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Showing 21 to 40 of 2885 Records
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1992 (12) TMI 219 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r guidelines in the matter of exercise of power under Section 8. Where, similar power is conferred without any limiting words like those contained in Section 8, the conferment has yet been upheld. Reference in this connection may be made to P.J. Irani v. State of Madras . Section 13 of the Madras Buildings, Lease and Rent Control Act, 1949 empowered the State Government to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act. It was argued that the said section confers unguided and uncontrolled discretion upon the State Government and, therefore, amounts to excessive delegation. The argument was repelled. It was held that the very policy and scheme of the Act furnishes adequate guidance to the Government in the exercise of its power. It was held at the same time that where such power is exercised for purposes, not germane to the purpose or policy of the enactment or where it is found to be discriminatory, the action can always be questioned.
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1992 (12) TMI 218 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... earlier date the assessee had filed written arguments before the Tribunal and while disposing of the present appeal ex parte, they have not been considered. It would have been proper if the Tribunal, while deciding the appeal, had taken note of those submissions also into consideration. 5. Learned Standing Counsel contended that the assessee has already filed an application for recalling the order which is pending before the Tribunal and, therefore, this revision may not be entertained. Although more than three years have passed, the Tribunal does not seem to have taken cognizance on the said application and there is no justification to reject this revision on the ground that an application for recalling the order had also been moved. 6. For the above reasons, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 20th February, 1989 is set aside and the Sales Tax Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal afresh after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the parties.
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1992 (12) TMI 217 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ner is that earlier eligibility certificate was granted to the petitioner for a period w. e. f. 30-7 1984 to 30-7-1989 i. e. five years but after expiry and completion of the said five years period, on 13-7-1990 the Divisional Level Committee reduced the said period from five years to three years by means of the impugned orders which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present petition. It has not been disputed by the learned Standing Counsel that the impugned order reducing the said period has been passed by the Divisional Level Committee which has no power to do so, hence the impugned orders dated 30-6-1990 and 1-11-1991 (Annexures 2 and 3 to the petition) are not sustainable and we accordingly quash the same. However, we do observe that this order will not preclude the Commissioner, Sales Tax from examining the matter afresh in accordance with law under subsection (3) of Section 4-A of the Act, 4. With the aforesaid observations the present writ petition is allowed.
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1992 (12) TMI 216 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 2nd August, 1990 issued by the Special Judge and the FIR registered by the CBI against the respondent under various provisions of different Statutes and other proceedings and orders based on the said FIR. 187. Criminal Appeal No. 567 of 1992 is allowed accordingly. Crl. M.P. No. 6365 of 1992 filed by Shri K. Madhavan to expunge the observation of the High Court is also allowed. 188. Before we part with this case, we have to observe that any views expressed or observations made by this apex court should be borne in mind and given effect to. In the instant case, inspite of the finding of this Court in Janata Dal, the High Court has grossly erred in quashing the FIR, the same has resulted in a glaring injustice, namely, that the investigation into grave and serious crime has got scotched and all the efforts so far taken by the investigating agency in digging out the requisite evidence got buried. Therefore, we find it imperative to quash the impugned judgment of the High Court.
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1992 (12) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT
When did the petition respondent get notice of the making of the award from the arbitrator?
Whether on the findings arrived at by the court below, the application itself is barred by limitation?
Held that:- High Court has rightly held that the application made by the appellant was an application for directing the arbitrator to file the award in Court so that such award is made a rule of Court. In this case, there was no express authority given by the arbitrator to the applicant to file the award to make it a rule of Court although a signed copy of the award was sent to the applicant. The forwarding letter clearly indicates that the award was sent for information.
The High Court has given very cogent reasons for not accepting the case of the appellant that he had received a signed copy of the award and the forwarding letter some time in May, 1965 and we do not find any reason to take a contrary view. The applicant has not produced the registered cover received by him which would have established the actual date of the receipt of the postal cover by the applicant convincingly. We are also not inclined to hold that the delay in presenting the application deserves to be condoned in the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellant has taken a very bold stand that he had received the signed copy of the award only in May, 1965 and only within three weeks of such receipt, he had filed the application. On the face of such statement, the plea of ignorance of the change in the Limitation Act need not be considered and accepted. As the case sought to be made out by the appellant that he had received the signed copy of the award only in May, 1965 has not been accepted, and we may add, very rightly by the Court, the question of condonation of delay could not and did not arise. Appeal dismissed.
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1992 (12) TMI 214 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... exercises its power to rescind any notification then the only interpretation which could be taken in the taxing statute will be that the notification which has been rescinded will no longer thereafter be effective. It cannot be interpreted to revive the superseded notification. 11.. The view which has been taken by this Court does not require consideration and there being no substance in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the revision petition has no force and the petitioner is liable to make payment of tax on the inter-State sale of pulses at the rate of 2 per cent and also the interest under section 11-B of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act read with section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act in accordance with the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1981 48 STC 466. 12.. For the reasons discussed above, the revision petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1992 (12) TMI 213 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion by the State Government. 28.. Section 6 of the Act is also a charging provision with regard to the additional tax. Notifications Nos. S.O. 92 and S.O. 94 do not speak of exemption of the additional tax. Thus, the exemption, as made in the aforesaid notifications, has to be construed strictly for the purpose they stand for, and cannot be allowed to extend beyond the subject specifically mentioned in the notifications. 29.. The decision in Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa 1983 53 STC 1 (SC) has no application on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, as there was separate Act, namely, Orissa Additional Sales Tax Act, 1975, in which there was a specific provision to the effect that the provisions of this Act shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to the additional tax. That apart, there was no such non obstante clause in the Orissa Additional Sales Tax Act. Thus, there is no substance in the submission of learned counsel. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1992 (12) TMI 212 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... or rationalisation of the tax rate, it is open to the aggrieved persons to highlight the said aspect before the State. Merely because several articles of day to day need are classified along with luxury articles, that cannot per se be a ground for judicial interference. It is also submitted that if all the articles are taxed at the first point of sale, much of the administrative difficulties and malpractices in the levy and collection of tax would be obviated. It is urged that large number of articles have been made taxable at the first point of sale, and this has resulted neither in any difficulty nor reduction in the total collection of tax. This again is a matter which cannot be judicially decided. It is open to the persons who are affected to move the State for necessary action in the matter. 17.. The irresistible conclusion is that the writ applications are without any merit, and are accordingly dismissed. No costs. D.M. PATNAIK, J.-I agree. Writ applications dismissed.
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1992 (12) TMI 211 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he Supreme Court in S.L.P. and avail of further appropriate remedies open to it under the law and that the furnishing of the undertaking in terms of the order of the court would not prejudice the petitioner s right under the law vis-a-vis the department and the Co-operative Sugar Mills, Meham and Bhuna. Petitioner-firm had made an application that instead of the period of one week which was granted to it while issuing notice of motion, it may be allowed to deposit the tax within a period of four weeks from this day subject to his right to approach the Supreme Court in S.L.P. and obtain appropriate orders. This prayer of the petitioner is accepted. It may deposit the amount of tax due as ordered by the Sales Tax Tribunal within a period of one month from this day and furnish surety regarding the payment of amount of penalty within the same period. On compliance with this direction, the first appellate authority may hear the appeal on merits. No costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1992 (12) TMI 210 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... he disputed profiles. 10.. In view of the undisputed fact that the disputed profiles have already been exported to Czechoslovakia on the strength of an interim order passed by us on June 18, 1992, we dispose of the case with the declaration that no entry tax is leviable on the entry of the 20 pieces of profiles (industrial screens) into the Calcutta Metropolitan Area by lorry bearing registration No. WGA 2802 for the purpose of exporting the same to Czechoslovakia through the Port of Calcutta. The applicants are discharged from the bank guarantee for Rs. 10,000 furnished in pursuance of interim order dated June 18, 1992 passed by this Tribunal. 11.. Parties will bear their own costs in the circumstances of the case. On the verbal prayer of the learned Advocate for the respondents, the operation of the order shall remain stayed for a period of eight weeks from this date. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.R. BALASUBRAMANIAN (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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1992 (12) TMI 209 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to pay sales tax. In so far as the petitioners in the last mentioned W.P. No. 8590 of 1991 is concerned, the respondent in his counter-affidavit indicated that they have already been registered, but they did not renew the registration and they have also filed returns showing that they were dealing in the business of bran and husk. As the question before us relates only to the liability of the petitioners to get themselves registered we do not propose to express any opinion about tax liability of the petitioners under the Act. From the above discussion it follows that section 12(3) of the Act is constitutionally valid and the notices issued by the respondent requiring the petitioners to register under section 12(3) of the Act do not suffer from any illegality. The petitioners are granted eight weeks time from today for complying with the impugned notices. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case with costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1992 (12) TMI 208 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d the Rules made thereunder, de hors our decision striking down rules 6-A and 6-B shall not stand in any manner affected or undermined by this decision (e) The State shall be at liberty to bring to life, force and effect section 3-B by appropriate legislation, including subordinate legislation in accordance with the principles and dicta laid down by the Supreme Court of India in the decisions in (i) Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. State of Rajasthan 1993 88 STC 204 supra 1992 2 MTCR 474 and (ii) Builders Association of India v. State of Karnataka 1993 88 STC 248 supra 1992 2 MTCR 542. (f) Nothing in this order shall affect the right of the Revenue to initiate or continue or pursue and proceed to decide or pass orders or assess and recover the tax due as and when the law is validly made and in accordance with law and (g) These writ petitions, shall stand ordered and finally disposed of in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs. Writ petitions disposed of accordingly.
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1992 (12) TMI 207 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion there should be some alteration in the nature or character of the goods. Approving this approach of the High Court it was held by the Supreme Court (at page 504) In our opinion, the interpretation of section 2(17) calls for a like limitation on the words used by the statute. As we have already pointed out, that if a very wide interpretation is given, it may lead to impractical consequences. 8.. We find that the controversy sought to be raised in this reference is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. It is now the settled position that the activity of fumigating and treating of foodgrains with insecticides, fumigants and similar chemicals does not amount to manufacture within the meaning of section 2(17) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. In that view of the matter, the questions of law sought to be referred are purely academic. No reference is, therefore, called for. Consequently this application is rejected. 9.. We make no order as to costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 206 - WEST BENGAL TAXATION TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... ctions of the applicant relating to photo-taking, enlargement and making and supply of photoprints are not taxable under section 6D of the Act. The prayer of the applicant with regard to issue of such a declaration is thus allowed. There should now be no difficulty in the matter of issue of declaration forms if the applicant is otherwise eligible. The concerned Commercial Tax Officer is directed to dispose of the application for such forms, if already made or to be made in future, in accordance with law. 62.. In the result, the application succeeds and is allowed on contest. Interim orders, if any, are vacated. There will be no order for cost. ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL The application is allowed in terms of the declarations and directions given in the foregoing paragraph 26. Operation of this judgment and order is stayed for eight weeks on verbal prayer of the learned State Representative. Interim orders, if any, shall remain in force for the period of stay. Application allowed.
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1992 (12) TMI 205 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dingly answer the question referred to us by saying that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the rate of tax on flap having not been specified in the rate chart, it would come under the category of unspecified goods taxable at the rate of 7 per cent and 8 per cent as it stood then for both the years in question. However, we find from the records that there is material to show that the assessees collected tax at the rate of 10 per cent in respect of the concerned goods and has deposited the same. If that be so, notwithstanding our conclusion that the residual rate is applicable, the assessee shall not be permitted to take refund of the amount which may be found due by application of the residual rate. This aspect shall be indicated by the Tribunal when it takes up the matter for disposal in terms of section 24(5) of the Act. There shall be no order as to costs. A. PASAYAT, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1992 (12) TMI 204 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... debt, and gives this action founded in the equity of the plaintiff s case, as it were, upon a contract (quasi ex contractu) as the Roman law expresses it. As Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. 1943 AC 32 (HL) 1942 2 All ER 122 (HL), pointed out, the obligation is as efficacious as if it were upon a contract. Such remedies are quasi-contract or restitution and theory of unjust enrichment has not been closed in English law . While therefore, holding that section 9-B(3) has no application to the facts of the case we are of the view that the amount collected should be returned to the State. If at any point of time the person who made payment of sales tax makes a motion for refund of the differential amount from him, said motion shall be duly considered by the State. The State cannot in such a case enrich itself at the expense of the customer. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs. R.K. PATRA, J.-I agree. Appeal disposed of accordingly.
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1992 (12) TMI 203 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The quantum of penalty that can be levied in the present case shall therefore be in a small proportion to the tax sought to be evaded since the declaration forms are found to be used bona fide. Since the entire materials are there before this Court, I find it unnecessary in this case to remand the matter to lower authorities to fix the quantum of penalty. Therefore after considering all aspects of the case I fix 10 per cent of the tax sought to be evaded by the assessee as penalty under section 45A in the present case. The Deputy Commissioner as per exhibit P3 levied the penalty equal to the amount of tax sought to be evaded. On the basis of that calculation I fix the penalty of Rs. 3,865 for the year 1982-83 and Rs. 8,875 for the year 1983-84 under section 45A of the Act. Exhibits P1 to P4 are modified to the extent indicated above. The fourth respondent is directed to issue demand notices to the assessee accordingly. The original petition is disposed of as above. No costs.
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1992 (12) TMI 202 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r years. Is it right and just, at this distance of time, that the petition should be dismissed merely because the petitioner has not resorted to a revision application? This question was rightly answered in the negative in Padmanabhan v. Kerala State Handloom Development Corporation 1993 82 FJK 32 (Ker). I am of the opinion that this petition should not be dismissed merely because the petitioner has not exhausted the remedy of revision applications. 25.. In view of my findings I allow the petition. The orders of the respondent referred to in prayer clause (ii) paragraph 11 of the petition, are hereby quashed. The respondent shall refund to the petitioner the entire amount of penalty recovered from them pursuant to the orders referred to in prayer clause (ii) of the petition. The respondent shall pay interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date on which the petitioner paid the penalty till the date of the refund of the amount to the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1992 (12) TMI 201 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ting out the state or condition of being equipped the manner in which a person or thing is equipped anything used in equipping furniture outfit warlike apparatus. In Stroud s Judicial Dictionary, Fourth Edition, it is stated that the equipment of e.g. a hospital, includes anything and every thing which is required to convert an empty building, a part of an empty building, into a hospital, or part of a hospital, with all modern appliances. 5.. The Tribunal has referred to the user of bricks and has recorded a finding of fact that the goods sold were encovered by the serial No. 14 of the items which the purchasing dealer was authorised to purchase in terms of the certificate of registration. The conclusions of the Tribunal appear to be in order, as a factual finding has been recorded about the user. 6.. The question referred for opinion is, therefore, answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1992 (12) TMI 200 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... essive dealers in Delhi and by virtue of the notification tax would be levied on the first sale. The Tribunal has proceeded on the basis that the dealer has made sales to manufacturers on the strength of their registration certificates. The goods which were sold by the dealer have been used in manufacture by the purchasers. These goods have, therefore, not been subjected to resale as such. There has been no series of sales of these goods in the Union Territory of Delhi, in view of the fact that the goods sold by the dealer had lost their character when they were used as raw material, in the manufacture of medicines by the purchasers. It is that manufactured item which is ultimately sold by the purchaser and not the item, as such, which was purchased from the dealer. For the reasons stated hereinabove the answer to the reframed question is in the negative and in favour of the dealer. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Question reframed and answered in the negative.
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