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Showing 121 to 140 of 231 Records
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1989 (4) TMI 113 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
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... ... ..... he light of the orders of the CIT(A) for the asst. yrs. 1975-76 to 1982-83 and thereby quantify the deductions in accordance with the directions given by the CIT(A). 25. As discussed above, all the orders of the CIT(A) on this issue have been set aside and the cases have been restored back to the file of the ITO to reframe the assessment orders of the respective year in view of the directions given by us while deciding this issue in ITA 3781/Bom/85 for the asst. yrs. 1975-76. Consequently, for the detailed reason given by us in the said appeal, we set aside the order the CIT(A) for this year as well as restore the issue back to the file of the ITO to reframe the assessment in accordance with the directions given by us in the appeal for the asst. yr. 1976-77. The issue, is, therefore, decided accordingly. 26. In the results (a) Cross Objections filed by the assessee stand dismissed. (b) As indicated above, the appeals filed by the Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
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1989 (4) TMI 112 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
Assessment Year, Reopening Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... osition is that the case boils down to there being no recorded reasons existing for the belief of escapement of income found by the Income-tax Officer before the issue of notice under section 148. Where no recorded reasons exist prior to the issue of notice the assumption of jurisdiction for reopening is void and the decision of the Supreme Court in Johri Lal (HUF) s case fully supports this view. 10. We, therefore, accordingly hold that since the requirements of section 148(2) were not satisfied prior to the issue of the notice dated 23-3-1981 by the Income-tax Officer the reassessment order dated 20-9-1982 is invalid and void ab initio. The same is hereby cancelled. 11. In the result, the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) is reversed on this point and the appeal of the assessee is allowed. 12. Since we have disposed of the appeal on the preliminary ground itself, we are not adjudicating upon the other grounds of appeal raised on the merits of the assessment.
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1989 (4) TMI 111 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
Assessment Year, Orders Prejudicial To Interests ... ... ... ... ..... sub-section (1) of section 263 of the Act is held to be prospective in operation and not retrospective. The impugned orders of learned Commissioner made under section 263 of the Act for both the assessment years under appeal stand cancelled. 8. Before parting, we like to derive desired fortification from the cases as Auto Pins (India) v. ITO 1987 20 ITD 1 (Delhi) to which the present J.M. was a party, and in the case of Aeroplane Shoe Factory v. ITO 1989 28 ITD 478 (Delhi) both the Benches having taken the same view on the same issue on identical grounds. 9. Since we have cancelled the orders of learned Commissioner on the main and vital reasoning of the learned Commissioner having no jurisdiction to exercise revisionary powers under section 263 of the Act for both the assessment years, grounds of the assessee taken on merits need not be decided and we are accordingly not discussing those contentions and the resultant decision. 10. Both the appeals succeed and stand allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 110 - ITAT BOMBAY-A
Assessment Year, Foreign Exchange, Fresh Information, High Court, Original Assessment, Plant And Machinery
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1989 (4) TMI 109 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-B
A Partner, Capital Gains, Legal Representative ... ... ... ... ..... during his lifetime though paid later on would be assessable in the hands of the deceased u/s. 159. Income from this source has also not been analysed, on this line and, therefore, his request was that we should direct the authorities below to analyse the income from the above single. There appears to us to be some substance in the above argument of the learned departmental representative. Having laid down the principle as above, we set aside the orders of the authorities below and restore the matter back to the file of the ITO with the direction that he will analyse each item of income with a view of ascertain as to which part of it accrued and arose to the deceased during his lifetime, and as to what is the income which accrued or arose after the death of the deceased, not to him, but to the executor and to bring to tax separately the two total incomes u/s. 159 and u/s. 168. With this direction we restore the matter back to the ITO. 13. We treat the appeal as partly allowed
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1989 (4) TMI 108 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Annual Value, Assessment Year, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... quisite relief to the assessee (quantum not disputed) is hereby approved. 20. Before we part with this appeal we would like to refer to the argument advanced before us by the DR to the effect that the assessee is not entitled to any benefit whatsoever since the property is being used for commercial purposes by the tenants and not residential . This point according to us is duly taken care of by the decision of the Hon ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Dr. J. V. Desai wherein it was hold that the user by the tenant was not relevant as long the property was a residential one when let out. This test stands satisfied in the present case since not only has the ITO himself allowed a deduction of Rs. 2400 u/s 23(1) to the assessee by treating the entire building as one residential unit but the explanation given by the learned counsel to the use of each unit for commercial-cum-residential purposes appearing to be a plausible one. 21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 107 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Assessment Year, Income Tax Act, Late Filing, Penalty Proceedings, Wealth Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... order can be applied to the entire period including the period prior to the date of coming into effect of the amendment. The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 substituted the new section in the place of the old one. Therefore, the old section must be said to have been repealed. Under section 6(c) and (d) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 where any Act repeals any enactment, that repeal does not effect any liability incurred under the repealed enactment or effect any penalty or punishment incurred in respect of an offence committed against any enactment so repealed. Therefore, the liability to the penalty incurred before the amendment is not effected. Hence the penalty in this case has to be calculated according to the old sec. 18(1)(a) up to the date of amendment and according to the new section after the date of amendment. Our decision above in effect is fully supported by the aforesaid decisions of the Bombay and Patna High Courts. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 106 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
Assessment Year, Capital Gains, Computation Of Capital, Gold Bonds ... ... ... ... ..... fully in a position to sell the gold and therefore for the purpose of this case it is that date which has to be taken for ascertaining the market value. If the assessee would have bought the gold from an outside source and not by way of redemption of the gold bond from the Reserve Bank only the date of its purchase would be taken as the market price i.e. the actual purchase price. Therefore the fact that the assessee obtained the gold by way of redemption from the Reserve Bank is not relevant for our purpose. Just as in the case of market purchase, the date on which the assessee purchases it thus becoming the owner and possessor of the gold so also in this case it is the date on which the assessee becomes the owner and also the full possessor which is material. We therefore hold that the assessee is entitled to the short term capital loss claimed by it. Accordingly the assessee s appeal is allowed. 4. and 5. These paras are not reproduced here as they involved minor issues.
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1989 (4) TMI 105 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... hereof the assessee moved the ITO as late as 24th of Nov., 1987 and the application was put under s. 154 of the IT Act. This is a highly arguable point as to whether the provisions of the Amnesty Scheme can be availed of by the assessee because before getting the benefit thereof certain conditions have to be fulfilled by the assessee. Whether these conditions are fulfilled or not is a matter, the answer to which is not free from doubt. A decision taken on such an issue could not be the subject matter of an application under s. 154 of the IT Act. As such the order of the ITO making the assessment order s. 143(1) and charging interest under s. 139 and 217 does not suffer from mistake apparent on the face of the record. Accordingly I am of the opinion that no relief could be granted to the assessee under s. 154 of the Act even though if he had objected to the assessment under s. 143(2)(a) there might have been some case for adjudication. With these remarks I reject this appeal.
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1989 (4) TMI 104 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... The search as a whole was one operation and all evidence collected at the time of search can be used in evidence against any person under sub-s. (4) in any proceedings under the IT Act in whose possession or control the jewellery or other valuable article or thing is found. It is not necessary that the warrant of search should have been issued against that particular person. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the additional ground taken in the case of Smt. Champaben has equally no substance. In the result both these appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. I may, however, point out that it will still be open to the ITO to make independent enquiries about the existence and the ownership of these ornaments and he shall not be embarrassed by the order of the CIT in which an opinion has been expressed about the ownership of the silver in question. He shall come to his own conclusions after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the assessee. 4. The appeals are dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 103 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... as such. The purpose of the assessee, in the present case, may be to acquire a capital asset but it was not necessary for the assessee to capitalise the interest payment because after all the interest had to be allowed as a deduction under s. 36 and not under s. 37 and s. 36 do not refer to the question of capital or revenue. It was only under s. 37 that expenditure of capital nature could be disallowed and s. 37 specifically makes a reference to expenditure not provided for in ss. 30 to 36. In these circumstances, although the assessee might have been better advised to capitalise the expenditure incurred on account of interest and claim depreciation thereof on the entire amount of interest, if the interest paid has been claimed as a revenue expenditure, this is not wholly contrary to the language of s. 36 and could be done by the assessee as such. The appeals of the assessee, therefore on merits are competent and are allowed. In the result, the appeals are allowed as such.
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1989 (4) TMI 102 - ITAT AHMEDABAD
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... ... ..... at tax avoidance in an under-developed or developing economy should not be encouraged on practical as well as ideological grounds. The effort for creating the trusts and BOIs in the present case has actually resulted in evasion of tax because the ultimate beneficiaries, namely, the members of the AOP, Ambica Enterprises have large taxable incomes so that the beneficiaries of the assessee trust who are members of the said AOP have in fact taxable incomes. It is only because they have technically formed as AOP for the purposes of receipt of the income of the present assessee that the benefit of cl. (i) of the proviso is being claimed by the assessee but allowing the assessee to have that benefit would be directly contrary to the spirit of the decision in McDowell s case which, to my mind, has been rightly denied by the authorities below. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the orders of the authorities below do not call for any interference. Accordingly I dismiss this appeal.
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1989 (4) TMI 101 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Readjudication ... ... ... ... ..... re negligent. They appear to be right when they stated that because of the communication gap between the Junagadh office and Bombay office nobody could remain present at the time of hearing of the stay application. Under the circumstances, it would be just and proper if the order passed by the Tribunal on the stay application filed by the petitioners is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to re-hear the said application and pass a fresh order thereon. 4. In the result this petition is allowed. Order dated 5-10-1988, passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside and the Tribunal is directed to re-hear the application after informing the petitioners of the date of hearing of that application and pass a fresh order thereon. Till the said application is decided by the Tribunal, respondents No. 1 and 3 are directed not to resort to coercive method for the purpose of recovery of the amount found due from and payable by the petitioners under the orders passed by the Collector.
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1989 (4) TMI 100 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Stay/Predeposit of duty and penalty - Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... ere negligent. They appear to be right when they stated that because of the communication gap between the Junagadh office and Bombay office nobody could remain present at the time of hearing of the stay application. Under the circumstances, it would be just and proper if the order passed by the Tribunal on the stay application filed by the petitioners is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to rehear the said application and pass a fresh order thereon. 4. In the result this petition is allowed. Order dated 5-10-1988, passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside and the Tribunal is directed to rehear the application after informing the petitioners of the date of hearing of that application and pass a fresh order thereon. Till the said application is decided by the Tribunal, respondents Nos. 1 and 3 are directed not to resort to coercive method for the purpose of recovery of the amount found due from the payable by the petitioners under the orders passed by the Collector.
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1989 (4) TMI 99 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE
Interpretation of statute - Exemption - Doctrine of promissory estoppel ... ... ... ... ..... ver, in the instant case, it appears, that the petitioners have made no attempt to ascertain the position about the tax relief despite the Press Note and the Notification under sub-rule (i) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules clearly limiting the benefit of the tax exemption upto a particular period. Therefore, it is not a fit case wherein any relief can be granted to the petitioners by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel in their favour. 34. In view of the fact that we have arrived at a conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to claim any relief by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel in their favour, we need not go into the question whether the plant in question is a mini cement plant or not. 35. In the result we find no force in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. The amount of security deposit, if any, on verification shall be returned to the petitioners.
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1989 (4) TMI 98 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Writ jurisdiction - Appeal against the order of the Tribunal not maintainable before the Single Judge
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1989 (4) TMI 97 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Jurisdiction - Writ Jurisdiction - Import Policy - Equality ... ... ... ... ..... view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their respective costs. 33. At this stage Mr. Roy Chowdhury, Advocate on behalf of the respondent submits that he only argued on the point of jurisdiction and maintainability of the application and he was under the impression that the matter was heard only on preliminary point and not on merit. Mr. Roy Chowdhury prays for recalling of the order as he submits that there is substantial point of law and he wants to argue. At no stage there was any prayer for hearing the matter on preliminary point nor any order was passed. 34. Mr. Roy Chowdhury may file an application if so advised. Mr. Roy Chowdhury prays for stay of operation of the order. 35. There will be a stay of operation of the order for a period of four weeks from date in respect of the interim orders passed in this proceedings. 36. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this operative portion of the judgment on usual undertaking.
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1989 (4) TMI 96 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Detention order ... ... ... ... ..... bove mentioned with the utmost expedition, which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously (unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu. This not having been done in the present case we have no option but to declare the detention unconstitutional. We order accordingly, allow the appeal and direct that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith. (Emphasis added). 5. For the reasons mentioned above, I have no option but to allow this writ application which is accordingly allowed, the order of detention passed by the Joint Secretary on 7th of July, 1988 contained in Annexure I and confirmed by the respondent - Union of India are hereby quashed and the petitioners are directed to be released forthwith, in case they are otherwise not required to be in custody. Binodanand Singli, J. - I agree.
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1989 (4) TMI 95 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Detention order based on solitary transaction ... ... ... ... ..... y of about 25 days in disposing of the representation of the detenu and no explanation for the same has been given. These are matters which must be closely examined by the Government. For the reasons given above, we hold that the continued detention of the detenu is void. We allow the petition and direct the detenu to be released forthwith. 8. Their lordships of the Supreme Court again observed in Dulal Chandra Majumdar v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 Supreme Court 2361, that the solitary ground is wholly irrelevant to the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate. In this case, the order of detention Annexure P-1 is obviously based on a single transaction of 21-9-1988 and, therefore, gets vitiated on this score as well. 9. In result, Criminal Writ Petition No. 250 of 1989 succeeds and is allowed. Detention order Annexure P-1 based on grounds of detention (Annexure P-2) is quashed and the detenu-petitioner Abdul Hanan, is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1989 (4) TMI 94 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Manufacture - Brand name goods - Valuation - Brand name goods - Refund - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... ent No. 2 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta-IV Division and any proceedings taken pursuant threreto upon declaration that the petitioner No. 1 Company is the manufacturer of transmission Belting and is liable to be assessed to duty on its manufacturing profit and the manufacturing cost. Leave is granted to the petitioner Company to make a proper application for refund of the amount collected as duty from the petitioner in excess of the duty leviable on the basis of manufacturing cost and the same may be considered by the concerned respondent authority in accordance with law without being influenced by any observations made by this Court in passing this judgment and the same may be disposed of within 8 (eight) weeks from the date of filing of the application by passing a speaking and reasoned order after considering all the relevant factors in accordance with law. The Rule is made absolute to the extent as indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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