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Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 623 Records
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2007 (1) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the State Government is obligated to constitute a committee of management of a public trust to which Chapter X of the Act applies?
Whether the constitution of such a committee of management falls within the discretionary jurisdiction of the State Government? Chapter X comprises of 14 sections beginning from Sections 52 to 65 of Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959?
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2007 (1) TMI 550 - SUPREME COURT
What would be the meaning of the term "immediately" occurring in Order XXI Rule 84 of the Code, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case?
Whether the sale was void only because it was confirmed before expiry of the period of 30 days?
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2007 (1) TMI 549 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the suit is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code?
Whether the appellant has established that there was a tripartite arrangement come to, by which the bus was made over by him to one Fernandes and Fernandes undertook to the Bank to discharge the liability under the mid term loan?
Whether the High Court was correct in granting the Bank a decree in the suit?
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2007 (1) TMI 548 - SUPREME COURT
Whether when an authority takes a decision which may have civil consequences and affects the rights of a person, the principles of natural justice would at once come into play?
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2007 (1) TMI 547 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the department enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case?
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2007 (1) TMI 546 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the appellant is not entitled to exercise the option to acquire ownership of the demised industrial sheds and his claim in that regard is wholly baseless?
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2007 (1) TMI 545 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULINGS
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the profits arising to Fidelity Hastings Street Trust : Fidelity Discovery Fund (hereinafter referred to as the " applicant" ) from the sale of portfolio investments in India will be treated as business income of the applicant ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the applicant can be regarded as having a permanent establishment (" PE" ) in India in accordance with article 5 of the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income entered into between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the " treaty") ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, if the income is found to be in the nature of business income, in the absence of a PE in India and in the light of the provisions of article 7 read with article 5 of the Treaty, such business income of the applicant will be taxable in India ?
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, if it is found that the applicant has a permanent establishment in India under the treaty and if the income is found to be in the nature of business income, the business income of the applicant in India from the sale of portfolio investments will be taxable in India at the rate of 20 per cent. in the light of section 115AD of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the " ITA" ) ?
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2007 (1) TMI 544 - SUPREME COURT
What would be the date on which declaratory decree can be said to have been obtained by the appellants?
Whether the suit of the appellants was barred by limitation?
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2007 (1) TMI 543 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Court. Therefore the only question that arises in the present case whether netting should be allowed. 4. In view of the judgment rendered by us on 12-1-2007 in the batch of appeals (ITA No. 166/2000 etc.) of which the present appeal forms part, we hold that netting should be allowed since the interest income has been treated as business income. Therefore we have answered the first question in the affirmative and against the revenue. 5. As regards the second question, we hold that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the income from the sale of scrap generated during the manufacture of goods which are entirely exported, was not incidental to the export activity and could not be treated as business income. Therefore this income was rightly not included for the purposes of computation for deduction under section 80HHC. Therefore question No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. 6. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with no orders as to costs.
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2007 (1) TMI 542 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... er sources it goes out entirely from the ambit of section 80HHC. In the facts of the present case, it must be held that the approach of the Department in the years previous to assessment year 1997-98 was not in consonance with the law as explained in our judgment delivered on 12-1-2007 in ITA 166/2000 etc., of which these appeals formed part. We are of the view that, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Assessing Officer was justified in taking a different view in the year 1997-98 and 1998-99. The Tribunal was therefore in error in allowing the deduction only on the principle of consistency. 6. We accordingly set aside the impugned orders dated 19-8-2005 and 20-3-2006 passed by the ITAT and allow both appeals with no orders as to costs. If appeal effect had already been given consequent upon the impugned order of the ITAT, the concerned Assessing Officer will now redetermine the section 80HHC deduction in accordance with our judgment rendered on 12-1-2007.
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2007 (1) TMI 541 - SUPREME COURT
Whether an Act or Regulation which, or a part of which, is or has been found by this Court to be violative of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14, 19 and 31 can be included in the Ninth Schedule?
Whether it is only a constitutional amendment amending the Ninth Schedule that damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution that can be struck down?
Held that:- If vacant land owned by a person fell within the ceiling limits for an urban agglomeration, he was outside the purview of the Act and could not be governed by any of the provisions of the Act. It was, therefore held by the learned Judge that the provisions of Section 27(1) were invalid insofar as they sought to affect a citizens right to dispose of his urban property in an urban agglomeration within the ceiling limits. Krishna Iyer, J. did not discuss the provisions of Section 27(1), but he agreed with the learned Chief Justice regarding the partial invalidation of Section 27(1). The learned Chief Justice had said in his brief earlier order that Section 27(1) was invalid insofar as it imposed a restriction on the transfer of any urban or urbanisable property within the ceiling area. Such property was transferable without the constraints mentioned in Section 27(1). What is relevant is that whereas Tulzapurkar, J. and A.P.Sen, J. struck down Section 27(1), in part, for violation of the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) respectively, without more, Krishna Iyer, J. said: What is a betrayal of the basic feature is not a mere violation of Article 14 but a shocking, unconscionable or unscrupulous travesty of the quintessence of equal justice. If a legislation does go that far it shakes the democratic foundation and must suffer the death penalty.
Refer these writ petitions and appeals for decision to a larger Bench, preferably of nine learned Judges. The papers and proceedings shall be placed before the Honble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.
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2007 (1) TMI 540 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ne appears on behalf of the dealer/opposite party. I do not find any error in the order of the Tribunal. Merely because as per the terms of the agreement, some payments were received towards advance from the commission agent it cannot be said that the movement of the goods was in pursuance of prior contract of sales. Sometime principal asks agent to pay some amount as a security against the goods, but mere payment of some amount in advance would not change the nature of transaction. As per the agreement, the dealer had appointed M/s. MSP Automobiles, Virudhunagar, Tamil Nadu as a commission agent. The genuineness of the agreement is not in dispute. The movement of goods was by way of stock transfer to the commission agent for sale. In the circumstances, the view of the Tribunal that the goods had moved by way of stock transfer for sale and not in pursuance of prior contract of sale, cannot be said to be erroneous. In the result, revision fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2007 (1) TMI 539 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Thus, I see no reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. A perusal of the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Trade Tax, Kanpur, shows that no proper reason has been given for the reduction of the turnover. Merely because the applicant has disclosed progressive turnover during the year under consideration in comparison to the earlier year, it is no ground to estimate the suppressed turnover only to the extent of Rs. 5 lacs. In my view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, estimate of the turnover by the assessing authority cannot be said to be arbitrary and without any basis. It may be mentioned here that in the best judgment assessment, there is always an element of guesswork but unless the estimate of turnover is arbitrary and without any basis, it cannot be interfered under section 11 of the Act in exercise of revisional powers. For the reasons stated above, the present revision is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2007 (1) TMI 538 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d specified under section 21(5) of the Act. First appellate authority has accepted the plea of the dealer and allowed both the appeals and quashed the assessment orders being barred by limitation. The Commissioner of Trade Tax filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by the impugned order dismissed both the appeals and confirmed the order of the first appellate authority. Heard learned counsel for the parties. I do not find any error in the order of the Tribunal. Issue involved is squarely covered by the Full Bench decision of this court in the case of Minakshi Udyog, Agra v. Commissioner of Trade Tax reported in 2005 UPTC 143 in which Full Bench of this court held that where the case is reopened by the first appellate authority limitation provided under section 21(5) of the Act will apply. Admittedly, the assessment orders had been passed beyond the period specified under section 21(5) of the Act. In the result, both the revisions fail and are accordingly, dismissed.
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2007 (1) TMI 537 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... it both pure silk yarn as well as artificial silk yarn. Even applying the common parlance test or the test as to how the goods are known in the industry, we are also of the opinion that the expression 39 silk yarn 39 would include within itself both pure silk yarn as well as artificial silk yarn. In the premises, as aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the expression 39 silk yarn 39 has been used in a generic sense and both the artificial silk yarn as well as the pure silk yarn would be covered by the said expression... Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18033 of 1991 against the aforesaid decision of the Orissa High Court has been dismissed by the apex court on December 9, 1991. Respectfully following the aforesaid decision of the Orissa High Court referred hereinabove, it is held that silk yarn includes both pure silk yarn as well as artificial silk yarn. Order of the Tribunal is accordingly, upheld. In the result, revision fails and is accordingly, dismissed.
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2007 (1) TMI 536 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... time). The decision relied on by the learned Government Pleader in support of his contention in Sha Bhoormull Buboothmull Jain v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer 1978 41 STC 400 (Mad) was rendered in a totally different context. That was a case in which notice under section 16 of the Act proposing reassessment was issued to the assessee on March 30, 1972, well within the period of limitation prescribed. The assessment order was served on April 3, 1972, which is beyond the period of limitation. In those factual circumstances of the case, having regard to the statutory provision, this court held that mere initiation for issuance of the notice would safeguard the period of limitation in favour of the Revenue. I am of the view that the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case, which is on a totally different set of facts as explained above. In view of the foregoing reasoning, the writ petition is allowed as prayed for. However, there is no order as to costs.
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2007 (1) TMI 535 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Oriental Carbon Limited, reported in 1997 10 NTN 105. Thus, for the levy of penalty under section 15A(1)(o) of the Act, a case of an attempt to evade the tax is to be made out. Perusal of the show-cause notice reveals that at the check-post, representative of the applicant voluntarily produced the bill and builty and told that inadvertently declaration form was left with the seller, however, the goods were seized in the absence of declaration form without making out any case of an attempt to avoid the declaration of goods. Similarly in the penalty order no case of an attempt to evade the tax has been made out and the penalty has been levied merely on the ground that the goods had been imported without declaration form. In this view of the matter, penalty is not sustainable and is liable to be set aside. In the result, revision is allowed. Order of the Tribunal is set aside and the penalty under section 15A(1)(o) of the Act is quashed.
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2007 (1) TMI 534 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... order of the appellate authority reveals that at no stage, dealer had explained that why the books of account were not produced before the Assistant Commissioner (Mobile Squad) and before the assessing authority for verification of the entries of seized goods in the books of account. On these facts, the assessing authority has rightly drawn the inference that the goods were not entered in the books of account. The levy of penalty is justified. The goods were released on furnishing of security at Rs. 13,280. The assessing authority had not given any reason for the levy of penalty at Rs. 33,200. The Tribunal has also not adjudicated the issue relating to the quantum of penalty. In this view of the matter, the case is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the quantum of penalty. In the result, revision is allowed. Order of the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal to decide the quantum of penalty afresh in the light of observations made above.
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2007 (1) TMI 533 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t with a statutory provisions. Consistency and discipline are, according to this court, of far greater importance than the winning or losing of court proceedings. In the case of Collector of Central Excise, Bombay v. Jayant Dalal (Pvt.) Ltd. 1997 10 SCC 402, this court has held that it is not open to the Revenue to advance an argument or even file an appeal against the correctness of the binding nature of the circulars issued by the Board. Similar is the view taken by this court in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Bombay v. Kores (India) Limited 1997 10 SCC 338. Similar view has been taken by the apex court in a recent decision in the case of SACI Allied Products Ltd., U.P. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Meerut reported in 2005 5 RC 119 2005 7 SCC 159, Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan reported in 2003 263 ITR 706 (SC). In this view of the matter, the order of the Tribunal is upheld. In the result, all the three revisions fail and are accordingly, dismissed.
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2007 (1) TMI 532 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ers places and the assessee paid the amount for shortages and leakages to the purchaser. Therefore, the risk in the goods rested with the petitioner till the goods are delivered to the purchaser at the purchaser 39 s place. One more additional factor also found in this case was that the transit insurance in respect of the goods were taken by the assessee-dealer in their name only. So, all the above activities of the petitioner made it clear that the freight charges though separately shown in the invoices and collected would form part of the sale price and as such that turnover has been taken for levy of tax, for which course of action, in the absence of any other material to prove except the production of the invoices, wherein the freight charges have been separately shown, I do not find any material change or material evidence to interfere with the finding arrived at by the authorities. Therefore, this writ petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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