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Case Laws
Showing 181 to 200 of 217 Records
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1980 (2) TMI 37 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... ed on by the assessee is duly satisfied and it is on that basis that we have to proceed to determine the rate of rebate that is admissible in this case. Once it is found that such machinery or plant was installed before the 1st day of April, 1970, for the purposes of the manufacture or production of any one of the articles or things specified in the list in the Fifth Schedule, cl. (i)(a) of s. 33(1)(b)(B) gets attracted and the rate of rebate applicable is 35 . We have, therefore, no hesitation to uphold as correct the conclusion recorded by the Tribunal that the assessee is entitled to the grant of development rebate at the rate of 35 . In the light of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the department. The parties will bear their respective costs. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Tribunal as required by law.
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1980 (2) TMI 36 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Profits ... ... ... ... ..... ds the object of not truly stating the consideration for the transfer as agreed to between the parties so far as the instrument of transfer was concerned. If our conclusion regarding the object remains, the conditions precedent cannot be said to be satisfied. We, therefore, allow these two special civil applications and quash and set aside the notices dated 17th September, 1973, issued to the respective petitioner, the transferor company and the transferee company, in each of these two special civil applications. Accordingly, the notices are held to be illegal, void and inoperative. We further issue a direction to the respondents to forbear and desist from taking any action pursuant to the notice dated September 17, 1973, issued to the respective petitioner in these two special civil applications. Rule is made absolute in each matter accordingly. The respondents in each of these two special civil applications will pay the costs of the petitioner concerned in these two cases.
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1980 (2) TMI 35 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... view of our answer to question No. 1 we do not deem it proper to answer question No. 2, as in our view the Tribunal, which was seized of the appeal filed by the assessee, looked at the material on the record keeping in view the provisions of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 145 of the Act and since we find that the examination of the material from this viewpoint was not warranted, therefore, in the interests of justice, we consider it proper to refer the case back to the Tribunal with the direction that the Tribunal shall decide the appeal filed by the assessee in accordance with law. It is made clear that the Tribunal shall be seized of the appeal of the assessee as originally filed and it is up to the Tribunal to reach at particular conclusion so as to decide the case in accordance with law. Nothing mentioned in this judgment will detract the Tribunal from deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law. We order accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 34 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Extinguishment Of Right ... ... ... ... ..... ccrual of title so far as the landlord is concerned, the surrender having only the effect of merging the lesser estate of the tenant into the greater estate of the landlord. This position is now well established-See Makhan Lal Laha v. Nagendra Nath Adhicary, AIR 1933 Cal 467, Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai Manubhai, AIR 1954 SC 61, Mubarak Hussain v. Custodian-General of Evacuee Property, AIR 1957 Punj 197 and Palanivelu v. Ouseph Mathai, AIR 1973 Mad 309. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any transfer by Veeranna Thevar of his interest in the land in favour of the writ petitioner so as to attract the applicability of the provision contained in S. 23 of the Act. The petitioner cannot, therefore, be proceeded against under the said section for the recovery of the arrears of agricultural income-tax due by Veeranna Thevar. The judgment of the learned single judge is accordingly confirmed and this writ appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 33 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... original right of the assessee to the property acquired, that amount cannot be determined as the net wealth of the assessee for the first three assessment years, i.e., 1960-61, 1961-62 and 1962-63 the assessment made by the Tribunal at 50 of the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector, i.e., Rs. 2,74,454, in the circumstances of the case, is the proper valuation of the net wealth of the assessee for those years and for the subsequent years, 50 of the entire amount of compensation, i.e., Rs. 4,09,300, is the proper valuation. Accordingly, we answer questions Nos. 1 to 3 in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. On the last question, we hold that the entire amount of compensation ultimately awarded together with interest accrued thereon and due could not be included in full in the net wealth of the assessee on the relevant valuation dates. We answer this question, accordingly, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1980 (2) TMI 32 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Limitation, Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... 254 (Ker) and CIT v. M. Nagappa 1978 114 ITR 707 (Kar). In all these cases, it was held that s. 275 of the Act which provides the time limit within which proceedings for imposition of penalty had to be completed, was amended by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, with effect from April 1, 1971, and after its amendment the penalty proceedings could be completed within two years of the completion of the financial year in which the penalty proceedings were initiated because the section embodies a rule of limitation which is procedural in character and, therefore, would govern the penalty proceedings at the time of the imposition. Respectfully agreeing with these decisions, we hold that the limitation for the imposition of penalty would be governed by the amended clause, as it stood on the date when the penalty was imposed. Consequently, the second question is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. No costs. B. S. DHILLON J.-I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 31 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Penal Interest, Return ... ... ... ... ..... er and decide any matter arising out of the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed In our opinion, the words any matter arising out of the proceedings are not wide enough to include a matter which could have been raised before or considered by the ITO but was not raised before him or considered by him. These words, in our opinion, mean any matter which was processed by the ITO or was raised before him for being processed. The proceedings before the ITO are limited to the matters expressly or impliedly raised by the assessee and the ITO and the processing done by him of these matters. The Explanation does not authorise consideration of any matter by the AAC which was not raised or processed before the ITO and the Explanation, therefore, on its true construction, does not help the department. For the reasons given above, we answer all the questions in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the department. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 30 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Jewellery, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... year prior to that date. We do not accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the Commissioner that the Explanation was added as a matter of abundant caution. In our opinion, it was clearly added to give a wider meaning to the word jewellery with effect from I St April, 1972, and this wider meaning cannot be given for any prior assessment year. The very fact that the words but not including jewellery were retrospectively added with effect from 1St April, 1963, and the Explanation was added only with effect from I St April, 1972, by the same Finance Act gives out the clear intention of Parliament that the wider meaning given in the Explanation is not to be applied for any assessment year be ore 1st April, 1972. For the reasons given above, our answer to the question is that the Appellate Tribunal was right in allowing exemption in respect of the gold and silver ornaments under s. 5(1)(viii) of the W.T. Act, 1957. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1980 (2) TMI 29 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... assign, mortgage, charge or grant sub-licence without the permission of N.R.D.C. even during the period of agreement. It is further provided that the grant is on a non-exclusive basis. The payment of royalty under cl. 3 of the agreement is only for a period of 14 years. The grantee has to pay 2 on the net ex-factory sales of lightning arresters and other products arising from the exploitation of the patent. Thus, as pointed out by the Tribunal, the payment of royalty is linked up with the sales. Having regard to all these circumstances and applying the principles laid down by the decision of the Full Bench of this court in Praga Tools Ltd. v. CIT 1980 123 ITR 773 and the Supreme Court in Ciba s case 1968 69 ITR 692, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the expenditure incurred by way of payment of royalty is of a revenue nature. We, accordingly, answer the question referred to us in favour of the assessee. Advocate s fee Rs. 250.
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1980 (2) TMI 28 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... e Madras, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh High Courts. See Addl. CIT v. Kuppuswamy 1978 112 ITR 1012 (Mad), Addl. CIT v. M. Ranga Pai 1975 100 ITR 413 (Kar) and Addl. CIT v. S. R. Y. Ankineedu Prasad 1978 115 ITR 78 (AP) . We are aware that a contrary view has been taken by the Kerala High Court in ITO v. K. P. Varghese 1973 91 ITR 49 (Ker) FB . But with great respect we are unable to accept the view taken by the majority judgment in the Kerala case. We may point out that the Direct Tax Laws Committee has made recommendations which are in line with our view See Sundaram s Law of Income Tax in India, 11th Edn., Vol. 2, pp. 1640, 1641 . For the reasons given above, we answer the questions referred as follows (1) The Tribunal was right in holding that neither s. 52(1) nor s. 52(2) was applicable. (2) The Tribunal was right in its conclusion that the assessee was not liable to pay tax on the capital gains amounting to Rs. 56,462. There will be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1980 (2) TMI 27 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction To Reassess, Reassessment, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... reopening Ex. R-1 contains the valuation of the property as on April 1, 1974, which is not for the relevant year and the revenue having failed to show how for the years commencing from 1969-70 to 1973-74, the valuation was arrived at in Ex. R-1 in each case, the reopening notices are liable to be quashed. The result is that all the 11 writ petitions are accepted and the notices dated May 4, 1970, under s. 17 of the W.T. Act to Smt. Anandkumari who has been succeeded by Brig. B. Lall for the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74 for reopening the completed assessment of wealth-tax are quashed. Similarly, notices dated 7th March, 1978, under s. 17 of the W.T. Act, issued to Nawal Kanwar for the assessment years 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, 1973-74 and 1974-75 for reopening the completed assessment of the wealth-tax are quashed. The respondents are restrained from reopening the above completed assessments. The parties would bear their own costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 26 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Mutual Association ... ... ... ... ..... (KB). So long as the occupation of the room is referable to the amenity provided for the members for themselves, no income can be said to be earned, so as to be brought to tax by the provisions of the I.T. Act. We have taken the same view in a sales tax case in State of Tamil Nadu v. Indian Officers Association 1979 44 STC 264 (Mad). In that case, apart from the persons belonging to the families of the members occupying some rooms provided by the association, there was also provision of food for them. In other words, the amenities were in the shape of what could be found in a hostel. It was held that there was no sale to the inmates, as the organisation of a mess by the students themselves and dividing the expenditure among themselves was purely in the nature of mutual service and amenity. The same principle would apply here. In this view, we answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The assessee would be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 500.
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1980 (2) TMI 25 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Place Of Accrual Of Income, Procedure For Reference ... ... ... ... ..... questions referred to this court years back in 1978 will remain unanswered. We appreciate the contention of learned Advocate-General and we sympathise with his predicament but as the latest decision of the Supreme Court has finally settled this question, we have no alternative but to decline to answer the referred questions Nos. 2 and 3. The learned Advocate-General submitted that the assessee may be permitted to have recourse to any other remedy permissible at law. We cannot make any more observations about it save and except stating that it is open to the assessee to have recourse to any other remedy that may be permissible at law and we are sure that in such an eventuality the concerned authority will deal with the case of the assessee with due sympathy and in accordance with law in the interests of justice with a view to advance the cause of justice and not to place reliance on any undue technicalities. This reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 24 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed the property in partition he was minor and that he continued to be a minor in the assessment year also and further that he had no family of his own. In the circumstances, it is difficult to appreciate the contention of the assessee that the property received by him on partition retained the character of the joint family property in his hands also, even though he did not constitute a joint Hindu family. The character of the property is determined according to the status of the person who holds the same. We are of the opinion that, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was fully justified in holding that the status of the assessee during the assessment year was that of an individual and not of an HUF as contended by the assessee. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, our answer to the question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this reference.
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1980 (2) TMI 23 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Benevolent Circular, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... Act, namely, that the order passed by the WTO was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the revenue is satisfied. While exercising jurisdiction under s. 25(2) it was not open to the respondent to disregard the binding nature of the circular of October 31, 1967, and to proceed to exercise jurisdiction under s. 25(2) on the footing that the shares should be valued on a principle altogether different from and contrary to the principle set out in the circular of October 31, 1967. Under these circumstances, the notice, Ex. C to the petition, being the notice dated January 5, 1980, must be quashed and set aside. We, therefore, allow this Special Civil Application and quash and set aside the notice dated January 5, 1980, and direct that a writ of mandamus should issue restraining the respondent from acting in pursuance of the notice dated January 5, 1980. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The respondent will pay the costs of this Special Civil Application to the petitioner.
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1980 (2) TMI 22 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Annual Value, Business Expenditure, House Property ... ... ... ... ..... o consider whether the advantage which accrued to the assessee by the transaction of June 11, 1958, was of such an enduring and permanent nature as to mean that the expenditure incurred on it was capital expenditure, as held by Khanna J. or whether the advantage was secured directly for the conduct of the business of the assessee and was, therefore, obtained by expenditure of a revenue nature as held by Ranganathan J. For the above reason, the question referred to the court by the Tribunal is answered as below On the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was not right in holding that a sum of Rs. 10,901 paid by the assessee-company to Moti Ram was an expenditure of revenue nature and hence allowable in the computation of the total income of the assessee-company. For, the expenditure was in no way connected with the business carried on by the assessee and did not, therefore, fall within the purview of s. 10(2)(xv) of the old Act or s. 37(1) of the new Act at all.
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1980 (2) TMI 21 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... rejected the application filed by the assessee under s. 256(1) of the Act. We do not agree with the Tribunal that the question has become purely academic, but at the same time we discharge the rule by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Lakhiram Ramdas 1962 44 ITR 726, for the assessee has not challenged, by raising an appropriate question, the basic finding of the Tribunal that the assessee has not disclosed fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for the accounting year in question. It may now be noted here that reliance was placed before us on the cases of ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das 1976 103 ITR 437 (SC) and ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. 1979 118 ITR I (SC), on behalf of the assessee. The aforesaid cases were, however, decided on different facts and in our opinion they have no application to the facts and the circumstances of the instant case before us. There will be no order as to costs. R. N. PYNE J.-I agree.
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1980 (2) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... it is with a view to avoid or reduce the tax on capital gains a lesser consideration of Rs. 2,60,000 has been shown. It is well established by several decisions of this court that what is intended to be taxed by s. 12B of the Act is the actual capital gain and not a fictional gain and the avoidance of tax liability can only be on the capital gains actually received by understatement of consideration. As, in this case, no understatement of consideration had been proved or established either in respect of the bases or in respect of the route permits, the revenue was not justified in invoking s. 12B of the Act. The revenue in this case has in fact charged the fictional capital gains on the sale of buses with route permits and not on the real or actual gain. In this view-of the matter, we are inclined to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal in this case. We, therefore, answer both the questions in the affirmative and against the revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 19 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Co-operative Society, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... pective of the fact that the income from one or more parts of the activities was not liable to income tax, the entire expenditure incurred by the assessee in connection with the business, has to be allowed. In this view of the matter, the contention of Shri Awasthy, the learned counsel for the revenue, that proportionate expenditure should be allowed, is without any merit. In all fairness to Shri Awasthy, it may be mentioned that he places reliance on (1) Madras Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank Ltd v. CIT 1968 67 ITR 89 (SC) and (2) CIT v. Sabarkantha Zilla Kharid Vechan Sangh Ltd. 1977 107 ITR 447 (Guj). None of these authorities, in our view, are of any help to us in deciding the question which is before us. For the reasons recorded above, question No. 2 in I.T.Rs. Nos. 92 and 93 of 1978, referred to us at the instance of the revenue, is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. However, there will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (2) TMI 18 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... cannot be utilised to sustain the impugned notice. These are the only two grounds for the respondent to reopen the assessment proceedings and as neither of them falls within the purview of information as contemplated by s. 147(b), the condition precedent to the exercise of the jurisdiction by the ITO to reopen the proceedings is absent in the present case and where the condition precedent is absent it must be held that the ITO had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, it must be held that the impugned notice at annex. D is ultra vires and de hors the provisions of s. 147(b) and is a nullity and consequently this petition will succeed. The petitioner will be entitled to a writ of mandamus quashing and setting aside the impugned notice. The respondent is permanently restrained from proceeding further with the said notice which is declared to be null and void. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. Interim relief vacated.
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