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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 190 Records
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1989 (10) TMI 50 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Company, Increase In Capital ... ... ... ... ..... diture is an expenditure of a capital nature and not a revenue expenditure. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the deduction of Rs. 7,500 paid as fees to the Registrar of Companies, Jaipur, for bringing about a change in the memorandum and articles of association of the company in relation to increase in its authorised capital as revenue expenditure. In our view, the said expenditure should have been treated as a capital expenditure. The reference is, therefore, answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee in the following terms In the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the amount of Rs. 7,500 paid as fees to the Registrar of Companies, Jaipur, for bringing about a change in the memorandum and articles of association of the company in relation to increase of its authorised capital is allowable as a revenue expenditure. No order as to costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 49 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Draft Assessment Order U/S 144B, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... (3) of the Act is attracted and since the intended addition to the returned income was more than one lakh rupees (during the relevant time) it behoved the Income-tax Officer to refer the matter under section 144B of the Act. The Income-tax Officer is mandated by section 144B of the Act to make such a reference. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding so. In the light of the above, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. It is common ground that if the reference under section 144B of the Act is legal, the assessment is made within the extended period under clause (iv) of the Explanation I to section 153 of the Act. The reassessment completed on September 20, 1979 is within the time allowed by law and not barred by limitation. We hold accordingly. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1989 (10) TMI 48 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ated hereinabove have been referred for the decision of this court. We heard counsel. At the time of hearing, it was agreed, that in the light of the Full Bench decision of this court in CIT v. Ruby Rubber Works Ltd. 1989 178 ITR 181, the rubber replantation subsidy received by the assessee cannot be called a revenue receipt assessable as income. In the light of the above Full Bench decision of this court, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. We have answered question No. 2, which is on merits in favour of the assessee. In the light of the above answer, it is purely academic to give an answer on question NO. 1, as to whether the reopening of the assessment under section 147(b), of the Act is valid. We decline to answer question No. 1 in the above circumstances. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1989 (10) TMI 47 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Allowable Expenditure, Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... he process and what was done was only in the nature of filling up of vacancy and not in the form of new plantation . On this finding, it is evident that no question of allowing an expenditure, much less a capital expenditure, is involved calling in aid Explanation (2) to section 5 of the Act. In the light of the finding of the Tribunal that what was done is only the filling up of the vacancy as a matter of routine and for keeping a uniform planted area, the expenditure incurred was rightly held to be revenue expenditure. No question of law, formulated as question No. 5, arises on the facts of the case. Therefore, we decline to refer the question. In the result, we decline to refer the five questions, numbered as questions Nos. 1 to 5 extracted above. Question No. 6 was not even formulated before the Appellate Tribunal. The original petition is dismissed. The Registrar shall send a copy of this judgment to the Agricultural Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Trivandrum, forthwith.
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1989 (10) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g asset or capital asset. The Tribunal has found that the assessee s business was in copper bars. They were trading assets. They were seized and the insurers paid for them. The said amount was part of that payment. The Tribunal rightly held that the said amount was a trading receipt. Applying the test set out above, it must be held that the Tribunal was also right in taking the view that the said amount was taxable. The facts in the case of Mehboob Productions Pvt. Ltd. 1969 74 ITR 676 (Bom) to which learned counsel for the assessee made reference were different. The monies which had been earned as profits had been assessed and had borne tax in Pakistan and had been left there with the assessee s distributing agent as an asset. In these circumstances, the loss sustained by the assessee on account of devaluation was held to be a loss in the nature of a capital asset. In the result, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 45 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... amendment in the statute itself. In this case, it has to be noted that the amendment sought to be relied on is not an amendment of the Act, but only the rules. By no stretch of imagination, it is possible to hold that the rules can have retrospective operation. In this view, we are of opinion that the provisions of law relating to depreciation as they stood on April 1, 1980, have to be applied in this case. The Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) have done so. But the Tribunal disagreed, according to us erroneously, with the orders of Income-tax Officer and the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). We are of the opinion that the questions referred to us have to be answered in the negative and against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. The income-tax reference is disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1989 (10) TMI 44 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he two years in question. Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the assessee s appeal and allowed the Department s appeal. Against the order of the Tribunal, the petitioner has a statutory remedy by way of application for reference tinder section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and it is submitted that the assessee has availed of that remedy and filed petitions before the Tribunal. But, in the meantime, this original petition is filed to quash the same orders on the ground that the statutory remedy available is one involving delay. That is not a ground for exercising jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227. If statutory remedy is available to the assessee, he has to avail of that remedy. The petitioner approached this court challenging the same orders against which a statutory remedy is available. Therefore, there is no merit in the petition. I make it clear that this will not preclude the petitioner from availing of the statutory remedy. The original petition is dismissed.
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1989 (10) TMI 43 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Law Applicable To Concealment Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... iling incorrect returns in response to the notices under section 148 subsequently, he becomes liable to penalty under a provision of law different from the one that obtained on the date when he had first committed that default. Both the Delhi and Madhya Pradesh High Courts, in the judgments respectively relied upon by Shri Munim for the assessee and Shri Jetley for the Revenue, have considered this very question. The Delhi High Court has analysed the relevant provisions in great detail and discussed all available case law. With respect to the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the Delhi High Court s view has commended itself to us. Accordingly, we hold that penalty is imposable in this case under section 271(1)(c) as it stood on the dates when the returns were filed originally, i. e., as the provisions stood before amendment with effect from April 1, 1968. In the result, we answer both the questions in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 42 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment, Draft Assessment Order U/S 144B, Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... 47 held that, under section 144B, the Income-tax Officer is not expected to take any fresh initiative or pass any order other than the one in accordance with the directions issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. In such a situation, if there is a change of Income-tax Officer when proceedings are pending before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, section 129 will not apply and the assessee cannot demand rehearing by the succeeding Income-tax Officer. Following that decision, we hold that the very order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner granting opportunity of rehearing of the proceedings to the assessee by the Income-tax Officer (Assessing Authority) being not called for in law, the time taken for the rehearing proceedings cannot be excluded. Consequently, the orders of assessment passed by the Income-tax Officer on October 16, 1981, are barred by limitation. The reference is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 41 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... to Rs. 10,000. In that case, there cannot be any concealment Of Rs. 18,000. There is nothing on record to indicate that it is the assessee who had remitted the payments for the chit fund out of his undisclosed income. Under such circumstances, the levy of penalty of Rs. 18,000 as the concealed income of the assessee cannot also be sustained. On a careful perusal of the above discussions of the Tribunal, we are of the view that we cannot invoke the principle laid down by this court in CIT v. Sarada (P.) 1985 154 ITR 387 extracted above. Likewise, we cannot even say that the Tribunal has misappreciated the facts, leave alone non-appreciation. If that be the position, there is no scope for re examining the findings rendered by the Tribunal. If the findings rendered by the Tribunal are accepted, there is no case for interference. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The assessee is entitled to costs. Counsel s fee is fixed at Rs. 500.
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1989 (10) TMI 40 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Appeal To Supreme Court, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... Moreover, there is a divergence of opinion among the High Courts as noticed by us in the aforesaid judgment. Accordingly, we allow this application under section 261 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and grant the requisite certificate certifying that it is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court of India.
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1989 (10) TMI 39 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Perquisite, Plant, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... hat set out above in the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, applied only to sums in regard to which there was an obligation on the part of the employer to pay and a vested right on the part of the employee to claim it could not apply to contingent payments to which the employee had no right until the contingency occurred. The employer s contribution towards the premia were not perquisites allowed to the employee by the employer or amounts due to him from the employer. This judgment squarely applies to the case before us. It has been held by the Tribunal, and rightly too, that the directors of the assessee had no present right to the said sum which was provided for making payments under contracts between the assessee and the Life Insurance Corporation. The provision of the said sum did not represent any present benefit or amenity to the directors. In the light of this discussion, the second question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 38 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Educational Purposes, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... ikuli festival in Droupathi Amman Temple. The conduct of the festival or the expenditure of the money of the festivals must be supervised by the trustee/manager for the time being. The abovesaid sums may be varied suitably by the District Judge, Ramanathapuram, on application made for that purpose. Further, it is seen that factually only a small amount had been spent for educational purposes leaving a huge surplus for other charitable purposes. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the institution is solely for educational purposes so as to attract section 10(22) of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal is right in holding that this case does not fall under section 10(22) of the Act and directing the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to consider the application of sections 11 to 13 of the Act. In the result, we answer the reference in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The assessee to pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1989 (10) TMI 37 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income, Profits Chargeable To Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ount exceeding the written down value, i.e., the original cost less depreciation allowance, the Revenue was justified in taking back what it had allowed against wear and tear because , in fact, depreciation had not resulted. It is difficult to see how this statement of the reasons for the balancing charge supports the case put forward by the Revenue. The rationale of the balancing charge is the taking back of that which the assessee had not suffered. The implication is that the balancing charge must be restricted to what the assessee has in fact received by way of the sale of the capital asset. In other words, the sale price must be reduced by such expenses as are directly relatable to the sale, such as commission or brokerage, registration and stamp fees and legal costs. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Having regard to that answer, it is not necessary to answer the second and third questions. No order as to costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 36 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and also the fact that the assessees cannot be mulcted with interest, we recommend to the third respondent to treat this special civil application as a representation and issue appropriate direction taking into consideration the reasonable prayer made on behalf of the assessees who were prevented from filing their returns in time owing to the strike. The third respondent will take into consideration such of those persons who have suffered owing to the strike referred to above. We hope that the third respondent will pass orders taking into consideration the genuine grievance of the assessees represented by the petitioners herein. The averments made in this special civil application will be filed as a representation before the third respondent within two weeks from this date. In view of these observations made by us, Mr. K. H. Kaji, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, withdraws this special civil application which is disposed of as not pressed. Notice is discharged.
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1989 (10) TMI 35 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... , then the past savings will be resorted to for the purpose of incurring that expenditure or making that disbursement such a course would be in accord with the commonsense point of view. Looked at in this light, it seems to us that the common account notwithstanding, the expenditure for the purposes of the trust and the investment in Government securities was made from the taxable income of the trust so as to obtain the benefit of the exemption afforded by section 11. We see no good reason to render the assessee liable to tax on the basis that it acted otherwise and imprudently. Accordingly, we cannot hold that the assessee should be deemed to have made the expenditure on the objects of the trust and the investments in Government securities on a pro rata basis from out of the income derived from property held on trust and the subscriptions. We uphold the view taken by the Tribunal and answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 34 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... issolved or not, has assumed importance in order to give a complete answer to the question referred to us. This question had been left uninvestigated by the appellate authorities. In a given case, whether, on facts, there was dissolution or not requires a factual investigation which can appropriately be investigated by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal or other tax authorities. Unless this aspect of the case is gone into, we do not consider it advisable to record any answer to the question referred to us. For the reasons given above, we return the question unanswered with a direction to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to rehear the appeal and to decide the same afresh in the light of the observations made above and in accordance with law. It will be open to the Tribunal, if necessary, to remand the matter to the first appellate authority in case the Tribunal considers it necessary to do so and if the circumstances of the case so warrant. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1989 (10) TMI 33 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Karnataka Profession Tax, Reasonable Classification ... ... ... ... ..... nd those who are not and the classification was withdrawn. The Supreme Court observed, while withdrawing the classification, that if there is a broad classification, that is enough and there need not be any micro-classification. Indeed, in Avinder Singh s case, AIR 1979 SC 321, where tax was levied at a flat rate of Re. 1 per bottle irrespective of the quality and the quantity of liquor contained in it, the Supreme Court upheld the same as foreign liquor itself is a class. In Ganga Sugar Corporation Ltd. s case, AIR 1980 SC 286, the Supreme Court upheld the levy made on the basis of lots of sugarcane irrespective of the sugar contained in the sugarcane. So, it is not always necessary that there should be too scientific a classification to pass the muster of article 14 of the Constitution considering the smallness of the tax levied. In that view of the matter, I find no substance in the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners. Consequently, these petitions are rejected.
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1989 (10) TMI 32 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e entire material available before it and had concluded that the cash credits are not genuine. The said finding of fact is based on material. It cannot be stated that the said finding is based on no material or irrational or otherwise perverse. The estimation of income was also arrived at on a preponderance of probabilities. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the six questions of law, formulated by the assessee in paragraph 6 of the original petition, centre round the cardinal question as to whether the cash credits are genuine or not. The final fact-finding authority, the Appellate Tribunal, has held that they are not so. That being a question of fact, it is binding on us. We are of the view that the questions of law, formulated in para 6 of the original petition, are not referable questions of law. Therefore, we decline to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to refer the said questions for the decision of this court. The original petition is dismissed.
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1989 (10) TMI 31 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... troverted as Alleged in the writ petition that the said application is still pending decision. The Tax Recovery Officer, Agra, respondent No. 1 was obliged in law to decide the application and to pass an order thereon. Since it has not been done, we issue a direction to respondent No. 1 to decide the applications of the petitioners within six weeks from the date certified copy of this order is produced before him. With the above observations, the petition stands disposed of. A copy of this order may be given to the petitioner within two days on.
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