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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 230 Records
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1985 (9) TMI 90 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the cost of final packing in corrugated fibre board containers would be liable to be included in the value of the cigarettes for the purpose of assessment to excise duty?
Held that:- Now it is apparent that under s. 3 of the Act the levy of excise duty is made on manufactured cigarettes, which after all are the excisable goods. And s. 4 provides how the value of manufactured cigarettes shall be determined. The expression "value" has been extended to include the cost of packing. The packing itself is not the subject of the levy of excise duty. The manufactured cigarettes are the subject of the levy, because excise duty is here charged on the manufactured commodity, that is to say, cigarettes. For the purpose of computing the measure of the levy, however, the statute has given an extended meaning to the expression "value" in clause (d) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Act. Plainly, the extension must be strictly construed, for what is being included-in the value now is something beyond the value of the manufactured commodity itself.
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1985 (9) TMI 89 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the goods are manufactured by the seller or are manufactured by the seller on behalf of the buyer?
Held that:- It seems to us clear from the record that the trade-marks of the buyer are to be affixed on those goods only which are found to conform to the specifications or standard stipulated by the buyer. All goods not approved by the buyer cannot bear those trade marks and are disposed of the sellers without the advantage of those trade-marks. The trade-marks are affixed only after the goods have been approved by the buyer for sale by the seller to the buyer. The seller owns the plant and machinery, the raw material, the labour and manufactures the goods and under the agreements,affixes the trade marks on the goods. The goods are manufactured by the seller on its own account and the seller sells the goods with the trademarks affixes on them to the buyer.
We hold that the High Court is right in concluding that the wholesale price of the goods manufactured by the seller, is the wholesale price at which it sells those goods to the buyer, and it is not the wholesale price at which the buyer sells those goods to others. Appeal dismissed.
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1985 (9) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the cost of final packing in corrugated fibre board containers would be liable to be included in the value of the cigarettes for the purpose of assessment to excise duty?
Held that:- Now it is apparent that under s. 3 of the Act the levy of excise duty is made on manufactured cigarettes, which after all are the excisable goods. And s. 4 provides how the value of manufactured cigarettes shall be determined. The expression "value" has been extended to include the cost of packing. The packing itself is not the subject of the levy of excise duty. The manufactured cigarettes are the subject of the levy, because excise duty is here charged on the manufactured commodity, that is to say, cigarettes. For the purpose of computing the measure of the levy, however, the statute has given an extended meaning to the expression "value" in clause (d) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Act. Plainly, the extension must be strictly construed, for what is being included-in the value now is something beyond the value of the manufactured commodity itself.
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1985 (9) TMI 87 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Goodwill ... ... ... ... ..... urposes of estate duty, on his death, upon his legal representatives... Thus, there can be no doubt that goodwill is an asset which can pass on the death of a person, The goodwill is capable of being valued. In our view, therefore, the Tribunal was not correct in law in holding that share in the value of goodwill was not includible in the estate of the deceased. The question referred to us is thus answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The question in regard to the value of the goodwill, as contended by the assessee or the Department, was not gone into by the Tribunal, nor had the Tribunal decided whether the firm in question had a goodwill. These questions must now be decided by the Tribunal. The reference is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal through its Assistant Registrar under the seal and signature of the Registrar of this court.
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1985 (9) TMI 86 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ht in holding that merely because of the dispute which resulted in delay in recovery of the amount by the assessee from the Bhilai Steel Project, the nature of the receipt does not change from a trading receipt to a capital receipt. All the efforts of the assessee were in effect directed towards the recovery of the trading receipt which were in connection with the business. The amount received by the assessee was not capital receipt. Under the circumstances, the amount received by the assessee was taxable Ls an ordinary trading receipt under section 28 of the Income-tax Act. For the reasons stated above, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee in the following manner The Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was carrying on the business and that the receipt of Rs. 11,82,520 was an ordinary trading receipt taxable under section 28 of the Income-tax Act for the assessment year 1973-74. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 85 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Assessment, Change In Constitution Of Firm, Firm, Firm Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... , there was merely a change in the constitution of the firm during the relevant period to be governed by section 187 and it was not a case of succession governed by the section 188 of the Act and the income earned by the assessee before such change is to be clubbed with the income earned after such change and a single assessment is to be made on the firm for the entire accounting period. This was also the view taken by us in Chhote Lal Rewaprasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Misc. Civil Case 417 of 1981 ( 1985 156 ITR 565) relating to the period prior to the amendment of section 187(2) of the Act. Consequently, the reference is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee as under The Appellate Tribunal was not justified in law in affirming the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), directing the Income-tax Officer to pass two separate orders for the two periods, before and after the date of death of the partner. There will be no order as to costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 84 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... rrently recorded was that the document in fact had been executed after the purchase of the stamps. That is a finding of fact which cannot be challenged before us. Learned senior standing counsel was candid in accepting this position. The further fact which cannot be disputed is that the deed of partnership was filed by the assessee during the relevant year in question. The Tribunal also recorded that there was no other material on record to show that the firm was not genuine and was not entitled to registration under the Act. Those being the facts and those being the findings recorded by the AAC and the Tribunal, there is no escape from the position that the Tribunal was absolutely correct in allowing registration to the firm. For the reasons stated above, the reference is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal through its Assistant Registrar.
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1985 (9) TMI 83 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... olding the order of refusal of registration of the partnership. In our view, the Tribunal has erred in not properly applying the correct position of law and in holding that if she does not make an investment, the agreement by which she is to be admitted falls to the ground as not supported by consideration. This is the only ground which has been held to be fatal. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the fact that Smt. Manjulaben did not bring capital as stipulated is not fatal to the claim of genuineness and validity of the partnership. We accordingly answer question No. 1 in the negative. In view of our answer to question No. 1, question No. 2 will have to be answered in the affirmative inasmuch as in law a partnership has come into existence and it was entitled to registration. Accordingly, we answer both the questions in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Accordingly, the reference is disposed of. No order as to costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 82 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... e discussion, we make the following orders and directions- (i) We dismiss this writ petition in so far as it challenges the validity of section 18(2A)(b) of the Act. (ii) We quash the order impugned in this writ petition and direct the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Hassan, respondent No. 1, to restore the proceedings to its original file and redetermine the same on receiving the objections, if any, to be filed by the petitioner within 30 days from this day, consider the cause, if any, shown by him, afford him an opportunity of hearing on October 28, 1985, if he appears on that day or on such other day to which date the case may be adjourned by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer and make a fresh order in accordance with law and the observations made in this order. Writ petition is disposed in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Let this order be communicated to the respondents within ten days from this day.
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1985 (9) TMI 81 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... 43A(1) is in respect only of depreciation and does not affect the general provision in the statute in respect of development rebate. In so far as the Notes on Clauses are concerned, we can only say that the phraseology of subsection (2) of section 43A does not express the intention of the Legislature conveyed thereby. In the result, the question posed to us must be answered thus The Tribunal was right in holding that, for the purposes of computing the deduction on account of development rebate, the provisions of section 43A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, shall be ignored. The Tribunal shall now consider what deduction on account of development rebate is allowable to the assessee having regard to the provisions of section 33 read with section 43(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the parties shall be at liberty to address the Tribunal on what should constitute the actual cost of the asset and as of which date. The Revenue shall pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1985 (9) TMI 80 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... find support for our view in the decision of a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Rai Bahadur H. P. Banerjee v. CIT 1941 9 ITR 137. It was there held that the provisions of section 16(iii)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (substantially similar to those of section 64 of the Income-tax Act, 1961), inserted by an Amending Act in 1937 applied to assessments made for the years subsequent to April 1, 1937, and that the provisions of section 16 as amended applied to income from assets transferred by a husband to his wife otherwise than for adequate consideration, whether such transfer was made before or after April 1, 1937. The first question must, accordingly, be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The answers to the questions are (1) In the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. (2) In the negative and in favour of the Revenue. (3) In the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The assessee shall pay to the Revenue the costs of this reference.
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1985 (9) TMI 79 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... e find it still more difficult to understand how it could be said that there would be no such close proximity in a case where the shares in which the said amounts were invested earned a dividend, but that close proximity would cease in any year in which the dividends were not earned on the said shares. Either there is a close proximity or not and we fail to see how it can be said that the close proximity would come into existence if dividends were earned on those shares, but would disappear in a year when the shares earned no dividend. We do not propose to refer to the two decisions cited by Mr. Jetly because, in our view, they have nothing to do with the question before us. In the result, the questions referred to us are answered as follows Question No. (1) in the affirmative. Question No. (2) in the affirmative. Question No. (3) in the affirmative. All the questions are answered in favour of the assessee. The Commissioner to pay the costs of this reference to the assessee.
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1985 (9) TMI 78 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... of the original assessment ignorant of the provisions of section 2(6A)(e) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. We cannot agree. Clearly, this is no finding of fact but, to use the Tribunal s own word, an impression . In this view of the matter, we answer the question posed to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The Tribunal shall now decide upon the merits of the case, namely, whether the loan to the assessee was made by the company in the ordinary course of business whether the company was carrying on money-lending business and if so, whether it constituted a substantial part of its business income. The Tribunal shall then decide whether the loan amount or any part thereof can be treated as a deemed dividend under section 2(6A)(e) read with section 12(1B) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Tribunal shall also be free to consider all other submissions in this behalf that are made on behalf of the assessee and the Revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 77 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... to the newly constituted firm on the basis of the declaration in Form No. 12. Consequently, the first portion of question No. 2 that the Tribunal was right in law in vacating the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax is answered in the affirmative for the reasons recorded above but the latter part of the question is answered in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. Question No. 3, it was not disputed, is covered by a decision of this court in Jupiter Foundry and Machines (Knives) v. CIT 1977 109 ITR 92, and is accordingly answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Also it was not disputed that cancellation of the assessment by the Commissioner has the affect of setting aside the order of continuation of the registration as well. Question No. 4 is accordingly answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 76 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and CIT v. Asiatic Trade Combine 1977 108 ITR 75 respectively. We are conscious that normally it is a question of fact whether there existed reasonable cause or not for non-filing of the return by due date. However, in view of the prima facie erroneous approach adopted by the learned Tribunal in the assessment of absence or existence of reasonable cause and further whether there could at all be said to exist any reasonable cause in the present case, we are inclined to direct the Tribunal to refer the following overall question of law in the facts and circumstances of the present case to the High Court. This is all the more so as the Tribunal observed that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had not taken into consideration the explanation submitted by the assessee while in fact he had considered the same Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in deleting the penalty levied under section 271(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?
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1985 (9) TMI 75 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... alled upon to show cause why the registration be not cancelled, as the agreement was invalid on account of the fact that Sardar Ravinder Singh was a minor on the date of execution of the deed. It is well established that if any of the partners to a partnership agreement is a minor, that partnership is invalid in law which learned counsel for the assessee was candid to concede that that provision is correct in law. Thus, in regard to the cancellation of registration for the year 1964-65, no error was pointed out to us. We are satisfied that the Tribunal was justified in upholding the cancellation of registration under section 186(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for the assessment years 1964-65, 1962-63 and 1966-67. The questions in all the four references are thus answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be transmitted to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal through its Assistant Registrar.
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1985 (9) TMI 74 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he valuation date. The correct principles for determining the valuation of the property like the one with which we are concerned when it is in the possession of the tenants, is by multiplying annual rent by certain years of purchase. As the valuer s report in this case was based on the cost of construction and value of the land, which is not the proper basis, as held in the aforesaid authorities when the property is in possession of tenants, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the valuer s report and applying the multiple of 14 times as was done by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Question No. 5 is also answered in the affirmative. The result of the foregoing discussion is that all the five questions referred for the opinion of this court are answered in the affirmative, i. e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs of this reference. Let the Tribunal be informed of this order.
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1985 (9) TMI 73 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Income, Limitation, Non-resident, Non-resident Agent, Reassessment, Representative Assessee ... ... ... ... ..... sen in India during such year. It is, therefore, evident that even if there is no known or disclosed source of income, the income would still be deemed to have accrued to a non-resident of India from undisclosed sources if it is actually found in the hands of his representative assessee. It is not necessary for us to dilate upon the point any more because it stands concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Barendra Prasad Ray v. ITO 1981 129 ITR 295, wherein it was held that sections 9(1) and 163 are comprehensive enough to include all heads of income mentioned in section 14. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly held that the income accruing to the non-resident from undisclosed sources would also be covered by the provisions of section 9(1)(i) and liable to be included in his assessment. This question as well is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. G. C. MITAL J.-I agree.
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1985 (9) TMI 72 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... pose of incurring the expenditure and the resultant fact, that is to say, the fundamental change in the income-earning machinery and structure and not merely making income more easily available. Therefore, the Tribunal was right in disallowing the sum of Rs. 13,99,305, being expense incurred in connection with the issue of the fresh lot of shares by the assessee company. Respectfully agreeing with the above ratio, we also hold that the fees paid under the Companies Act for increasing the share capital were an expenditure of capital nature. Question No. 3 is accordingly answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The case would now go back to the Tribunal for recording a finding as to whether the amount of loan was utilised by the assessee as fixed capital or working capital in the relevant assessment year and for its disposal in the light of the observations made in Groz-Beckert Saboo Ltd. v. CIT 1981 127 ITR 608 (P and H). No costs.
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1985 (9) TMI 71 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... xtinguish the debt. If the shares were not pledged, the assessee would receive the same amount for the shares. So far as the market value of the shares is concerned, it remained the same and what the assessee received was that very market value regardless of the question whether a debt had to be discharged or not. We, therefore, do not think that the mere fact that the shares were pledged affected the market value of the shares. In the case cited, since the face value of the shares stood reduced, there was a reduction in the market value of the share unlike in the present case. We, therefore, do not think that the decision on which reliance is placed can be of any assistance to the assessee. For the above reasons, we answer the second question in the negative, that is, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. In view of this answer, the matter will go back to the Tribunal for a decision regarding the computation of capital gains. There will be no order as to costs.
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