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Showing 161 to 180 of 231 Records
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1984 (12) TMI 71 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Classification list - Iron and steel products ... ... ... ... ..... elief against the final order. 8. We think we should make it clear that if the classified list is one which had not previously been approved by the Assistant Collector MOD-11 then only can the question of denying approval be raised. Once the list has been approved by one of the Assistant Collectors it becomes an approved list and accordingly the Excise authorities can only take recourse to some other provisions of the Act. So the show cause notice has to be held to be invalid. Furthermore, we think we should not deny the petitioner s relief at this stage when the notice is clearly invalid. The notice states that list should be approved under Item 68 in respect of the Railway Track Material i.e. Tie Bars, Cottors and Two Way Keys etc. This position is untenable as all the four items have been approved under item 26AA not only in the same period but also for the previous period. 9. We accordingly grant the writ and quash the impugned notice. There will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 70 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction - Smuggling - Appeal ... ... ... ... ..... e petitioner the Assistant Collector of Customs, that the complaint in this case is being filed in a day or two and he undertakes to complete the trial within two weeks. With a little amount of cooperation on the part of the defence, it may not be difficult to dispose of the case within four weeks from now. The learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras is, therefore, directed to give priority to this case and dispose of it expeditiously, 12. In the result, the petition is allowed. The order of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (E.O.II) Egmore, Madras, directing the return of the passport to the respondent is set aside. 13. Learned Counsel for the respondent makes an oral application for leave to file an appeal before the Supreme Court. As substantial question of law is involved in the matter regarding the jurisdiction of the Criminal Court to withhold or impound the passport of a foreigner who is accused of a grave offence, leave is granted.
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1984 (12) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Customs - Taxable event ... ... ... ... ..... l exemption or partial exemption. We, therefore, find that there was no promise made by the Government in the Notification No. 129, dated 1-7-1977 to keep it alive indefinitely and that accordingly, the Government had the power to rescind or modify the order whenever they were satisfied that it was necessary in the public interest so to do. Therefore, the notification cannot be challenged on the ground of promissory estoppel and this plea is also rejected. 24. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 25. Learned Counsel for the appellant made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 134A of the Constitution. We are of the view that this is a fit case for appeal to Supreme Court and an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court on this complicated question and especially on the scope of Sec. 12 of the Act, is necessary and therefore, we grant leave to appeal to Supreme Court.
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1984 (12) TMI 68 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Forged products of iron and steel - Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... foundation for this submission. The petitioner placed before the Central Excise authorities as also on the record of this case only certificates from the parties as to how those products were being dealt with. Not one order of any adjudicating authority or of Appellate Collector or of the Government has been produced by the petitioner. It is, therefore, not possible to infer that the forged products which are machined and are ultimately parts of machinery have been classified by some Collectors under Tariff Item No. 26AA(ia). 20. The result of the above discussion is that the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The Central Excise authorities are granted liberty to determine as to which of the forged products of iron and steel manufactured by the petitioner are transformed by a further process of manufacture as parts of machinery liable to duty under Tariff Item 68 in addition to the duty at the stage of forging. On the facts of the case, I make no order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 67 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
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... ... ..... stribution of finished product would not amount to manufacture or production and would not attract duty. For this reason also, the application of Rule 56A is excluded. Necessarily therefore we must understand sub-rule (2) as contemplating a situation where a finished product, which has already suffered Central Excise or countervailing duty, is received by the manufacturer of specified goods (except specified under sub-rule (1) either for the manufacture of the specified goods or for the convenient distribution of the specified goods). Similar view has been taken by the Madras High Court in Seshasayee Paper and Boards Ltd., Erode v. Appellate Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Madras and Another 1984 (15) E.L.T. 3 (Mad.) . It seems to us that is the only correct view to be taken in the context of the words used in Rule 56A(2). In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 66 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Bill of Entry - Adjudication order ... ... ... ... ..... rievance of Shri Sethna that certain statements in the judgment on pages 257 and 259 of the compilation do not appear to be correct. It is also argued that the inferences and conclusions on page 259 are also not proper. However, it is not necessary to consider this aspect as the appeal succeeds without going into this contention. 19. The net result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds. The impugned orders in miscellaneous petition No. 496 of 1970 are quashed and the rule in that petition is discharged with costs, throughout. 20. On the pronouncement of this judgment, the learned Counsel for the respondents asked for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are unable to find that this appeal involves such important question of law as requires the consideration of the Supreme Court or this is otherwise a fit case for grant of leave to appeal. Leave refused. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the operation of the order is stayed for a period of four weeks.
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1984 (12) TMI 65 - SUPREME COURT
Levy of customs duty on newsprint
Whether it is open to the Government to levy any tax on any of the aspects of the press industry?
whether the tax has been shown to be so burdensome as to warrant its being struck down?
Held that:- In view of the intimate connection of newsprint with the freedom of the press, the tests for determining the vires of a statute taxing newsprint have, therefore, to be different from the tests usually adopted for testing the vires of other taxing statutes. In the case of ordinary taxing statutes, the laws may be questioned only if they are either openly confiscatory or a colourable device to confiscate. On the other hand, in the case of a tax on newsprint, it may be sufficient to show a distinct and noticeable burdensomeness, clearly and directly attributable to the tax.While we, therefore, cannot agree with the contention that no tax can be levied on newspaper industry, we hold that any such levy is subject to review by courts in the light of the provisions of the Constitution.
On the material now available to us, while it is not possible to come to the conclusion that the effect of the levy is indeed so burdensome as to affect the freedom of the press, we are also not able to come to the conclusion that it will not be burdensome. This is a matter which touches the freedom of the press which is, as we said, the very soul of democracy. This is certainly not a question which should be decided on the mere question of burden of proof. There are factors indicating that the present levy is heavy and is perhaps heavy enough to affect circulation. On such a vital issue, we cannot merely say that the petitioners have not placed sufficient material to establish that the drop in circulation is directly linked to the increase of the levy when, on the side of the Government, the entire exercise is thought to be irrelevant. Hence, there appears to be a good ground to direct the Central Government to reconsider the matter afresh in the light of what has been said here.
We do not, however, see much substance in the contention of some of the petitioners that the classification of the newspapers into small, medium and big newspapers for purposes of levying customs duty is violative of article 14 of the Constitution.
If on such reconsideration, the Government decides that there should be any modification in the levy of customs duty or auxiliary duty with effect from March 1, 1981, it shall take necessary steps to implement its decision. Until such redetermination of the liability of the petitioners and others is made, the Government shall recover only ₹ 550 per MT on imported newsprint towards customs duty and auxiliary duty and shall not insist upon payment of duty in accordance with the impugned notifications. The concessions extended to medium and small newspapers may, however, remain in force. If it is found that any of the petitioners is liable to pay any deficit amount by way of duty, such deficit amount shall be paid by such petitioner within four months from the date on which a notice of demand is served on such petitioner by the concerned authority. Any bank guarantee or security given by the petitioners shall be available for recovery of such deficit amounts and it is found that any of the petitioners is entitled to any refund, such refund shall be made by the Government within four months from the date of such redetermination.
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1984 (12) TMI 64 - SUPREME COURT
Determination of rateable value of certain categories of properties situate in the Union territory of Delhi
Held that:- The first category of premises where the premises are sell-occupied residential premises, the standard rent determinable under the provisions of sub-section (2)(a) or (2)(b) of s. 6 in cases falling within the scope and ambit of those provisions and in other cases, the standard rent determinable under the provisions of sub-s. (1)(A)(2)(b) of s. 6 would constitute the upper limit of the rateable value of the premises. Similarly, on an analogous process of reasoning, the standard rent determinable under the provisions of sub-s. (2Xa) or (2)(b) of s. 6 in cases falling within the scope and ambit of those provisions and in other cases, the standard rent determinable under the provisions of sub-s. (1)(B)(2)(b) of s. 6 would constitute the upper limit of the rateable value so far as self-occupied non-residential premises are concerned. The rateable value of the premises, whether residential or non-residential, cannot exceed the standard rent, but, as already pointed out above, it may, in a given case, be less than the standard rent.
Second category of premises which are partly self-occupied and partly tenanted the sum total of the rent which the owner may reasonably expect to get from a hypothetical tenant in respect of each distinct and separate unit of occupation calculated in the manner aforesaid, would represent the rateable value of the building. We may point out that this formula for determination of the rateable value would apply, irrespective of whether any of the distinct and separate units of occupation comprised in the building are self-occupied or tenanted. The only difference in the case of a distinct and separate unit of occupation which is tenanted would be that, subject to the upper limit of the standard rent, the actual rent received by the owner would furnish a fairly reliable measure of the rent which the owner may reasonably expect to receive from a hypothetical tenant, unless it can be shown that the actual rent so received is influenced by extra-commercial considerations.
Third category of premises where the land on which the premises are constructed is leasehold land with a restriction that the leasehold interest shall not be transferable without the approval of the lessor the assessing authorities would obviously have to estimate for themselves, on the basis of such material as may be gathered by them, the reasonable cost of construction and the market price of the land and arrive at their own determination of the standard rent. This is an exercise with which the assessing authorities are quite familiar and it is not something unusual for them or beyond their competence and capability. It may be noted that even while fixing standard rent under sub-s. (4) of s. 9, the assessing authorities have to rely on such material as may be available with them and determine the standard rent on the basis of such material by a process of estimation.
Fourth category of premises where the premises are constructed in stages the rateable value of this category of premises is to be determined when the premises at the first stage of construction are to be assessed for rateable value, the assessing authorities would first have to determine the standard rent of the premises under sub-s. (2)(a) or 2(b) or (1)(A)(2)(b) or (1)(B)(2)(b) of s. 6 as may be applicable and keeping in mind the upper limit fixed by the standard rent and taking into account the various factors discussed above, the assessing authorities would have to determine the rent which the owner of the premises may reasonably expect to get if the premises are let out to a hypothetical tenant and such rent would represent the rateable value of the premises. The basic point to be noted in all these cases is and this is what we have already emphasised earlier that the formula set out in sub-ss. (1)(A)(2)(b) and (1)(B)(2)(b) of s. 6 cannot be applied for determining the standard rent of an addition, as if that addition was the only structure standing on the land.
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1984 (12) TMI 63 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Keeping in view the language used in s. 187(2) of the Act and the principles laid down in Dahi Laxmi Dal Factory s case 1976 103 ITR 517 (All) FB , CIT v. Dilsukh Rail Madho Prasad 1977 108 ITR 299 (All), Addl. CIT v. Ramakrishnaiah and Sons 1978 111 ITR 296 (Orissa), Mathurdas Govardhandas s case 1980 125 ITR 470 (Cal) and Addl. CIT v. Harjivandas Hathibhai 1977 108 ITR 517 (Guj), we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in holding that with the death of Kanhaiyalal (one partner), the firm automatically stood dissolved by operation of law and that a new firm came into being and to such a firm, s. 187(2) of the Act is not applicable and that two separate assessments are to be made on the firm for the assessment 1969-70. We answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs of this reference. Let the answer be returned to the Tribunal in accordance with s. 260(1) of the Act.
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1984 (12) TMI 62 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... .B., Mysore, was not very much relevant. In fact, it was not disputed before the Tribunal that the possession was taken from the purchasers only in March, 1972, pursuant to an award made on May 10, 1971. All these events took place after the sale. Secondly, the assessee after selling the sites cannot contend that he has to repay the purchase money because he had doubtful title. The assessee has not produced any instance of a claim for refund of the purchase money. This takes us to the third question We do not think that the assessee would be justified in contending that the true profit earned by him by sale of the sites during the year ending March, 1970, would be ascertained only after the entire estate was sold. In fact, the way in which the Commissioner has directed to redo the assessment would be beneficial to the assessee. Nothing more, therefore, need be said on this question. In the result, we answer all the three questions in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1984 (12) TMI 61 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Donation To Charitable Institution, Religious Purpose, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... at the language used in a trust deed should be interpreted in accordance with reason and common sense. It must receive a construction according to the plain meaning of the words and sentences therein contained. (Per Lord Halsbury L.C. in Leader v. Duffey 1888 13 AC 294, 301). Prayer and worship in common parlance denote religious activities. Every day thousands of people of every religious community all over India engage themselves in prayer and worship either in their home or in public places of worship and prayer. Clause 2(h) of the trust deed sets out two purposes one relates to places of worship, the other relates to prayer halls. Prayer halls and places of worship are places where people congregate to worship and pray. I fail to see how cl. 2(h) can be construed to be a non-religious purpose. The question of law referred by the Tribunal, therefore, is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SATISH CHANDRA C. J.-I agree.
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1984 (12) TMI 60 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Incentive, Attendance And Customary Bonuses, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... the matter on the ground that really this expenditure will come tinder s. 36(1)(ii) of the Act and not under s. 37 of the Act and that question will have to be decided and, therefore, a reference is called for. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. Section 36(1)(ii) has reference to bonus paid under the Bonus Act and incentive bonus or attendance bonus or customary bonus is not bonus paid under the Bonus Act, and, therefore, s. 36(1)(ii) has no application. Therefore, the question will have to be considered whether it will come for deduction under the, general provision of s. 37. There could be no doubt that the incentive bonus paid is an expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for purposes of the business. That was the view we have held in the earlier case. In the result, no question of law which is subsisting could be said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal and, therefore, this petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1984 (12) TMI 59 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... s pressed at the time of hearing and there was omission on the part of the Tribunal to consider this ground, the Tribunal shall go into the question of valuation while passing an order conformably to this judgment. Before parting with this case, we must express our appreciation of the thorough and exhaustive investigation made by the Wealth-tax Officer (Sri G., Ramadoss) to bring home to the assessee the falsity of the claims made. Investigation was conducted with meticulous care and attention. To sum up, questions Nos. 1 to 7 referred to this court are answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Question No. 8 is answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 9 is answered in the negative, that is to say, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. As the Revenue has substantially succeeded, the assessee shall pay the Revenue s costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 750.
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1984 (12) TMI 58 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... stands renovated, but it is still the same cinema with the same seating capacity. No benefit of an enduring nature other than the existing cinema has resulted. When we consider that the assessee is not the owner and is only a monthly tenant, the principle applied by the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Kalyanji Mavji and Co. 1980 122 ITR 49, seems to be the appropriate rule to apply. Furthermore, the repairs and renovations were absolutely necessary, otherwise the cinema licence would not have been renewed. The only doubt that one can have is about the replacement of urinals. But, even those would belong to the landlord. So, we are of the view that these expenses cannot be treated as capital expenses, but have to be treated as revenue expenses. We would accordingly answer the question referred to us in the affirmative on the footing that these allowances have to be allowed under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. We would leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 57 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Reassessment, Unexplained Cash Credits ... ... ... ... ..... , then probably even tinder the new Act, the financial year would indicate that which assessment year was to apply. We take it as settled, as far as we are concerned that the two amounts in question have to be taxed in the financial year corresponding to the assessment year 1953-54 and the Tribunal s view is not correct. This means that we have to answer the question referred to us in the negative, in favour of the Department and against the assessee. However, this does not end the matter because at the close of the Tribunal s order in appeal, there are the following observations In view of our above findings, it is not necessary to record a finding on merits in regard to the genuineness of these transactions. We have, therefore, to direct the Tribunal to deal with the assessee s case in accordance with our answer to the question and also this means that the Tribunal will to deal with the question on merits. The Department will be entitled to its costs counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (12) TMI 56 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Land, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... ts arising from their sale would be assessable as capital gains. The same view has been expressed by the Madras High Court in Beverley Estates Ltd. v. CIT 1979 117 ITR 302. Mr. Bhat, for the assessee, urged that he did not base his case on the ground that the tree growth was separately acquired and his contention was that the compensation paid for loss of plants and trees was attributable to the loss of future income from the trees and plants and, therefore, it should be treated as agricultural income. It may be noted that this contention has not been considered by the Tribunal in reaching the above said conclusion on the second question. We, however, answer the second question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Oar answer to this question is purely based on the finding recorded by the Tribunal and we must hasten to add that the assessee should not be shut out by these answers from arguing his case on the contention which he has raised in the memorandum of appeal.
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1984 (12) TMI 55 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Material Facts, Reassessment, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... nected Civil Writ Petition No. 308 of 1979, held that no infirmity can attach to the issue of notice under section 148 of the Act in so far as the Income-tax Officer wants to examine this matter. On that view, it would not be possible to give any relief to the petitioner on this count. The other items of disallowance in the order of March 8, 1979, is a small amount on account of profit and loss on exchange due to the fluctuation in rate (i.e., Rs. 7,867 and Rs. 67,788 respectively). On the facts and circumstances, 1, therefore, feel that it is not possible or correct to say anything on merits on any of these items of disallowances, because they form part of appeal proceedings filed by the petitioner, and must necessarily be allowed to be decided by the appropriate authorities concerned as provided under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. As a result, both the writ petitions will be dismissed but with no order as to costs. The writ petitions are disposed of as above.
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1984 (12) TMI 54 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... ses contain Explanations. Clause (1) indicates that the section relates to personal laws. In clause (4), it is clear (more so after the Explanation is added by Parliament), that holders of office or recipient of benefits of person relevant to Mitakshara, Marumakattayam or Aliyasanthana law. The clauses in section 7 thus have reference only to incident of Hindu (personal) law. Therefore, we hold that section 7 has no application on the facts of the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, we reverse the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal. On facts, we hold section 10 of the Act is applicable. The trust fund is to be included in the estate of the deceased. The question is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the accountable person. We order costs be paid to the Revenue. Advocate s fee we fix at Rs. 300. On an oral application made by the counsel for the accountable person, we certify that it is a fit case to grant leave to appeal to Supreme Court. Leave granted.
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1984 (12) TMI 53 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is a detriment to the family, there is no material on record, much less a finding by the Tribunal, that there was any detriment caused to the joint family by reason of the payment of remuneration to the karta. Indeed, the remuneration paid by a company to the karta or any member of the family for services personally rendered without any connection with the investment by the family of its funds in the company can never be regarded as a detriment to the interests of the family. On a consideration of the entire evidence on record, we are satisfied that the Tribunal correctly came to the conclusion that the remuneration paid to the karta of the joint family by the company constituted his individual income and is consequently not liable to be assessed in the hands of the joint family. We accordingly answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The Revenue shall pay costs to the assessee. Advocate s fee Rs. 500.
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1984 (12) TMI 52 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business, Leasing Activity, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... ery in a perfect condition. In our opinion, this activity constitutes the business of the assessee. It is a case where a commercial asset is leased out for the purpose of carrying on the business of redrying. The assets did not cease to be commercial assets merely because they were leased out. So long as a business asset is exploited as such and profits or gains are earned from it, the same are profits and gains of a business in whatever way the owner exploits a commercial asset. He makes profits or gains just the same and he makes the same from and in consequence of running and maintaining a business asset. In this view, we hold that the Tribunal was perfectly justified in directing registration of the firm. It is a firm validly constituted under the provisions of the Partnership Act and as such entitled to registration. We accordingly answer all the four questions in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 500.
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