Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 565 Records
-
2001 (10) TMI 1060 - SUPREME COURT
Conviction orders - Held that:- The High Court appears to have proceeded on the basis that the denials/averments in his reply dated 21-5-1993, were sufficient to shift the burden of proof onto the appellant complainant to prove that the cheque was issued for a debt or liability. This is an entirely erroneous approach.
The High Court erroneously set aside that conviction. Thus the impugned judgment is set aside. The conviction and sentence as awarded by the Magistrate by his order dated 21-3-1994, stand. The first respondent is granted one month’s time to pay the fine. In default thereof he shall suffer simple imprisonment for three months. The fine if realised, ₹ 60,000 therefrom shall be paid to the complainant as compensation.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1057 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Suspension of legal proceedings, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... society stating therein whether the proceedings which were initiated before the BIFR are still pending and if so, the stage of the said proceedings (enquiry under section 16, preparation of scheme/implementation of scheme/appeal under section 25 of the SICA). In default, it shall be open to the certificate officer, respondent No. 3 to proceed with recovery in accordance with law. 24. In the event the proceedings before the BIFR/AAIFR are still pending in relation to the petitioner-company, it shall be open to the respondent-society to make such application before the said authority for consent/approval for recovery of the amounts due under the certificate. 25. No proceedings for recovery under the said certificates shall be taken against the petitioner-company except with the consent/approval of the BIFR/AAIFR as long as the proceedings are pending before the said authorities. 26. The writ application is accordingly disposed of. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1056 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding up order ... ... ... ... ..... the matter to the Chief Justice to form a larger Bench or send the matter to the appropriate Appellate Court having determination over the company matters to come to a definite conclusion on these two issues (a)whether leave can be granted subsequent to the order passed by the appeal court in regularising the appeal ? (b)If not, what would be the fate of the order of the appeal court already existing ? Let the matter be placed before the Chief Justice for the said purpose of formation of appropriate Bench or for appropriate assignment or for taking appropriate steps. Xeroxed certified copies of this judgment will be supplied to the parties within seven days from the date of putting requisites for drawing up and completion of the order and certified copy of this judgment. 9. Department and all parties are to act on the signed copy minutes of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking and subject to satisfaction of the officer of the court in respect as above.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1055 - HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN, JAIPUR BENCH
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... , as referred above, such serious dispute has been raised in regard to the hire purchase agreement made between ITC Bhadrachalam Finance and Investments Ltd. and the petitioner-company and further, the whole equipment involved in the present matter along with the up-to-date rental instalment has been claimed by BFIL, formerly known as ITC Bhadrachalam Finance and Investments Ltd., in my opinion, no case for winding up of the respondent-company has been made out in the present case. The judgment, referred above by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. Accordingly, there is no merit in the company petition and the same is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. However, the petitioner shall be at liberty to take any other legal remedy available to them in accordance with law and may also approach the respondent-company for negotiations, if possible and permitted under the law. Petition dismissed.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1051 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Winding up - Circumstances in which a company may be wound up ... ... ... ... ..... ontentions. He stated that above amounts will be paid within three months. Both the parties agreed that the dispute should be referred to the arbitration as per the agreement. Mr. Madon appearing for the appellants stated that the appellants have nominated Mr. A.Y. Bookwalla as an arbitrator, which is acceptable to the respondent-company. In the result the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The respondent-company is directed to pay to the appellants Rs. 36,52,000 within three months. If the respondent-company fails to pay this said amount within the said period the company petition shall stand admitted and the appellants will advertise the same in Free Press Journal, Loksatta and Maharashtra Government Gazette and deposit a sum of Rs. 2000. 15. All contentions of the respondent-company in respect of the service charges and enhanced lease rentals are left open. Ad interim order granted by this Court to continue for a period of six weeks. 16. Appeal is disposed of.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1050 - GUJARAT STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
Deficiency in services ... ... ... ... ..... pponent UTI in this appeal, we are of the considered opinion that non-acceptance of the initial request for Reinvestment Plan for one of the three certificates as stated above clearly amounted to deficiency in service, particularly when the opponent UTI did not set out the alleged technical reason for not accepting the request for exercise of option for Reinvestment Plan. However, since the dividend amount remained with the complainant, we propose to award token compensation in favour of the complainant against opponent UTI. Order Impugned order dated 7-6-1997 rendered by the learned Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Ahmedabad City, Ahmedabad in Complaint No. 1202 of 1994 is hereby set aside. The opponent Unit Trust of India is directed to pay to the complainant token compensation in the sum of Rs. 300 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of this direction. This appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed with no further order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1049 - SUPREME COURT
Whether rule 11 of the rules framed by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala under section 34(1) of the Advocate Act, 1961, is binding on the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council, and if not, whether the Disciplinary Committee was justified in ordering that on account of the disqualification under rule 11, the appellant could not be allowed to appear, act or plead till he gets himself purged of the contempt by the order of the appropriate court?
Held that:- The respondent-advocate continued to appear in all the courts where he was earlier appearing even after he was convicted by the High Court for criminal contempt without being objected by any court. This is obviously on account of the fact that presiding officers of the court were not informed of what happened. We, therefore, direct that in future, whenever an advocate is convicted by the High Court for contempt of court, the Registrar of that High Court shall intimate the fact to all the courts within the jurisdiction of that High Court so that presiding officers of all courts would get the information that a particular advocate is under the spell of the interdict contained in rule 11, until he purges himself of the contempt.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1047 - SUPREME COURT
Whether a particular trade practice has the actual or probable effect of diminishing or preventing competition?
Whether the trade practice has or may have the effect of preventing, destroying or restricting competition?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The impugned order has to be set aside solely on the ground that there was no material before the Commission to come to the conclusion that the appellant by collecting refundable security deposit without interest has committed any restrictive trade practice within the meaning of section 2(o)(ii ).
-
2001 (10) TMI 1046 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts etc. ... ... ... ... ..... in Annexure 6 of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II (Compliance and Recovery Officer, State of Orissa) addressed to the chairman-cum-managing director, IDC (petitioner No. 1) declaring it to be a deemed defaulter in view of section 8F of the Act, read with the Certificate Rules, 1989, is misconceived in law and has to be quashed. However, I find no illegality or infirmity in the order of the Commissioner directing petitioner No. 2-M/s. ABS spinning Mills Orissa Ltd. in Annexure 3, and the order of attachment in Annexure 8 and as such the provident fund authorities are free to proceed in accordance with law thereon. It is made clear that the liability of petitioner No. 1, if any, in the event of the winding up of petitioner No. 2-company has to be worked out in accordance with law as and when such occasion arises, on which I expressed no opinion. The writ petition is thus allowed in part to the extent indicated, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an application challenging an award, under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The time expiring under section 34 is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the Court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the Court’s powers by the exclusion of the operation of section 5 of the Limitation Act.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1043 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
Debt Recovery Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... hich are not relevant for the purpose of this case. Out of the many judgments referred, one judgment needs to be mentioned that is K.L. Gauba, In re. AIR 1954 Bom. 478. This was a case in which there was an agreement between the advocate and client, this agreement had a stipulation that the client would give a share in the subject-matter of litigation in the event of success. The Bombay High Court was of the view that this was misconduct. Fixation of fee by banks for payment to the lawyers uniformly would not in any way be termed as an agreement between the client and the advocate for sharing the fruits of litigation. As such, we do not find that even this judgment would come to the rescue of the petitioners. 7. Since the petitioners have failed to show us any rule or any law by which it could be said that the High Court had fixed the fee which could be payable by clients to the advocates, this writ petition deserves to be dismissed which is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1042 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Effect of Act on other laws ... ... ... ... ..... t, 1976 for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of an industrial company or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act. Section 32 has no application to the agreements. This section gives overriding effect to the provisions of the SICA. Even rules and schemes made thereunder override any other law. In other words, provisions of the SICA and rules and schemes made there-under shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in other statutes or rules. This, however, does not affect agreements executed by contracting parties. Therefore, the terms of the perpetual lease deed, which are not statutory in nature, are not affected by the provisions of section 32 of the SICA as they do not override an agreement. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the demand raised by the DDA is not hit by section 32 of the SICA. The writ petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1025 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
Customs House Agents Licence - Suspension of - Natural justice ... ... ... ... ..... rred under sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 21 of Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 1984, passed an order of suspension of the CHA licence with immediate effect, vide order dated 11-12-2000, against which the present appeal has been preferred. 3. emsp We find that it has been held by the Larger Bench that such an order passed without hearing the Customs House Agents does not pass the test of rule of natural justice laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. U.O.I. 1978 (1) S.C.C. 248 (S.C.) . The Tribunal has directed the Commissioner of Customs to give a personal hearing to the CHA and pass a speaking order under Regulation 21(2) of the CHA Regulations on the question whether the suspension of the licence should continue or not. Following the ratio of the above order, we direct that the Commissioner should act in accordance with the direction contained in paragraph 5.4 of the Larger Bench decision cited supra. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1024 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
Evidence - Confessional statement vis-a-vis Documentary evidence ... ... ... ... ..... ade in the appeal memorandum as reiterated by Shri Sarkar emphasised once again the first confessional statement of the appellant. Shri Gurnamsingh submits that the confessional was on account of physical force. Shri Sarkar submits that there was no timely retraction on record. 4. emsp I have considered the submissions and find that where there is voluminous documentation indicating lawful importation of certain goods and where the appellate authority on examination has held the documentation as genuine, his action of not giving any importance to confessional statement could not be faulted. 5. emsp In the appeal memorandum, the claim made is that even if the Commissioner (Appeals) had felt the sale deeds to be genuine, he should have sent this back to the original authority for adjudication. I find little merit in this plea. 6. emsp On perusal of the impugned order, I find that the Commissioner (Appeals) analysis cannot be faulted. His order sustains. The appeal is dismissed.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1019 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Stay/dispensation of pre-deposit - Modvat - Duty paying documents ... ... ... ... ..... pplier and not the appellants. He also relied upon the decision of the Larger Bench in the case of Kamakhya Steels (P) Ltd. v. CCE, Meerut, 2000 (121) E.L.T. 247 (T) - 2000 (40) RLT 575 (CEGAT-L.B.) . 3. emsp Countering the arguments, Shri C.L. Mehar, learned SDR, submitted that as held by the Larger Bench in the case of CCE, New Delhi v. Avis Electronics Pvt. Ltd., 2000 (117) E.L.T. 571 (T) 2000 (37) RLT 501 (CEGAT-LB) insistence on document evidencing payment of duty on the inputs as prescribed by Rules is not a technicality to be complied with for availing Modvat credit. 4. emsp We have considered the submissions of both the sides. The learned Advocate has made out a strong prima facie case in favour of the Appellants as the old invoices were used by the Essar Steels Ltd. after being allowed by the Superintendent. Accordingly we stay the recovery of entire amount confirmed against them during the pendency of the Appeal. The appeal is posted for final hearing on 12-11-2001.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1018 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Production capacity based duty ... ... ... ... ..... having jurisdiction over the input-manufacturer is not expressly envisaged under the notification and any denial of deemed Modvat credit on the ground of non-production of such certificate cannot be justified. In the instant case, Baba rsquo s invoice certainly contained their declaration of discharge of duty liability and hence that document ought to have been accepted. In the Malhotra rsquo s case, the invoice did not contain such a declaration as that invoice declared only to the effect that duty liability was yet to be discharged. But this deficiency was made up by the input-manufacturer by issuing a certificate to the effect that duty liability had been discharged. In my view, this supplementary certificate issued by M/s. Malhotra ought to have been treated as a declaration for the purpose of the Notification. The applicants have been able to establish a strong prima facie case. The application is allowed unconditionally. The appeal is directed to be posted in its turn.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1017 - CEGAT, MUMBAI
Manufacturer - Job worker - Furniture attached to earth - Excisability ... ... ... ... ..... ould not attract and the parts thereof before fitment, may attract duty if they fit in the description in the tariff entry. In these circumstances we direct re-examination of this issue also by the Commissioner. 11. emsp The plea on limitation in respect of demand in show cause notice dated 25-7-1997 - the appellants rsquo claim that the demand is partly barred is also to be considered by the Commissioner who shall also consider the plea of the appellant that while arriving at the assessable value abetment of duty payable was required to be allowed since the appellant had not recovered any duty from their clients. The Commissioner shall also consider the claim for Modvat credit if ultimately duty is found payable by the appellants. 12. emsp In the result the impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed by remand to the Commissioner, who shall pass fresh orders after extending a reasonable opportunity to the appellants of being heard and putting forth their defence.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1016 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Modvat/Cenvat - Modvat on capital goods ... ... ... ... ..... he goods in question has brought out a nexus between such use and the process of manufacture of Glass Shells (final product) in the respondents rsquo factory and, therefore, the nexus test put forward by the appellant is positively answered by each of the goods. As rightly submitted by the counsel, even the nexus test is not relevant for considering the question whether any of the goods is capital goods eligible for Modvat credit under Rule 57Q in view of the ruling of the apex court in Jawahar Mills Ltd. (supra) that the definition of lsquo capital goods rsquo under Rule 57Q is very wide and it rsquo s the user of the goods that would determine whether it would qualify as capital goods or not. In the instant case, the use of the goods, noted by the lower appellate authority, has not been disputed by the appellant. I find that the use of the goods renders them eligible for capital goods credit under Rule 57Q. The present appeal therefore has no merit and the same is rejected.
-
2001 (10) TMI 1000 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Special Court ought to have allowed the appellants to lead evidence for proving its case that the transaction in question was opposed to public policy?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. In our opinion, the decision of the Special Court calls for no interference. The plea which had been taken in the written statement essentially was that there was a squaring up of the transaction. This did not succeed as there was lack of evidence. The other plea of repayment also failed. We see no infirmity with the decision of the Special Court on this account with regard to the contention that the transaction was opposed to public policy. The Special Court was right in observing that no such plea has been raised in the written statement and we agree with the Special Court that permitting such a plea to be raised would be contrary to the plea already taken in the written statement namely, of squaring up or of repayment.
-
2001 (10) TMI 999 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the judicial review prayed for under article 32 needs consideration?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. A petition under article 32 is maintainable but the petitioners are not entitled to any relief by reason of insufficiency of available materials on record as regards the issue of infraction of article 21. In regard to the prayer for consolidation, the petitioner would be at liberty to approach the High Court in accordance with law. Similar is the situation as regards the orders of the Consumer Forum and the petitioner in the normal course of events would be at liberty to ventilate the grievance, if any, before the Appellate forum in accordance with law.
............
|