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Showing 181 to 200 of 228 Records
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1983 (12) TMI 48 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reference, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... en assuming that the WTO can determine the market value by applying r. ID of the Rules, still the reasonableness of that estimate can be gone into by the Tribunal. In these cases, the Tribunal after taking into account the value of the shares as determined by the WTO by applying r. ID of the Rules, found that there is a variation in the value as quoted on the stock exchange. The Tribunal also took note of the fact that even though the shares were not quoted on the stock exchange prior to March, 1977, there have been transactions in shares as registered in the books of the company and the value indicated in these transfers is considerably less than the market value arrived at by the WTO and, therefore, the value quoted by the assessee can be taken as fairly representing the market value of the shares. In view of the said finding rendered by the Tribunal we do not think that any reference is justified in these cases. The tax case petitions are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 47 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Deduction, Interest On Borrowed Capital ... ... ... ... ..... disallowed the deductions claimed in respect of such sums of money as were remitted as capital to the Ipoh branch. When that was challenged on a reference to this court, this court held that the deductions to be made are normally those as represent sums of money which it is necessary to pay out in order to earn the very profit which are under review to be taxed such as any rent paid for the premises in which such business is carried on and repairs thereto. The learned judges construed the expression capital borrowed for the purposes of the business as meaning capital borrowed and used for tile purpose of the business the income of which is sought to be taxed. The above decision has been referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in CIT v. Indian Bank Ltd. 1965 56 ITR 77. As a result of the above discussion, we also answer the first question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1983 (12) TMI 46 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Delay In Filing Petition, Special Deduction, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... ly in respect of the service agreement and that error should not deprive the petitioner of a valuable right. In my judgment, the submission of the learned counsel is correct and deserves to be upheld. The respondent No. 1 should consider the application of the petitioner of August 3, 1973, as it was an application for approval for both the service agreement and the know-how agreement. As the approval is already granted in respect of the service agreement, respondent No. 1 should consider the application of the petitioner in respect of the know-how agreement on merits and pass an appropriate order. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute and respondent No. 1 is directed to consider the application dated August 3, 1973, filed by the petitioner as an application for approval of the know-how agreement also and then dispose of the said application on merits. As an indulgence is shown to the petitioner, the petitioner shall pay the costs of the respondents.
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1983 (12) TMI 45 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Supreme Court, Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... ar from the judgment in the case of CIT v. Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd. 1981 132 ITR 831 (Cal) that the correctness of the judgment delivered in the assessee s own case on November 7, 1978, was doubted in any way. Mr.Bajoria appearing for the assessee has prayed for a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court. The question whether an amount set apart in excess of what is actually required for depreciation will automatically amount to a reserve or will continue to remain a part of mass of undistributed profits of the company is an important question of law. There is no judgment of the Supreme Court on this point. In view of the aforesaid, we grant Mr. Bajoria s prayer for a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court. Let a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court be issued under s. 261 of the I. T. Act read with s. 18 of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. There will be no order as to costs. SATISH CHANDRA C.J.-I agree.
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1983 (12) TMI 44 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... ir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur. The question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the trustees-assessees. R.C. No. 87 of 1978.-The trust created by the deceased on March 21, 1953, known as Sahebzadi Oolia Kulsum Trust is void ab initio and it is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the trustees-assessees. R.C. No. 88 of 1978.-As the trust created on March 21, 1953, is void, the value of the corpus of the Sahebzadi Oolia Kulsum Trust is liable to be included in the principal value of the estate of late Sir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur. The question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the trustees-assessees. There will be no order as to costs. Sri Ratnakar, counsel for the assessees, prays for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not certify that this is a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. Hence, certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court is refused.
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1983 (12) TMI 43 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... trading activities. Whether the land was held as stock-in-trade or not is essentially question of fact. The Tribunal has considered the entire evidence that was placed before it. The finding of the Tribunal is not vitiated by any error of law. The assessee has not raised any specific question challenging the finding of the Tribunal as erroneous or perverse. We do not find any infirmity of law in the order of the Tribunal. In fact, there is hardly any question of law involved in this matter. The Tribunal after considering all the facts that were placed before it came to the conclusion that the land that was sold was held by the assessee as its stock-in-trade and so the surplus arising out of the sale of the land was the assessee s business income. In our view, the Tribunal has not committed any error of law and the question that has been referred is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. Each party will pay and bear its own costs. SATISH CHANDRA C. J.-I agree.
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1983 (12) TMI 42 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... ion as to whether Sivagami Textiles is an independent concern or it is a benami concern of the assessee. On that question, the Tribunal felt that the AAC has not given any specific finding as to whether the amounts invested by Navaneethammal in that concern as a partner came from the joint family or from her own funds and for purposes of ascertaining that fact, the matter has been remitted to the AAC as, according to the Tribunal, that question is material to find out whether Navaneethammal is a partner benami for the joint family or whether she is a partner in her individual capacity. On the materials on record, the Tribunal is right in directing remand on the question as to whether Navaneethammal has invested her own funds or she is a partner by virtue of a HUF investing the funds. We do not see any error in the order of the Tribunal. Therefore, both questions are answered against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fee Rs. 500, one set.
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1983 (12) TMI 41 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Income, Works Contract ... ... ... ... ..... o be determined on the basis of the value of the contracts represented by the cash payments received by the assessee-firms from the M.E.S. department exclusive of the cost of the material/stores received for being used, fixed or incorporated in the works undertaken by them. Thus, following the aforesaid principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, we hold that the value of the materials supplied by the Government department to the contractor for being used for the execution of the works is to be excluded while determining the turnover of the contractor assessee. After the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Brij Bhushan Lal s case 1978 115 ITR 524, the legal position in respect of the question referred to us has been set at rest. Consequently, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference.
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1983 (12) TMI 40 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Settlement ... ... ... ... ..... available for the purpose of considering the distributable surplus and the provisions of s. 23A would not be attracted. This case, in our opinion, is applicable on all fours. Here also the finding of the Tribunal is that the addition was made merely because the assessee failed to prove the genuineness of the loan transactions. They could not, hence, be considered to be profit available for computing the distributable surplus under the provisions of s. 104 of the I.T. Act, 1961. The question whether s. 104 of the I.T. Act, 1961, is a penal provision of the same nature and character and will attract the same principles of interpretation as s. 271(1)(c) does not arise for a decision in this case. We reserve our opinion on this question. In this view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since no one has represented the assessee, we are making no order as to costs. SUHAS CHANDRA SEN J.-I agree.
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1983 (12) TMI 39 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, Settlement ... ... ... ... ..... the trustees to defray the expenses to be incurred by him in regard to the purposes laid down therein not only out of the income but also out of the corpus, in its entirety, without any limitation whatsoever in which event the said property shall be deemed to pass on the settlor s death. (iii) life interest in property cannot be reckoned as synonymous with interest in property for life . (iv) Though the settlor in this case has not exercised the right so reserved, yet it cannot by implication be held that the reservation must be deemed to have been surrendered two years before his death. In order to attract the benefit of the first proviso to s. 12(1) of the Act, on surrender of the interest or right postulated therein, the property must have been subsequently enjoyed to the entire exclusion of the settlor for at least two years before his death. This act must be positive, certain and unequivocal. The question referred is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee.
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1983 (12) TMI 38 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Omission To Disclose Fully And Truly, Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... gard to the value of the agricultural land, there was no failure on her part which would entitle the WTO take recourse to s. 17(1)(a) of the Act for reopening the assessments. Learned counsel for the Department was unable to point out as to why the ratio of the aforesaid decision would not be attracted in this case. In view of the aforesaid decision, it must be held that the petitioner having placed all the primary facts before the WTO with regard to the value of the agricultural land, recourse to s. 17(1)(a) of the Act by the WTO for reopening the assessments in question was not justified. The petition is, therefore, allowed and notices issued by respondent No. 1 the WTO, under s. 17 of the Act for reopening the assessment for the assessment years 1972-73 and 1973-74 (annexures F and F-1) are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this petition. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any to be refunded to the petitioner.
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1983 (12) TMI 37 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains, Exemptions, Jewellery Intended For Personal Use, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... he sale proceeds of the jewellery, which is the corpus, on behalf of or for the benefit of the beneficiaries and, hence, the trustees are liable to be assessed under s. 164 but not under s. 161 of the Act. Having regard to the above discussion, our answer to the third question is that the capital gains realised on the sale of the jewellery is exigible to tax and that assessment should be made under s. 164 of the Act. In the result, our answers to questions Nos. 1 and 2 are in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessees and against the Revenue. Our answers to question No. 3 in R. C. No. 92 of 1978 and the question in R. C. No. 28 of 1979 are in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees. There shall be no order as to costs. Sri Ratnakar, learned counsel for the assessee, seeks for the grant of certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court. We cannot certify that this is fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. Hence, the certificate is refused.
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1983 (12) TMI 36 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Service By Registered Post ... ... ... ... ..... nts in souvenirs may be allowed, if the conditions under rule 6B of the I.T. Rules, 1962, are fulfilled and there is evidence that the expenditure had been incurred. In this case, the authorities below were satisfied that the expenditure had been incurred by the assessee and that the conditions under rule 6B of the I.T. Rules, 1962, were also satisfied. This circular, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Varghese v. ITO 1981 131 ITR 597 at 612, would be binding on the Revenue in administering or executing the provisions in the Act. Thus, on a consideration of the different facets of the question, we are of the view that the Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the expenditure of Rs. 50,000 incurred by the assessee towards advertisement charges in souvenirs would be an allowable item of expenditure. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The assessee will be entitled to the costs of this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1983 (12) TMI 35 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Service By Registered Post ... ... ... ... ..... oose to prefer any appeal to the higher authorities against the said demands and rather after dilly dallying the matter for some time filed this petition in February 15, 1980. It cannot possibly be disputed in the light of the provisions of s. 249 of the Act that he could reasonably plead, had he been truthful, for the condonation of delay in the filing of these appeals or could very well treat the date of intimation or acquisition of knowledge of the demands against him as the starting point of limitation against him. He did not choose any such course apparently for the reason that he was not in a mood to pay the tax due from him. In the light of the discussion above, I am satisfied that the petitioner was duly served with the notices of demand as referred to above and the respondent authorities are perfectly justified in resorting to the course they have chosen for effecting recovery of tax due from him. I thus dismiss this petition with costs which I determine at Rs. 500.
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1983 (12) TMI 34 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... party of the Income-tax Department on point of law cannot be regarded as information within the meaning of s. 147(b) of the Act for the purpose of reopening the assessment. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the ITO was clearly in error in initiating the proceedings for reopening the assessment. The submission of Shri Dastur that the mere fact that the ITO was not aware of the circular of the Board is not sufficient to reopen the assessment is also correct. The approval from the Government of India was received subsequent to October 1 of the relevant assessment year, but that was not due to any fault of the petitioners. In my judgment, the initiation of proceedings by respondent No. 1 by issue of notice tinder s. 148 is entirely without jurisdiction and the action of respondent No. 1 deserves to be quashed. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 33 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Failure To Disclose Fully And Truly, New Industrial Undertaking, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... for the relevant assessment years, and a perusal of the same discloses that the ITO had decided to exercise powers under s. 148 of the Act after going through the records and finding that relief under s. 80J has been wrongly allowed on the basis of inaccurate particulars furnished by the assessee. The perusal of the order indicates that the relevant particulars were furnished by the assessee and the ITO decided to issue notice under s. 148 of the Act merely because of a change of opinion. It is now well settled that mere change of opinion does not entitle the ITO to exercise powers under s. 148 of the Act. The initiation of proceedings by respondent No. 1, therefore, was clearly without jurisdiction and are required to be quashed. Shri Joshi promised to put the copies of the relevant order-sheets on record during the course of the day. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. There will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 32 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... erred to in the Fifth Schedule in the repair or construction of a shipyard will not enable the assessee to claim higher development rebate. If the assessee s contention that the user of any of the articles referred to in the Fifth Schedule in the assessee s business should be taken to enable it to claim relief under s. 33(1)(B)(i)(b) is accepted, it will be clearly a misreading of the section. As stated already, the section contemplates higher development rebate only if the plant and machinery has been used for the manufacture or production of any one of the articles contained in the Fifth Schedule. It does not contemplate mere use of any of the articles in the Fifth Schedule in connection with the assessee s business. In this view of the matter, the decision of the Tribunal is consistent with the scope of s. 33(1)(B)(i)(b) of the I.T. Act. We, therefore, do not see any justification for directing a reference. The petition is dismissed and there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 31 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Contribution Towards Capital, Firm, Partners ... ... ... ... ..... e property in question right from November 8, 1960. Consequent to that finding of ours, no penalty was exigible in the case of Arjun Singh for non-inclusion of the income from that property. The question referred to us has accordingly to be answered in the affirmative. We may also state here that even if it be held that the property in question did not stand transferred to the firm, in that case also having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed above, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that Arjun Singh could be under a bona fide belief that he was no longer the owner of the property and as such was not liable to include the income from the property in his return for the assessment year 1964-65. In conclusion, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee, Arjun Singh, and against the Department. In view of the facts and circumstances of the cases, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Provisional Assessment ... ... ... ... ..... ference to such return, accounts and documents, and for the purposes of the adjustments referred to in clause (iv) of sub-section (2), also with reference to the records of the assessments, if any, of past years. A plain reading of this sub-section makes it clear that the ITO has a power to make adjustment to the income declared in the return by disallowing any deduction which, on the basis of the information available in such return, accounts and documents, is prima facie not admissible. The sub-section also makes it clear that the ITO has power only to grant refund to the assessee and has no power to determine and demand tax. The order passed by respondent No. 1 is clearly without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. As the impugned order suffers from a serious infirmity, it is required to be quashed. Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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1983 (12) TMI 29 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Compulsory Acquisition ... ... ... ... ..... ined by the Electricity Board could have arisen in that case as the transaction of transfer of the undertaking is pursuant to the statutory option of purchase. It does not amount to compulsory acquisition. It is only a sale for consideration to be ultimately determined by arbitration. The determination of the purchase price is provided in section 7A of the Electricity Act. Those provisions are at variance with the provisions of the Acquisition Act. The other case relied upon is Shah Vrajlal Madhavji v. CIT 1947 95 ITR 614 (Ker). The Kerala High Court has taken the contra view. With great respect to the learned judges who rendered that opinion, we record a note of dissent. In the result, we answer the first question in the affirmative that is against the assessee and in favour of the Department. The second question is answered in the negative that is in favour of the assessee and against the Department. In view of partial success, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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