own costs.
-
1981 (12) TMI 10 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
False Statement In Verification, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... are concerned. I may also mention that so far as the provisions of the I.T. Act are concerned the )prosecution under s. 278 as well as under some other sections requires the sanction of the Commissioner under s. 279 of the Act. In the present case the sanction is annexed. It relates to an offence under s. 277 of the I.T. Act only and there is no sanction for the prosecution under s. 278 of the Act. The order of the Magistrate summoning applicants Nos. 2 and 3, therefore, cannot be sustained. In the result the application under s. 482, Cr. PC, is partly allowed and the proceedings against applicants Nos. 2 and 3, namely, Ayodhya Prasad and Ram Autar, only in pursuance of the complaint Criminal Case No. 2430 of 1980, pending in the Court of the Chief judicial Magistrate, Varanasi, namely, State through Sri B. K. Srivastava, Income-tax Officer, B Ward, Varanasi v. Rajendra Prasad Agarwal, is quashed while the application of applicant No. 1, i.e., Rajendra Prasad, is dismissed.
-
1981 (12) TMI 9 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... at there was sufficient link between the so called cash credits and the intangible additions. It cannot be said that, the Tribunal was wrong in law in holding so. Reference was also made to s. 68 of the Act. This section provides that where any sum is found credited in the books of an assessee maintained for any previous year, and the assessee offers no explanation about the nature and source thereof or the explanation offered by him is not, in the opinion of the ITO, satisfactory, the sum so credited may be charged to income-tax as the income of the assessee of that previous year. The section, on a proper construction, in our opinion, does not debar the assessee from offering alternative explanations and if either of them is accepted, the cash credit cannot be charged as the income of the assessee. For the reasons given above, we answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
-
1981 (12) TMI 8 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Previous Year ... ... ... ... ..... ri Sakai Ghisa Ram v. CIT 1979 120 ITR 338, where talking of the manner in which an assessee changes his previous year it was observed that the change implied a deliberate or voluntary change at the instance of the assessee. This case does not, however, lay down as to how the consent of the ITO is to be inferred. It is not an authority for the proposition that unless there is an express order of the ITO regarding his consent to the change of the previous year by an assessee, consent cannot be inferred from the acts of the ITO. So far as the assessee is concerned he had voluntarily effected a change of his previous year by filing a return for a changed period. We are, therefore, of the View that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the ITO had consented to the change of the previous year. We accordingly answer the question in the affirmative, in favour of the Department, and against the assessee. The Department is entitled to its costs, which are assessed at Rs. 250.
-
1981 (12) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Company, Relief ... ... ... ... ..... ought to grant on the assessee s application, even if the Act does not provide for such an application. The order passed by ITO in this case was in fact an order passed by way of disposal of an application by the assessee on January 18, 1974. Since the order refused the relief asked for, it must, in our judgment, be considered as one passed under s. 237 of the Act, in which event, an appeal against that order is perfectly maintainable. Of the two questions both of which raise the issue of maintainability, we think that the second question need not be gone into separately, since it only raises a point of argument. For reasons which we have earlier set out, our answer to the pertinent question as to the competence of the appeal is in favour of the assessee and against the Department. In the result, our answer to all the three questions referred to us by the Tribunal is in favour of the assessee. The Department will pay the costs of the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500, one set.
-
1981 (12) TMI 6 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Cash Credits, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... the assessment, the Tribunal, however, thought that the mere addition of Rs. 7,000 towards unexplained cash credit cannot justify any penalty for concealment. For coming to this conclusion, they relied on the wellknown decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Anwar Ali 1970 76 ITR 696. We may observe that in following the Supreme Court s decision and applying it to the particular facts of this case and the way in which the amount of Rs. 7,000 was brought to assessment, the Tribunal had not committed any error of law, for, according to the Supreme Court, the mere fact that an addition is made towards unexplained cash credits cannot, on the strength of such an assessment and without more, justify the levy of penalty on the ground that the amount added in the assessment really represented the concealed income of the assessee. It was this principle which was applied by the Tribunal to the extent that the levy of penalty took note of the addition of Rs. 7,000 towards cash credits.
-
1981 (12) TMI 5 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Search And Seizure, Special Bearer Bonds ... ... ... ... ..... 30th April, 1981. No immunity is given for any unaccounted money between May 1, 1981, and November 30, 1981, and it was liable to be seized. No provision of law has been brought to our notice which gave immunity from search and seizure of such amount. When no immunity is given in respect of any amount during the period, commencing from May 1, 1981, to November 30, 1981, the question of any promissory estoppel operating against the first respondent from seizing this amount arises. In view of the above, we find no merit in this writ petition and, accordingly, dismiss the same. Sri Y. V. Anjaneyulu, learned counsel for the petitioner, made an oral request for grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In the view we have taken, we are unable to certify that this matter involves such substantial question of law of general importance as requires consideration of the Supreme Court or that it is otherwise a fit case for grant of leave. The oral request is, therefore, rejected.
-
1981 (12) TMI 4 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Shares ... ... ... ... ..... o say which value per share, in terms of rupees and paise, is the correct valuation. Within the framework of the tax reference procedure, however, it is not possible for us to answer the question in this form. Having decided the matter of principle that the break-up value of the shares has to be worked out on the basis of the balance-sheet as at March 31, 1971, which is nearer the date of the gift, we must leave the actual figures to be worked out by the forum whose job it is to render factual findings. In the result, therefore, while holding that the Tribunal s valuation is not based on a correct approach, we make it clear that we do not express ourselves as to the correctness or incorrectness of the figures adopted by the Income-tax Officer and the Tribunal, respectively. This means that the correct figure will have to be worked out by the Tribunal from the view-points we have earlier laid down. The reference is answered accordingly, but there will be no order as to costs.
-
1981 (12) TMI 3 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Annual Value, Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... cer to fix the value on his own on the basis of the expected reasonable rent. On the facts, the Income-tax Officer in this case did not find out the expected rent, but merely ascertained the cost of the properties to the assessee, which is not necessarily a good test for determining the rent at which the property might reasonably be expected to be let out. Hence, the Tribunal was right in accepting the annual value fixed by the municipal authorities as being correct. One of the effects of the two Supreme Court judgments noted earlier is that the annual value or bona fide letting value, as the case may be, has to be based on the standard rent and the standard rent is constant, not subject to variations on account of rise in prices or market increases in rent. This is, therefore, an additional reason for accepting the conclusion of the Tribunal. We would answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the assessee, but leave the parties to bear their own costs.
-
1981 (12) TMI 2 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Annual Value, Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... value of the properties, No. 3, Sikandra Road and No. 9, Mansingh Road, New Delhi ? Both counsel agree that the same question in relation to the assessment year 1961-62 has been disposed of by a Bench of this court. This was ITR No. 103 of 1974 which was disposed of on 16th December, 1981, by another Division Bench of this court. Learned counsel for the Department also points out that the point at issue is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sheila Kaushish 1981 131 ITR 435. In these circumstances, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. We may add just for the purposes of record that this reference comes up before us by way of a supplemental statement in relation to ITR No. 32 of 1970, which has also been disposed of by this court on November 5, 1981. But there is no connection between the questions raised in ITR No. 32 of 1970 and the present reference.
-
1981 (12) TMI 1 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Penalty, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... the reassessment made by the Income-tax Officer by way of carrying out the remand order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It was this penalty order which was sought to be challenged as bad in law. The Tribunal, however, sustained the validity of the penalty holding that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction to levy penalty arising out of the subsequent reassessment proceedings. The three questions of law which have been referred to us by the Tribunal, at the instance of the assessee, have a bearing on the validity of the penalty order based on the reassessment. They canvass different grounds of invalidity. Since we have already held that the penalty cannot be levied under section 271(1)(c) for the reason that there is no evidence of concealment of income, it would be academic to enter into these questions referred by the Tribunal at the instance of the assessee. We, therefore, leave these three questions unanswered. There will be no order as to costs.
............
|
