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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 242 Records
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1993 (4) TMI 86 - SC ORDER
Food products and food preparations ... ... ... ... ..... e been taken through the orders of the authorities below and also of the High Court. We see no ground to interfere with the orders of the authorities under the Act as upheld by the High Court. We agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached therein. Even otherwise the order of the Central Government in this case, has been indirectly approved by this Court in Collector of Central Excise v. Parle Exports (P) Ltd. - 1988 (38) E.L.T. 741 (S.C.). In this view of the matter we see no force in the appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.
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1993 (4) TMI 85 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... m as silver they would attract duty under Tariff Item 24 but if they are not so known by those dealing with the articles in question they would fall outside the broad spectrum of the expression silver in Tariff Item 24 and would then perhaps fall within the residuary clause unless attracted by any other specific Tariff Item. 3. In the above view of the matter, we think it proper to remit the matter to the Tribunal with a direction that the Tribunal may permit the parties to lead evidence to establish how the goods in question are known to those who deal in them. After permitting the parties to lead such evidence as they would consider relevant to establish how those who deal in such articles understand or know them, the Tribunal may dispose of the matter on the strength of the said evidence. Having regard to the passage of time we hope that the Tribunal will be able to accord priority to these matters. The appeals will stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1993 (4) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK
Power projects and captive power projects ... ... ... ... ..... gistration having been granted under the provisions of the Regulations, unless the Regulations provide for cancellation and grounds for cancellation, the authority has no power to cancel the same. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Union Government in course of hearing has contended that if registration had been granted erroneously, it could be cancelled. We are unable to appreciate this contention. In the absence of any power for cancellation of registration under the Regulations, the impugned order under Annexure 3 cancelling the registration is bad in law and, therefore, the same must be quashed. 14. In the net result therefore, Annexures 1, 2 and 3 are hereby quashed and the appropriate authorities are directed to consider the question of petitioner No. 1 s application for registration of the contract with Asea Stal. The writ application is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Order per B.N. Dash, Member (J) . - I agree. Writ application allowed.
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1993 (4) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE
Value of first clearances - Computation of - Tyres, tubes and flaps ... ... ... ... ..... st the plain language of the Notification. It would convert an exemption granted to first clearances in the chronological order into a concession granted on the aggregate sale during the entire financial year to be taken on such clearances as the manufacturer deems fit. This was not the intention of the Government in issuing the Notification. 5. We, therefore, do not see any merit in the case. The petitioner s contention that in other collectorates the Notification is being interpreted in the manner in which the petitioner desires it to be interpreted, should not deter us from interpreting the provision in the correct manner. If the petitioner is aggrieved, he should follow the normal course of adjudication process under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and take the matter to the highest tribunal through the hierarchy of the adjudicatory bodies under the Act. We do not deem it to be a fit case for admission. 6. The petition is dismissed without notice to the other side.
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1993 (4) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT INDORE
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit - Writ Jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... ase was not that of financial hardship. Even so the CEGAT has directed the applicants to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- as the deposit as a condition for entertainment of the appeal instead of depositing the full amount which is about 22,00,000/-. We find no reason to interfere with this order. Shri Bhat further submitted alternatively that since in the communication of the impugned order to his client and in preparing, filing and getting this case heard, a lot of time has been lost and the time of 8 weeks for deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- would be insufficient. In the circumstances of the case we direct that if the deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- is made on or before 10-5-1993, the date fixed for reporting compliance before CEGAT, a deposit shall be accepted and the time granted for making the deposit shall be extended up to 10-5-1993. However, the CEGAT shall be free to extend the time further if it so considers necessary and proper. With these directions the case is disposed of.
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1993 (4) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Writ Jurisdiction - Alternative remedy ... ... ... ... ..... been decided by the authorities after due exercise of their jurisdiction and power and the said decision is based on materials on record and also on evidence, the Writ Court should not interfere with such decision. However, for the ends of justice it is ordered that the petitioners will be at liberty to prefer an appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. Customs, Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, if advised, will pray for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal, as the petitioners have taken recourse to file the present application and if such an application is filed, the Appellate Authority i.e. Customs, Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal will allow the condonation petition and hear the appeal on merits, in accordance with law. 11. The application is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. 12. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of the judgment on the usual undertaking.
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1993 (4) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Import licence - Confiscation - Criteria for ... ... ... ... ..... oods on payment of duty. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge, if the validity of the licence, in respect of Staple Pins, is ultimately upheld in the adjudication proceedings initiated by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Madras, pursuant to the show cause notice dated 5-2-1993, the petitioners can always seek refund of the duty paid by them for clearing the goods in question subject to the statutory limitations. 13. For all the reasons stated above, we are inclined to hold that the learned Single Judge is quite right in directing that the goods in each of the cases shall be allowed to be cleared within 10 days from the date of payment of 50 of the duty in each case plus furnishing Bank Guarantee for 25 of the duty and executing a personal bond for the balance 25 . We cannot take exception to the conclusion of the learned Single Judge and therefore, all the writ appeals are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, these writ appeals are dismissed. No costs.
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1993 (4) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Assessment - Exemption notification cannot be ignored - Classification of goods - Rate of duty - Refund (Customs) - Unjust enrichment - Writ jurisdiction
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1993 (4) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Refund - Unjust enrichment - Meaning - Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... issed, but in the circumstances without costs. Advocate s fee Rs.500/- W.P. No. 8339/92. 110. Immediately after pronouncement of the judgment, Sri K. Subrahmanya Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner in this Writ Petition made an oral application to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment in the Writ Petition. In our opinion no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, arises in this case. Application for leave is therefore rejected. 111. Learned counsel requests that the operation of the judgment be suspended to enable the petitioner to approach the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as the petitioner has approached this Court against the show cause notice to explain as to why refund claim made by it should not be rejected and no immediate action which would cause irreparable injury would follow from the judgment, we do not consider it just and appropriate to suspend the operation of this judgment.
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1993 (4) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Appellate Order ... ... ... ... ..... have been determined by the Tribunal. That the Tribunal s decision is binding upon the Customs Officers is not disputed by the respondents. The Customs Officers are, therefore, bound to carry out the directions of the Tribunal. The mere fact that the application under Section 130(3) of the Act has been filed does not mean that that acts as a stay of the operation of the judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 16th January, 1992. 4. For the reasons aforesaid the application of the petitioners must be allowed. There will be an order in terms of prayer (a) subject to the same terms and conditions imposed by the Tribunal in its judgment and order dated 16th January, 1992. There will be no order as to costs. The payment as directed by this order is to be made within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of the operative portion of this order upon usual undertaking. 5. All parties concerned to act on the signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.
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1993 (4) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Countervailing duty (Additional duty of Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... amely, N.V. AIZKRAUKLE, is set aside. On the petitioners paying the Duty on the basis of the Notification No. 74/93-Cus., dated 28-2-1993, that is, 5 ad valorem, the petitioners may dismantle and clear the dismantled parts of the said vessel. 14. In the event the petitioners have already paid the amount of 5 ad valorem the Bank Guarantee subject to which the interim order had been granted will stand discharged. 15. Let the notice dated 12th April, 1993 given by the Advocate-on- Record for the petitioners to the Senior Central Government Advocate, be kept on the record of this case. 16. There will be no order as to costs. 17. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents prays for stay of operation of this judgment and Order. Such prayer is allowed. There will be a stay of operation of this Judgment and Order for a period of 2 weeks from date. 18. All parties concerned are to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment and Order on the usual undertaking.
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1993 (4) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Valuation (Customs) - Rate of Exchange ... ... ... ... ..... e as on the date of presentation of the Bills of Entry. The goods were directed to be released to the petitioner subject to payment of the dues as assessed and subject to the petitioner securing the difference between the assessed dues and the dues as would have been applicable at the rate of exchange applicable on a subsequent date. The petitioner has paid the assessed dues and has also furnished a bank guarantee for the difference. The goods have been released to the petitioner by the respondent authorities. In view of the finding of this Court that the rate applicable is the rate prevalent on the date of the presentation of the Bills of Entry namely 31st March, 1992, the only consequential order that is necessary to be passed is that the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner will stand discharged and will be returned by the respondent authorities to the petitioners. All parties including Bank to act on a signed xerox copy of this Dictated order upon usual undertaking.
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1993 (4) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether "toilet soap" would be household soap within the meaning of Tariff Item 15(1) of the Schedule?
Held that:- As considered in the legal setting and commercial parlance we are of the considered view that "toilet soap" being of everyday household use for the purpose of the bath and having removed its separate identity which it enjoyed preceding amendment and having been not specifically included in "other sorts", it took its shelter in commercial parlance under "household". As stated if anybody goes to the market and asks for toilet soap he must ask only for household bathing purpose and not for industrial or other sorts. Even the people dealing with it would supply it only for household purpose. It may be true that household consists of soap used for cleaning utensils, laundry used for cleaning soiled clothes and soap toilet is used for bathing but household is compendiously used, toilet soap is used only by the family for bathing purpose. Individual preference or choice or taste of a particular soap for bath is not relevant. The soap "toilet" would, therefore fall within the meaning of the word "household" in sub-item (1) of Item 15 of the Schedule. The classification shall accordingly be adopted. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The cases are remitted to the primary authority to deal with the matters accordingly.
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1993 (4) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Whether mere rejection of the Special Leave Petition of co-accused persons cannot seal the fate of the appeals of the appellants which have been entertained after leave having been granted by this Court?
Held that:- On materials on record, the prosecution has not been able to prove and establish that appellants had the common object or shared the common intention to cause the murder of the victim. From the evidence of the prosecution itself it appears that the flour mill of the deceased and the residential unit of the accused persons being adjacent to each other, suddenly a fight took place in which the appellant Satbir gave a blow by the back side (wooden part) of the Pharsa, which caused one of the two injuries on the head of the deceased. It cannot be held that appellant Satbir had an intention to cause the death of the victim. In the circumstances of the case, it can be said that he had only knowledge that such blow may cause an injury resulting in the death of the victim. Accordingly he should have been convicted under Section 304, Part-11, of the Penal Code.
So far appellant Gulbir is concerned, according to the prosecution case, he was carrying a stick and he is alleged to have given a stick blow to the deceased on a non-vital part of the body. In this background, according to us, he can be held to have committed the offence only under Section 325 of the Penal Code. As already pointed out according to the prosecution case itself, the appellant Hari Singh, who was aged about 60 years at the time of the occurrence is said to have given a stick (lathi) blow to the informant PW 16. He is not alleged to have given any blow to the deceased. Once it is held that different accused persons neither had any common object nor any common intention which they shared together to commit an offence under Section 302 or alike, the appellant Hari Singh has to be held guilty for an offence only under Section 323 of the Penal Code. In the result the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code is set aside. The conviction under Section 148 and 323 read with 149 is also set aside. The appellant Satbir is convicted for an offence under Section 304 Part II and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. The appellant Gulbir is convicted for an offence under Section 325 of the Penal Code and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. So far the appellant Hari Singh is concerned, he is convicted for an offence under Section 323 of the Penal Code and is sentenced to the period of imprisonment already undergone. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed in part to the extent indicated above.
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1993 (4) TMI 69 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Paper laminates ... ... ... ... ..... (ii) As regards difference in duty, the petitioner is directed to furnish Bank guarantees. (iii) The above arrangement shall govern until the CEGAT renders its decision in the appeal preferred by the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 162 of 1993. 4. The questions awaiting resolution, if answered by the CEGAT would pave the way for the parties to work out their fights and remedies, and the CEGAT will do well to dispose of the appeal preferred by the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 162 of 1993 with expedition so that all the parties could work out their rights and remedies depending upon the decision at the hands of the CEGAT. We also make it clear that in case the petitioner ultimately fails the question of recovery of interest on duty, as is permissible in law can certainly be agitated before the authority who may be seized of the question at that time. 5. This Special Civil Application is disposed of in the above terms. We make no orders as to costs.
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1993 (4) TMI 68 - SUPREME COURT
Whether Ferro-alloys was the real exporter for all purposes and it was Ferro-alloys which earned and received the foreign exchange and M.M.T.C. got only its commission of 2% and nothing more?
Held that:- The M.M.T.C. must be held to be the exporter for the purpose of Section 280(Z)(C). The entire system of barter and the several documents executed in that behalf including those required by statutory provisions cannot be explained away as mere "external appearances". The Ferro-alloys cannot come to M.M.T.C. when it is profitable to it and disavow it when it is not profitable to it. It cannot have it both ways. The title to goods passed to M.M.T.C. by virtue of the several documents executed between the parties. Indeed, that was the fulcrum of the entire scheme of Barter. We are also not convinced with the alternative reasoning of the High Court that even if it is held that the title to the goods passed to M.M.T.C., even so - Ferro-alloys must be held to be the real exporter, in view of the objective underlying Section 280(Z)(C). If M.M.T.C. has acquired the title to the goods and is the exporter for all other purposes, it is equally the exporter for the purposes of Sec. 280(Z)(C). There can be no dichotomy of the nature propounded by the High Court.
Thus the High Court was not right in holding to the contrary. The appeal is allowed.
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1993 (4) TMI 67 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the mandate under Section 20(3) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (the Act), to pay the undisputed tax before the appeal is entertained, is also applicable to the additional tax payable under Section 6B of the Act?
Held that:- The additional tax is nothing but an enhancement in the rate of the sales tax, purchase tax under the Act. As soon as the assessing authority determines the levy of sales tax/purchase tax the additional tax under Section 6B becomes part of the assessment order. Similarly if the main impost under Section 5(1) is successfully challenged, the reasoning sustaining the challenge would also ipso facto affect the validity of the additional impost under Section 6B of the Act.
Thus the High Court was not justified in holding that additional tax under Section 6B was not a tax for the purposes of Section 20(3) of the Act. Appeal allowed.
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1993 (4) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of the levy and collection of cess under Section 3 of the Vegetable Oils Cess Act, 1983 for the period commencing 1st March, 1986 and ending with 31st March, 198?
Whether the power of exemption conferred by Rule 8 can be carried to the extent of nullifying the very Act itself?
Held that:- It is not brought to our notice that the budget proposals contained in the Finance Minister's speech were accepted by the Parliament. The cess having been imposed by a Parliamentary enactment could be rendered inoperative only by a Parliamentary enactment. Such repealing enactment came only in the year 1987 with effect from April 1,1987. Not only that. The repealing Act expressly provided in Section 13 that the cess due before the date of said repeal, but not collected, shall be collected according to law as if the Cess Act is not repealed. This provision amounts to a positive affirmation of the intention of the Parliament to keep the said imposition alive and effective till the date of the repeal of the Cess Act. In the face of the said statutory provisions, no rights can be founded nor can the levy of the cess be said to have been dispensed with by virtue of the alleged decision referred to in the Finance Minister's speech or on account of the letter dated August 11, 1986. The Finance Minister's speech is not law. The Parliament may or may not accept his proposal. Indeed, in this case, it did not accept the said proposal immediately but only a year later. It is only from the date of the repeal that the said levy becomes inoperative.
Coming to the argument based upon Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules read with Section 3(4) of the Cess Act it is totally unacceptable. No notification has been issued under Rule 8(1) by the Central Government - much less was any such notification published in the Gazette. No special order has also been made by the Central Board of Excise and Customs in this behalf under Rule 8(2). The cess imposed under Section 3(1) of the Cess Act, it may be remembered, is a duty of Excise as stated in Section 3 itself. To repeat, the power of exemption cannot be utilised to dispense with the very levy created under Section 3 of the Cess Act or for that matter under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act.
Additional contention that the goods concerned therein cannot be called "Vegetable Oil" within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the Cess Act and, therefore, the levy of the cess thereon is incompetent disallowed to be raised in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Appeal dismissed.
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1993 (4) TMI 64 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Perquisite, Perquisite To Employees, Rule Against Double Taxation ... ... ... ... ..... nue submits that it was a mistake to do so. Such a contention cannot be raised by the Revenue for the first time in reference proceedings before this court. The Revenue itself has treated the amount as dividend and assessed it to income-tax. The entire controversy in this case has arisen on that account. We are not called upon to decide whether the amount should have been assessed as deemed dividend or not. The fact remains that this amount has been treated as dividend and this has been accepted by all the authorities right from the Income-tax Officer to the Tribunal. The only question before us is whether having assessed the amount as dividend, the Revenue can refuse to take that fact into account while computing capital gain and decline to reduce the consideration received on transfer to that extent. In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer question No. 2 referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1993 (4) TMI 63 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... tion where despite a specific challenge to the summoning order before the Magistrate there is an inordinate delay in the disposal of the plea or the prosecution of an accused has fruitlessly lingered for a long time which may compel the conscience of this court to intervene in the interest of justice under section 482. It is not possible to enumerate the various situations where resort may have to be had to section 482. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and section 397(2) of the Code, it can be said with reasonable certainty that section 482 will not be applicable on account of a summoning order simpliciter without even putting in appearance before the Magistrate and making a prayer for recalling the same for seeking his decision. In view of the above conclusion, I think it is not necessary to go into the other submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
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