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Showing 101 to 120 of 130 Records
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1976 (2) TMI 30 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Valuation - Deduction for selling expenses and selling profits ... ... ... ... ..... ing the expenses incurred. In connection with marketing and distributing of goods, interest on the value of goods attributable to the period between the time at which the goods left the factory premises and the time at which the price was paid by the wholesaler as well as the freight, octroi and other charges involved in the transport of the articles from the factory gate to the selling points. He was also justified in directing the Excise authorities to determine what portion of the advertisement expenses incurred by the manufacturer can be allowed to be deducted depending upon how far it can be traceable to the selling operation and not attributable to the manufacturing operation or manufacturing profit. The items referred to above are not exhaustive but only illustrative of the nature of deductions which have to be made before arriving at the assessable value for the purpose of Section 4, clause (b). 18. These appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1976 (2) TMI 29 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... a formal nature, and that no prejudice was in fact caused to the petitioner. Hence according to Mr. Manjrekar, copies thereof were not furnished to the petitioner. 6. Whether these reports were of a formal nature of prejudice was or was not caused to the petitioner, was not a matter for the concerned authority to decide. It was incumbent upon the concerned authority to have furnished copies of these reports to the petitioners which admittedly was not done despite the petitioner s request. In this state of affairs, we hold that the principles of natural justice were not observed, and on that ground alone this special Civil Application deserves to succeed. 7. We therefore, set aside the appellate order of the 2nd respondent and the revisional order of the 3rd respondent and remand the case back to the appropriate appellate authority which shall come to its finding on the materials before it and in the light of observations made by us above. Rule absolute. No order as to costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 28 - DELHI HIGH COURT
1922 Act, 1961 Act, Assessment Year, Failure To Deduct Tax At Source, Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... 7. Consequently, I hold, that the recovery certificates were issued contrary to law, and cannot be allowed to stand. Because of this conclusion I have found it unnecessary to discuss any of the other points raised on behalf of the petitioner. Accordingly, these petitions are allowed and the recovery certificates issued by the respondents in respect of the ten assessment years from 1st April, 1941, to 31st March, 1952, are quashed. Further, the respondents are prohibited from taking any proceedings for recovery in pursuance of those certificates. To avoid doubt or confusion I add that nothing in this judgment will be construed as precluding the respondents from taking steps to recover the tax from the assessee in such other manner as may be permissible in law. As the point of limitation on which these petitions have succeeded, though taken in the petitions, was not grounded on section 231 of the Act of 1961, I will leave the parties to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1976 (2) TMI 27 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Jurisdiction Of High Court, Notice For Reassessment, Original Assessment, Writ Petition
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1976 (2) TMI 26 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Development Rebate Reserve, General Reserve ... ... ... ... ..... fers wide powers upon the Income-tax Officer to withdraw an allowance originally made and that for that purpose a specially enlarged period of limitation has been prescribed. Its effect and consequences upon the assessee would be considerably serious, for it might unsettle things which have since long been settled. Such discretionary power cannot but be exercised reasonably on an overall consideration of all the circumstances of the case. In our opinion, taking a reasonable view of the matter, the power of rectification could not have been validly exercised by the respondent in the present case and the order, therefore, is invalid. Even on the alternative ground put forward by the revenue, therefore, the impugned order cannot be held to have been made in valid exercise of power. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated December 27, 1975 (exhibit F), is declared to be invalid and unenforceable. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 25 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
1961 Act, Act Of 1922, Assessment Year, Bad Debt ... ... ... ... ..... ive, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. We have already indicated that, in the light of the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Arvind Narottam, question No. (1) in Income-tax Reference No. 168 of 1974 must be answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. Question No. (2) in the light of the above discussion is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Commissioner in each of these two references. Mr. J. P. Shah has orally applied for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under section 261 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In our opinion, the question decided by us is on points involving substantial question of law, and, therefore, this is a fit case in which leave should be granted. Leave is accordingly granted and certificate is issued so far as the question of section 41(4) of the Act of 1961 is concerned.
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1976 (2) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Firm Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ed under the provisions of the Income-tax Act on the partners can the partners be proceeded against under the provisions of the Act. A certificate issued for collection of tax from the firm cannot be utilised for the purpose of taking coercive steps against the partner of the firm. The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, contained a provision specially incorporating rule 50 of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code. It was in the light of that specific provision that the Supreme Court in the decision in Income-tax Offtcer v. Radha Krishan, already referred to, upheld the proceedings taken against the partners of the firm. Such a provision is significantly absent in the Act. This has been noticed in the judgment under appeal and the absence of such a provision makes all the difference. It is, therefore, not possible for steps being taken against the partners of a firm for collection of tax imposed on the firm as such. We dismiss this appeal but direct the parties to bear their costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e was on account of the fact that he was advised by his legal adviser that it was no use pursuing the point, as the benefit the assessee wanted he would get, in view of the law laid down by the High Court of Allahabad by which the income-tax authorities were bound. Since the assessee acted on legal advice which ultimately was found to be wrong and acting on the wrong advice it did not press the appeal on the main question on which the parties were at controversy it could not amount, in our opinion, to any admission of fact or unqualified withdrawal of the ground taken before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We are not aware of any principle of law which would justify in the eye of law such conduct on the part of the assessee as coming within the mischief of the doctrine of estoppel. For the reasons given above we answer the question in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. We assess the costs at Rs. 200, payable by the revenue to the assessee.
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1976 (2) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Income Tax Act, Interest Payable, Regular Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... nt by meaning assessment made under sections 143 and 144 and not to confine to initial assessment, in my opinion it cannot be said that the legislative intent was to confine the meaning of regular assessment to initial or first assessment as indicated in the judgment referred to hereinbefore. In the aforesaid view of the matter, in my opinion, the Commissioner, in holding that the regular assessment was confined to the initial or first assessment, committed an error of law apparent on the face of the order. The order of the Commissioner dated the 7th November, 1972, in so far as it held that the petitioner was not entitled to interest under section 214 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is set aside and quashed and the Commissioner is directed to reconsider the matter in accordance with law and in accordance with the observations made herein. The rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs. Operation of this order is stayed for six weeks.
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1976 (2) TMI 21 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Capital Expenditure, Collaboration Agreement, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... sufficiently enduring in nature, but with a view to earn more profit. It was, therefore, laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business as contemplated by section 37 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the light of the above discussion, we answer the questions referred to us as follows Question No. 1 in Income-tax Reference No. 125 of 1974 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assesseee and against the revenue. Question No. 2 in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In Income-tax Reference No. 181 of 1974, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue, question No. 2 in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. The Commissioner will pay the costs of the assessee in Income-tax Reference No. 125 of 1974. In Income-fax Reference No. 181 of 1974, since each party has succeeded partly and lost partly, we direct that there will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 20 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
House Property, Rent Control ... ... ... ... ..... kdar, the learned standing counsel, submits that the ground floor of the building was rented out at Rs. 200 per month but the first floor was occupied by the deceased, and, therefore, it was not a case of rented house wherein the gross rental method may be applied. His submission is, however, meritless inasmuch as the ground floor is on rent and for the first floor also the Appellate Controller has taken into account some reasonable rent on the basis of the rent received for the ground floor and under such circumstances if the land and building method is adopted it will cause unreasonable hardship against the accountable person. Hence, we find that the Tribunal did not commit any error of law in directing that the house property in question should be valued on the rental method as contrasted with the land and building method. We, accordingly, answer the question referred in the affirmative and against the department. There will be no order as to costs. K. LAHIRI J.--I agree.
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1976 (2) TMI 19 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... and, in our opinion, the Income-tax Officer took the cause shown by the assessee in that light and that too correctly. That being so, it cannot be said that in the instant case the reason for non-payment of taxes as shown by the assessee was not considered by the Income-tax Officer. After considering the reason given by the assessee for non-payment of the taxes the Income-tax Officer was not satisfied and this non-satisfaction cannot be said to be perverse or without consideration of the materials on record. That being so, the Income-tax Officer was within his jurisdiction and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal were not wrong in accepting the finding of the Income-tax Officer and upholding the impugned orders of penalty passed by the Income-tax Officer. In the result, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the deparatment. The reference is answered accordingly. We, however, make no order as to costs. BAHARUL ISLAM J.-- I agree.
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1976 (2) TMI 18 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Account Books, Capital Gains Tax ... ... ... ... ..... clusions. I would like to add that it has been found as a fact by the Tribunal that, (a) the assessee got no right, title and interest, (b) the assessee did not acquire any interest in the capital asset, and (c) the assessee only got back from the price received by the vendee what it had actually invested originally. These facts have not been challenged in the questions mooted before us. The indenture of sale pursuant to the decree specifically records that the said sum of Rs. 1,30,000 has been paid by the purchaser, that is, Sur Estates, to the vendor, that is, Sircar Estate. In view of this finding of fact it appears to me that the matter is otherwise concluded. The indenture recording the transfer is principally. by Sur Estates, the vendor, and the assessee is only a confirming party. In any event it cannot be said that if any capital gain has resulted from this transaction the same can be taxed entirely in the hands of the confirming party ignoring the vendor altogether.
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1976 (2) TMI 17 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Mercantile System, Sales Tax Refund, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... in the course of which this right to refund accrued. In view of section 41(1), therefore, it is that previous year in the course of which the right to receive this amount of Rs. 42,263 by way of refund accrued to the assessee and the provisions of section 41(1) are, therefore, applicable and it is the assessment year 1965-66, the previous year being Samvat year 2020, which is the year in which the amount of refund can be brought to tax under section 41(1). Under these circumstances we cannot accede to the request of Mr. Kaji made in the alternative to reframe the question and we answer the question as originally referred to us. We answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and question No. 2 also in the affirmative as to the first part. The rest of question No. 2 does not arise, that is, the income was rightly assessed to tax in the assessment year 1965-66, when the order of the Supreme Court was announced. The assessee will pay the costs of this reference to the Commissioner.
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1976 (2) TMI 16 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Levy Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... evident from the rulings mentioned above. Even if there is division of the assets of the Hindu undivided family subsequent to the execution of the deed of partnership it has to be held that a genuine firm came into existence. Thus, on the above reasonings, the Tribunal has held that a genuine firm came into existence on and from April 1, 1960. We have considered the reasonings given by the Tribunal and the decisions of the Supreme Court relied upon by it. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the Tribunal did not commit any error of law in holding that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case a genuine firm of the four partners as stated in the deed of partnership dated April 1, 1960, was in existence during the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1961-62, 1962-63 and 1963-64. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the department. We, however, make no order as to costs. BAHARUL ISLAM J.--I agree.
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1976 (2) TMI 15 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Bona Fide, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... to be a sham one or unless he found that the prices paid were not what was shown in the books of account and since none of these three conclusions had been reached by him, he had no right to depart from the books of account of the assessee-firm. In view of these conclusions we hold that the Tribunal was not justified in disallowing a part of the actual price of tobacco paid to the partners and question No. (1) must, therefore, be answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. In view of our conclusion it is really not necessary to answer question No. (2) but in any event it appears that the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the partners and their relatives were paid higher price was erroneous in law as the Tribunal has not compared comparables. We, therefore, answer question No. (2) in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The Commissioner will pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1976 (2) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... findings recorded by the Appellate Tribunal. It has been urged by Mr. Deokinandan that the scope of the question is wide enough and we can go into the merits of the findings recorded by the Appellate Tribunal. In our opinion, this would be appreciating the evidence which the Supreme Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1971 82 ITR 547 (SC) has negatived. It has held that when the question referred to the High Court speaks of on the facts and circumstances of the case , it means on the facts and circumstances found by the Appellate Tribunal and not facts and circumstances that may be found by the High Court on a reappraisal of the evidence. In view of this pronouncement of law, we are of opinion that we cannot go into the findings recorded by the Appellate Tribunal. The result is that we answer the reference in the affirmative, against the department and in favour of the assessee. The assessee shall be entitled to his costs which we assess at Rs. 200.
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1976 (2) TMI 13 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Individual Income ... ... ... ... ..... hich the notice had been issued to one heir of legal representatives had been explained in the affidavit- in-opposition on behalf of the revenue. The infirmity of that notice cannot, in my opinion, be challenged by the petitioner who is admittedly served with a notice. If aggrieved, the other heirs, if any, of Premgopal Bhandari can challenge the said fact. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the observations of the courts in the case of First Additional Income-tax Officer v. Mrs. Suseela Sadanandan 1965 57 ITR 168, 172 (SC) and in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. 1971 79 ITR 637 (Bom) are not quite relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. In that view of the matter, this challenge to the reopening cannot be sustained. The application, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. Rule nisi is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Operation of this order is stayed for four weeks.
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1976 (2) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Mercantile System, Sales Tax Refund, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... on the costs in terms of the proviso to section 7 of the Act. But the first question that requires to be considered is what was the agricultural income received by him. It is not material wha t was receivable by him in such a case. Therefore, the amount that was received by the petitioner is the material consideration in this case. From that point of view, in my opinion, it appears that the impugned orders of assessment for these two years contain errors apparent on the face of the record and need rectification. In the aforesaid view of the matter I set aside these two orders and direct the Agricultural Income-tax Officer to proceed afresh in accordance with law on the basis of agricultural income actually received by him and compute such income in accordance with law. For this purpose, the petitioner should produce all relevant evidence indicating the amount actually received by him. With the aforesaid direction, the rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs.
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1976 (2) TMI 11 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Annual Letting Value, House Property, Municipal Taxes ... ... ... ... ..... , as the case may be. The test thus laid down is clear, though we must say that like some other tests it may not be easy of application in all cases. The Tribunal, in adjusting its decision under section 260(1), will have to apply this test to find out whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was diversion at source of income, in the shape of remuneration of the office of the director-in-charge in favour of the HUF. It is only if that question is answered in favour of the assessee that the assessee s claim that such income is not taxable in his hands will have to be upheld. The result, therefore, is that, so far as the first question is concerned, we decline to answer the same for the foregoing reasons. So far as the second question is concerned, as earlier stated, we answer the same in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There will be no order as to the costs of the reference in the circumstances of the case.
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