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Case Laws
Showing 121 to 140 of 158 Records
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1986 (5) TMI 38 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Reassessment, Period Of Limitation, Non-Disclosure Of Primary Facts ... ... ... ... ..... irmalaben Ranvir Khatau 50 (e) Khimjibhai Nanjibhai Mehta 520 ------ 51,180 ------ Even assuming for the sake of argument that the above parties holding 51,180 share could acting concert, even then more than 40 per cent shares were held by the public which would substantiate the assessee s case for treating as a widely-held company. Thus, even on merit the conclusion reached by the taxing authorities cannot be sustained. As pointed out earlier, through inadvertence the basis of shareholders was taken as fifty per cent and not forty per cent or sixty per cent though the assessee was a manufacturing company. 8. In light of our above discussion, we uphold the conclusion reached by the Commissioner (Appeals) that the assessee was rightly treated as a widely-held company by the ITO in course of original assessment. In our opinion, the reassessment proceedings were rightly held to be bad in law and on facts, for the reasons stated by us here in before. 9. The appeals are dismissed.
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1986 (5) TMI 37 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
Prosecution - Sanction ... ... ... ... ..... rticularly from the evidence of P.W. 1., at the time of raid about one hundred people had gathered and, therefore, witnesses were procured from the spot itself without any lapse of time. In the seizure list (Ext. 7), two persons (Raghunath Sahu and another) have signed as witnesses to the seizure, but unfortunately, none of them has been examined by the prosecution. Without, therefore, coming to the conclusion that the seizure is illegal on this score, there cannot be any doubt that the seizure in question must be viewed with suspicion, but I am not examining this contention in detail since I have already held that the conviction cannot be sustained on account of the invalidity of the sanction as discussed earlier. 11. In the ultimate result, therefore, the convictions of the petitioner both under Section 135 of the Customs Act and under Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act as well as the sentences passed thereunder are hereby set aside and this criminal revision is allowed.
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1986 (5) TMI 36 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... its that the goods imported by the petitioner fall within the definition of Item 63(14) of the Indian Customs Tariff and the customs duty is leviable thereon as per Notification No. 118-Customs, dated 20-8-1965 as amended at the time of application. A number of authorities have been cited at the Bar of the various High Courts. I am not adverting to those authorities as I am inclined to remand the appeal back to the Appellate Collector of Customs for determination of the appeal on merits after affording an opportunity to the petitioner. 6. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders of the Appellate Collector of Customs and the orders passed by the Central Government are hereby quashed. The Appellate Collector of Customs shall determine the appeal of the petitioner afresh after affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard, within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of this order from this Court. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (5) TMI 35 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Estoppel - Viscose staple fibre ... ... ... ... ..... the Andhra Pradesh High Court that the power of exemption granted to Government under section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 was with a view to enable it to regulate, control and promote the industries and industrial production in the country. The Government was not bound by its notification once issued and was free to modify or rescind them as and when public interest so demanded. An exemption notification, as such, cannot be made a basis for founding a promissory or equitable estoppel. 29. The Bombay High Court in Hindusthan Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Union of India, 1984 (17) E.L.T. 281 has also adopted the same view. 30. That being so, the only contention raised by Mr. Pal fails. 31. The Rule, accordingly, is discharged and the interim orders do stand vacated. 32. The respondents will now be at liberty to realise the unpaid customs duty from the petitioners in accordance with law including encashment of the Bank guarantee as well as the bond. No order is made for costs.
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1986 (5) TMI 34 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Iron or Steel Castings - Review show cause notice - Refund ... ... ... ... ..... n has been made without any authority of law, the respondents cannot retain the same and are bound to refund to the manufacturers from whom such duty had been realised. If the orders are set aside being illegal or void all consequences of such determination must follow logically and if the consequence is to grant refund of the duty collected pursuant to the orders held to be bad and illegal, such duty must be refunded to the manufacturers on whom the liability to pay excise duty was fixed. 66. For the reasons aforesaid this application succeeds. The Rule is made absolute. Let appropriate writs be issued. The Show Cause Notice dated 10th September, 1981 is set aside. The respondents shall give effect to the order dated 30th April, 1981 of the Appellate Collector, and shall refund the sum of Rs. 92,28,857.03 to the petitioner payable in consequence of the said order dated April 30, 1981 of the Appellate Collector within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order.
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1986 (5) TMI 33 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Manufacture - Dismantling of ships - Waste and scrap ... ... ... ... ..... ill be lawful for the Central Excise authority to levy and collect excise duty on waste and scrap (Heading No. 72.03) obtained by breaking up ships. But the Central Excise authority will not be entitled to levy and collect any duty on any goods obtained by breaking ships falling under Tariff Item Nos. 72.06, 72.07, 72.08, 72.09, 72.10, 72.11, 72.12 and 72.13 and also goods and materials of Heading Nos. 73.03, 73.04, 73.05, 73.06, 73.07 and 73.08. The interim order is vacated. 38. The writ petition is disposed of finally as above. 39. There will be no order as to costs. 40. This order will govern the other Writ petitions, namely, (1) M/s. Lala Shyamlal Jain Shipbreaking Company and another, (2) M/s. Amar Steel Industries and another, (3) M/s. Gopi Chand and Company and another and (4) M/s. Shree Parashnath Shipbreaking Company and another. 41. Prayer for stay of the operation of the order made on behalf of the Department by Mr. J.N. Ghosh is refused in all the writ petitions.
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1986 (5) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the demand for payment of excise duty on the M.S. Rounds was illegal since they had been Re-rolled from rails which were exempt from levy of excise duty?
Held that:- No hesitation to uphold the view expressed by the High Court that the M.S. Rounds manufactured by the appellant fell within the ambit of Item No. 26-AA and were liable to be charged to duty under the said item.
The time limit of three months specified in Rule 10 has no applicability at all in the present case since there has been no assessment of duty before the goods were removed and it is not a case of short levy occasioned by any of the reasons specified in the said Rule. The case is, therefore, covered by the provisions of Rule 10A, which is a residuary provision authorising the demand and collection of any deficiency in duty or of any other sum of any kind payable to Central Government under the Act or the Rules without any limit of time. Hence the High Court was clearly right in rejecting the contention of the appellant that the demand notices issued to it under Rule 10A were illegal and unsustainable. Appeal dismissed.
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1986 (5) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the value of the interest of the deceased in the said partnership would include the goodwill of the partnership firm?
Held that:- The share of the deceased in the partnership did not evaporate or disappear. It went together with the other assets and should be valued in the manner contemplated under rule 7(c) of the Estate Duty Rules as indicated in the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in CED v. Annaraj Mehta and Deoraj Mehta [1979 (3) TMI 47 - CALCUTTA High Court]
Thus the question must, therefore, be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The appeal is, therefore, allowed.
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1986 (5) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the assessee was a dealer in shares in the accounting periods relevant to the assessment years 1959-60 and 1960-61 ?
Held that:- The dealings in the right shares by the assessee keeping in the background these were right shares and effect of non-subscription on the value of the original shares were not fully appreciated by the Tribunal. And, as such, the attitude of a person entitled to right shares for judging whether he was a dealer or investor was not viewed in proper dimension but merely noted by the Tribunal resulting in the non-consideration of a vital factor leading to an erroneous inference. The Tribunal, in this case, has undoubtedly noted the assessee's contention of nursing the investment. The Tribunal, however, has not considered in its order the actual position as to how the nursing of the investment was necessary. The Tribunal thus erred. In that view of the matter, the High Court was justified in interfering with the conclusion reached by the Tribunal. There is no reason to interfere with the order of the High Court.
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1986 (5) TMI 29 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Appeal And Revision, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... the petitioner or respondents Nos. 4 to 20. Mr. Wazir Singh has referred to Girnar Builders P. Ltd. v. IAC 1985 156 ITR 403 (Kar). In that case, a notice of acquisition was, in fact, published in the Gazette on March 6, 1982, and the competent authority had intimated the petitioner about it on April 5, 1982. The initiation of proceedings in that case was by publication of notice in the Official Gazette. In this view of the matter, this judgment does not help Mr. Wazir Singh, as in the instant case the requirements of the statute have not been complied with. In this view of the matter, as the impugned notice does not comply with the requirements of section 269D of the Income-tax Act, no proceedings can be initiated on that basis as the notice had not been published in the Official Gazette prior to the intimation of alleged initiation of proceedings sent to the petitioner. The same is, therefore, liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1986 (5) TMI 28 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Deduction From Profits And Gains, Priority Industry ... ... ... ... ..... (Baroda) Private Limited 1985 155 ITR 120 (SC). The total income of the assessee has to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act excepting section 80E. In computing the total income, the Income-tax Officer has to take into account the provisions of sections 32(2) and 33(2) as regards unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate brought forward from earlier years. The deduction of unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate must be made before allowing any relief under Chapter VI-A. The Tribunal, therefore, fell in error in holding that the assessee is entitled to deduction under section 80-I on the profits from priority industries before deducting therefrom the unabsorbed depreciation and unabsorbed development rebate brought forward from the earlier years. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1986 (5) TMI 27 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Profits ... ... ... ... ..... ound both at the stage of the appeal before the Tribunal as well as at the stage when the case was stated to this court, that the facts for this year are similar to those, in so far as they are material, with those that had been considered in the earlier years, we cannot now hear the Department to contend to the contrary and ask us to decide on different facts or even to direct the Tribunal to examine the facts afresh. It is a pity that the Tribunal at the appropriate stage was not called upon by both the parties to consider the facts of this year independently and that both parties proceeded on the agreed basis that a similar position prevailed as in the earlier assessment year. In the above circumstances and in view of the earlier decisions of this court referred to above, we answer this reference by saying that the sum of Rs. 31,653 was rightly not assessed to tax in the assessment year 1965-66. The reference is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (5) TMI 26 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Intercorporate Dividends ... ... ... ... ..... t off under section 71 or section 72 was not part of the process of the computation of the total income and that such set off was to be made after the computation of the total income. Chapter VI of the Act relates to the aggregation of income and set off of loss and accordingly in computing the total income, provisions of Chapter VI cannot be ignored and must have to be taken into account. The Tribunal also fell in error in holding that the deductions contemplated in section 80G and under section 80M of the Act were to be allowed in the first instance if there were positive income before setting off of brought forward losses and unabsorbed depreciation for the earlier years. In our view, the decision in the case of Distributors (Baroda) Private Ltd. 1985 155 ITR 120 (SC) sets the controversy at rest. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. DIPAK KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1986 (5) TMI 25 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ctor (assessee), the rate of profit must be calculated on the basis of the net receipt of the assessee. In the instant case, as in Taxation Case No. 82 of 1975 ( 1986 162 ITR 643), the matter has not been enquired into with an eye on the law laid down by us. In that view of the matter, this reference also must be remanded to the Tribunal for reconsidering the entire matter with an eye on the law laid down by us in Taxation Case No. 82 of 1975 ( 1986 162 ITR 643) which was disposed of on February 25, 1986 by following the previous decision in Brij Bhushan Lal Parduman Kumar v. CIT 1978 115 ITR 524 (SC) and the decision of this court in Ramesh Chandra Chaturvedi v. CIT 1980 121 ITR 116. We, therefore, refuse to answer the question referred to us an remand the case to the Tribunal for disposal according to law. There shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in terms of section 260 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1986 (5) TMI 24 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 43, the result may have been entirely different. Having gone through the provisions of section 139 both prior to the amendment brought about with effect from April 1, 1971, as well as the post-amendment period, and specially the judgment of P. N. Bhagwati C.J. in the Division Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Addl. CIT v. Santosh Industries 1974 93 ITR 563, which dealt with a case prior to the amendments in question and which has already been referred to earlier by the learned Chief justice, I am constrained to hold that I am in full agreement with the judgment of the learned Chief justice and I cannot disown the responsibility for having been a member of the Bench deciding the case of Bahri Bros. 1976 102 ITR 443, and having laid down the law incorrectly therein, albeit concurring with the view of S. N. P. Singh C.J. It must, therefore, be held that the judgment in CIT v. Bahri Bros. (P.) Ltd. 1976 102 ITR 443, has to be overruled and is hereby so done.
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1986 (5) TMI 23 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Association Of Persons, Hindu Law, Muslim Law As To Guardianship ... ... ... ... ..... guardian of the minor children in carrying on the business and thereby holding that the business was not being carried on by an association of persons ? 4. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that Mrs. Moktar Begum, widow of Imam Ahmed Khan, was managing the estate including the business as a constructive trustee for the benefit of all the heirs of the deceased including herself whose shares were determinate ? Our answer to the first question is in the affirmative and against the Department. The second question is answered in the negative and against the Department. The third question is answered in the affirmative and against the Department and in favour of the assessee. The fourth question is not very material but since it has been referred to us, it is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the Department. We make no order as to costs. MUKUL GOPAL MUKHERJEE J.-I respectfully agree.
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1986 (5) TMI 22 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC ... ... ... ... ..... of the status of a registered firm is to be continued or not would be certainly maintainable. The question referred to us, therefore, is governed by the decisions of the two Division Benches of this court. It must, therefore, be answered accordingly. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the Tribunal was correct in holding that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was competent to entertain the appeal against the Income-tax Officer s order refusing continuation of registration under section 184(7) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, relating to the two assessment years. The question referred to us, therefore, is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The references are thus answered accordingly with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty) payable by the Revenue to the assessee. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in terms of section 260 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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1986 (5) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Gift Tax, Reassessment In Gift Tax ... ... ... ... ..... laid down that in adjudicating the validity of the reassessment proceedings, the Tribunal was required to enquire into and determine whether the item alleged to have escaped assessment constituted profits in the hands of the assessee or not. For the reasons as aforesaid, we hold that the Gift-tax Officer concerned did not have any valid reason to believe that the transaction involved in the instant case was a gift. We agree with the opinion of the learned judge of the first court that the conditions precedent for proceedings under section 16(1) of the Gift-tax Act were not fulfilled in the instant case, as the transfer, in the instant case, was not without adequate consideration and thus did not come within the mischief of section 4(a) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958. For the above reasons, the appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Let the name of the respondent be corrected and recorded as IEL Ltd. MUKUL GOPAL MUKHARJI J.-I agree.
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1986 (5) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Change Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... e first instance before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner before whom no objection was raised by the Revenue as to the maintainability of the appeal. For the above reasons, in our view, the question referred to us is academic because the appeal had been properly entertained and disposed of ultimately on merits. We refuse to answer the question referred. There will be no order as to costs. The learned advocate for the Revenue prays for a certificate from us that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. It appears to us that the decision of this court in Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. s case 1979 116 ITR 516, which we have followed, has not been expressly dissented from by any other High Court including the Patna High Court. In that view, we direct the Revenue to make a formal application setting out therein the substantial and important question of law, if any, which may be said to arise from the judgment for proper consideration. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1986 (5) TMI 19 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... absence of the assessee, when the notice under section 251(2) fixed March 31, 1975, for hearing was not a valid concession. The second question referred to us is a corollary to the first question. The Tribunal having set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and in our view rightly, the only proper course was to remand the case to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The assessment could not have been knocked off as a whole. Remand was the natural consequence in that situation. In that view of the matter, it has to be held that the Tribunal was right in remanding the matter to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner after setting aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. For the reasons stated above, the two questions are answered against the Revenue with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty). Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in terms of section 260 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
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